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CONCEIVING SYSTEMS 
by 
Professor Derek K HITCHINS 
ABSTRACT 
The thesis is concerned with the development of innovative, robust design 
concepts for a class of systems called Information Decision Action (IDA) 
Systems. IDA systems are typified by Command and Control (C2) and 
Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) systems as used 
by police, emergency services and the military - the two titles refer 
respectively to the human activity and the technological systems. The class of 
systems is much wider, however, and includes, financial, traffic control, 
business and even governmental systems where infonnation is gathered, used 
as a basis for human decision-forming, and results in action, all in real, or 
near-real time. IDA system complexity stems largely from the dominance of 
robust human activity systems within the overall system, and also from the 
employment of often-rigid, technology-based, decision support systems 
which are unable to adapt as swiftly as the humans they serve. 
The thesis is in two parts. In the first part, the author presents a perspective 
on "hard" and "soft" systems and the gradual move by so-called "hard" 
systems engineers towards softer concepts in the search for more satisfactory 
IDA systems. This progression is presented partly by anecdote, supported by 
some of the author's papers showing the development of his contribution to 
understanding of, and partly by an exposition of the essential themes inherent 
in, IDA systems. Keynote papers in the first part are: MOSAIC: Conceptsfor 
the Deployment of Air Power in Europe and The Human Element in C3 I: 
The first of these presents a highly-survivable alternative to the present force 
and C2 deployment approaches which have evolved little since World War IT; 
the second considers the human and his social behaviour as keys to 
understanding IDA systems. Other papers develop the themes and show their 
application to systems in which the author has had major involvement 
The second part is concerned with the process of conceiving and creating 
IDA systems and it too draws on published papers as direct support for the 
thesis. Keynote papers here are A General Theory of Command and Control, 
a unique recent paper which proposes a set of design axioms for an idealized 
IDA system, the award-winning Managing Systems Creation which presents 
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an engineering framework for Creating Systems, and SEAMS (Systems 
Engineering, Analysis and Management Support) which signals a major 
design initiative to develop engineering frameworks into company-wide IT 
environments. The second part also introduces a complete Conceiving 
System, called the Seven-Step Continuum (SSC), describes some prototype 
tools developed by the author to perform some of the tasks of design . 
conception and - in Chapter 9, which is a paper within the thesis - shows 
results from using the SSC, its methods and tools, in practice. The second 
part closes with a look forward to the building of flexible future systems 
ｷｾｩ｣ｨ＠ ｣｡ｾ＠ adapt to their environment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Coming to Terms with the Human Dimension 
Early Training 
Like all young engineers of my era, and like almost all engineers today, I was 
trained largely in the science of design. Unlike many of today's young 
engineers, however, I was trained in ｾ＠ school which believed that future 
careers for young engineers would change often and radically; in 
consequence, the training was both broad and deep. Training covered 
mechanical, electrical, electronic and aeronautical engineering, with digital 
and analogue computing, materials science, thermodynamics, hydraulics, 
pneumatics and many others thrown in. Not forgotten were the humanities of 
life, English, literature, leadership, history, some economics and even a little 
politics and international affairs. Consistently, I was taught that an answer 
existed to any design issue and that it was undoubtedly a quantitative answer. 
The training was expensive, prolonged and instilled great confidence in the 
recipients; as time was to tell, much of the training was to prove 
inappropriate to any of the jobs which followed. In my case, I was in an 
organization dedicated to operations where design was not exercised, merely 
observed and frequently despaired over. 
Ambitious Design Concepts 
My first job of significance was concerned with a major undertaking -
Linesman / Mediator. The system concept was concerned with correlating air 
defence of the UK with civil air traffic control. A number of military radars 
was to be installed around the coast of the UK to detect intruding aircraft and 
to help control our interceptor aircraft on to their potential targets. Civil air 
traffic control radar pictures were also to become involved. To harmonize 
civil and military air traffic, and to provide central control of air operations, 
all the radar data were to be transferred :by radio links to a central point near 
London, where civil and military activities could combine. Linesman was the 
military part; Mediator was the civil part. 
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The design concept was years ahead of the technology. The architectural 
concept was vulnerable to attack, since it presented a spectacular node, the 
disabling of which would bring chaos to both civil and military air activities. 
The expense was unacceptable, too. Not all was bad, however. The military 
radars from that era are still working today. Out of the project's ashes is 
emerging IUKADGE, the Improved UK Air Defence Ground Environment, 
some 25 years later. And, on a personal note, I learned more le"ssons from 
observing failure than from success. One lesson was concerned with 
architecture, another with optimization. 
Optimizing through Compromise 
My particular role in Linesman Mediator was concerned with the Lightning 
interceptor. The Lightning was developed from a very high speed prototype; 
the operational aircraft had to be fitted with radar and missiles which, while 
making it into a useful fighting machine, would also impair its speed. The 
optimization process was designed to minimize the incursion by enemy 
aircraft into UK airspace. The system therefore comprised the ground radars 
for long range warning, the ground fighter controllers who directed the 
interception to the general area of the incoming target, the Lighting pilot 
with his aircraft, its radar and its missiles - and of course the hostile. 
The principal area of design compromise concerned the aircraft radar and 
missiles. If the radar were to detect the target and home-in, then it needed 
long range. But longer range meant a wider radar dish, which widened the 
aircraft fuselage, which increased the drag, which slowed the aircraft, used 
more fuel and reduced the radius of action. Similarly, longer range in the· 
radar would be of value only if the missile could use the extra target detection 
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range, which meant larger missile motors, which also increased drag and 
weight. Increasing the range of the ground surveillance radars was difficult, 
as they were at the edge of the then-technology.: 
Time to Engagement 
Engagement 
Range 
Optimum Radar Dish Diameter 
ｅ｡ｲｬｹｗ｡ｲｮｩｮｧｾ＠
--- Range ｾ＠
;/ 
\ ｾｲｎｔ＠
ALERT __ R.YOUT ____ ｾ＠ ... / 
TIME 
Compromise was reached by single-minded dedication to one measure of 
effectiveness - shortest enemy penetration distance. Penetration distance 
could be minimized by a variety of approaches: 
Reducing the sum of the following times: 
* Time taken by ground (or airborne patrol) surveillance to 
alert the fighters , 
* Time for the chosen fighter to ｴｲ｡ｮｾｩｴ＠ to the target area 
* Time to engage the enemy 
These times could, in tum, be reduced not only by technical 
optimization, but also by locating the surveillance radars and the 
fighter bases well forward in the direction of expected incursion. 
With the need to see even beyond ground surveillance radar horizon, 
the potential for an Airborne Early Warning aircraft became 
apparent. 
The results were impressive, as those associated with UK Air Defence can 
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testify. From that point, I was dedicated to the systems approach, whatever 
that was - it gave real results to real problems. 
Territorial Imperatives 
Later I became the Tri-Service Consultant on Automatic Test Equipment 
(ATE) to all three services, Army, RN and RAF. This MOD post gave 
considerable insight into management issues between the various companies 
competing for defence contracts. It was the fashion at the time to replace a 
plethora of test facilities serving the hundred or more black boxes ｾｯ＠ be 
found on any modem aircraft with one ATE. In principle, ATE is as hard a 
systems problem as one might expect to meet. As more black boxes are taken 
off the list of manually tested boxes and brought into the queue for the one 
ATE, the latter's queue becomes progressively longer, following an 
exponential growth pattern predictable by simple queuing theory. By 
producing a cost model it is simple enough to show that, beyond a certain 
level of automation, the cost of filling the ATE queue with expensive black 
boxes exceeds the savings to be achieved by the introduction of the ｾ＠ TE. 
Unexpectedly, this tidy concept presented a number of problems we might 
call "soft", in that they were not concerned with the engineering and costs at 
all; difficult though the engineering was for these Wurlitzers of the avionics 
world, the management problems proved even more intractable. 
The contractor for the single ATE invariably was also a manufacturer of 
some of the boxes it was intended to test, and in this arena he was in 
competition with other box manufacturers. They were required to give the 
ATE contractor details of their boxes so that he could write test programs, 
but he was a competitor. Result? Stalemate. The box manufacturers did not 
actually refuse to give the necessary test data, they just did not hand it over. 
This outcome was, of course, predictable; the procurement agents had not 
considered the idea of competition,·As it was, an apparently considerable 
economy from the use of ATE was effectively denied.The lesson to be 
learned was concerned with territorial imperatives, boundary marking and 
the host of simian behavioural characteristics we humans display in our 
everyday lives 
Image versus Human Needs 
As a last example of appreciating the human condition, consider the plight of 
the aircrew of a Tornado fighter aircraft as they cruise at altitude over a 
featureless North Sea for seven hours at a stretch, day in, day out with rarely 
another aircraft in sight. 111eir radar produces a synthetic image - there is no 
screen "noise", so with no target the screen is plain black. As the Tornado 
Avionics System Design Manager, this time in industry, I co-operated with 
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the Institute of Aviation Medicine in devising a scheme for the pilot and the 
navigator, who sit in tandem, to be able to play GO or draughts between their 
respective screens. This had a number of advantages: it kept their eyes on the 
radar screens; it improved manual dexterity with the somewhat cumbersome 
hand controllers; and it stopped them from becoming too bored and losing 
concentration. The MOD turned down the no-cost proposal because "none of 
our aircrew officers is prone to loss of concentration". A triumph of image 
over necessity? Yes, but the real lesson was concerned with tribal loyalties, 
taboos and boundaries. 
.. 
1.2. DAMASCUS ....• 
Feeling through Fog 
These experiences have been recounted to show developing awareness that all 
is not well with the progress of hard systems engineering in which Ii along 
with many others, have been immersed for many years. The number of 
major system fiascoes is almost countless; it is rather hard, in fact, to find a 
successful major systems engineering project, particularly in the defence 
field. Nimrod, the Type 22 Frigate and the Sergeant York Missile are just 
three of the contemporary representatives of a long heritage. 
Like other system designers in the late 70s, I recognized the symptoms but 
found solutions less easy to come by. Until, that is, the U.S. company', TRW, 
sent Robert J. Lano to Europe in 1979 to give a series of two day lectures on 
C3I - Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. 
Robert J Lano 
Robert Lano is a software and systems engineer who was specializing in 
methodologies at the end of the 1970s. Regrettably, but like many employees 
of companies, he has published little in the way of papers or books - see Lano, 
(1979) and Lano, (1980). His lectures were excellent however. He showed 
how, using four.essentially simple, hand-operated techniques, it was possible 
to unravel, understand, redesign and re-integrate complex systems. ｈｾｳ＠
insight was concerned with levels of abstraction, viewpoints and, although he 
never mentioned the word, architecture. His toolset has found wide use in 
many companies throughout the western world's defence industry; many of 
the papers included in this document use the methods (as I have come to apply 
them - I have modified their application from, principally, software analysis 
to general system analysis.) 
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The Lano Toolset and the Viewpoint 
The four tools introduced by Lano were: N2 ("N-Squared") Charts, Data 
State Design, R-Nets and Structured Analysis. N2 Charts are explained in the 
enclosed papers "Managing Systems Creation" and "The Human Element in 
C3I", Data State Design is best seen at work in "Air Command and Control", . 
R-Nets and Structured Analysis are used in "Managing Systems Creation" 
Lano did not invent all of these tools. R-Nets, or Requirement Nets are part 
of a US Programme called SREM, Software Requirements Engineering 
Methodology, see Alford (1985). The R-Net technique is fmding application 
in Manufacturing Systems Design, Hughes (1986). Data State Design is said 
by Lano to have been produced by Peterson of IBM. Lano was responsible 
for bringing them together, however, and for using them together to develop 
differing viewpoints of the system in question. Structured Analysis is well 
known and documented, Ross, (1977), Ross and Schoman (1977), Gane and 
Sarson (1979). Lano seems to have been responsible for recognizing the true 
potential of the N2 chart and, of course, for bringing the tools together in a 
matched set. 
CO-ORDINATION 
Structured ｩｴＭＭＭＮｲＭｎＺＭＺＺＺＧＲＭＭＢｩＭＭＭｲｲＺｄＺＺ｡ＺＺｴ｡ｾｓｾｴＺＺ｡ｴＺＺ･ＱｲＭＭＭＭｩ＠ SREM 
Design Charts Design Design (R-Nets) 
DEFINES 
"'FUNCTIONS 
'" IDERARCHY 
"'IN1ERF ACES "'DATA FILES "'TRANSACTIONS 
"'RELATIONSHIPS '" DATARELATION "'DATA FLOWS 
DOES NOT DEFINE 
"'DATA FILES "'HIERARCHY 
"'INTERFACES "'DATA FILES 
"'DATA FLOWS "'TRANSACTIONS 
"'TRANSACTIONS "'DATA RELATIONS 
"'FUNCTIONS 
"'HIERARCHY 
"'DATA FLOWS 
"'INTERFACES 
Lano's Toolset 
"'HIERARCHY 
"'INTERFACES 
"'DATA RELATIONS 
"'RELATIONSHIPS 
The viewpoints, advantages and limitations of the four tools are shown in the 
figure and it can be seen that all four tools had to be used concurrently to 
address any problem at system level 
Lano's insight unlocked the door to understanding for many designers and 
systems engineers; he was seminal and inspirational, but seems singularly 
unrecognized in the world of systems science. 
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1.3. Aims and Objectives 
This introduction has been anecdotal in nature to show some of the 
developments which have been taking place in the systems engineering world 
and most particularly in the major defence systems engineering arena where 
systems engineering is most active due to the large, complex and general one-
off nature of the projects. Systems engineering technique has been 
developing, albeit slowly, but its method of development has to a large extent 
been bottom-up, that is driven by component and subsystem influences, 
notably those of software engineering. The objectives, then, of this 
document are as follows:-
* To review the present Systems Engineering Scene 
* To identify shortcomings in that Scene 
* To examine the contribution which softer methods might 
make to Systems Engineering 
* To develop the essentially human and anthropomorphic 
nature of human-designed IDA systelns 
* To introduce the concept of Conceiving Systems as a 
bridge between Enquiring Systems and Creating, or Design 
& Development, Systems 
* To present a Conceiving System for the conception of 
Information-Decision-Action Systems designs. 
* To explore the role of the user I operator in Conceiving 
Systems 
* To achieve these objectives, in part, by presenting work 
undertaken in the last 10 years and, in so doing, to present a 
view of the confluence of the so-called Hard and Soft 
Schools of systems thinking. 
1.4. The Structure of the Document 
Chapter 2 will review the developments in systems thinking, both in the so-
called "hard" practice of systems engineering and in the "soft" systems school 
as it relates to conceiving systems. 
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Chapter 3 will develop the underlying themes to be found in the author's 
'papers, enclosed at the end of the document, in respect of Infonnation-
pecision-Action systems 
Chapter 4, looks at the human aspects of IDA systems, and presents a view, 
unlike SSM, of the predictability of human activities when human activities 
occur in groups under the influence of territorial imperatives and "tribal" 
influences 
Chapter 5 considers systems for creating systems, metasystems, as a pre-
Cursor to understanding conceiving systems 
Chapter 6 presents the basic elements of, and arguments for, a system for 
developing design concepts - a conceiving system, also a metasystem. 
Chapter 7 presents and explains the Seven-Step Continuum, a conceiving 
system 
Chapter 8 reviews the tools and techniques needed to support the Seven-
Step Continuum 
Chapter 9, effectively a paper within the body of the thesis, applies the 
Seven-Step Continuum to a variety of problems to demonstrate its use in 
action 
Chapter 10 looks ahead to the use of conceiving systems in building future 
systems 
11 
2.· DEVELOPMENTS IN SYSTEMS THINKING 
2. t. Continuing Development in Systems Engineering 
Systems engineering lacks a defmition with which practitioners would 
generally agree. Academia proposes holism, emergent properties, 
ｭ｡ｾ｡ｧ･ｭ･ｮｴ＠ of complexity and other criteria. In industry, viewpoints are 
more pragmatic and focused, sometimes even myopic. To some, systems 
engineering is little more than progress-chasing to ensure that all engineering 
aspects of a project are considered and progressed according to plan. To 
others, many others, systems engineering is making the software and the 
hardware of a computer-based system work together. To a few, systems 
engineering encompasses all aspects of analysis, design, development, 
manufacture, maintenance and operation - but excluding project 
ｭ｡ｾ｡ｧ･ｭ･ｮｴＬ＠ which is generally felt to be separate. 
Industry's better approaches to systems engineering are perhaps epitomized 
in the conception, design and development of satellites, where the constraints 
of launcher space and payload invoke a severe optimization ethic on each of 
the many subsystems, which must be optimized not only in physical, but in 
temporal and financial dimensions, simultaneously and continually 
throughout a project. The one-shot opportunity presented to many satellite 
projects requires an intimate relationship between all participants, be they 
project managers, systems engineers, scientists, or single discipline engineers 
in order to meet the launch window. And, of course, the system design skills 
needed for deep-space probes, with their very long, unattended lifetimes in a 
hostile environment, has been tempered in the most demanding of furnaces. 
Unmanned satellites are, perhaps, the present-day pinnacle of hard systems 
engineering achievement 
ｾ＠
The advent of distributed computing has indelibly changed the engineering 
task on a much wider front than satellite engineering, however. As more 
computers have been introduced into human activities, supposedly to ease the 
burden of human effort (or to remove the human from the activity 
altogether), the interconnection of computing elements has burgeoned. ' 
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SYSTEMS TEND TO TIlE SECOND LAW OF THERMODYNAMICS 
Architecture Generation 
As more is demanded of systems and as they become more complex and 
interwoven, there is a continuing need to reduce them to understandable 
elements, or subtasks in the figure. While systems may be evolving, man is 
not changing perceptibly and the size of subtask which he can accommodate 
mentally has changed little either. Thus many more "man-sized" subtasks 
become necessary to constitute more complex systems, and infrastructure 
expands accordingly.This interweaving of modules, links and channels is 
referred to as architecture:' "Architecture" generally does not seem to 
include the humans as part of the system, however. 
The architectural complexity introduced by distributed computing and 
distributed operating systems, of which the best known is UNIX, has grown 
explosively. As little as ten years ago, architectures for computer based 
systems comprised a central processor, star-connected to sets of peripherals, 
some via modems to permit distant operation. Now the trend is towards 
distributed, replicated databases and away from server systems to sets of 
desktop processors, each of individual power greater than yesterday's central 
processor. Integrated services digital networks promise intelligent 
communications, with the network containing stored knowledge of the 
location of data, so that users may simply ask for what they want and the 
system will conduct the necessary transactions with a variety of remote 
databases, collate the results and present the answer, translated if need be. 
To accommodate this wealth of complexity, a variety of robust standards and 
protocols has emerged. Standards for communication include the 
International Standards Organization's Open Systems Interconnection (ISO 
OSI), a seven-layered protocol for interconnecting heterogeneous processors 
by telecommunications, see Bird (1987). In the manufacturing industry in the 
US, the car manufacturer General Motors has developed a widely-used, 3-
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layer protocol called MAP (Manufacturing Automation Protocol- see MAP, 
(1985) - which is much faster than the OS! protocol due to the smaller 
number of layers, and is u,sed for the "tails" or stubs which attach small, 
dedicated systems to larger, networked systems. 
At a lower level, communications protocols have been introduced for packet 
switching, circuit switching and message switching systems and the military, 
not to be outdone, have developed their own, generally to deal with the much 
harsher environments that they must anticipate. Processor protocols are less 
in evidence as each vendor has, until recently, vied to be as different as 
possible in order to preserve his or her market area, a classic example of 
territorial marking. ' 
The biggest single influence on the systems engineering front has 
undoubtedly come from advances made in software engineering. These 
advances have come ofneGessity, as debacle followed debacle with timescale 
and cost overruns often in the several hundred percent. Initially, the defence 
industry lead the way in developing solutions because they tended to be 
involved with more advanced, more complex project developments. Latterly 
the burden has perceptibly shifted toward commercial applications as these 
become more complex, more widely interwoven and, in particular because 
they tend to be so short lived compared with their military counterparts. 
A significant shift is observable in the technology which supports this vast 
new industry; whereas the military called the tune on new devices and 
materials in the seventies, now the military are following industry and using 
industry-proven devices, protocols and applications. This shift is inevitable 
as computer-based technology reaches the vast market presented by medium 
and even small enterprises throughout the western world, which market 
greatly exceeds the slow-turnover, specialist military market . 
• 
Software engineering has seen the concomitant development of an array of 
tools principally designed tq provide:-
* A much needed discipline in the capture and decomposition of software 
requirements - see Jackson (1975) and DeMarco (1978) 
*Configuration management, made essential by the large number of system 
modules in simultaneous development at various build standards 
*Project management over the software analysis, design and development 
life cycle 
That these tools and techniques development have greatly benefitted software 
engineering is unquestioned; later topics will, however, examine the risk to 
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creativity that is endemic in their use. 
Advanced Networked Systems Architecture 
One current enterprise is worthy of mention under the present heading - the 
Advanced, Networked System Architecture, ANSA. Readers should note the 
title carefully; it refers, not to a network, but to a networked system. ANSA 
originated in the UK's Alvey Project and is sponsored by:-
British Telecom 
Digital Equipment Company Ltd 
GEC Marconi Ltd 
GEC Plessey Telecommunications Ltd 
Hewlett-Packard Ltd, Information Technology Ltd 
RACAL Group Services Ltd 
Standard Telephone and Cable Laboratories Ltd. 
The development of ANSA is being conducted, post Alvey, by Architecture 
Projects Management Ltd of Cambridge, with continuing sponsorship from 
the participant companies. ANSA is an ambitious concept An extract from 
the current ANSA Reference Manual, Volume A, will indicate the point 
"ANSA supports the design, implementation, operation and evolution of 
distributed infonnation processing systems where the different components 
that make up the system, such as application packages, operating systems, 
computers and networks, come from different vendors. The complexity, and 
consequent cost, that arises from this heterogeneity of hardware and software 
can be significantly reduced if information technology vendors adopt a 
common approach to the design and interconnection of the components they 
offer 
"Common design principles based on a consistent model of information 
processing across the system ease the task of integrating diverse applications 
into a coherent, extendible system ........ . 
" ....... ANSA has five projections called enterprise, information, 
computational, engineering and technology ....... The enterprise projection is 
concerned with modelling the relationships between the system owners, 
d " operators an users ........... . 
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ANSA concerns itself also with:-
*Financial Security *Responsibility 
*Mistrust 
*Ownership *Value 
*Security *Fear of Failure 
*Fear of Injury and Damage *Fear of Alienation 
*Frustration . 
*Privacy 
*Ethics 
*Fear of Loss *Reasoning, Creativity and 
Decision Making 
* Aesthetics and Presentation 
Work 
* A voidance of Tedious 
ANSA is state-of-the-art distributed computer system design, at least in 
concept - much of it is still on the drawing board; yet it serves to show the 
trend in commercial systems engineering, which quite clearly embraces - as 
it must - the human dimension 
The ANSA, and other system engineers', viewpoints are inconsistent with the 
comments of some soft systems practitioners who express the view that 
systems engineering is concerned with mathematically determinable aspects 
of design, the so-called hard features and who further suggest that soft 
systems have "taken over" as it were from the RAND school of OR-and 
science-based analytical, reductionist hard systems approach. On the 
contrary, the hard practitioners have been moving steadily towards the 
"firm' centre for over 15 years and now embrace some - although far from 
all- of the soft concepts, albeit using markedly different approaches 
appropriate to their environment. 
2.2. Present Limitations in Systems Engineering Methods 
The Systems Theology 
The lack of consensus concerning the nature of systems engineering was 
referred to above. It is, perhaps, unwise to pin the defmition of such a subject 
down too narrowly in any event.There is within the minds of most 
practitioners a wider acceptance of the meaning of "the Systems Approach" 
(see the enclosed paper "Systems Creativity"). In broad terms, there is kernel 
Top Down approach to system design, which supposedly pursues the 
following path:-
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Start at the highest abstract level of system requirement description 
B. Functionally decompose the requirement 
c. Map the decomposed functions to the elements of a physical 
architecture 
D. Develop, and progressively integrate the physical elements into a 
system 
Hall (1962) provides a more detailed, classical view of the steps in systems 
engineering. Unfortunately, there is no generally accepted way to achieve the 
first three steps, although many systems engineers ｾ｡ｶ･＠ patent methods of 
their own; it is perhaps for this reason that some observers regard systems 
engineering more as an arcane art-form than a science-based engineering 
discipline 
Indeed, there is no consensus on the meaning of "function" in the Systems 
Approach. Many experienced systems engineers cannot establish the range of 
functions in, say, a radar system. The usual first decomposition is into 
sensors, communications, processing and display. Unfortunately, that turns 
out to be most unhelpful since these so-called functions apply to almost every 
system of significance and hence the division offers no insight into a 
particular system 
The point can best be understood by attempting to functionally decompose a 
human being. To start at sensors (all five), nerves and brain is not really 
helpful: not only is it true for all animals (and therefore offers no 
discrimination or differentiation), the decomposition misses out the 
interesting parts of the human design. A better approach is needed, and will 
be described later. 
Similarly, functional-to-physical mapping is obscure in practice, with most 
practitioners unwilling to be drawn on their methods, which are often 
therefore declared to be "obvious". These methods generally recognize the 
complexity of interfaces between groups of functions and attempt to group 
functions so as to reduce the residual interface complexity between the 
resulting groups. The methods tend to be difficult to justify under pressure, 
the more so since they are generally based on an uncertain definition of 
functions to be grouped. 
Part of the systems engineering ethic includes the developluent of design 
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.. 
options, their modelling and subsequent tradeoff to select the most cost:-
effective solution. Choosing the appropriate range of design options from 
which to trade is, at the best, a crude art. Modelling of systems is becoming 
increasingly expensive, although there is a growing tendency to prototype 
information and Command & Control systems. Trading between options 
often employs dubious weighting-and-scoring techniques. And there is, 
surprisingly, no agreed way of defining what the term "cost-effective" 
means. 
All in all, it has to be said that the theology on which systems engineerin£ is 
supposed to be based has some dubious foundations. Systems engineering 
survives, even thrives, despite this lack of scientific underpinning, 
principally because it is a theology, a way of approaching problems that is 
axiomatically sound. It must be better to approach a problem top-down, to 
view the whole system rather than simply its parts, to proceed from function 
or purpose toward realization, and so on. 
Software Engineering Threats to Systems Creativity 
There is a risk, presently significant and increasing rapidly, that the 
application of requirements capture tools to higher levels of system design 
will erode creativity at those levels. The tools are seductively simple to use, 
being generally graphically based, but it is broadly their task to decompose 
established design concepts into their component parts, ensuring consistency 
and completeness in the process. The present tendency to use these tools to 
formulate the design concepts themselves, and particularly those of the 
higher, parent system rather than the computer-dominated sub-system, is not 
. 
encouragmg .. 
Examples of this problem area are security-sensitive in some instances. One 
recent paper on the application of Y ourdon (Real Time), as defined by Ward 
and Mellor (one of the many software requirements analysis tools) concerned 
a complex but un-named modem defence platform. The tool had been used to 
perform a functional decomposition of the complete platform requirement, 
after a period of knowledge elicitation. The result was incomprehensible t9 
users and to peer group designers and was not followed up by functional-to-
physical mapping. This last point arose for several reasons. First, the time 
taken to perform the analysis had exceeded expectation; second, the team 
could fmd no way to integrate the decomposed functions; third, not 
surprisingly, the MOD customer was becoming nervous about both cost and 
the validity of the approach 
"Off-the-Shelf" Syndrome 
Before moving on to softer issues, it is worthwhile to consider perhaps the 
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biggest element which militates against top-down design in industry. 
Companies which design, develop and manufacture components and systems, 
invest intellectual effort as well as money in the process. Faced with the 
requirement for a new system, the pressure to simply adapt their presently 
available, "off-the-shelf' system to a new requirement is almost irresistible 
Unfortunately, there is ample evidence to show that complex systems rarely 
repeat themselves and that the off-the-shelf solution is an illusion. That this 
must be so, can be seen by considering just one aspect, the timescale of 
contemporary projects. An off-the-shelf solution must have been designed 
several years before to be on the shelf now. With the pace of technological 
development so high, the off-the-shelf solution is out of date. Perhaps it is for 
this reason that more developed countries attempt to unload their present 
solutions on to third world countries. Third world countries are no longer 
naive, however, and are often smarting from having been "sold a pup" in the 
past. The true ethic of the systems engineer has always been to do the best by 
his customer. Current claims being made for "Total Quality Management" 
and similar vogue concepts look suspiciously like the standards which were 
applied assiduously in the past by systems engineers 
2.3. Enquiring Systems 
Since the end of the seventies the systems science community has seen an 
upsurge of the so-called "soft" systems approach as opposed to "hard" 
methods which, according to Checkland (1981), are characterized by 
assumptions that "problems can be formulated as making a choice between 
alternative means of achieving a known end". It is not the purpose of this 
document to provide an authoritative assessment of these methods, but some 
are of considerable interest, particularly in the field of management, and 
their broad approach may offer succour to systems engineers who, as has 
been demonstrated, are moving steadily into less firm territory in an attempt 
to solve mounting human problems. These problems include the 
understanding of the requirement, an area where soft methods promise 
capability. 
SSM and Peter Checkland 
The doyen of the soft academics is undoubtedly Professor Peter Checkland 
from Lancaster University who produced his seminal book "Systems 
Thinking, Systems Practice" in 1981, some two years after Robert Lano et al 
were showing their methods to the world. Checkland's Soft Systems 
Methodology, see Checkland (1972) and Checkland (1981), conceives of 
hierarchies of systems including natural systems whose origin is in the origin 
of the universe, designed physical systems which man has made, ranging 
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"from hammers via tram cars to space rockets", designed abstract systems 
such as mathematics, poetry, books and human activity systems. In earlier 
work, Checkland (1971), had closely linked some human activity systems 
with natural and designed systems, but in "Systems Thinking ... " he took the 
view that defmition of human activity systems should be confmed to the 
activities themselves. 
Unfortunately, this defmition tends to exclude the Information Decision 
Action system if, as later chapters will strongly suggest, there is advantage in 
perceiving an IDA system as containing both the humans and their 
technology in one inseparable set. Happily, at least one of Checkland's 
acolytes, Brian Wilson (Wilson,1984), takes a broader view by describing 
human activity systems as "undertaking purposeful activity such as man-
machine systems, industrial activity, political systems, etc. 
Both Checkland and Wilson follow a classically simple route in exploring 
their problem domains. In essence, they appreciate a real problem situation, 
analyse and express the problem situation, formulate a variety of viewpoints 
concerning the real problem situation, form idealized conceptual models of 
the problem situation, compare characteristic features of the idealized model 
with the real world, and hence identify any feasible and desirable change. By 
choosing a variety of viewpoints they hope to bring robustness to the process 
and avoid the pitfalls of pre-conceptions. (I hope that precis of their approach 
is not so brief as to misrepresent). 
Critiques of SSM 
Critiques of Checkland's work are not difficult to find.- see Boulding, (1982) 
and Burrell, (1983). Burrell, for example, observes that the method is not 
objective since it depends upon soliciting views from those immersed in the 
problem situation. Further, the introduction of a variety of 
Weitanschauungen "raises the issue of incommensurability of world view". 
Both observations combine in Checkland's choice of client, which is 
invariably from among those sitting high in an organization. In effect, 
Checkland seems to preach the value of Weltanschauung, but practise from 
only a narrow selection of world views. 
This point concerning world views is important to pursue in the present 
context of IDA systems, since the differing world views are supposed, via 
different root definitions, to result in different idealized systems. One of two 
outcomes must follow: either a single world view is pursued, or several 
world views are explored. If only one, then there has to be a pre-exploration 
selection process; if more than one, then there has to be either post-
exploration selection, or post-exploration reconciliation to produce a 
combined basis for deductions and recommendations about the problem 
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situation. It has to be said that this selection / reconciliation process is not 
strongly in evidence. Similarly, bounding of the System of Interest (SOl), 
essential to sound analysis, is not well supported or explained by Checkland. 
An example from my own work will illustrate the point. 
Exploring Weltanschauungen 
I have been exploring, with several police forces, the implications of Home 
Office Circulars 104 and 105, concerned with civilianisation and with 
efficiency / effectiveness within the police forces. The exploration consisted 
in the first instance of appreciating the problem situation, which was 
elaborated in concert with a group of policemen of varying ranks. I simply 
modelled their views using the very high - level modelling approach 
favoured by Checkland. The first topic concerned Administrative Support 
Units (ASUs); these are small groups of policemen formed within police 
stations from personnel who, for one reason or another (often health) are not 
on the street. An analysis of ASUs might appear as follows. 
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The anticipated result of introducing ASUs is that patrolling policemen will have 
more time on the beat because they will not spend so much time in the station doing 
paperwork. Instead, the paperwork aspect will be covered more efficiently by the 
ASUs who, because they will become practised, will be faster, make less mistakes 
and should develop a consistency of approach which will result in enhanced public. 
confidence that "like crimes will receive like treatment". 
The view of the police involved with ASUs over a period of time was that 
other effects soon took over after a promising start, which initially supported r 
expectations. The beat copper, with more street time and no negative 
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feedback (previously provided by the dread of "more paperwork"), 
generated much more work for the ASUs. In consequence, there was 
pressure to increase their staffing. More seriously, perhaps, the prosecution 
rate impacted the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS); as queues increased for 
prosecution, delays meant that prosecutions had to be dropped and, as the 
model indicates, police felt that this would have quite the opposite effect on 
public morale from that desired. 
The analysis is simple, persuasive and easily understood - but whose view 
does it represent? NQt the general police view, since I talked with only a small 
selection, chosen for their broad, intellectual approach. The particular group . 
with which I was interacting were, moreover, representing not only their 
view of the ASUs but their view of the public's attitude to the police. Further 
investigation with my local police at senior level revealed concern that 
separating the beat copper from his paperwork and hence from continual 
contact with his suspect would result in bad policing because it could lead to 
irresponsibility. (In this officer's view, the measure of policing was likely to 
be the number of cups of tea that patrolling policemen were offered in their 
area - an interesting and provocative thought!) Interestingly, the analysis did 
show to the policemen concerned why it was that the ASUs were less effective 
than forecast, and they were quick to see that treating the police force as the 
System of Interest (SOl) while excluding the CPS was not likely to work 
A second example from the same study shows a different angle 
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ll1is example concerns police crime screening, in which a SOCD or Scene of 
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Crime Officer, assesses whether there is sufficient evidence to justify 
expenditure of resources. The analysis conducted with the police, shown in 
the above diagram, clearly showed a dichotomy in the mind of the police, 
with efficient use of police resources militating against effective policing in 
terms of satisfying the public. The analysis showed the police engaged in the 
analysis to be concerned and caring, prepared to see the views of others, 
indeed sensitive to those views. This contrasts rather sharply with a political 
view of crime screening as presented by Brian Sedgemore, M.P. who writes 
in the Hackney Gazette of 28th July 1989 as follows:-
"I was astonished to learn recently that the Met Police don't 
bother to investigate 70% of the crime committed in places like 
Hackney. A local shortage of police officers, for which the 
Home Secretary is responsible, means that most calls for help 
from the public are not met. 
Except for very serious crime, local police operate a points 
system which in the jargon they use "screens out" most crime as 
being impossible:to solve. 
We're supposed to praise this policy as being sensible because 
without clues it's obvious that crimes cannot be solved. 
Only a fool would fall for that argument. In the case of Hackney 
the clues don't exist because there aren't enough police 
searching for them, acting quickly enough, or on the spot to 
prevent them. 
My own view is that we need more resources, new structures 
that make local policemen more accountable to local people and 
a complete rethink of police policies .......... " 
In Sedgemore's view, the police are understaffed, yet he says that they "don't 
bother". He condemns cqme screening, rightly or wrongly but then goes on 
to propose that the problem would in some way be solved by making 
policemen more accountable locally. Since this last view, be it reasonable or 
otherwise, is not traceable to his foregoing argument, it appears to be 
politically motivated, so presenting quite a different world view of police 
resource shortages.Indeed, a little thought suggests that his motivations could 
be radically different from his overt, expressed view. 
The two examples support Burrell's view amply. Observing students 
attempting to employ Checkland's methodology, one is struck by the 
excellence with which they develop the so-called "rich picture" compared 
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with the relative paucity of subsequent traceable and rational analysis of that 
picture. Could it be that Checkland's framework, straightforward as it seems 
to be, is a vehicle principally for those already expert in the domain of the 
problem situation to be operated within? 
The SSM approach is applied by Checkland to management issues in the 
main; clearly he is intellectually powerful and, for him at least, and for 
students under his direction, the method shows results. At a conference held 
under the auspices of the Institution of Measurement and Control on 6th 
March 1986, ｃｾ･｣ｫｬ｡ｮ､＠ expounded the following (paraphrased) view. 
Systems are not, as hard systems thinkers might suppose, like marbles 
in a bag which can be individually extracted, examined and replaced. 
Instead, systems resemble more the branches in a privet hedge: 
removing anyone branch is impracticable, since it will be damaged in 
the process and cannot be replaced. 
Again, Checkland's views are intellectually appealing, but is the insight he 
provides helpful in the context of developing IDA system design concepts? 
Wilson's SSM 
Wilson is much more concerned with the hurly-burly of practical operations 
and engineering ｾｦｹｳｴ･ｭｳＬ＠ to the point that his book smacks more of 
conventional, "hard"systems analysis than of pure "SSM according to 
Checkland". In both cases, there is a predisposition, born I suspect of the 
nature of SSM, to apply themselves to extant systems, rather than to conceive 
systems ab initio. Wilson is clearly an expert systems engineer, and his work 
encourages the view that bridges can be built from soft to hard systems 
concepts; Wilson,however, does not explain the intellectual jumps he 
frequently makes from soft to hard, and so his approach, worthy though it 
may be, lacks traceability and justification - two essentials in the real world, 
where system design concepts are formulated by sizeable groups of 
engineers, perhaps twenty or more - with some being less experience than 
others - and where: many millions of pounds may ride on "getting it right" 
Colin Eden 
Another UK practitioner of soft methods is Colin Eden, lately of Bath 
University, presently at the University of Strathclyde. He is continuing to 
develop his methods, and he tends to adopt the facilitator role, acting as 
transparent "oil" between the members of a client team so that they may 
reach their own group consensus view without his views being imprinted. 
The diagram shows an application of Eden's early graphic approach by the 
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author to an organization in 1986. An analysis was undertaken by 
interviewing a selection of middle managers representing their views and 
linking them by discussion. Although this is not precisely the way Eden 
tackles the problem, the work was stimulated by his approach and it proved 
valuable. The connecting arrows were seen to point toward "sinks" and away 
from 'sources". So, morale was a symptom of the problem situation, not a 
source. Overlap in Divisional business was seen as a root problem, not a 
symptom. The diagram has been simplified from the tangled original, but it 
serves to demonstrate the process. Eden's graphical approach, simple though 
it may appear, c;ln reveal to the user a system's latent characteristics, and in 
this respect it has a capability not implicit in Checkland's approach where 
such revelation is due to the analysts intellect rather than to the methodology. 
(Note: I use the term methodology, which surely means "the study of 
method" only because it is the current practice. Checkland's and Eden's work 
present methods, and are not methodologies per se) 
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COMPANY SELF-APPRAISAL 
IDA Systems are designed and purposeful systems. One aspect of the two 
approaches illustrated so far is that neither method is implicitly goal-seeking. 
They are simply ways of unravelling some aspects of a human problem, 
usually a group problem, in a subjective way If, as a result, that problem is in 
some way alleviated, then the problem owners, the facilitator/or and the 
analysts have provided the creative components, not the methodology per se. 
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Ross Janes 
Ross Janes, in the Department of Systems Science at City University, London, 
adopts the facilitator role, not unlike Colin Eden, and his methods, although 
essentially subjective like Eden's, are quite different. Janes favours 
Interpretive Structural Modelling, a system of developing structure within a 
set of situation objectives, aiffis or factors by successive pair-wise 
comparison. The potential combinatorial explosion implicit in large-scale 
problems is contained using processor based tools to eliminate redundant 
comparisons and to manipula:te and draw the resulting hierarchical networks. 
Janes' approach is interesting in the IDA systems context for two reasons:-
It is a group exercise, in which participation by the owners of the 
problem are of necessity involved, with Janes acting as an expert 
facilitator but, in principle, introducing no problem-related expertise 
which he might possess. Under his guidance, the group generate ideas 
about, and develop ｴｨ･ｩｾ＠ own understanding of, the issues they face. 
They prioritize and rank the issues. And in the process of 
participation, a group consensus, and a group identity emerges. It is 
this last, more than any other aspect, which is the benefit of the Janes 
approach 
The process reveals emergent properties in the problem which are not 
necessarily visible in the individual factors which are generated under 
Janes' guidance by the participating group. The structuring and 
grouping of the issue factors reveals architecture. See Toda and 
Sugiyama (1983) for a comparison of Q-Analysis, Interpretive 
Structural Modelling and Visual Q-Analysis. See Warfield (1974) for 
Interpretive Structural Modelling 
, 
Goal-Seeking 
A method that purports to be goal-seeking is that attributed to Manheim and 
Hall (1967), and similar approaches to Multi-Attribute Utility Functions are 
noteworthy from Churchman and Ackoff(1957) and many others. Manheim 
and Hall develop a goal fabric, a hierarchical decomposition. This method 
has characteristics of visibility, traceability and - as will be shown later - also 
possesses the beginnings of some formality in that the decomposition is 
developed with Necessary and Sufficient Set concepts seemingly in mind 
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The figure, which is an extract from "Systems Analysis for Engineers and 
Managers (de Neufville and Stafford, 1971), relates to the discussion 
surrounding the proposed purchase of Supersonic Transports at the time of 
Concorde. Evidently the goal fabric relates to value judgements and strategic 
decision fonnulation and once again, although it might well assist in that 
arena, its contribution to the ah initio design of IDA systems is not evident. 
Decision-Based Approaches 
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J olm Friend, of the Institute for Operational Research and the Tavistock 
Research Institute, presents yet another soft approach to managing 
complexity. Complexity, he states, is not systemic, so it is better approached 
from a decision perspective than from a systems perspective. He draws 
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together concepts, approaches and methods from both OR and from social 
science into a framework which, as the figure shows, operates in one of four 
modes - shaping, choosing, companng and designing. His ideas are 
particularly appealing because they show an orderly progression toward a 
decision. Typical applications of his methods have been: County Council 
planning; LPG storage and distribution for the Dutch government; pollution 
control on the Rhine; and community health services. 
System Dynamics 
" 
Last in the series of soft method overview is System Dynamics -. see Roberts, 
N.,(1983), Forrester (1961) Coyle (1977) and Lammers (1987)- a technique 
which is viewed with the gravest suspicion in some defence industry circles, 
owing to its potentially imprecise approach to modelling - it is, of course, 
that very imprecision which makes systems dynamics potentially useful for 
addressing softer issues. In use, the 'formulation of so-called "Influence 
Diagrams" precedes any ｮｵｭ･ｲｩ｣ｾｬ＠ modelling, and it is my view, based on 
evidence that will be presented in ｳｾ｢ｳ･ｱｵ･ｮｴ＠ chapters, that Influence 
Diagrams have much to offer in the development of IDA system design 
concept formulation. Judgement on the efficacy of the mathematical sections 
is reserved, although I have used the technique myself for modelling many-
on-many helicopter-helicopter combat (see Air Command and Control, 
enclosed). Indeed, experience to date suggests that System Dynamics may be 
an effective approach to the thorny issue of bounding systems. Since Systems 
Dynamics is used extensively in one of the enclosed papers, A General 
Theory o/Command Control, it will not be enlarged upon further here. 
Postscript 
An interesting parallel can be seen emerging between the developments of 
soft attitudes in Systems Science and'in Anthropology, Horgan, J., (1989). 
Writing in Scientific American about Clifford Geertz,the noted U.S. social 
anthropologist, Horgan records Geertz as saying:" ... the way out of the 
impasse is not to saddle anthropology. with a specific ideological or political 
purpose, or to ape the rigorous methodology of the "hard" sciences ...... the 
solution lies in accepting cultural anthropology as, for better or worse, a 
literary enterprise - 'imaginative writing about real people in real places at 
real times"'. Geertz has borrowed the term "thick" from the philosopher 
Gilbert Ryle, and has produced an essay entitled"Thick Description: Towards 
an Interpretive Theory of Culture". "Thick" invokes concepts, not of 
recording culture, but of interpreting it , to extract meanings from it that 
are, ideally, as complex and richly imagined as the culture itself. 
Geertz sounds a warning to anthropologists which might well have been 
penned for systems scientists, judging by the gap separating systems science 
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from systems practice: He insists that anthropologists should not let 
"epistemological hypochondria drive them into a formal academicism in 
which anthropology will become only for anthropologists" 
The parallel between social anthropology and systems science in the context 
of IDA systems is far from illusory. Human behaviour may not be 
predictable at the individual level with any precision, but modem tribal and 
territorial influences predominate in the way groups of humans conceive, 
design, procure and employ IDA systems . 
.. 
Summary 
Systems Engineering has been developing steadily, if unspectacularly, over 
the last 10-15 years, driven by ever-more complex system design needs. A 
major influence has been the emergence of large scale computer-based 
systems and in particular geographically-distributed information and 
processing systems. These have necessitated a rapid development in software 
engineering methods, bringing a much-needed discipline to bear, but with the 
associated risk of misapplying software design tools at wider system level, to 
the prejudice.of creativity at that level. 
Systems engineering continues to be more of a faith or theology than a 
method based on sound, .scientific principles. Its principles are treated as 
. axioms, either not requiring, or not capable of, proof. . 
Recent years have seen the emergence of a variety of challengers to the 
conventional systems engineering approach, the so-called soft systems 
practitioners. 
Their concentration on understanding the issues, though laudable, is 
underpinned neither by scientific proof - which they generally suggest to be 
impracticable - nor by a SUfficiency of "track record". The arrival of soft 
methods has, however, considerably livened the systems debate and promises 
to produce more robust approaches to the conception and design of future 
systems. 
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3. CONSISTENT. UNDERLYING THEMES 
3.1. Architectures 
Structure, Balance and Flow 
There are features about any good design which seem somehow "right". We 
are familiar with aircraft and ships being the "right shape", for example. So 
it is with systems, and IDA systems in particular. A well-designed system 
exhibits three characteristics: structure, balance and flow. This thesis is 
substantially about realizing the substance of those three words. First, 
structure. 
Pervasive Architectures 
Architecture is widely used term, implying many things to many 
people. Consider Bronowski's viewpoint, Bronowski,(1973) 
"I am making a basic separation between architecture as moulding and 
architecture as the assembly of parts. That seems a very simple 
distinction: the mud hut, the stone masonry. But in fact it represents a 
fundamental intellectual difference, not just a technical one. And I 
believe it to be one of the most important steps that man has taken, 
whenever and wherever he did so: the distinction between the 
moulding action of the hand, and the splitting, or analytical action of 
the hand 
" ... The notion of discovering an underlying order in matter is man's 
basic concept for exploring na.ture. The architecture of things reveals a 
structure below the surface, a hidden grain which, when it is laid bare, 
makes it possible to take natural formations apart and assemble them in 
new formations. For me this is the step in the ascent of man at which 
theoretical science begins. And it is as native to the way man conceives 
his own communities as it is to his conception of nature 
"We human beings are joined in families, the families are joined in 
kinship groups, the kinship groups in clans, the clans in tribes, and the 
tribes in nations. And that sense of hierarchy, of a pyramid in which 
layer is imposed on layer,runs through all the ways we look at nature" 
A view of balance, at a different level, is expressed by Edward Rubenstein 
(1989), Associate Dean at Stanford University School of Medicine:-
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"How does nature encompass· and mould a billion galaxies, a billion 
billion stars - and also the earth, teeming and exuberant with life? New 
insights into how nature operates come from parallel advances in 
particle physics and in molecular biology, advances that make it 
possible to examine the fundamental physical and biological processes 
side by side. The resulting stereoscopic views reveals a previously 
hidden, unifying logic in nature; its paradigm for construction. 
"What nature does, in essence, is to make assemblies. It relies on the 
same template of programmed. actions in each step of assembly along 
the way. Continuing sequences of assembly are the veins of evolution. 
Biological evolution is the result of natural selection operating on 
random variations. Physical evolution is a similar process of 
construction: a chain of chance associations from which new structures 
arise. Whether these objects survive or vanish depends on their 
environment. 
" ...... Physical evolution and biological evolution are both 
characterized by common descent, natural selection and the eventual -
and apparently inevitable - expression of symmetry," 
My view of structure and balance as essentials of good architecture embrace 
both Bronowski's and Rubenstein's views, as later chapters will reveal. But 
first, what is architecture in a visual sense? 
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What is Architecture? 
In the figure on the left is a set of entities. There is no interconnection. There 
is no architecture. On the right, the same entities have been connected in 
patterns which reveal two features: clusters of entities, and both cluster intra-
connections and inter-connections. Now there is architecture. Architecture at 
its most elemental, then is clustering and linking. For artifacts, clustering and 
linking are purposeful, where purposeful includes aesthetics. Entities, at this 
level of definition, may be - physical chunks, activities, people, ideas even. 
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Architecture can be comprised of heterogeneous entities, so long as· 
purposeful clustering can take place. 
Clusters of papers 
It would give a quite false impression to suggest that only physical entities can 
be clustered. As an exercise, I examined the relationships between the various 
papers which I have written over the last 10 - 12 years, with a view to 
clustering them At first glance, they appear to overlap and intercollRect in a 
confusing fashion and so I clustered them, and some predominant themes, 
using the CADRAT tool which will be explained later (for now, it is simply a 
way of grouping entities according to the characteristics, degrees and 
strengths of their relationships, using a processor to reduce the very 
considerable workload) 
The unclustered set of papers and themes may be viewed as follows:-
｣ｅｭ･ｷｯｾ＠
Document Organisation - Unclustered 
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Interesting although this set of disconnected titles might be, they certainly 
lack structure. As the author, and knowing the contents, of course I am·able 
to connect the papers containing like ideas, but unfortunately many of them 
map to many of the others in a confusing mess. A more organized way is to 
construct a simple hierarchy of strengths of association so that, for example, 
The Human Element in C3I is strongly associated with Systems in Command, 
moderately with A General Theory o/Command and Control and hardly at 
all with SEAMS. Executing this idea for all papers to all papers produces a 
17x17 matrix of relationships, which may be clustered as follows:-
CONCEIVING 
SYSTEMS 
,. 
I SYSTEMS 
Document Organisation - Structured 
, 
The clustering process revealed that the papers were in two main groups" 
linked by the underlying theme of Survivability, and that the two groups . 
were about IDA Systems on the one hand, and about metasystems for 
conceiving and designing IDA Systems on the other hand. Until the 
application of the tool, these emergent properties of the papers - for that is 
what they are - were not so clear to me, the author although I knew, of 
course,that they were thematically connected in several ways. It is this ability 
of some methods to reveal underlying structure in seemingly-featureless 
complexity which makes them particularly valuable for the analysis of 
systems and the development of design concepts. 
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Binding and Coupling 
Robert Lano developed concepts of coupling and binding, which provide 
another way to view structure. Entities bind together when they share 
common processes, interfaces, communication links, physical features, 
etc. Functionally-bound entities are candidates for physical grouping in order 
to reduce the end-system interface complexity. 
. Coupling is the degree of interaction between entities in different groups, and 
it is desirable to reduce coupling (of this variety) also to reduce complexity 
of interface and communications infrastructure. Lano was concerned 
principally with software and computer systems. I have developed his 
concepts and applied them to higher levels of architecture, including 
grouping of humans into organizations 
The following diagrams illustrate the N2 chart which is associated with Lano, 
but is now used world-wide. The N2 chart is an incidence matrix comprising 
N rows and N columns - hence N -squared squares. Entities are recorded on 
the leading diagonal and interfaces between them occupy the other squares in 
the matrix. By convention, all outputs from an entity are on the row 
containing that entity, while all inputs to an entity are on the columns 
containing that entity. Each square (other than those occupied by entities) 
thus stands at the coincidence of an output from, and an input to, two entities; 
it thus represents the one-way relationship between those entities. 
Lano observed that relationships, or interfaces in the software jargon, 
formed patterns when mapped on to the N2 chart. Consider the following:-
A 9 9 
9 C 2 9 2 2 2 2 
2 D 9 
.,9 9 B 
2 H 8 8 
2 9 E 9 
2 8 8 G 8 
2 8 9 8 F UNCLUSTERED 
The N2 Incidence Matrix 
The entities at the left have been mapped into the chart at the right, using an 
arbitrary numbering scheme. There is some pattern: evidently, entity C has 
some relationships with all the other entities and is some form of system 
node, but otherwise there is little to see 
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A 9 9 
9 BJ 9 NODS /YSTFM 
99 C: l2 2 222 
291 E 19 
\ "2 DI9-WA_ 
cnONAI.LY 2 "9iF I 8 8 ｄｂｌｏｃｋｓｾＧＸ＠ G 18 FUN BOUB 
2 ＸＸｾ＠
CLUSTERED 
The Clustered N2 Matrix 
The clustered matrix reveals much more pattern, however, with the 
emergence in particular of two tightly-bound functional blocks, detectable by 
the completely filled-in pattern of interfaces. These are candidates for 
physical aggregation, as shown on the right. 
So, the unstructured first pattern has led to the structured, simplified, second 
structure. This is a powerful technique, which becomes very much more 
powerful when coupled with the speed of a computer, since there are some 
Nt / 2 (factorial N divided by two) pennutations of entities which, for a large 
matrix can become extremely unwieldy. I have applied the N2 technique in 
most of the accompanying papers and to a variety of subjects. In particular, I 
have developed techniques for identifying poorly-fonned patterns which 
reveal design weaknesses, missing links, vulnerable nodes,parallel nodes, 
source and sink nodes, over-tightly bound systems, different types of 
clusters, and so on. The enclosed paper A General Theory 'of Command and 
Control shows some of the variety of application, and more will emerge in 
Chapter 9 
Push and Pull ideas 
It is the practice at present to send infonnation in IDA systems at the behest 
of the sender as opposed to the needs of the receiver. This approach has 
arisen for two reasons: 
First, it decouples the sender and receiver since the sender has no need 
to consult the receiver before sending provided, of course, that the 
receiver has some mechanism for accepting and temporarily storing 
the messages. 
, 
Second, there is a need to ensure that the receiver's infonnation is 
"fresh", that is that the infonnation is up to date when needed. One way 
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to achieve this in dynamic situations is to send updates either 
periodically or whenever change occurs. 
Seductive though both arguments appear, their practical consequence is a 
profligate consumption of communication bandwidth and data processing 
memory. The receiver may be undertaking a variety of activities, and he or 
she may not refer to the infonnation received from a particular source for 
some time; During that time, the infonnation may have been sent many 
times, on each occasion overwriting the previous one, and on each occasion 
wasting ｣ｾｲｮｭｵｮｩ｣｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ bandwidth. The simple alternative in many, but not 
all, situations is for the receiver to either call for, or enable the transmission 
of, infonnation when interested in it. (1bis is how pain signals are 
accommodated in the human body - see The Human Element in C3 I, 
enclosed.) 
I refer to these two philosophies as "push" and "pull" respectively. In The 
Human Element ... presentation, I calculated that a typical IDA system could 
reduce its c9mmunication bandwidth by up to forty times and its data storage 
by a lesser, but still impressive, amount. 
The signal entropy dilemma 
A dilemma facing all designers of IDA systems concerns signal entropy. The 
Linesman-Mediator project referred to in the first chapter illustrates the 
point ideally. Consider an infonnation-receiving and decision-fonning 
system in which the sensors are remote; radar sensors are typical. The sensed 
infonnation can either be reduced at the sensor, or conveyed to the IDA 
system. Reducing the sensor data at source saves on transmission bandwidth, 
but it is possible that some of the source data may be inadvertently lost in the 
ｲ･､ｵ｣ｴｩｯｮｾﾷｰｲｯ｣･ｳｳＮ＠ . .. 
For example, the source data may be sent as:--
Raw vi,deo, faithfully reproducing the originally received signals 
Extracted plots, showing all the real target plots and the plots 
generated by supposed noise 
Extracted tracks, made from a series of coherent plots, with the bonus 
perhaps of attached identity, height and vector data 
Data reaching the IDA system may come from various locations and sources. 
It may be possible, by correlating data from, say, a radar source and an infra-
red source - neither of which gives a positive target signal on its own - to 
deduce the presence of a target. Clearly, that would not work if the radar had 
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passed tracks instead of raw video, but might work on the basis of transient 
plot data. 
So, the designer is faced with a serious problem: to reduce signal entropy at 
source, so simplifying and reducing cost; or to maintain signal entropy to 
improve correlation and extraction prospects at sink. TIlis dilemma is at the 
root of current concerns over so-called data fusion projects which seek to 
correlate (the word fusion is used very loosely) data from a large number of 
air, surface and sub-surface sensors with human intelligence 
Russian Dolls and Fractal Thoughts 
Peter Checkland is attributed with the statement that there are no such things 
.. as sub-systems. Whether the thought is useful to the would-be analyst, or not 
- I believe not - I agree with the statement. Systems do, however have parent 
systems, and systems do serve other systems, their siblings if you will. The 
reason for making the distinction is that, at each level in a hierarchy of 
systems, the current level contains systems; move up or down a level and 
there are still systems. I call this phenomenon Russian Dolls, since each 
system sits inside a larger systems which sits inside a larger system until we 
reach the ｕｮｩｶ･ｲｳ･ｾ＠
This concept is far from fanciful. In the enclosed paper A General Theory of' 
Command and Control I attempt to apply classic control theory to the 
Command and Control process; the attempt is a failure. In an organizational 
hierarchy, each level exists in a "sandwich"; each person has both an 
immediate superior, or superiors, and immediate subordinates. At each level 
in the hierarchy an individual is at one and the same time a boss or manager 
and subordinate or worker. If one attempts to apply classic control theory at 
any particular level, that which is controlled is the subordinate. But the 
subordinate has exactly the same view of the world; he or she too controls his 
or her subordinates, and so on, not quite ad infinitum. Classic control theory 
has no means of dealing with this continual, hierarchical iteration, although 
The Law of Requisite Variety, Ashby (1985), does cast helpful light. The 
Russian Dolls problem is one of the reasons why analysts fmd it very difficult 
to analyse organizations and management structures and to produce sensible 
models. 
The mathematics of hierarchies is also expounded in A General Theory of 
Command and Control. If we consider an N2 chart, and exclude the entities 
themselves on the diagonal, then there remain N*N - N ,or N(N-l) squares 
or interfaces. As N increases, then, it appears that the number of interfaces / 
relationships rises approximately as the square of N. If we now impose on the 
N2 chart the concept of hierarchy, many of the squares are left blank owing 
to the limitation imposed by the pyramid organization, which favours 
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communication within the local group and upwards and downwards, but not 
between groups at the same hierarchy level. Thus the number of interfaces 
does not rise as the square of N in such cases 
Consider, for example, the case where each superior had three subordinates. 
Starting with the top person, the number of people in the organization at each 
successive level is 1,3,9,27, 81. ...... and so on. Consider now an N2 chart for 
those first three levels of hierarchy. Drawing this out on an N2 chart results 
in 13 entities (1+3+9), giving 13x13=169 squares from which we subtract the 
13 entities themselves to leave 156 interface, or relationship opportunities. If 
- we assume a strict, pyramid hierarchy,then number of occupied squares is 
only 48 (see figure 10 of A General Theory of Command and Control), even 
allowing for full peer communication at each management level. So, instead 
of a convenient square-law rule concerning the growth of relationships with 
hierarchy levels, we have a law which lies somewhere between unity and two 
(For the mathematical record. If we define the full N2 chart as containing 
NxN relationships, by the simple expedient of allowing entities to have 
relationships with themselves, then the organizational pyramid described 
above contains 61 (48+13).interfaces rather than the full 169 (13E2) This 
number 61, corresponds to 13E(1.602715). Theindex ,1.602715, lying 
between one and two, is fractional.) 
Taking the concept, in which the expansion index for relationships lies 
between the linear and the square, together with the Russian Doll concept of 
iteration, raises thoughts that human organizations may tend to be fractal in 
nature. (Fractal geometry displays similar characteristics, of course - hence 
the term fractal, indicating fractional indices of expansion). For the purist 
mathematician, this would be difficult to accept because of the indeterminate 
nature of fractal structures; evidently, human organizational pyramids do not 
go on for ever in greater and greater detail. Accepting the limitation, one is 
none-the-Iess struck by the similarity and the potential richness of the 
resulting patterns which hierarchy can exhibit. 
3.2. Information-Decision-Action Systems 
Classification and Membership 
IDA systems are human activity systems distinguished by the following 
features:-
Existence with competing or hostile systems and addressing spheres of 
human endeavour 
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, 
Close association with sensor and action systems, together with which, 
IDA systems form a closed loop acting within the sphere of endeavour 
Sensed information providing an input for rational judgement 
Intelligent decision taking 
Decision-based action instructions 
DECISION 
SUPPORT 
SYSTEM 
(HUMAN) 
DECISION-FORMING SYSTEM 
OPPOSING IDA 
SYSTEM 
INFORMATION 
DECISION 
ACTION 
SYSTEM 
Generally, IDA systems comprise human organizations grouped to undertake 
tasks supporting human decision-taking and supported by information 
collection, analysis, handling, presentation and communicating systems. An 
IDA system need not, essentially, contain technological devices for these 
supporting purposes . 
Process control systems are not IDA systems; there is no human decision-
taking. Process control systems may, however, form subordinate systems 
within an IDA system. 
Management information systems are not, of themselves, IDA systems since 
they lack the action-ordering element. Management information systems may 
form part of an IDA system when integrated with decision-taking and action-
ordering elements 
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The Nature of IDA Systems - Human Decisions, Information 
Support 
In IDA systems, then, a key characteristic is that decisions are taken by the 
humans; they may, if they wish, ignore all the advice and sensor indications 
presented to them and make their own decisions. A man driving a car is the 
focus of an IDA system when a dog runs out into the road; he senses the 
situation, decides on his course of action, initiates the action and he and his 
car change vector (or not) according to the chosen decision. 
In the kind of IDA system of particular interest, groups of people act in 
concert to arrive at decisions. In some cases, the amount of information 
collected, handled, analysed and presented requires the support of 
processors, sometimes of very large processors, with sophisticated control 
and display systems. None-the-Iess, the basic rules apply; humans making the 
decision, with decision-support in an advisory role. 
IDA systems can become very difficult to conceive, design, develop and use. 
One reason for this is because the human activity system, in which the 
machinery is intended to form an intimate part, is extremely robust. Humans 
respond to changes in situation and environment extremely well - indeed it is 
their special capability above all other species. A decision support machine 
that is designed to satisfy particular situations and environments cannot adapt 
as can humans under such dynamic conditions. Many of our present-day 
command and control systems fall into this category of rigid design; as a 
result, they are obsolescent by the time they are delivered to operate in a 
peace-time environment, and would be white elephants in conflict.The need 
is for systems that can support the robust human activity system, be a part of 
that system, and yet not inhibit its essential flexibility. 
The Decision Circle 
Core to IDA systems is the concept of decision-making. I contend that all 
rational decisions can be represented in the following cyclic manner 
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ASSESS 
SIl1JATION 
MONITO'I 
f'AOCl'lESS 
IDENTFY 
THREATSf 
OPPORnJNITES 
The decision circle is, to the 
best of my knowledge, my own 
invention although similar 
concepts do exist. Wohl (1981) 
offers the SHORE paradigm, 
which stands for 
Stimulus,Hypothesis, Option, 
REsponse. Clearly SHORE is an 
abstraction of my Decision 
Circle to some degree but 
excludes the essentially cyclic 
nature that I have obseIVed in 
IDA systems in operation 
( 
INITIATE 
ACTION 
CB£RAlE 
FEASIBlE 
OPTIONS 
\ 1 REVEW CONSTRAINTS 
ｾ＠ ｾ＠
OPTION ..----
A variety of other pundits has produced versions of the decision process, 
generally in the field of conflict; Mayk and Rubin's (1988) Paradigms for 
Understanding C3,Anyone? produces twenty variants. The title "decision 
circle" has also been used by others, including Coe and Dockery (1988), but 
in the substantially different context of conflict, where the circle is in two 
halves, each representing the decision processes of their relative opposition .. 
The beauty of my decision circle illustrated above is its simplicity; it applies 
not only to a car-driver faced with a dog running out into the road,but 
equally to a football manager with a choice of substitutes and ten minutes to 
the final whistle, a police chief facing an unruly crowd, and so on. 
IDA systems often assign different people, or groups of people, to uqdertake 
different elements of the decision process represented by the Decision Circle. 
A typical distribution of activities might be as follows:-
Assess Situation Intelligence & Operations 
Identify Threats Intelligence 
Identify Opportunities Intelligence and Operations 
Generate Feasible Options Operations and Intelligence 
Review Constraints Logistics & Engineering 
Select Preferred Option Commander 
Initiate Action Operations 
Monitor Progress Intelligence & Operations 
Assess Situation Intelligence and Operations 
Etc 
It is then possible to take each one of the above activities fonning the 
Decision Circle and use it as a nucleus· to develop its own activity circle 
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Whereas the N2 chart looked at structure, the Decision Circle develops flow 
in IDA systems design; groups of people are purposefully organized around 
the centre circle, and around each of the supporting circles. The various 
support circles may be thought of as cog wheels, meshing with the central 
decision circle. Following the analogy, note that the direction of arrows in 
the supporting circles must be anti-clockwise to maintain the rotation of 
activity and that the speed of rotation of the central circle will be no faster 
than that of the slowest supporting circle. The coupling of decision circles 
operating at different levels in a hierarchy, and the mapping of decision 
circles on to N2 charts, are dealt with in the enclosed papers, Systems 
Creativity and A General Theory of Command and Control. 
I discussed earlier the subject of civilianization of police posts. That topic can 
now be reviewed in the light of the Decision Circle above. The police force 
would be ill-advised to prejudice the inner circle by civilianizing any of the 
inner circle elements, since these are at the first level of decision-making; if 
serving police officers do not make the first level of decision for normal 
operations, then they no longer constitute a police force in the general sense 
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of those words, since they have no inalienable control of over their own 
decision-making. Their degree of concern over civilianization diminishes as 
they consider first the outer ring of support circles and - not shown - the 
rings beyond that, since the support circle concept can stretch to several 
layers of support circles. 
Boundaries to IDA Systems 
Bounding an IDA system, like any other system, is one of the most difficult 
tasks facing the would-be designer. A General Theory of Command and 
Control shows a series of system dynamics influence diagrams at 
successively increasing resolution, which shows the following inter-linking 
systems:-
A.An Information-Collecting and Analysing System 
B.An Action-Monitoring System 
C.An Option Generating System 
D. A Decision-Forming System 
E.An Order-Issuing System 
F.An Action System 
G. A. Logistic System 
H. A Higher-Authority (Political?) System 
I. A Competition System 
Within the above systems are contained systems. For example, the action 
system has its own IDA system for local management of operations and its 
own replenishment, servicing and engineering systems; the logistic system, 
too, has its own IDA system. The extent of the IDA system - how many of the 
listed systems are contained - is subject to convention. Usually, the IDA 
system does not contain the action elements under its control. Thus, items A 
and B on the list might well be included in an IDA system under the sub-
division of Intelligence, items C,D and E might be included under the 
heading of Operations and Operations Plans, but items F to I would be 
conventionally be excluded. In other cases, however, the action elements are 
so intimately bound up with their control that the action system becomes a 
part of the overall Information-Decision-Action System - a fighter aircraft 
may present an example of this latter situation. 
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3.3. Creativity 
A third consistent underlying theme to my work has been the subject of 
creativity. This thesis is essentially concerned with that process, and so are all 
of the enclosed papers in one sense or another. Explicitly on the subject are 
Managing Systems Creation which will be discussed later and Systems 
Creativity. More than any other papers, these two papers have generated 
widespread interest with copies being called for particularly from eastern 
Europe. Systems Creativity, which amongst a variety of concepts, including 
decision circles, creating creative environments and state transitions within 
organizations, develops the so-called Principles a/Creativity. These 
Principles are repeated below 
Highest Level of Abstraction 
Breadth before Depth 
Level at a Time 
Disciplined Anarchy 
Decomposition before 
Integration 
Functional before Physical 
Tight Functional Binding 
Loose Functional Coupling 
Functional Migrates to Physical 
The principles, collected over the years from a variety of sources - including 
"doing it wrong" - are worth a closer look. 
Highest Level of Abstraction This is the cardinal rule when 
approaching a new problem situation or design concept. It is essential 
to gain a panoramic view of the situation which removes the confusion 
of detail. Only by actively and assiduously pursuing this principle, is it 
possible for the analyst to see his own prejudice and rise above it. 
Breadth Before Depth and Level at a Time Similar concepts 
aimed at successively reducing the level of abstraction in an orderly 
and coherent fashion. These principles oppose the tendency to 
concentrate prematurely on parts of the design problem in depth, to 
the exclusion of other parts and of the overall design. Breadth-before-
Depth implies covering the whole problem "in the round", while 
Level-at-a-Time implies that each level of abstraction I decomposition 
should be completed before descending to the next. Together, they 
provide an ethic of orderly progress 
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Disciplined Anarchy. It is essential to create an environment in 
which new ideas may flourish, rather than "hit the cutting room floor" 
before being given a real chance. Ideas are generally the province of 
the young - in mind if not in body - and are incompatible with strict, 
authoritarian control. Timescales and budgets have to be met, 
however, and so the principle of Disciplined Anarchy emerges - set 
periods when creative juices are encouraged and negative thoughts are 
banned. Organized brain storming and idea writing are among the 
many approaches to achieving the objective 
Decomposition before Integration. This principle, taken with the 
first, proposes that creativity requires the examination of the 
component parts of a solution prior to their being grouped and 
assembled. Without such decomposition, often a major task, it is not 
possible to see how best to combine the various elements of a solution 
Functional before Physical This principle has already been 
mentioned. It is essential to be concerned with the purpose of the 
solution before becoming embroiled in its form. 
Tight Functional Binding and Loose Functional Coupling. 
Both principles have already been discussed, and are attributable to 
Robert Lano 
Functional Migrates to Physical. This principle is self-evident, 
but can be overlooked in the heat of concept formulation. Eventually, 
all the functions are going to be realized in some physical fonn. The 
grouping of functions for functions' sake is not the end of the matter; 
functions become bedfellows for physical reasons, too. The archetypal 
example is, perhaps, the I/O (input/output) for a processing system: 
functionally, I and 0 are at opposite ends of the process; physically, 
their construction is generally very similar and hence they are often 
grouped together. 
It is interesting to note that the Principles of Creativity fmd echoes in other 
spheres, notably art and music. Discussions with painters in oils and with 
composers indicates that their approach to composition is very similar, 
suggesting strongly that creativity in the systems arena is linked to creativity 
in other spheres. 
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3.4. Survivability 
Survivability (of Perfonnance) as a topic is to be found throughout the 
enclosed papers. I believe it to be a fundamental design concept for all IDA 
systems and for many other systems and artifacts, too. "An animal that is 
adapted to its environment is first and foremost organized with a view to its 
own survival", Guilbaud (1959) states in discussion about Ashby's 
cybernetic"homeostat" . 
Why is survivability so important? It fonns a basic set with Perfonnance and 
Availability (of Perfonnance). Together, Availability and Survivability 
underwrite or guarantee Perfonnance, the one against internal failures, the 
other against external threats. Availability is well-developed as both an 
engineering and a scientific discipline. Survivability, however, is not. There 
is no established science or mathematics of survivability, and yet our various 
IDA systems are threatened continually by terrorist attack, by electro-
magnetic attack, by enemy missiles or groundfire, and so on. Those who have 
operated in situations of danger are generally agreed that survivability is 
paramount, even at times beyond perfonnance itself. I address the subject in 
the enclosed brief System Survivability Science which is one of the very few 
attempts to address many of the issues. 
Damage Tolerant Architectures 
For IDA systems, as usually bounded, there is a wide variety of strategies and 
mechanisms that can be employed to achieve requisite levels of survivability -
requisite, that is, in relation to some supposed threat environment. 
At the visible, physical level, the choice is generally concerned with 
hardening (annour, for example), mobility (which sits uncomfortably 
alongside armour due to the latter's weight) and replication such that damage 
to one part does not destroy the whole. 
At the human level, much more important in practice than physical aspects 
and yet often poorly addressed, there arises the concept of autonomy. 
Survivability could, perhaps, be exemplified by the World War II Japanese 
soldiers who emerged from the jungle up to twenty years after the war had 
finished. These soldiers survived because they were self-sufficient and 
because they had clear instructions and the will to follow them. Misguided? 
Perhaps. Survivable? Certainly. 
In IDA systems, however, there is a tendency to control from the centre; 
central control is comforting to the controlling party, who then knows all 
that is going on. Should the central control be eliminated, or simply 
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disconnected, the system will no longer operate, despite the capability of the 
action elements which may be in complete working order. Additionally, 
central control requires communication and takes time - the concept results 
in slow, authoritarian behaviour. 
Happily, we humans are designed differently; when treading on a thorn, we 
do not convey the pain sensation from the foot to the brain and then send a 
motor signal from the brain to the foot. If we did, the thorn would have 
penetrated by the time we had responded. Instead, we have a sensor-motor 
crossover in base of the spine - the spinal reflex arc - which short-circuits the 
communication network to the brain, and enables us to lift the foot quickly. 
Of course, the brain also receives the pain sensation, often after the reflex has 
removed the foot. And so it should be in good IDA system design. There are 
many responses which should be delegated to lower levels of authority both 
to speed overall responsiveness and to enhance survivability. The enclosed 
paper The Human Element in C3! addresses these issues in some depth 
Systems Survivability Science is a short brief, prepared for an international 
audience, concerned with a very large, classified international defence 
.' project. The brief contains mathematically robust approaches to the 
quantification of survivability in C2 and C31 systems, and is part of a 
continuing pro gramme of research in this area 
3.5. Optimal Design 
Optimizing Air Command and Control 
A further consistent theme is that of optimal design, a Holy Grail for system 
designers. The enclosed paper Air Command and Control presents the 
following diagram which illustrates the issue:-
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AXIOM: "A system 
comprised of elements 
which have been 
separately optimised will 
not itself be optimised" 
COROLLARY: "An 
optimised system will 
contain elements which are 
not, of themselves, 
optimal" 
• REASONS: A. "4" is a new 
function. Its optimisation 
has not been attempted 
B.The interfaces between 
the elements 1,2 and 3 
have not been considered 
in their context of 4 
SYSTEM DESIGN AXIOM AND COROLLARY 
The conclusion drawn in the paper, apparently obvious, was as follows:" 
Improving the effectiveness of air power requires a total system approach 
rather than a function-by-function development". Strangely, this concept was 
- and is - avante garde in the air power business. The idea that three "tribes", 
Offensive Operations, Defensive Operations and Transport Operations, 
should be treated as one is difficult to accept.At such high level, the 
application of such self-evident concepts are difficult, if not impossible. 
Optimizing approaches that do not cross tribal boundaries, or better still that 
appear to preferentially benefit an already-dominant tribe, have a much 
better prospect of working. 
Tradeoffs 
Optimal design supposes an objective, or set of objectives, against which the 
design may be optimized. In practice, there are many, mutually-incompatible 
objectives for any complex system and a means of trading between them is 
necessary 
The usual practice is "weighting and scoring", in which optional designs are 
,compared according to a set of criteria, or measures of effectiveness, by 
scoring numerically. The criteria are weighted according to perceived 
relative importance, weighted scores are totalled and the highest weighted 
score sum decides the winner. 
Weighting and scoring is invalid, for two main reasons;-
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" 
" 
The measures of effectiveness are generally different dimensions, such 
as "operational performance" and "ease of maintenance", or "utility" 
and "cost". It is clearly invalid to add scores algebraically for criteria 
of different dimensions 
Scoring and, particularly, weighting, are subjective. The view on 
which criterion to weight and to what degree.depends on the 
perspective. An engineer will weight ease of repair, an operator will 
weight utility as he perceives the need, and so on. 
There are many valid ways of providing valid multi-variate analysis. The 
method I have developed and used successfully is Rank Matrix Analysis 
(RMA). RMA also works on a matrix format, with design options as column 
headings and criteria as row headings. For each criterion in tum, the design 
options are ranked in order of preference. It is generally easy to state 
whether A is better than B, provided there is no need to state by how much. 
Genuine inability to rank results in allocation of equal ranks. The resulting 
table of ranks is assessed statistically to establish whether the pattern of ranks 
differs significantly from a random set, and a Coefficient of Concordance is 
produced If the probability of being random is, say, less than 5% then the 
table is meaningful and the column (design option) showing the minimum 
rank sum is selected. The process is illustrated in the enclosed paper 
Managing System Creation .. 
RMA cannot be said to be entirely objective, because it still uses data solicited 
from system designers and operators. The manner of the data categorization 
and the manner of its processing are, however, reasonably resistant to 
challenge. 
Comparing Weighting and Scoring with RMA is interesting. Generally clear 
winners and clear losers emerge the same by either method, while the group 
of design options in the centre change in order of preference. For close-run 
choices, using both methods is preferable. Users invariably feel happier with 
the (invalid) Weighting and Scoring approach; they are happy enough with 
ranking but not with the concept that criteria are not weighted in RMA. 
Summary 
The chapter has presented the principal underlying themes in the last 10-15 
years of work.These have been:-
• Architecture, in all its systems-related aspects, including 
decomposition, synthesis, binding and coupling, push and pull, signal 
entropy, and many other aspects, viewpoints, methods, tools and 
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techniques. 
• Recursion in architecture, as exemplified by the Russian Dolls 
paradigm, with its fractal connotation 
• Information-Decision-Action Systems and, in particular, Command 
and Control Systems, with their human activities of structured 
organisation of information and of decision formulation. 
• Creativity, how to promote and nurture it 
• Survivability, the overlooked but fundamental characteristic 
required of every system 
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4. THE NATURE OF THE ANIMAL 
4.1. Isomorphisms 
The isomorphism relating humans and the systems that they design has been 
mentioned and is enlarged upon in the enclosed paper The Human Element in 
C3 I. The degree with which we replicate ourselves in our designs seems to 
surprise us, perhaps because we are often unaware that we do it. But do it, we 
do. 
.' 
Architecture Isomorphisms 
The figure shows just a few of the systems in which isomorphisms, in the 
broadest sense perhaps, can be envisaged. Isomorphs are becoming 
particularly evident with the advent of neural networks, for example, but all 
of the examples in the figure share architectural features, with central 
nervous systems, sensors of external and internal activities, energy 
distribution and so on. It is, of course, possible to see isomorphs where none 
exists - that would be a human thing to do, too, and we humans would perhaps 
be unable to detect our own fallibility. On the other hand, if the process of 
detecting isomorphisms is employed as part of a cross-development of ideas, 
then only good can come. We heed a master pattern to ensure that 
comparisons are fruitful; that master pattern, by virtue of the elegance and 
success of its evolution to success, is our human frame and our human society 
IDA systems never work fully when first employed; purchasers of 
technological solutions are inevitably disappointed. But most IDA systems, 
intimate mixtures of human activity with machine support, evolve towards 
being valuable in use. Evolution is a much more powerful stimulus to 
performance than a design team's cerebral power, at least in this respect. The 
human frame appears to be the most evolved on the planet; it is certainly the 
most successful. It seems eminently reasonable to use it as a working master 
plan for IDA system design. 
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The first obserVation to be made about human design is that it does not excel 
at anything. It is not the fastest, strongest, biggest, smallest, most agile ...... 
No, instead it is a master of compromise. And the compromise in the 
individual has often been in favour of the group as the following table, taken 
from the presentation which accompanied The Human Element in C3 I, will 
show;-
FEATURE COMPROMISE LOSE GAIN 
Reduced Running Speed. 
• Survivability (Flight) Free Hands, Early Warning 
Bipedalism .Ene.-gy from Raised Remote Sensors, 
Manoeuve.-ability Bette.- Intra-Group 
• Olfactory Tracking Communications 
10 - 15 year Nurture Limited Pre-Birth Imprint; Group Mobility and Adaptability, Flexibility, Infant Helplessness Survivability (Flight) Social Evolution 
Hardening Limited Cranial, Spinal and Thoracic Protection 
Survivability (Fight) Mobility, 
Survivability (Flight) 
Distributed Processing 
(Spinal Reflex) 
Some Processing Occurs 
Outside of the Spine Central Control Speed of Response 
Weight I Size I Volume Not the Largest I Fastest I Individual Survivability Larger Group Size, 
Strongest, etc, of animals (Fight) Greater Group Survivability 
Sensors :-
• Small Eyes • Limited Night Vision • Ability to operate at night • Simpler, more Survivable 
Sensor by Day 
• Eyes and Ears 
.1... 
o Colocated and Passive o Diroc:t Range Infamation o Ease of Correlation/ 
Avoidance of Detection 
• Cone of Foveal Resolution • Narrow Cone Supported by aural • Wide FIeld of View o F lISt« Processing I 
and periphe.-al flicker clues Speed of Response 
Human Design Compromise 
So, we may look inside the human frame for design concepts, perhaps of a 
harder nature, but it is to human groups that we must look to determine the 
softer issues. Since IDA systems deal largely with the more primitive aspects 
of human behaviour - warfare, terrorism and the like - it is reasonable to 
look to the more primitive side of human behaviour for insights into IDA 
system design concepts 
4.2. Anthropomorphic Designs 
TlzeHuman Element in IDA Systems 
The enclosed paper has been mentioned several times; it was, when written, 
something of a venture since it was not, and is not, usual for practising system 
designers to present such papers in front of a largely military and industrial 
engineering audience. The paper starts by viewing the human body through a 
command and control system designer's eyes and observing the built-in 
redundancy and survivability features in the design, from the hardening of 
the skull to protect the dual-redundant central processor to the splendidly 
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designed rib-cage, with its dual functions of flexible protection of the organs 
and lifting of the lungs to draw in air. . 
The paper employs Professor Patrick Wall's Pain Gate Theory to design a 
digital processing system which would unquestionably operate, but for which 
there is no precedent in conventional design. The paper picks up on the eye-
brain combination and sensor correlation between eye and ear, which 
concept the author had previously used in the Heuristic Intelligent Threat 
Assessment System (HITAS) design - see below. The paper ends also raises 
the topics of tribal behaviour and territorial imperatives, which will now be 
enlarged upon. .. 
Simian Social Behaviour 
In "The Quest for a C3 Theory; Dreams and Realities", Levis and Athens 
(1988) present the view that a theory of C3 (Command, Control and 
Communication - IDA but with the communication aspect raised in 
perspective) is unlikely to be attained owing to system complexity. 
"A major source of the complexity is that many human decision 
makers are integrated in the C2 process. These humans - intelligent, 
active persons - are not just components or users of C3 systems, but an 
integrated part of the process itself - on both sides, ours and the 
adversary's" 
Clearly, the statement has substance, but it is not helpful. I believe that it is 
possible to predict and anticipate human behaviour to a degree if we 
understand our primitive responses. Why, for example, do we arrange our 
offices with our desk opposite the door and our backs against the far wall? 
Territorial imperative. We wish to create an area which is ours and into 
which others may not encroach, at least without our ｫｮｯｷｬｾ､ｧ･Ｎ＠ Bosses and 
management scientists know about dominance and territorial imperatives, the 
one perhaps intuitively and the other through study. Social scientists and 
ethologists in particular have developed an understanding of the way we 
behave at the social interaction level. Subjects of direct relevance to IDA 
systems include limb discipline, touching and dominance, triad (three-person 
groups) instability, boundary marking, the instability of larger groups of 
people and non-verbal communication 
Consider and IDA system operations room with, say, ten personnel and their' 
relative information sources. How should the room be laid out? Should the 
operators face outwards, with their backs to the centre of the room, or 
inwards so that they can communicate directly with each other? This is a 
more interesting example, and not simply resolved. If there is a real-time 
controlling operation in which the personnel communicate principally 
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through their screens and controllers, then they have to face them. Facing 
outwards will inhibit direct person-to-person communication and presents a 
submissive rear aspect to a supervisor, making the position of the operators 
subservient. But if they are required to offer advice, to come to consensus 
views, then they should be able to communicate both visually and aurally, by 
voice, by body language and, yes, even by pheromone.In such situations, 
which are very common, the attempt has been made to have screen operators 
supplied with low-level screens, so that they may face inwards for direct 
personal communication and see their own screens at the same time. Such 
solutions are limited; body language is screened by the equipments and there 
. is little room at the centre for a controller to: occupy. 
This seemingly simple consideration of which way to face significantly 
characterizes IDA systems. Power station control rooms and air traffic 
control rooms almost invariably are of the "glued to the screen" variety, such 
as we see on TV for NASA space shots. Strat.egic command and control, on 
the other hand, is more likely to be of the "round-the-table" variety. 
In all organizations of more than a few people, there develops hierarchy and 
division. The quotation from Bronowski given at the beginning of Chapter 3 
illustrates my view admirably. We develop into family groups, clans, tribes 
and so on. This tribal behaviour is very apparent once looked for. The Royal 
Air Force, of which I was once a proud member, and for which I have an 
abiding affection is, like all three services, highly tribal. First there are the 
clans. The principal clans are:-
Operators, or commissioned aircrew 
Engineers 
Suppliers 
Ground Controllers 
Administrators 
Then, of course there are family groups within each clan: the Operators have 
pilots, navigators, air electronic officers and others as families, with the 
pilots occupying senior family status. In the other direction, the clans 
aggregate into tribes. RAF tribes include the following:-
Bombers 
Fighters 
Flying Trainers 
Groundcrew Trainers 
Etc 
Each tribal group demands tribal loyalties, which are reinforced by tribal-
specific custom (the open, top unifOlTIl button for the fighter pilot?) and 
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inter-tribal competition. The tribes, of course, have a variety of clans within 
them. A member of the Engineer Clan within the Fighter Tribe, as I was for 
some time, fonns binding relationships within his tribe and his clan, and to a 
lesser extent with clan members in other tribes. Efforts are always being 
made to promote splinter clans. These often take the fonn of clubs or groups 
to which membership is limited by some clear demarcation which excludes 
rather than includes. Masonry is an overtly primitive clan and tribal activity, 
for example, making "free masonry" something of an oxymoron. 
Should the reader feel this to be fanciful, there is ample evidence of the . 
fiercest internal competition within almost any organization of significance, 
with members of different tribes often more intent on maintaining tribal 
position than in addressing the external threat / competition - many 
businesses operate in this manner. The behaviour of unions in seeking 
solidarity against the bosses is tribal. The divisions between different unions 
in the same industry is more clan-like. 
Once groups of humans are viewed in this old, rather than new, light, their 
group behaviour is both more understandable and predictable. While I do not 
suggest that an individual's response is predictable, I most certainly do 
suggest that groups of people do behave predictably, by jealously guarding 
territory and by competing with other clans and tribal groups. So deep is the 
instinct that clan loyalties can be observed in people who left the clan over 
half a century previously. .' 
An understanding of territorial imperatives and tribal culture is not 
academic; it is an essential element of IDA design concept formulation. An 
IDA system which cuts arbitrarily across tribal or clan boundaries will not 
work, because the highly robust human systems will revert to tribal 
boundaries. The military are equipped with many such systems; security 
inhibits description. 
The last paragraph presented the negative viewpoint; the positive approach t.o 
design concept formulation is to recognize the strong human system drivers 
and to design systems compatible with these influences. In fact, this approach 
seems in practice to offer a double advantage. Systems which are designed ' 
with subsystems which relate to those in the human body seem to be more 
readily understood and operated by new users. The following two systems 
were designed by me according to these rules. HIT AS was designed to be 
human-like; CLAN was based on territorial imperatives and clan loyalties 
The Heuristic, Intelligent, Threat-Assessment System (HITAS) 
In 1981 British Aerospace were engaged in a design for a new fighter, the 
Agile Combat Aircraft. That project is now defunct but, in the way of these 
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things, the design work translated into the successor, the European Fighter 
Aircraft (EFA). .' 
BAe designers felt that the crew workload dictated a two-man crew, but the 
aircraft was intended to be small, agile and inexpensive, all of which 
favoured a one-man aircraft. I was asked to conceive an "automatic 
observer", an electronic second crew-member with the particular role of 
detecting enemy ground threats and responding to them 
COGNITIVE MAP CONCEPT 
PLAN VIEW 
Recommended _ -
AltackPalh 
\ 
\ 
-
-
Tl 
Key:-
S - self 
.. 
F - Threat Fighter 
Z - Anti-Air Gun 
M7-SAM 
TIt T2 - Ground Targets 
.. 
The resulting design study is in the enclosed paper Automatic Airborne 
Threat Assessment, but the design became better known as HIT AS. The study 
was very well received, both by British Aerospace and by the Royal Aircraft 
Establishment, Famborough, and is still referred to within the company of 
origin, EASAMS Ltd, as the first study which produced a complete avionics 
architecture from first principles. The design has the following subsystems:-
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Non-imaging sensors 
Thennal Imager 
Radar _ 
Multi-sensor correlation 
Hazard Sensor 
Ranking 
Response 
The non-imaging sensors gave very low directivity but wide scan, and were 
used as peripheral vision sensors to direct the infra-red and radar which 
equated to foveal vision in their resolution. Thermal imager and radar gave: 
scene interpretation on their own, but their outputs were correlated to give a 
combined scene which was set against stored multisensor threat models 
representing the known threats. 
Recognized threats were ranked using a 3-D cognitive map approach, with 
the aircraft at one focus of an ovoid, or solid ellipse - see the figure - the 
major axis of which extended in front of the aircraft by an amount related to 
aircraft speed; the faster the aircraft, the longer the ovoid. Around 
recognized threats were generated, in the systems processors, spheres of 
lethality corresponding to the ranges of the recognized threat weapons. The 
volume of the solid intersection between these threat spheres and the zone of "" 
safety set by the ovoid represented the degree of risk facing the aircraft. 
Threats were ranked according to degree of risk and imminence.The degrees· 
of risk were used via an autopilot to steer the aircraft by the minimum risk 
path via the threats in precisely the same way that pedestrians avoid each 
other when hurrying along a busy street - the model I used, based on research 
work into human cognition being undertaken at Newcastle University at the 
time. 
HITAS had to "learn" about threats. The basic idea was to present the sensors. 
first with a series of physical threat models, suitably scaled, so that the 
processors could learn what a threat looked like. Next, the system was to be 
taken airborne and the same process repeated against real targets. It was 
intended also that HITAS should be able to gather intelligence by recording 
real threats that did not fit its models and that a degree of latitude should be 
provided in the design such that HIT AS could modify the polynomials which 
formed the basis of its threat models. Hence, the system was heuristic, and 
intelligent, using that last tenn in a limited sense that it was to be able to learn 
from its environment and to modify its behaviour sensibly according to that 
learning. 
A list of the analogous, human-like features embedded in the HITAS design 
concept incIude:-
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Peripheral Flicker Vision 
Foveal Vision 
Heterogeneous Remote Sensors 
Sensor Correlation 
Image Learning 
Image Recognition 
Cognitive Mapping 
Route Finding 
Reflex 
Learning 
Adaptive Behaviour 
Judgement / Prioritization 
The time was 1981. AI had yet to become popular. Expert systems did not 
exist, and my solutions were Bayesian. My calculations showed that the 
amount of processing needed was such that, while a slow-flying helicopter 
might be equipped, it was impracticable to fit a high-speed fighter with the 
then technology. However, in the design, I developed a basic three-bus 
avionics architecture which, I am lead to believe (I can say no more, as a 
subcontractor at the time) became the basis for the bus architecture for EFA. 
It is noteworthy that maintaining the analogy with the human, both 
anatomically and socially, had enabled a complete avionics design concept to 
be developed 
CLAN 
CLAN, Command of Land, Air and Naval (Forces) is not described in an 
enclosed paper; the company concerned did not encourage professional . 
papers for reasons of commercial security. The design concept was avante 
garde and stili is some six years later; it had a profound effect on the 
subsequent approach to system design within the company, and on competing 
companies who saw it at exhibitions 
Instead of the usual central processor supporting sets of terminals arranged 
in celis, Clan used a UNIX-based approach to connect a number of 
workstations via a Cambridge Ring. Each workstation corresponded to an 
operational group, or clan. There were stations for intelligence, 
communications, operations, engineering, plans & resources and, of course, 
the commander. Each workstation could support a set of terminals working 
through it, so that a section of staff could simultaneously contribute to the 
task in hand; these supporters could, but normally would not, communicate 
over the Cambridge Ring - each section was clan-based, in the human societal 
sense. 
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Command 
Plans & 
Resources 
Clan • Function-Mapped Architecture 
A strict code of data ownership was conceived (now popular, but novel at that 
time, 1983). So, the intelligence desk officer was responsible for all 
intelligence data in the HQ; others might read it, only he could authorize its 
update.This approach maintained territorial imperatives 
Each HQ communicated with other HQs via bridges between the rings. 
Intelligence communicated with intelligence, operations with operations, 
engineering with engineering, and so on, so maintaining clan protocols 
Subordinate formations also stuck to the clan code. A logistic depot, for 
example, communicated stock levels exclusively to the Plans & Resources 
Officer, who then authorized the data for dissemination. This last concept 
invoked a level of sophistication in the protocol; the P&L Officer could 
disagree, with the depot, or wish to propagate different data. The concept of 
Data and Infonnation Ownership arose, with the subordinate formation, who 
could actually count items physically being declared the data owners, while 
the HQ officers, who aggregated and occasionally "massaged" that data 
became information owners. Thus pecking order dictates were satisfied. 
The effects of CLAN on customers was quite staggering; generally military 
operators themselves, but often foreign and lacking in English, they 
understood CLAN immediately. Each workstation was "stand alone" and 
they could perceive a clear, physical, territorial boundary. 111e separation 
between the purposes and activities of different workstations was also 
instantly understood; it mapped directly on to their internal military 
organizations. The physical design of each workstation employed a low desk, 
with inset graphics display screens and controls, so operators could literally 
sit in a circle, as in the diagram, facing inwards and backed by their 
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supporting sections which could be visible or concealed, but which could in 
either case communicate verbally and through the various section terminals. 
The commanders desk was similar to the others ,except that it was a little 
higher and had a larger graphic screen, consistent with his position of 
dominance. 
Regrettably, like many firsts-in-the-field, CLAN suffered development 
problems; it employed a software communications package called Newcastle 
Connection, named for the university of origin, which lacked security 
features and was less than robust. Nonetheless, CLAN's design concept 
influenced many other companies and its goals are still as valid today as they 
were. ANSA, mentioned earlier, seeks to provide a similar nodeless, 
integrated networked system. ' 
4.3. Models of Human Organization in Command & Control 
The Air Command and Control System (ACCS) 
At the time of writing, the NATO Air Command and Control System is 
rising, somewhat like Lazarus, from a moribund five-year slumber. I first 
wrote about this mammoth international venture in the enclosed paper Air 
Command and Control, a paper presented at Hendon Air Museum in 1981 as 
part of the Marconi 81 Symposium. I spent four years subsequently as the UK 
Technical Director for Airspace Management Systems, one of two giant 
consortia bidding for the ACCS business in Brussels from 1982 until today. 
During that process the following concept, MOSAIC, sprang to life, 
unbidden but irresistable in its simplicity and logic. 
MOSAIC 
MOSAIC is a major work, addressing at the mosrfundamentallevel the 
manner in which NATO deploys its air power in Europe. Presented first in 
Brussels at the 1984 European Symposium of AFCEA, the Armed Forces 
Communications and Electronics Association, it w,as presented again at the 
lEE's First International Conference on Advances. in Command, Control and 
Communications Systems in 1985, and was subsequently published, along 
with other selected papers in book form. 
MOSAIC appears to preach heresy, at least when regarded from a 
conventional airman's viewpoint. The present approach, which has changed 
little over the years, is to defend a land area, using air defence aircraft, 
surface-to-air missiles, etc, and to use the secure area as a base from which to 
launch bombing attacks on enemy ground forces and into enemy territory for 
interdiction. The concept, as developed in western Europe, results in a 
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ｬ｡ｹｾｲ･､＠ defensive screen facing east, behind which the attack forces shelter. 
There are limitations with this approach; it requires the enemy to attack from 
the .east. The advent of surface-to-surface missiles, ground and submarine 
launched, together with aircraft carriers in the various seas surrounding 
northern Europe, render the assumption suspect. 
The essence of MOSAIC - Moveable, Semi-Autonomous Integrated Cells - is 
Survivability, and the approach is in the title. Instead of dividing air power 
conventionally into Offence and Defence, with the Offence traditionally 
hiding behind a defensive screen (provided by the Defence) and sallying 
fortll on missions, why not form cells comprising Offence, Defence and 
Trarisport all in one such that each cell could operate autonomously, could 
fight, retreat, or jump over and was, indeed an independent unit? Further, 
since autonomy is not the normal practice, why not band these autonomous 
cells together into groups, giving them superior command and control to 
｣ｯｯｲｾｩｮ｡ｴ･＠ their activities? They would thus be autonomous only in extremis 
but, like the Japanese soldier, would be highly survivable. 
It might seem that MOSAIC operates across the tribal boundaries and to an 
extent it does. However it is in essence little different from an aircraft carrier 
which has transport, offensive air and defensive air. Imagine a series of land-
based aircraft carriers, mobile, potentially autonomous, but under the 
control of a command team which groups them according to threat and 
environment so that coordinated air attacks and defence can be undertaken. 
Essential clan loyalties remain intact. 
The value of MOSAIC is not simply that it offers an alternative approach; 
MOSAIC enables a fresh look to be taken at the existing approach in which a 
vast amount of effort and money has been invested, and to see it differently. 
In other words, it presents a different model, not unlike Checkland's concept, . 
from which recommendations about the real-world system might flow. 
Today, MOSAIC stands as the only alternative to conventional air power 
deployment in Europe. MOSAIC has created, and still creates, a considerable 
amount of interest not only because of the basic idea, but also because of the 
spin-offs. These include the concept of a universal language, T ADIL-ACCS 
(Tactical Data Interchange Language for ACeS) and the concept of an 
airborne action group, analogous to surface action groups, comprised of a 
variety of aircraft types, including C2 aircraft. 
The General Theory of Command & Control 
A General Theory of Command and Control is a bold attempt to provide a 
structured approach to C2 design by developing an underpinning theory. The 
60 
" 
" 
paper arose in response to a gauntlet thrown down by Professor C J 
Harris,the chainnan of the lEE's organizing committee for the Second 
International Conference on Command, Control, Communications and 
Management Infonnation Systems, in April 1987 . He deplored the lack of 
any coherent C2 theory. It took some two years to conceive one. 
Why is A General Theory of Command and Control bold? Some experts 
believe that a theory of command and control is not a practicable proposition. 
Levis and Athans (1988) take the view that a theory is impracticable because 
of the high degree of complexity and because of the unpredictability of the 
humans who are embedded as decision makers in both of the opposing forces' 
command and control organizations. 
A General Theory of Command and Control postulates an ideal world of 
human activities, and seeks fundamental axioms in that world. This approach 
has unimpeachable credentials; it is the method of Galileo, Newton and 
Faraday. Newton's three laws of motion apply in a perfect world, for 
example, where mass is equated to inertia - a reasonable, but unprovable 
supposition. A General Theory of Command and Control produces ten so-
called Laws or Postulates of Command and Control which apply to a 
similarly-ideal world and so set standards for the real world, in much the 
same way as Shannon's Laws of Infonnation and Communication present 
useful, but unattainable, benchmarks. A General Theory certainly brings to 
the fore relationships that C2 system designers presently leave unaccounted 
and it offers some guidance in such difficult areas as the prediction of 
database sizes and communication capacities - and yet technology is 
deliberately not discussed. 
" The method adopted in A General Theory of Command' and Control is to 
model the subject using a wide variety of modelling methods, each effectively 
forcing a different viewpoint. Surprisingly, neither classic control theory not 
infonnation theory gave much insight, while Systems Dynamics and Simple 
Queuing Theory proved much more helpful. Most insights came simply from 
examining pyramidal command structures, their clusters and linkages. Some 
of the laws suggest that conventional approaches to designing IDA and C2 
systems are extremely profligate with technological resources. 
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A General Theory of 
Command & Control 
Vertical Data Compression 
Diminishing Lateral Cooperation 
Equipartition 
Infrastructure Expansion 
Action/Order-Rate Equality 
Action/Reporting -Rate Equality 
Infrastructure Expansion 
Decision Rate Invariance 
Decision Scale Invariance 
Survivability 
Command and Control "Laws" 
The ten laws presented in A General Theory of Command and Control are 
principally about human inter-relationships. The Law of Diminishing 
Lateral Cooperation states that peers in a pyramid organization will have less 
success in cooperating the further they are separated horizontally within the 
structure. This phenomenon, well known to us all, arises because the greater 
their lateral separation, the larger the number of superiors through which 
sanction for cooperation must pass. With each additional superior, the 
probability of approval diminishes (Occam's Razor or contingent 
probabIlities) and hence the law. 
The Law of Vertical Data Compression operates up and down a hierarchy, as 
the name suggests, rather than laterally. The Law observes that humans have 
approximate parity of intellectual capacity. A superior with, say, five 
subordinates (span of control equals five) can absorb the same amount of data 
as each of his subordinates, individually. If he is to supervise their activities 
then he can at most absorb only one fifth of each person's output, on average. 
Hence the Law, which states that the mean rate of vertical data compression 
equals the span of control (in a pure pyramid organization). The remaining 
laws are along similar lines and concern themselves with decision dynamics, 
human &ystem inertia, and infrastructure in tenns of the numbers of 
relationships generated by different organizations. 
A General Theory of Command and Control has raised considerable interest 
amongst military specialists, varying from the view that the laws are little 
more than statements of the blindingly obvious, to requests for experimental 
validation. If the laws are obvious, then they probably do qualify as axioms 
which have, surprisingly, never been stated. As for experimental validation, 
that will take rather longer - even Newton's First Law lacks that seal of 
respectability today. 
62 
Summary 
The chapter concerns itself with humans, their nature and characteristics 
both as individuals and socially. The value of understanding both humans and 
groups of humans, as organisms is presented in a variety of papers, as 
follows:-
.- HITAS, an intelligent, learning system based on the abilities of people 
to weave their way along a crowded pavement without colliding with 
others similarly occupied . 
. 
. ｾ＠ CLAN, an IDA system which took advantage of clan and tribal 
loyalties in its design rather than, as so often happens, seeking to 
override such boundaries in the interests of technological 
optimization. 
- MOSAIC, the only alternative to the current approach to the 
deployment of air power in European NATO, emphasising 
survivability of human and function rather than of physical assets. 
- A General Theory of Command and Control, which develops a set of 
axioms for an idealised human hierarchy. 
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5. CREATING SYSTEMS 
5.1. Incentives 
In one small organization where I was the line-manager for all engineering 
activities, the organization was proposing to supply quite complex, custom 
intelligence systems for overseas customers at the rate of one every two 
weeks.The engineers working with me were'bright, intelligent, but 
inexperienced and I found myself executing most of the design tasks in an 
effort to meet the demand. It is a familiar trap to most managers; in the time 
. it would take to explain the job, you could do: the job yourself, so you do. 
Result? Overworked manager, under-worked and demotivated staff. 
It became evident that I was repeating the same groups of tasks in the same 
order with each new project. Clearly there was a well-founded pattern to the 
process, which involved providing customers with a design solution to a 
fixed price and timescale. To establish both of these it was necessary to plan 
the whole of the requirements analysis, system design, system development, 
test, integration, shipping, setting up, commis'sioning, handing over, training 
of user staff, after-sales service, and so on. Although each project was 
different, there was a substantial core of cOffiI11onality between them. 
I developed a standard framework of tasks which was given to the engineers 
as the basis for each new project. The framework evolved with experience, 
becoming more abstract in some areas, more detailed in others. The resulting 
framework is enclosed as a set of figures under the heading Initial IDA 
Engineering Framework. 
The engineering framework proved highly successful within its limitations. 
It was applicable to all the projects the organization undertook, even for quite 
different customers; while it never fitted any project precisely, it was a sound 
basis on to which to graft project-specific needs and similarly from which to 
eliminate inappropriate tasks. The framework was, however, too specific in 
two respects. All of the organization's design sO,lutions presupposed a 
particular range of technology, CLAN (q.v.), and these specifics had become 
embedded in sections of the framework. Further, Middle East customers 
were quite uncommunicative about their needs, it being considered a loss of 
face for them to admit lack of knowledge on the one hand, and for security 
reasons on the other. As a result, the framework took little account of human 
issues and concentrated on "turning the handle" to produce technological 
solutions as quickly and effectively as was practicable. 
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5.2. Managing Systems Creation 
The enclosed paper, Managing System Creation, first presented at the IEE in 
1985, grew out of the initial framework. This paper, which was awarded the 
IEE Management and Design Division's 1986 Premium, covered a much 
wider field, a general approach to design, development and implementation 
of IDA systems - in fact, the term IDA System was coined in this paper. For 
one company, the paper has become a "bible", a handbook given to each 
engineer in the company to ensure a common, coherent approach across the 
board for the design and development of systems. 
Managing Systems Creation takes a high-level view of systems, which are 
presented as having seven ages, by analogy with the seven ages of man.:-
Conception 
Design 
Development 
Implementation 
Transition 
Utility 
Senility 
Replacement 
The Seven Ages of System 
(Replacement might appear to make the number of ages sum to eight; 
however, Replacement is generally an event and, like death, cannot be 
considered as part of the living process). Managing Systems Creation also 
presents the view that a customer purchasing an IDA system is actually 
paying for five systems, and will need to buy, own and maintain three of 
them. The five systems are as follows:-
The IDA system which the customer wants (eg an air transport system) 
An IDA crew / operator training system (eg flight simulators for the 
aircrew) 
An IDA maintenance and servicing system (eg aircraft maintenance systems) 
A test and integration system for use in the factory during development 
An in-company support system to maintain the developing equipments 
The first three systems in the list are needed by the customer; the last two are 
paid for as part of the contract; all are IDA systems in their own right.-
Managing Systems Creation presents a variety of methodologies for 
analysing systems, for trading between options, for connecting systems for 
integrating systems and for organizing systems to create systems. 
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Managing Systems Creation seeks also to present the systems engineer's view 
of creating an IDA system which will last and be valuable to its users and 
owners for its lifetime. In some respects, the paper presents the systems 
engineer's ethic; in others, it presents a simple blueprint for how to organize 
a project-management-based organization; and in still others, it presented a 
set of graphical methodologies for understanding design requirements. 
Managing Systems Creation, as the title implied, is concerned with the 
creation process. It is intentionally more abstract than the intitial framework 
and, as such, more widely applicable. Some attention had been given to front-
end issues, such as "the wider system" and system boundaries, without being 
too specific about the meaning of either tenn and certainly without showing 
ways to address these issues. The approach adopted in Managing Systems 
Creation, for good and sound engineering reasons, was based on successive, 
fonnal specifications to ensure a finn basis both for understanding between 
customer and supplier and and for progressive, well-regulated development 
and implementation activities. 
5.3. SEAMS and Systems Factories 
Developing a creative framework on paper is one thing; encouraging an 
organization to use it is another. Organizations are, after all, human activity 
systems and they are robust and resistant to change. They also lack corporate 
memory, that is the ability to remember approaches that worked and 
,particularly, that did not work, and to learn from the lessons by transferring 
the memory between projects. 
An organization, particularly an engineering organization, needs a corporate 
memory. In the past, such memory has resided in long-serving employees 
who have reached a position of respect and who remember successful ways to 
achieve objectives or pitfalls to avoid. Nothing is more galling than making 
the same expensive mistake twice simply because nobody remembered the 
lessons from the previous occasion. Attempts to store such learning in 
company standards usually fail because of the robustness of the human 
engineer-system which will often revert to redesigning the wheel from first 
principles, and which is generally averse to being governed by thick and 
dusty tomes full of procedures. . 
With projects becoming more complex and diverse, and with labour mobility 
becoming the norm rather than the exception, depending on written 
procedures and on the memory of individuals is inadequate. There is a need 
to build procedure, process and experience into a live, constantly-evolving 
framework which can incorporate the avoidance of pitfalls. The enclosed 
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paper "Getting SEAMS Straight" introduces the concept of a computer-
based, company-wide system for such an enterprise. SEAMS is an acronym 
from Systems Engineering, Analysis and Management Support . 
(Environment) 
SEAMS introduces a variety of elements, including:-
SEAMS as a meta-system 
A core framework of engineering tasks 
The system engineers toolset " 
SEAMS as a corporate memory 
Standards for Procedures 
Standards for Specifications 
Standards for Project Control 
Standards for Quality Assurance 
Standards for Reviewing the Standards 
SEAMS as a company-wide CAD/CAE "backplane" into which 
project-specific tools and techniques could be "plugged" according to 
ne ' 
A systems engineering Code of Practice 
(The Code of Practice is being actively pursued by The lEE's M5 Executive 
Committee on Systems Engineering) 
. SEAMS is only one example of the general move toward what are sometimes 
called system factories, The Alvey Software Engineering Programmes had as 
its keystone the Information Systems Factory (ISF) which sought to provide a 
continuous on-line environment of computer-aided tools to permit the 
analysis of requirement, high-level-design, module design, code, link and 
test, of software, together with documentation production and configuration 
management, ' 
Latest in the line of systems factories is the ESPRIT project, 
ATMOSPHERE, which will seek to provide a similar environment.for the 
creation of systems as ISF sought to provide for software. The success of 
these very large enterprises is by no means assured - if it were possible to 
develop an effective metasystem for the creation of new systems, it is by no 
means evident that it would be effective and affordable; the degree of 
investment which would have to be made by an organization would require 
that the organization have a systems production throughput on a massive 
scale. Another concern revolves around the definition of "system" as it 
applies to ATMOSPHERE - is a system defined around a computer system, 
or could it encompass wider systems, such as aircraft or ships, or could the 
defmition run to companies and organizations? 
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Other Engineering Frameworks are also in evidence, although most are 
rudimentary. The most impressive is that of M'Pherson (1980) in which he 
describes graphically the process of developing a system design, par 
excellence 
SEAMS stands at present as the only proposal before UK industry for an 
affordable solution to the need for better ways of creating systems. It is not a 
factory, for that is presently both too difficult and too expensive. It does 
incorporate a framework of tasks and it does include features which amount 
to a corporate memory. It contains no tools as suc4.but rather the ability to 
interface with tools. The present status of SEAMS is as a proposal within 
industry, being actively pursued. In course of that pursuit, I produced a 
network of the related set of tasks that SEAMS would support in the process 
of conceiving any IDA system. This network, or framework for conceiving 
design concepts, is unlike any of its predecessors and is the subject of 
following chapters. 
Summary 
The chapter presents the topic of Creating Systems, an important topic in its 
. own right, but one which is presented here particularly to show the 
development of engineering frameworks into which the output from any 
Conceiving System must feed. 
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6. A CONCEIVING SYSTEM 
6.1. The Purpose and Role of a Conceiving System 
Previous chapters have presented Enquiring Systems, to enquire into 
problem situations, and Creating Systems, to develop systems, ab initio, to 
meet a requirement. Between these two metasystems is a gap; the purpose of a 
Conceiving System is to fill that gap. 
. 
Soft ｾ＠ Bridge ｾ＠ Hard 
Enquiring Conceiving Creating 
Systems Systems Systems 
Understand Develop Produce 
the Issues Design Solutions 
Concepts 
® ｾ＠ Bridge .-
Conceiving Systems 
A Conceiving System is intended to bridge the gap from soft issues where 
there is no established requirement, simply a problem situation suggesting a 
need, to the development of a substantial design conc.ept for a solution to 
(part of) the problem. A Conceiving System should also, by virtue of its 
concern with operational domain issues, provide a bridge between user I 
operators, those who understand the domain, and designer / engineers, those 
who understand the technology. A Conceiving System is a meta-system, too. 
Its objective is to provide a coherent basis for structUred innovation of, 
particularly but not exclusively, IDA systems in their broader defmition. 
Coherency requires that a design concept be realized comprehensively and 
traceably and that each step of the path be justifiable. In the real world, as 
experiences with Creating Systems testified, work is more often carried out 
by the inexperienced, rather than the experienced designer, particularly 
where innovation is the order. Coherency therefore must be judged relative 
to the inexperienced. 
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Innovation is a much bandied term. Innovation is concerned with more than 
creativity. Innovation involves the realization of creative ideas, and that is a 
much harder process than simply creating ideas. 
Compromise 
A variety of .solutions 
A visible tradeoff mechanism 
Creativity 
New ideas 
New perspectives 
.' 
Realisable technology 
Affordable 
Acceptable to Industry 
Credibility 
Innovation - the 4· Cs 
Contribution 
Net gain to 
Parent System:-
i.e. More bangs per buck 
More kills per loss 
More launch windows! 
launched-at windows 
As the figure shows, innovation may be thought of under the headings of:-
Creativity, to generate the ideas ｡ｮｾ＠ concepts 
Credibility, to ensure that the creative ideas ar more than flights of 
fancy 
Compromise, to recognize that any real-world solution has to be 
adapted to its environment 
Contribution, to ensure that the creative concept is really useful 
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6.2. Issue-Based Approach 
Problem situations exist in domains of activity. The problem situation 
concerned with command and control of a new frigate exists in the 
management of naval warfare domain. It is not possible to understand the 
problem issues without understanding the domain issues. 
DOMAIN 
of 
Activities 
& Issues 
Principal 
Players' 
Activites 
(Proposed) 
S-O-I Domain 
Activities 
/ \ 
Activities in 
Support of the 
S-O-I Mission 
Activities to 
Maintain 
S-O-I Status 
/ 
S-O-I "Internal" 
Activities 
CLUSTER 
& LINK 
S-O-I I: 
ARCHITECTURE ｾ＠
:, 
" 
" ::,: ｾＧＮＧＧ［ＧＺＺＡＧＧＧＺＧＧ［ｘ＠ ... :;,:: " .• ' ... ＮＮｾ＠
THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF ARCHITECTURE 
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The figure shows a domain at the top within which are many activities and 
issues. At the centre of the domain is shown a set of activities proposed to 
resolve one or more issues and to be undertaken by a proposed System of 
Interest (SOn which may be virtually undefined and unbounded. 
Surrounding the central core is a set of activities related to those proposed 
for the SOl within the domain (outer ring) and beyond that are the remaining 
domain activities which have no meaningful relationship with those of the 
SOl 
The Proposed SOl activities comprise two major ｧｲｯｾｰｩｮｧｳＺ＠ those in support 
of the primary mission, to resolve the domain issue(s), and those designed to 
maintain the status of the SOl itself, since it will need to perfonn and survive 
in a hostile environment and it may absorb energy and resources from within 
the domain. Together, these activities may be regrouped and considered as 
the SOl Internal Activities; typical internal activity groupings might be 
entitled "Conduct Operations", "Collect Intelligence / Infonnation", "Assess 
Situation", and so on 
The Domain activities related to those of the SOl are undertaken by 
associated systems, referred to in the figure above as Principal Players. 
These activities, since they relate to SOl Internal Activities, influence the 
organization of those Internal Activities and a process of activity clustering 
and linking recognizes the influences and develops the' basis of structure, or 
architecture. Note that SOl architecture is, in a sense, a reflection in 
miniature of the of domain of activities which generated it, consistent with 
ideas of Russian Dolls 
Within the domain and influencing it are political, economic, technological 
and environmental factors, at the very minimum. In real instances, ethnic and 
religious factors can predominate, and clan, tribal and territorial imperatives 
are always present,-often in the guise of "doctrine" or "practice". Domains of 
human activity also exist in a variety of states. In conflict, such states would 
include, peace, tension, transition to war, and many others. In less primitive 
domains, tenns such as "standby", "shift", "silly season:', "working-to-rule" 
and "normal service" suggest finite states. The imperatives and influences 
differ markedly between finite states in the same domain. 
Against the backcloth set by these many factors, there may be a problem 
situation that requires examination. It is in the ethic of a conceiving system as 
here dermed that it anticipates the possibility of solution; in this respect, it 
differs from enquiring systems. 
The domain will exhibit a variety of activities, undertaken by the domain 
occupants. Issues arise because these activities: are inadequate, superfluous, 
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inappropriate, untimely, aggressive, expensive, inconsiderate, offensive, 
politically irritating, etc. In exploring these activity issues, within the 
domain, under wider system influences, strains become apparent. It is 
possible in these problem situations to postulate a variety of solutions. It is 
likely that SSM, for example, will provide a cogent medium for unraveling 
the issues and perhaps even for postulating potential solution systems 
Systems have parents and siblings. Any potential system will, by definition, 
form part of a larger system which is its parent. The goals, objectives and 
"drivers" of the System of Interest (Sal) must be substantially compatible 
with those of its parent system. Systems have peer systems, (siblings) and 
systems serve other peer systems.The characteristics of a Sal must be 
compatible with the needs of its served system; in this respect, I am in 
agreement with Checkland(1981) and his Law of Conceptualization 
Issues will arise as a result of any new system which is proposed to be 
introduced into the domain. The analyst has, therefore, to be concerned not 
only with the issues already extant in the domain, but the changed set of issues 
that his work might introduce. This requires that he or she produce a putative 
set of activities which a solution Sal would undertake. 
6.3. Cost Effectiveness and Net Contribution 
Systems to solve (or at least change) problems are often complex and 
expensive. It is practice to relate their effectiveness, however anticipated, to 
their cost, however estimated, and to rank potential Sal competitors 
according to cost-effectiveness rules. 
J Perfonnance I ,... Performance 
I Prediction I Model ｾ＠ . 
Design Survivability Effective- Cost-H Survivability L Concept Model I Prediction ... ness ｾ＠ Effectiveness Options Prediction Tradeoff 
I J Availability II- ,.. Availability t I Model Prediction 
:1 Cost I 
Prediction I 
Cost-Effectiveness 
Such rules are valuable in the real world, but they do not tell the whole story. 
Each potential Sal, in addition to being effective for its particular, declared 
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purpose, is also owned by its parent system. A proper measure of the worth 
of an Sal is its Net Contribution to that parent. Consider for example a 
competition between system concepts in which the winner, the most cost-
effective solution in relative tenns, also was (say) the heaviest in a case where 
the parent system had a limited payload. Analysis of that Sal would trade 
relative cost-effectiveness - a gain - against concomitant weight - a loss - and 
detennine Net Contribution. The same Sal, now offered for a parent system 
with no payload concern, would exhibit a quite different Net Contribution. 
The concept of Net Contribution is, perhaps, new but important in the 
conceiving of systems .. 
SERVEDI 
SIBLING 
SYSTEM(S) 
DOMAIN 
ISSUES 
PARENT 
SYSlEM 
Net Contribution 
CONVENTIONAL CER PROCESS 
NET CONTRIBUTION 
The figure shows the cost-effectiveness paradigm from the previous figure in 
the shaded panel. It also shows that domain issues affect the parent systems 
and sibling systems in addition to the SOL Net Contribution is seen, then, as 
the balance of contribution made by the Sal systems's goals. The figure also 
shows that the Sal influences the domain issues and indeed an SOl may create 
as many new issues as it seeks to solve - The US Strategic Defense ｉｮｩｴｩｾｴｩｶ･＠ is 
a case in point. 
6.4. The Continuum Concept 
Some methodologies, and SSM is typical, have very few steps; SSM has 
seven. The would-be analyst has to progress from step to step, iterating 
where need be, but essentially he is using his own intellect to find his way in a 
very loose framework. Advocates of such frameworks would say that it is the 
very "looseness" that provides the ability to address a wide variety of "soft" 
problems. I would agree, but it is also true that these frameworks are suitable 
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structures only for practitioners of substantial, and unusual, intellect; what of 
the rest? 
For the less experienced, or for those treading a particularly complex path 
where the wood may be obscured by the trees, a set of stepping stones is more 
appropriate. Purists might criticize the concept as reductionist, see Burrell 
and Morgan (1979) for categorization, but is that reasonable? A man 
approaches a river, to find no crossing. Using a stick to probe the water and 
some nearby boulders, he finds a route across the river and establishes a 
. stepping-stone path over the water. Is his method reductionist? In a sense, 
yes, he has reduced the problem of crossing the river to a series of smaller 
problems. But in a sense, no, because what he did was exploratory - he had to 
fmd his way, there was no sense of decomposition, little of Descartes 
principles of 1637, so often referred to as the foundation of reductionism:-
"Accept only that which is clear and distinct as 
true 
Divide each difficulty into as many parts as 
possible 
Start with the simplest elements and move by an 
orderly procedure to the more complex 
Make complete enumerations and reviews to 
make certain that nothing was omitted" 
Whether or no the idea of stepping stones is reductionist, there is clear 
advantage to the typical analyst in having rather more than less guidance in a 
methodology, provided always that guidance does not become anti-creative . 
• 
Accepting, with that proviso, the idea of stepping stones, considerations of 
step-size come into focus. In real-world problems; the need for a structured 
conceiving system arises principally as a result of the need to manage 
complexity. Individual steps should therefore be such that they uniquely 
contain easily grasped concepts. on the one hand, and do not require 
unattainable leaps of the intellect on the other 
So emerges the idea of a continuum - a set of steps, so arranged as to provide 
a contiguous route from issues to well-formulated design concepts for 
solutions. 
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6.5. Bounding Concepts 
Putting sensible boundaries around the SOl is a difficult task. There are few 
rules, and they are mostly negative; the most important of these is not to 
identify the SOl boundary with a convenient physical or organizational 
boundary. That rule is of limited value to the average analyst, serving only to 
caution, not to assist. 
Sensible boundaries concern themselves with interfaces. The ideal boundary 
would not be crossed in either direction, but would uniquely contain the SOL 
The only case of such a boundary is the Universe: again, not too helpful, but 
at least indicative. A reasoned, and reasonable, SOl boundary is one where 
the number of relationships with external entities is in some sense minimized 
and, where relationships do exist, they are well understood. 
IDA systems have boundaries that are encouraged by convention. The 
diagram below shows the convention used by many western military systems. 
In this approach, the IDA system is separate from the Ac.tion System which it 
controls, remembering of course that the Action System'contains one or 
more miniature IDA systems of its own. Other systems in the figure also 
contain their own IDA systems. Political and Logistic Systems are in 
evidence on the figure, and clearly they have an impact on the central IDA 
system. These influences are, however, determinable to a degree, and the 
usual practice is to contain within the IDA system, replicas in miniature of 
these other systems. An IDA system might have a logistics cell, for example, 
which "looks after" the interface with the complex external logistic system; 
this is a good example of the proper use of clan loyalties to accommodate 
tribal objectives, since the logistics cell would be manned by a logistics 
specialist - and similarly for political advisers, engineering cells, and so on. 
76 
EVENTS 
+ EXTERNAL r ｉｎｲｮａｔｉｖｅＱｾ＠ _____ ＭＭＺｾ＠
HIGHER ｾ＠
VTHORITY r 
CON N ONAL 
IDA SYSTEM ＭＭＭＭＭｾ＠
BOUNDARIES 
+ ELEMENTS- COMPETITIVE 
",,,,.,,,,,+- IN ACTION_ ACTION 
An approach to bounding, presented by example later, arises from clustering 
domain activities and by then identifying the activity clusters with the 
resulting physical clusters. The process of clustering draws together those 
activities which have many, or strong, interrelationships. If the clustered 
activities are retained in physical realization, then relationships will not be 
impeded. Bounding the SOl then becomes a process of identifying the domain 
activities and clustering them according to some suitable strategy or rules 
Some of those rules have already been presented under the discussion about 
N2 charts. 
Other approaches to bounding are available. The systems dynamics figure 
above is a useful device for representing connected system& at a sufficiently 
abstract level for sensible groupings and inter-group influences to be 
apparent. Similarly, Data State Design offers a usefully abstract view for the 
same purpose - see the enclosed papers, A General Theory 0/ Command and 
Control and Managing Systems Creation for details, the one at macro-level 
and the other more at the internal boundary level within anIDA system 
Since boundaries form around clusters which are the stuff of architecture, 
the concept of bounding is basic to architecture too. Clusters, and hence, their 
boundaries, come in varieties. An entity may become a member of a cluster 
because it has a strong relationship with one of the existing cluster members. 
Alternatively, it may have many relationships with many of the cluster 
members. Different clustering rules result in tight, compact clusters, or 
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loose, strung-out clusters. Some strategies leave entities without a cluster to 
which they should belong; others provide "homes" for all entities but by 
loose attachments in some instances. Examples of different strategies and. 
their impact on clusters will be presented in Chapter 8. 
Visual Q Analysis is developing as a powerful means of exploring clustering 
and hierarchical concepts; see Macgill (1983). Q Analysis examines clusters 
and hierarchies topographically and geometrically, enabling the analyst inter 
alia to, as it were, slice horizontally through a hierarchy and view the cross-
section from above. 
.. 
6.6. Middle-Out Design 
Top Down design is a fundamental feature of the systems engineer's 
philosophy; it implies a high level of abstraction at the start so as to free the 
mind of prejudice and to encompass all aspects of the subject. Top Down, . 
improperly applied, can be a disaster of overkill and misdirection. It is 
essential to have some knowledge of "the bottom" if Top Down is to be given 
sensible direction; understanding the bottom equates to having good domain 
and subject knowledge. 
Most people, if they are honest, do not work Top Down. While it is often . 
sensible to present the results of work top down, analysts faced with a new .. 
problem generally seem in practice to start somewhere in the middle of a 
problem, choosing a topic with which they are reasonably comfortable, so 
easing their way into the overall problem, as indeed proposed by Descartes. 
It is the mark of a good analyst that he or she can retract from this early 
effort and move up to the top level once a greater degree of understanding 
has been achieved without retaining undue allegiance to their initial work. 
The real world in which design solutions have to be conceived operates under 
budget and time pressures. A methodology that does not make the best use of 
time will prove impracticable. It is a characteristic of some soft 
methodologies that they produce at the beginning a vast array of problem 
situation data much of which is subsequently discarded. SSM's rich picture: 
can fall into this category (when being developed by the inexperienced), 
although it can also be argued that unless the full spread of situation factors is 
uncovered, it will be difficult to discern the issues. A compromise is needed . 
which directs attention of analysts towards factors which could be relevant 
and away from factors that cannot be relevant. 
For similar reasons of time and budget, and with the added incentives of 
traceability and completeness, it is important to employ formality in the 
concept evolution process. The software industry is presently in the throes of 
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introducing fonnal methods for mathematically provable software design 
and test. The move is inevitable where a soft engineering practice meets stark 
reality in business. The process of conceiving designs is not at a stage of 
development where such formal methods could be applied, but a simpler 
form of such fonnal methods is a minimum feature. 
A suitable approach to the kind of relaxed formality appropriate to 
Conceiving Systems is that of the template. The template is simply an empty 
set of pigeon holes, suitably annotated with headings indicating the contents 
with which each hole is to be filled. 
A Requirement Template, available from the start of a concept formulation 
exercise, will enable analysts to concentrate their early work towards the 
intermediate goal of filling the template pigeonholes. Further templates, 
available from the start of the exercise, will guide the effort after filling the 
Requirement Template towards filling the solution templates. Completing 
templates also provides milestones of achievement and progress, which are 
necessary even in this essentially creative process. 
A Requirement Template, at high level, might appear as follows:-
S-O I PRIME DIRECTIVE 
Semantic Analysis 
of 
Prime Directive 
STRATEGY FOR 
ACHIEVING PRIME DIRECTIVE 
Behaviour 
Aggression 
Discretion 
Co-operation 
Unifying Concepts 
Innovative Approaches 
Strategy Options 
Management Se1 
Mission Management 
Vehicle Management 
Resource Management 
r".' ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• , ••••••••••••••••••••• r •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Measures 
of S-O-I 
Effectiveness 
Performance 
Availability of Performance 
Survivability of Performance 
, , 
Negative 
Contribution 
Factors 
Threat 
to 
Achieving PD 
Cost External 
Parent System Degradation Internal 
- Consumption / Dissipation. Environmental 
: ' - Opportunity Cost Ｚｾ＠ •••••••••••••••••••••••• # •••••••• 
: - Adverse Mission Effectiveness: Political I Economic I 
, ' 
: : Technology 
SOl Requirements Template 
(Following paragraphs will explain the meaning and purpose of the various 
Requirement Template panels.) 
The following template is an example of one used later in the process of 
conceiving a design concept, and it presupposes that several design concepts 
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are vying for success. The Tradeoff Template, one form of the general 
solution template, is used for recording the characteristics of several design 
concept options and for trading between their respective merits and 
demerits:-
OPTIONS 
1 2 3 4 
E 
PERFORMANCE - Mission Management 
F - Vehicle Management 
F - Resource Managemen 
E AVAILABILITY - Reliability 
c 
- Maintainability 
T 
- Re-Configurability I 
v SURVIVABILITY - Avoidance of Detection 
E - Self Defence 
N 
- Damage Tolerance E INTEROPERABIUTY s 
s USABILITY 
SECURITY, ETC 
c COST 0 
N N ADVERSE PARENT MISSION FACTORS 
E T FAILURE PATTERNS G R 
A I CONSUMPTION T B 
DISSIPATION I U 
V T MASS I WEIGHT E I 
0 VOLUME I SHAPE, ETC 
N 
NET CONlRIBUTION 
501 Tradeoff Template 
It is immediately apparent that the two templates are related, since some of 
the titles are shared between them.That commonality follows the thread 
identified earlier in this chapter concerned with issues, effectiveness and net 
contribution 
6.7. Creative Entropy 
Templates are intended to direct the effort, not to inhibit creativity. 
Stimulating creativity within the template framework is an essential objective 
of a conceiving system. There is a nwnber of approaches employed in this 
context; together I have dubbed them as promoting Creative Entropy - the 
term is intended to evoke an intellectual image rather than a mathematical 
formula, but it requires explanation 
Entropy is a measure of the degree of disorder in a system. Guilbaud (1959) 
states: "To say that entropy increases spontaneously, in specified 
circumstances, is simply to say that the physical system in question tends 
naturally towards states that are more probable, being realizable in a larger 
number of distinct ways" 
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Entropy is concerned, then, with variety and possible states. Creative 
Entropy is the purposeful development of variety and the exploration of 
possible states, the purpose being to create an information base relevant to 
some concept-of-interest 
It has long been noted that there is qualitative correspondence between 
entropy and information, supported by a notable mathematical similarity 
which de Broglie (1951) suggests is the "Most pleasing and most important of 
the ideas suggested by cybernetics ... ". Certainly, the generally accepted view 
of the relationship between the two measures is that an increase in entropy is 
analogous to a diminution of information, given suitable statistical models 
for both. 
Negentropy, (negative entropy) is a term used by communication and 
information specialists to describe information content. Checkland (1981) 
points out that information and entropy are mathematically very similar 
except for the introduction of a negative sign in the measurement of 
information content in messages. "Now, since entropy measures degree of 
disorder, and information may be plausibly regarded as that which reduces 
uncertainty and hence increases order, it is extremely tempting to equate 
information with negative entropy". 
I am less happy with Checkland's view than with Guillbaud's approach, since 
the negative sign in negentropy results from taking the logarithm of a 
probability that a message will occur, by convention less than or equal to 
unity. 
Creative Entropy, as I derme it, is the conscious development of concepts, 
data and ideas, using a variety of techniques to provide frameworks and 
environments to stimulate and direct this essentially creative process of 
design concept formulation. 
Mind Sets 
One way to generate concept entropy is to induce intentional mindsets in the 
analyst. The template is a high level mind set. Contained within it is a variety 
of mindsets. These mindsets are self-contained topic areas requiring 
concentration in which the analyst can roam, generating ideas by 
brainstorming, ideawriting or cerebral energy. By moving from mindset to 
mindset, a wealth of creative concepts can be stimulated. It is, of course, 
important to ensure that the sum of such mindsets is sufficient to cover the 
necessary range of design issues - that is the role of the template. A 
particularly useful application of mindset is the necessary and sufficient set. 
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Necessary and Sufficient Sets 
Survivability may be thought of as comprising three sub-headings:-
Avoidance of Detection 
Self Defence 
Damage Tolerance 
Avoidance of Detection concerns itself with camouflage, mimicry, covert 
communications, Stealth and the like. Self Defence addresses the ability of the 
system in question to fight off an attack. Damage Tolerance presumes ,. 
damage and addresses the ability of the system to continue operation .. 
Together, they form a set which has some of the formalism of a Necessary 
and Sufficient set. Why necessary and sufficient? Avoidance of Detection 
seeks to survive by not being seen. Self Defence presumes Avoidance to have 
failed. Damage Tolerance assumes Self Defence to have failed. Together, all 
three cover the range of feasible situations. Provided the individual sets can 
be filled, then the composite set is both necessary and sufficient. 
Necessary and Sufficient Sets can be applied more widely than survivability 
and are of particular value in Conceiving Systems; they provide an 
unobtrusive formality to the process of generating and developing design 
concepts. ," 
Creative Tension 
Creative Tension is realized by identifying objectives in the design, 
formulating strategies for achieving those objectives and at the same time 
elaborating the threats to the achievement of those strategies, see Popper 
(1972). A typical objective might be the improvement of system availability .. 
Creative tension requires attention to the threat to achieving that 
improvement, which might be political, skill shortages, cost, inaccessibility. 
or a host of other threats. Creative tension prevents narrow focusing on 
particular aspects of the problem situation which, for improved availability, : 
might have been simply to increase spares in anticipation of failures. 
The Spectrum of Options 
The degree of Creative Entropy is clearly related to the diversity of optional 
design concepts that are generated. Choosing both the degree of diversity, 
and the number, of options is non-trivial. 
It is possible to approach an understanding of this issue geometrically, which 
method I developed when working on the ACCS programme in Brussels to 
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provide a coherent and traceable means of reducing the ideal number of 
computer simulation runs from 2000 to an affordable number of less than 
100. Consider a circle, or disk. It has area and two dimensions. We can show 
simply that the area is proportional to the square of the radius. 
In the figure, only 5% of the radius 
(1 - 0.949) accounts for 10% of the 
area. If the axes of the circle 
represented dimensions of interest, 
then we could say that 10% of the 
information content.is contained in 
the outer 5% of the radius. This 
simple concept applies to any 
number of dimensions. Consider a 
problem situation with, say, twenty 
independent parameters of interest, 
Anulus area as % of whole = 1 - (r / R)1\2including speed, capacity, power 
Take anulus to ｯ｣ｾｰｹＬ＠ sal' 10% of area dissipation, weather and so on. 
Then r - "0.9 R These parameters are independent 
r = 0.949 * R ..: ' 
or dlmenslOnaly orthogonal. They 
Information Shells can thus be represented in N-
dimensional space, where N = 10 
The mathematics as applied to the circle can be applied equally. to the N-
dimensional information sphere, but this time taking the Nth, or tenth, root. 
Keeping with 10% as the figure of choice, we calculate that 10% of the 
sphere's volume is contained in an outer skin only 1.05% of the radius. I 
refer to this as the orange peel effect - as the number of orthogonal 
parameters increases, the burden of the information content in·the resulting 
N-dimensional information sphere migrates rapidly to the surface of that 
sphere. Moreover, as the number of dimensions increases, the opportunity to 
pursue design concepts that examine each dimension independently along its 
length, diminishes due to time and budget constraints. In practice, time 
allows us to pursue only a few options - the greater the number of 
dimensions, or degrees of freedom, the fewer the number of ｯｰｾｩｯｮｳ＠ due to 
their increasing individual complexity. 
The choice of options is difficult but, continuing along the multi-dimensional 
orange analogy, the choice should be made near the orange surface and 
equidistant around the surface from the ends of axes. For example, consider 
three dimensions - speed, weather and height - in an N-dimensional 
infonnation set. Given limited choice, it is better to choose combinations 
such as: {maximum speed, minimum height, bad weather} than to select 
{cruising speed, average height, good weather} for the following reasons. 
The first set has extremes, evidently; the second set contains inter alia, 
average height. Average height lies between minimum and maximum height 
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- it is the origin point of the height axis, and so we are exercising the other 
parameters along the height axis. We will explore the limits of the design 
envelope less by so doing. Better by far to combine an extreme of height -
high or low - with an extreme of speed - high or low, and so on. In practice, 
many extreme combinations prove uninteresting, as in this example might 
{low height, low speed, good weather} which would often be mundane. A 
process of elimination is thus possible in which the less interesting 
combinations of extremes are progressively eliminated until an a.cceptable 
number of options consistent with time and budget is achieved 
6.8. The Concept of a Prime Directive 
.. 
Central to the idea of Conceiving Systems is the Prime Directive (PD). The 
PD is the highest level of abstract, objective statement of SOl purpose. The 
expression, Prime Directive, is borrowed from life sciences and is 
exemplified by homo sapien's prime directive, "propagation of the species" 
Mention was made earlier of the difficulty faced by analysts in trying to 
functionally decompose high level requirements, a truly reductionist process. 
If functional decomposition starts too low in the hierarchy or if there is no 
real understanding of "function" then difficulties and shortcomings ensue. 
The difficulty, previously mentioned, facing radar analysts who start 
decomposition at the "sensor, communications, processing" point (actually 
not functional at all, but physical decomposition) is that they can never justify 
"what kind of radar" The homo sapiens PD above is ideal; starting at that 
point allows the following approach, by comparison with the radar 
decomposition. 
Humans evolved physically and socially. Social 
evolution, behavioural evolution during one lifetime, 
required minimal birth-imprinting. Human children 
were therefore born helpless and were protected and 
educated socially within the family circle. Their 
helplessness necessitated shelter by night, and, homo 
sapiens operated principally by day. Optical sensors 
consequently evolved to be optimal in the green part of 
the visual spectrum, where greatest solar light energy 
falls by day 
Returning to the radar case, were the radar analysts to,work from an 
equivalent prime directive for their radar,stating what the ultimate objective 
of their radar was to be, rather than from a set of pseudo-functions, then 
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they would learn what kind of radar sensor was needed rather than simply 
that one was to exist. 
The prime directive is the point to which all design concepts should be 
traceable. Clearly its formulation is of considerable importance. The PD is 
not synonymous with SSM's root definition which seeks to describe a system. 
The PD presumes a general need and describes the need in the highest 
possible terms. A PD must be abstract. It should, therefore,comprise a phrase 
containing only one verb, in the infmitive.In that one phrase, only the highest 
principles should be included. 
.' 
Perhaps the best way to understand PDs is to observe some. We have seen the 
archetypal PD for homo sapiens The Royal Air Force have a Prime Directive 
(my term, not theirs) for the Air Defence of the United Kingdom: "To 
neutralize enemy air incursions into the UK Air Defence Region". This is an 
excellent PD. It expresses succinctly and precisely the raison d'etre, the limits 
of action and the sphere of activity of the Air Defence forces.It does not 
over-specify; "neutralize" is vague yet entirely sufficient for purpose and 
there is no hint of solution in the PO's wording. These, then, are the features 
that characterize a good PD:-
Highest Level of Abstraction 
Ultimate Purpose 
Sphere of Endeavour 
Solution Transparency 
Semantic Analysis 
Semantic Analysis was learnt in Brussels working with French designers on 
the ACCS Programme - they appear to use it incessantly. The process is' 
straightforward: each word in a statement (the PD in this instance) is 
examined and expanded as far as it can be to extract all meaning, stated and 
implied, that it might contain. 
On first association, semantic analysis may seem boring and pedantic. 
Experience suggests considerable value, however. A group engaged in 
semantic analysis come to form a comprehensive, consensus view concerning 
the statement. Where the process is applied to a document, progress - at first 
apparently slow, rapidly accelerates as prior ideas that have been understood 
contribute to fuller understanding of later ideas. 
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I have developed my own style of semantic analysis for the application under 
consideration; an example follows, using the RAF Air Defence PD as start-
point. The PD is , again, "To neutralize enemy air incursions into the UK Air 
Defence Region" 
"To neutralize ... 
.... enemy .. 
hostile 
... air incursions .. 
.. into the UK ADR". 
dermed 
sovereign UK 
Implied Means:-
To eliminate the threat from .... 
. ...... those declared by government to be-
who .... 
. 
.... enter by air without permission...... : 
.. .... into the designated airspace legally 
and internationally promulgated as 
air space 
Use of U.K. Air Defence assets 
The semantic analysis thus comprises three parts: the PD, the analysis 
expanded as a continuous sentence, and statement of implied meaning - where 
such exists. The semantic analysis expands the understanding but without 
impairing the characteristics presented in the box above. 
6.9. Strategy and Threat 
The formulation of a sound PD is necessary, essential even, but not sufficient. 
Consider the case of homo sapiens; he shares his prime directive with every 
other biological entity on the planet. The PD alone lacks discriminatory 
power. That power is developed by identifying both a strategy for achieving 
the PD and a threat to its achievement (creative tension) 
Using homo sapiens as an example again, the strategy adopted by our 
forebears in meeting the prime directive of propagation of the species could 
be described at great length and it certainly had many variations, but it 
probably included the following:-
The formation of family groups and groups of such groups into clans 
or villages. The nuclear family related to a wider family, often 
matriarchal owing both to the greater longevity of the hardier females 
and to their continuous presence within the family unit. Around the 
family groups, the males hunted in cooperation, while the females and 
young children gathered food. Families and clans banded together for 
strength, sheltering in caves and constructions by night and in 
inclement weather to protect the young, the infirm and the old. 
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Threats could similarly be elaborated, but might be addressed very briefly as 
follows:-
Threats arose from a variety of sources: competing groups of homo 
sapiens; disease; weather effects on food supplies; carnivores; internal 
competition amongst aggressive, ambitious younger males, and so. 
The homo sapiens sapiens pattern shows how to tackle the IDA problem. 
Having established a threat to the achievement of the PD in some depth, 
various strategies can be conceived for an SOl and tried out against it, until a 
robust, high-level strategy, or set of strategy options is developed. These will 
give purpose and direction to the design concepts. 
Behaviour 
An aspect of IDA system seldom discussed is their 'behaviour". The Soviet 
Air Defence system that shot down the Korean airliner in recent years 
certainly exhibited behaviour - fierce territorial imperative. IDA systems 
generally exhibit character; it is developed within the design concept by the 
management structure, the speed of response, by the information presented 
to the operators, and of course by the behaviour of the operators themselves. 
If the IDA system is viewed as a single entity, humans and machines together, 
then behaviour is attributable.to the whole. If we look at the two elements 
separately, then each element enables behaviour on the part of the other. 
6.10. Management Sets 
Management Sets are necessary and sufficient set which describe the sum of 
activities undertaken within the SOl. Generally, the Prime Directive implies 
a system mission. The first of the three Management Sets is the sum of the 
activities needed to effect the mission. The IDA system may be viewed as a 
vehicle for executing the mission. That vehicle has to be run, organized and 
protected within and from its immediate environment. The second of the 
management sets is the sum of all the activities needed to sustain the vehicle as 
it pursues the mission. Both the vehicle and the pursuit of the mission absorb 
resources. The third management set is the sum of all the activities necessary 
to resource both the vehicle and the overall mission. 
As an example, consider the following notional example for a fire brigade 
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*Location of Fires 
*Determination of 
Routes 
*Knowledge of Traffic 
*Cooperation with 
Other Services 
Fire Brigade Management 
*Personnel Alerting 
*Shift and Rostas 
* Communications 
Control 
*Tender Readiness 
Provision and 
maintenance of: 
*Fire-Fighting 
Equipment 
*Mobile Comrns 
Set*Fuel *Reserve Power 
*Standby Pumps 
*Tender Servicing 
Note that mission management is concerned with the overall objective, while 
vehicle management refers, not to the fire tenders - which are the action 
elements and which contain their own IDA system, the fire-crews - but to the 
means of managing local operations within the fire HQ control centre, such 
as calling-in off-duty staff, alerting senior staff, preparing all the fire-station 
facilities, etc. Finally, resource management ensures that both the mission 
management and vehicle management activities are resourced. This means, 
for example, that resource management will provide mission management 
with backup tenders as called for to support the mission, while mission 
management will deploy those backup tenders operationally. 
The management set is another Necessary and Sufficient set. Closer 
examination shows that it enables provision of Performance, Availability of 
Performance and Survivability of Performance The three elements are 
mixed, but clearly discernible: Performance is vested in the skill and 
effectiveness with which control staff respond to fires by deploying and 
managing fire-fighting facilities and Availability and Survivability are 
provided by vehicle and resource management, which together ensure men 
and machines are provided, either from within owned resources or by 
borrowing from other forces. 
The ｍ｡ｾ｡ｧ･ｭ･ｮｴ＠ Set, as elaborated during the process of design concept 
formulatIon, is the precursor to software, since it embodies purpose and 
meaning into the solution. 
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6.11. Architecture and Process 
The eventual design concept will be characterized by a combination of 
architecture and process. The Management Set described above leads first to 
process and then to software. Each of the activities in the fire brigade 
diagram will result in a set of processes which, taken together, will achieve 
the activity. 
For example, consider the following:-
Determination of Routes ｾ＠ Fire Brigade 
The activity,"Determining Routes" is comprised of a number of processes, 
contained within the arrows of this data state diagram, but none-the-Iess 
highly visible.Note the level of abstraction that is being maintained by the 
choice of representation - the activity is clearly explained as a combination of 
overt data and presumed process. The diagrammatic language is simple and 
allows designers, domain experts and engineers to discuss on a conunon 
basis, meaningful to all. 
The various activities developed in the management set, together with those 
in the domain, have inter-relationships. The foundations of architecture are 
established by clustering those activities into organizational sets. This process 
will be elaborated in following chapters 
Summary 
The chapter has presented the important, fundamental concepts of 
Conceiving Systems which act as a bridge between those who simply enquire 
into problems without a drive to find solutions, and those who drive towards 
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solutions without perhaps enquiring as much as they should. 
The components of a Conceiving System are presented as follows:-
• Middle-out Design, using a set of templates such that the exploration 
of concepts and the generation of data and information is structured 
and directed, rather than haphazard and capricious 
• Creative Entropy, a device for generating a diverse information base 
from which to develop solution concepts 
• Necessary & Sufficient Sets, a means of introducing formality into 
the information generation, to promote complete coverage of subject 
matter 
• Prime Directive, the concept that any conceived system should be 
directed towards one overriding objective 
• The Triad of Prime Directive, Strategy for its achievement, and 
Threat to its achievement as a means of generating useful information 
• Management Sets, standard Necessary & Sufficient Sets which apply 
to any organism, and which comprise only three headings:-
- Mission, or Objectives, Management, concerned with the 
direct achievement of the Prime Directive 
- Viability, or Vehicle, Management, concerned with 
maintaining and enhancing the capability of the system to pursue 
its objectives 
- Resources Management, concerned with supporting the first 
two above. 
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7. THE SEVEN STEP CONTINUUM 
7.1. A Bridge from Soft to Hard? 
The previous chapter described features of a Conceiving System; this chapter 
presents a conceiving system, and subsequent chapters show it in use. To 
reiterate, a Conceiving System is intended to fill the gap between:-
Enquiring Systems, sometimes called Learning Systems, which seek to 
understand complex problem situations, and 
Creating Systems, sometimes called Engineering Frameworks or 
Design & Development Systems. 
A Conceiving System seeks to use methods, from whatever school of 
endeavour, to understand domain issues, to identify potential solutions and to 
develop robust design concepts. It is an aim of a Conceiving System that 
operators and users, familiar with the domain and its issues, could I should 
form a part of the Conceiving System together with system analysts and 
designers. 
The Seven-Step Continuum introduced and described below is a Conceiving 
System. 
7.2. Addressed Systems 
The Seven-Step Continuum (SSC) is designed primarily with IDA systems of 
the classic variety in mind, i.e. those which relate to, but essentially do not 
contain, either sensor systems or action systems. However, the framework is 
sufficiently relaxed to encompass a wider variety of concepts, and chapter 9 
will apply the sse to an avionics architecture which is at the limit of the 
definition. 
7.3. Developing the Continuum 
The SSC has been developed gradually over a number of years, emerging 
slowly from the Creating System presented in Chapter 5. Ithas been tried in 
use in industry, evolving in the process and so its progress may be described 
as action research 
User populations were originally design engineers, but more latterly the SSC 
has been used with non-engineer students in academia. The students were a 
mixed-sex, mixed ethnic-origin, mixed interest group concerned with the 
study of systems and management. Their surprisingly-ready grasp of the 
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methods and approach inspired the writing of this thesis. 
It is concerning to note that industry, comfortable enough with Creating 
Systems, presently has little opportunity to apply Conceiving Systems in the 
real world at present. Generally, the conception of a system is the 
responsibility of a customer organization while its design and development 
falls to a contractor. Thus in UK defence, for example, the Ministry of 
Defence Operational Requirements branches, populated principally by 
operator I users, detail the requirements for new systems, while MOD 
Procurement Executive branches let contracts for the study and design & 
development of those systems. This division might be counter-productive, 
but in the absence of an accepted Conceiving System, it is the present, wide-
spread practice. It is, in my view, one of the major, if not the principal, cause 
of dissatisfaction with procured systems. 
7.4. The ｓｾｶ･ｮ＠ Steps at Level Zero 
The Seven Step Continuum suggests, perhaps, that the seven steps themselves 
form a continuum. That is not quite accurate. The seven steps form a 
progression from soft to hard, from issue to solution (if there is one), but 
each step is quite large - too large to be termed a continuum. Each step could 
be viewed as a set of lesser steps, and each of those decomposed further. The 
SSC does not operate in quite that formal, reductionist manner, either. 
Instead the steps are "magnified", revealing more and more detail with 
increasing magnification. This differs from reductionism in that "smaller" 
ideas become visible at higher magnification, and are not necessarily simple 
decompositions from the higher level. 
First, the Seven-Step Continuum at the highest level, level zero:-
STEP 1 - Understand the Issues 
STEP 2 - Establish the SOl Requirement Template 
STEP 3 - Thvelop Process and Structure Softer 
STEP 4 - Assign Man-Machine Roles 
STEP 5 - Ikvelop SOl Performance 
STEP 6 - nvelop SOl Effectiveness Harder 
STEP 7 - Ikvelop the Preferred Design Concept 
Seven-Step Continuum from Soft to Hard 
Much of the content of the seven steps has been presented in the previous 
chapter and in the enclosed papers, particularly Managing System Creation. 
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However, some explanation of the step structure and sequence is warranted 
The steps clearly move from issue to design concept - the intention is to 
fmd a solution, the goal is to attain a result, even where the result is 
that no sensible solution exists even at concept level. 
Steps are taken in sequence, starting a Step 1. 
There being no established consensus on what constitutes a design 
concept, Steps 5, 6 and 7 develop successive degrees of robustness in 
the concept. It is, for some purposes, feasible to stop at Step 4, having 
become satisfied with the level of understanding for a particular design 
concept. For others, stopping at Step 5 will satisfy. The full seven steps 
will provide a well justified, traceable design concept where one exists. 
The steps do not, essentially, presuppose an SOl with objectives; in the 
real world, it is common for systems to be loosely prescribed by 
customers without apparent, or at least declared, objectives or with the 
declared objectives quite different from the real objectives which have 
to be inferred. 
The SOl, or System of Interest, is the complete IDA system and at all 
times includes the people and their machines; even when it is necessary 
to distinguish between the contained (human) decision forming system 
and the decision support system which may (but need not) be 
technologically based, measures of effectiveness will continue to 
regard the system as one. 
The SOl is influenced by parent and sibling systems, but it is not those 
systems. There is a relatively clear demarcation around an IDA 
system; the influences on the SOl are experience through its many 
interfaces 
Some of the steps require understanding, technique and method which 
may not presently be available either in an acceptable form, or in a 
form for which there is consensus approval. None-the-Iess, it is 
possible to delineate and describe the characteristics of such needs; 
indeed, it is useful and important so to do, in order to direct attention 
to the shortfall in tools and techniques. 
The development of Performance is seen to precede that of 
Effectiveness. This sequence is pragmatically based; there is no value 
in developing effectiveness in a system concept that lacks performance. 
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7.5. The Seven Steps at level One 
.' The first level of resolution is as follows:-
.. 
First 
Level 
Breakdown 
Step 1 - Understand the 
Issues 
- --
Step 2 - Set-Up the 
S-O-I Requirements 
Template 
ｲｲＺＢｉＧｾｾｾ］ＺＺＺＺｔＢＢＢＱ＠ Step 3 - Develop 
Appreciate 
Installation 
Constraints 
Conceive 
Availability & Survivability 
of Perfonnance 
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Processes & 
Structure 
Step 4 - AssignMan I 
Strategies for 
Perfonnance 
Machine • 
Roles 
_'-=:--:::I:""-==-' _ _ _ 
Step 5-
Develop 
S-O-I 
Perfonnance 
Step 6-
Develop S-O-I 
ｉＮＭＭＭｲＭＧＭＢ［Ｂｾ＠ Effectiveness 
Step 7 -Develop the 
Preferred Design 
Concept 
The individual steps will elaborated in the following paragraphs. Note, at this 
first level of magnification, the use of a restricted set of action words, at the 
beginning of each task; typical action words and their meanings follow:-
Gain an in-depth knowledge of all facets 
Describe the limits of the system 
Generate or discover, recognize, describe, categorize 
Propose, put forward 
Amplify, expand, decompose 
Understand 
Bound 
Identify 
Postulate 
Elaborate 
Develop 
Estimate 
Conceive 
Appreciate 
Enhance 
Formulate 
Cluster 
Predict 
Map 
Compare 
Etc 
o· 
Create, expand, detail 
Calculate numerically, approximately 
Create, generate the idea 
Survey and gain an understanding 
Add features, capability 
Develop justifiable, traceable rules 
o Group according to formulated rules 
Forecast on the basis of model or parametric analysis 
Transfer viewpoints 
Model options 
Some restriction to the range and meaning of action words is a useful adjunct 
to the formality of the metasystem process; it militates against 
misunderstanding without at the same time introducing a set of jargon terms 
that would deter the non-specialist or newcomer. 
Note in the figure above that the Requirement Template is set up as the output 
of Step 2 - in fact, Step 2 is devoted to setting up the Requirement Template 
on the basis of work undertaken in Steps 1, and 2. The Requirement Template 
is a hinge-pin of the SSC, directing earlier work and setting the stage for the 
the Solution Template of :;tep 4, which provides a similar hinge-pin for the 
remainder of the design concept formulation process going as far as is needed 
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7.6. The Seven Steps at Level Two 
This paragraph will briefly present each of the seven steps in turn at the 
second level of resolution or magnification 
Step 1 
V 
Understand 
Domain Imperatives, 
Doctrine & Practice 
I Ifl 
-'I 
Establish 
S-O-I 
Boundaries 1/5 
I 
'f I Explore S-O-I I 
Finite States I 1/8 
y 
Identify the 
System of 
Interest S-O-1 1/1 
). ｾ＠
ｾ＠ t' 
Postulate Identify Current S-O-I Activities Domain Activitie! in the Domain 
I 1/4 __ 1/3 
_ ..... 
.. ｾ＠
ｾ＠ r.. 
" Identify / Explore Identify / Explore 
S-O-I Negative Contributiol Wider System 
to Wider System Influences on S-O-I 
..... ｾ＠
1/6 I 
y 
Develop S-O-I 
Objectives and 
Drivers 
.... """'--
';"" 
Identify / Prescribe 
S-O-I Facilities, 
Sources and Indicator! 1/10 
STEP 1 • UNDERSTAND THE ISSUES 
• Political 
• Economic 
·Technology 
• Environment In 
1/9 
The first step explores and examines the full range of influences in the 
domain, and in the wider political, economic, technological and 
environmental arenas. The SOl either exists as a concept (1/1) or as part of 
the set of domain activities, (1/3 & 1/4). 
It is essential to fully comprehend, in the fullest sense, the domain 
imperatives, doctrine and practice (1/2) and it is here that the fallibility of 
knowledge elicitation comes into focus. Can it be possible for someone not 
immersed in the domain to capture not only the spoken and written, but the 
understood word of a particular domain in which the expert may have spent a 
lifetime and yet still be learning. Knowledge elicitation is a vicarious activity 
at best and - well-intentioned though the practitioners may be - it can surely 
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be rated no better than second to the expert's deployment of his personal 
understanding. 
Note also the deliberate opening up of the issues of Negative Contribution to 
the parent system and the exploration of differing finite states in which the 
SOl might be required to exist, co-exist, operate, etc; both are examples of 
Creative Entropy being introduced to expand out the issues at an early stage 
Step 2 
L.-__ r-----I 2/1 
r----.1..--..., "'External 
"'Internal 
2/4 "'Envirorunenlal L.-_-, __ ｾ＠
"'Perfonnana ｲＭＺＺＭＭＺＭＧＧＭＺＭＺＭＺｾ＠
"' Availabilit Fonnulate N&S Set of "'Mission Management 
"'Survivabilit ＧＭＭＮＮ［［Ｎ［Ｎ［ＮＮＮ［ｾｾ＠ 2/S Management Processes ·Vehicle Management C= ___ ｾｾ＠ __ -===r-2J71fl·Resource Management 
2J8 
ESTABLISH S-O-I 
REQUIREMENT lEMPLA TE 
STEP 2 • ESTABLISH THE S·O-I 
REQUIREMENT TEMPLATE 
The second step establishes the essential Prime Directive, from and to which 
all subsequent results should be traceable. The PD is semantically analysed to 
expand understanding and viewpoint within the (supposed) team of concept 
developers. Creative Tension can be seen in (2/3 &2/4) in Postulate a 
Strategy and Elaborate the Threat to Achieving the PD 
, 
Step 2 adds Creative Entropy ill the fOIm of Necessary and Sufficient sets, in 
three discrete areas:-
Threat - {External, Internal, Environmental} 
Measures of Effectiveness - {Performance, Availability, 
Survivability} 
Management Processes - {Mission Management, Vehicle Management, 
Resource Management} 
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There is also development of the negative contribution factors identified in 
the first step. 
It would be quite usual for a design concept to fail at step 2. To make the 
process more robust, several strategies and threats (2/3 & 2/4) would be 
preferable in step 2, allowing not only for a better prospect of uncovering the 
unexpectedly good concept, but also providing insight to those factors which 
discriminate between options. System Creativity, enclosed, presents an 
example of variety in strategy options resulting in an unexpected bonus in the 
choice of company divisional ｳｴｲｵ｣ｴｵｲｾｳ＠
The Requirements Template has been shown in the prior chapter; it is the 
output from step 2. 
Step 3 
.' 
STEP 3 • DEVELOP 
PROCESSES & STRUCTURE 
3{2 ·Zones/Areas 
Elaborate Set of ·La ycrs/Phasea 
Management Processes ·Sequen<:el 
L..-_-,. __ ..... ·SLlIea 
Internal 
3/6 Activities 
It is in Step 3 that structure, balance and flow make their first 
appearance. The Set of Management Processes is elaborated into a full 
description of all the activities taking phice within the IDA system, without 
regard to internal interface or boundary. Flow diagrams of various sorts, 
thread diagrams and - as shown in the previous chapter - data state diagrams 
are but a few of the methods. This process of elaboration, which is essentially 
creative, requires excellent domain understanding if the domain practices 
and imperatives are not to be inadvertently contravened. 
The elaborated processes for each of the many activities which might be 
represented in each of the Set of Management Processes can all be joined 
together (3/3); this is essentially so, due to their origin as related activities 
within the Necessary and Sufficient Set bounds. Joining them may produce a 
large diagram, but it is generally a worthwhile procedure since the result 
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represents all the functionality of the relevant design concept. It is also worth 
integrating the processes in order to partition the SOl at its boundaries 
The elaborated processes of necessity incorporate entities which are external 
to the SOI. The boundary of the SOl is superimposed, (3/4), and interfaces 
between the SOl and its parent and sibling systems can be established at that 
point, at least in terms of category and priority of information. At this point 
we may perform a degree of aggregation by grouping the internal processes 
into generic Internal Activities which are generic because they are repeated 
in different processes. Typical internal actiy.ities would usually include: 
information collection, operations management, contingency planning, 
resource management, etc. 
Relationships between internal and external entities are identified, (3/1 & 
3n), as the beginnings of architecture analysis. Architecture is formed 
initially within the sse by grouping entities; (3/8 & 3/9), which are 
principally activities, both within and external to the SOI. Examples will be 
shown in Chapter 9. The term "Management Organization" is used instead of 
architecture, (3/10), as more usual, but the organization of the system 
operators / users / managers is undoubtedly architecture within my 
definition. 
Step 4 
·Volatil • ....--......L.----. 
.SlAblt Set-up S-?-l 
.Deduciblc Infonnauon 
.Doctrina Template 
4(2 
4(1 
SET-UP S-Q.I 
SoumON 
'IEMPU.1E 
Apportion 
Functions I Tasks 
4/1 
4 To Man and MachilK 
.' 
STEP 4· ASSIGN 
MAN-MACIDNE ROLES 
Step 4 commences by setting up the solution template, based on previous 
work, to guide all further activity until the end of Step 7; Step 4 then 
addresses information, communications and performance. Creative Tension 
is invoked at 4/5 and 4/6 above, and 4/2 introduces another N &S Set, this 
time for the information which will be the life blood of the eventual IDA 
99 
system. - {volatile, stable, deducible, doctrinal}. An infonnation template 
from A General Theory of Command and Control, enclosed, is reproduced 
here:- . 
Stable Dynamic Deducible Doctrinal 
Terrain Positions 
Positions Cost-Exchange 
Action Element Strengths Balance of Forces Ratios 
Capabilities Threats SOPs Going Rates of Closure Performance Interoperability Weather Enemy Tactics 
Orbats Plans 
Weaknesses Tactics & 
Plans Engage/Disengage 
Enemy Intentions 
.Strategy 
Penetrateion and Move Egress : 
Availability of Alternate Status Attrition 
Mobility vs Armour 
Overrun Forecast Attack/Defend Survivability Alternates Self defence Stat05 Ratios 
of Self Defence Emcon Status Action Element Stand/Withdraw Performance Damage Toleranc Strengths Ethic Signature SUCOC/COLOC 
Reserves Warcon. POL Combat Days Predicted Conflict 
Availability Replenishmnet Spares Remaining Duration 
of Cycles Transport 
Performance Readiness 
Information Template 
The Infonnation Template, as the figure shows, is the meshing "of two N &S 
Sets since the row headings also fonn the, by-now-familiar, set of 
Perfonnance, Survivability and Availability. 
Step 4 also contains, at (4/9), the task "Apportion Functions I Tasks to Man 
and Machine". Much study has been undertaken in the area of Man-Machine 
Interface, Human Computer Interaction and the like, but this task still 
presents problems. For IDA systems which operate "near-real-time", i.e. 
they are on-line, transaction-based rather than in a real-time loop where 
failure to process in the allocated time results in system failure, the present 
practical approach is based on treating the infonnation handling system as 
"very dumb". Thus the machine is used to handle high volume, highly-
repetitive tasks requiring not only no intelligence, but no substantial 
calculation, concentration being on simple processes, sorting, presentation, 
aggregation, etc. 
For real-time systems, the situation is more severe; the IDA system has a set 
period, usually part of a cycle, in which to complete all activities. It is best to 
concede at this stage that task 4/9 is beyond the aims of this thesis, and is a 
specialist subject, the study of much research in its own right. 
Step 5 
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Step 5 is the most complex in the sse, but owing to its interwoven nature, 
with both human and machine elements of the SOl being considered in 
parallel and together, the complexity is inevitable. For many applications, 
this step will decide the validity or otherwise of system design concepts 
5(3 
Incorporate 
Performance 
Features 
Pre<licl 
S.Q-I 
SfEP 5 - DEVELOP 
S-O.I PERFORMANCE 
At the left are the power, installation and existing facility constraints endemic 
to any viable IDA concept.In the centre is the group of activities associated 
with processing and communications sub-architectures. At the right. the 
human system is developed. Along the bottom, the elements are brought 
together again, (5/13), to predict perfonnance, estimate cost and develop 
cost/perfonnance measures which may be used to compare optional design 
concepts. 
Step 6 
Level 6 is concerned with well-understood concepts of availability arid less-
well understood concepts of survivability, see System Survivability Science, 
enclosed 
101 
y 
Conceive 
Availabilil) 
Strategy 
Modify / Enhance 
Processing, Communication 
&.S/WModels 6/4 
I 
r 
Update S-O-I 
Performance 
Prediction 6/8 
ｾ＠
r 
Develop Threat Conceive 
To Availabili!) Survivabilil) 
6/1 &. Survivabilil} 6/l Strategy 6!3 
I 
/I.. 
Compare Self-Healing 
, 
Compare Damage Control, I Map on 10 S-O-I I. Repair, Redundancy & Architecture Repair, Hardening, Self-Defenctr 
Servicing Options 1 6/6 Damage Tolerance Options 6!S 
I I 
ｾ＠ 'f 1 J l Predict S -0-1 
Availability 6/9 
! Estimate S-O-I j! 
Life-Cycle Cow 6/10 
ｉｐｲｾｩ｣ｴ＠ ｳＭｏＭｾｉ＠
Survivabilit) 6/11 
T 
STEP 6 - DEVELOP S-O-I 
EFFECTIVENESS 
I 
Step 6 starts by Creating Tension, between strategies and threats for both 
availability and survivability, By definition, of course, their threats are quite 
different, the one being inherent in the system. its components and their 
environments, while the second is due to hostile acts. 
The content of individual tasks within Step 6 will not be pursued further 
here, since they are largely standard practice except, perhaps for self-healing 
" 
system design, which is at the cutting edge of design concepts at present. .' 
Step 7 
The [mal step is concerned with trading between design concept options to 
select the best, particularly in respect of the following:-
Risk, economic, political and technological, which has been carried 
through from task 1/6 in the first step 
Cost-Effectiveness as a means of ranking options 
Net Contribution, generally to the parent system, to establish whether 
any of the putative solutions is worthy. 
Incorporating those features from losing concepts into the selected 
preferred option - which may, of course, require its design to be 
substantially re-balanced. 
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ｾ＠
ASSESS TEOiNOLOGY. 
ECONOMIC &: POUTICAL 
RISK(S) 
l 
/l 
...... 
DEVELOP COMPLETE 
COST-EFFECTIVE SoumON 
MEASURE(S) 1EMPU\ TE(S) 
7(2 7/3 
I 
X 
'f 
-I Select ｐｲ･ｦｾｾ＠ , 
Design Cooccp 7/5 
,I Incorpor8IC Best Feature: 1 
7/6 From Losing Solutions 
l ｾ＠ 1 
X 
STEP 7 • DEVELOP THE 
PREFERRED DESIGN CONCEPT 
The Seven-Step Continuum Integrated 
ASSESS S-O-I I 
NEl' 
CONrRIBUTION(S) 
I 7/4 
It is, of course, possible to join the seven steps at level 2 into one larger 
network, enclosed at the end of the text. 
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Posrulate 
ｓｾＭｉ＠ Activities 
in the Domain 
1/1 
1/3 
Soft-to-Hard 
Methodology. 
Steps 1·3 
ＱＺＺＺＺＭＭＭＭＭＭＭｾＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺｳｾＺＺＺＺＺＺＺ［ＭＭＺＺＺＺＺＺＺｬｌＭ .... ＭＭｾＢｐｯｬｩｴｩ｣｡Ｑ＠
Identify I Explore Identify I Explore "Economic 
ｓｾＭｉ＠ Negative ContributiOi Wider System 
to Wider System lnnuences on ｓｾＭ｝＠ ·Technology 
U4 
ｌＮ［ＮＧ［ＢＧ［ＺＢＺＢＺ［ＺＧ［ＺＧｾＧ［ＺＢＺＺＮＮＺ［ｊ＠ ·Environment 
1/6 1(1 
Develop S-O-I 
Objectives and 
Drivers 
1/9 
STEP 1 - U1\1)ERST AND TIlE ISSUES 
,..... __ ...L ___ .. "External 
ｾＭＭ ..... .;....-.... 
"lnterna1 
"Environmental 
STEP 2 - EST ABUSH THE S-O-I 
REQUIREMENT TEMPLATE 
"Performana _--...J,-----. 
"Availabili. ·Mission Management 
·Vehicle Management 
"Survivabilit, L-....:;:;:.;r-;;:;..:....1 2/S L ______ .... __ ｾｾＢＢＭ .... -..:..-====T----:'!1"f "Resource Management 
EST ABUSH S-O-I 
REQUIREMENT TEMPLATE 
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ｾＭＭＭＭＭＭＭ
----1----. ... /2..., "Zones/Areas 
Elaborate Sct of ·Layers!Phases 
Management Processes • Sequences 
L-____ ｾｾＭＭｾﾷｓｵｴ･ｳ＠
'--_....-_--1 3/5 
3/6 Activities ｾＭＮＮＮＬＮＮＮＮＮＭＭＮＮＮｉ＠
STEP3-
DEVELOP 
PROCESSES 
& STRUCTlJRE 
I -. I 
f Soft-to-Hard ｓｅｔＭｕｐｓｾｉ＠
scumON ｍ･ｴｨｯ､ｏＩｏｾｙ＠
'JEMFI.A1E 4/1 
Steps 4-
. 
,. ｾ＠ t i I ｾｵｭ｡ｌ･＠ :1, I EstimaLe Dynunil Non-Volatile ｾ＠ ...., ｾ＠, Information 4/3 Infonnation Rate! 
·Volatil, 
Set-up S-O-I I I ! 4/4 I Conceive ｓｴｴ｡ｬ･ｾＱ＠ l Elaborale Threat I ·Stabk Information ｾ＠
-
for Perfonnance 10 Performance 
·Deducibl( 
·Doctrina Templale I ｾｴｩｭ｡ｬ･＠ ｾｉｯ｢ｾｴ＠ ｾｴｩｭ｡ｌ･＠ :J I 4/5 ... ..., , 4/6 Information Communication 
412 4(1 Storage Needs Capacities I R. 
4/8 
-r 
ｾｉ＠ ａｾｲｵｯｮ＠ J STEP 4 - ASSIGN Functions / Tasks 
:!! To Man and Machine _ MAN-MACHINE ROLES 
- - - - - - - - - - - -
Assess Power ｾｾ＠ l'" 5/8 J 'f .. 515 :>/t> S{7 ｾ＠
COlISumption I /. 
Incorporale 
1l;IUSIt'Z & L:: I Model SysleIll ｾｉ＠ I Develop Humane 11 ｾｴｩｭ｡ｌ･＠ I'cl 
Dissipation , 
Performance S-O-I Entities &Application srw HumanInlt'Zface Of Users 
Features ｾ＠ Sub-Architectures I 5/2 ｾ＠ , l Assess Existing 
" I AppreciaLe ｾＷＱ＠ ｾ＠5/4 Y Identify Facilities ｦｯｲｒ･Ｍｕｾ＠ I MO<Iell'lOCAlSSlng I I Propose MMI Optioml 
Installatiol .511 &: Communicatiol 
Environment 
ｃｯｮｳｴｲ｡ｩｮｾ＠ Sub-Architectures ｾ＠ 5/10 J Asses. Usability Factor I I 5/9 
5/3 5/12 ｾﾣ＠ ,. 
I Map sub-archileClure£ I Predict t I ROM ｾｴｩｭ｡ｌ･＠ I I Develop CO&t / s ｾ＠on to S-O-I S-O-I S-O-1 Cost Performance Measure(s Architecture Performance 
5/13 I 5/14 I 5/15 5/16 .1 STEP 5 - DEVELOP ｾ＠ ｓｾｉ＠ PERFORMANCE 
- -
.,. 
- -
ｾ＠
- - - -Conceive Develop Threat I Conceive 
Availabilit: To Availabilit) Survivability 
Sttategy 6/1 &: Survivabilit) 612 Sttategy 6/3 
1 I 
Modify / Enhance Compare Self-Healing .. Compare Damage Control, 
Processing, Communicatior: Repair, Redundancy & l Map on 10 S-O-} " Repair, Hardening, Self-Defellct Architecture &SfWModels 6/4 Servicing Options 6/6 Damage Tolerance Options 6{7 61S 1 I STEP 6 -
'-( DEVELOP S-O-I 
y t - ｾ＠ J EFFECTIVENESS UpdaLe S-O-I I Predict S-O-I I ｾｴｩｭ｡ｴ･＠ S-O-lsl ｲ］｣ｴｓＭｏＭｾＱ＠Performance Availability Life-Cycle Costs 6/1 0 Survivabilitv 6/11 Prediction 6/8 619 I 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
'* ASSESS TECHNOLOGY, 
DEVELOP COMPlEIE ａｓｓｾｓＭｏＭｉ＠ I 
ECONOMIC & POUIlCAL COST-EFfECl1VE SoumON 
RISK(S) MEASURE(S) TEMPlA 1F.(S) coNTRmunoN(S) 
/I 712 7/3 I I I 7/4 
1. 
'f 
-I Select Preferred ,I InCOlpOf&Le Best Feature 
Design Concept 
IS 7/6 From Losing Solutions STEP 7-
I I DEVELOP THE 
--
PREFERRED 
l. DESIGN CONCEPT 
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" 
Summary 
The chapter presents and describes the Seven Step Continuum at three levels 
of decomposition, defines the terms used, and ends with a complete, third 
level network of tasks which identifies the sequence and relationship between 
activities in the development of a robust concept for a system, should such a 
concept exist. Tools and techniques for undertaking the tasks were not 
presented, those being topics for the following chapter. . 
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8. TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR CONCEIVING 
SYSTEMS 
8.1. The GEe Survey 
In 1987 I chaired a General Electric Company (GEC) Working Party, tasked 
as follows:-
,. 
"To assess the models and modelling techniques available within the 
GEC product units and on the market for systems engineering 
"To assess the models and techniques not yet available" 
The three-month working party covered the wide range of GEe company, 
and external, systems engineering and model potential in some three months. 
Much of the report is confidential, but some aspects are not. 
First, the unwritten task was to explore the potential of existing models and 
tools - the terms being virtually synonymous in this context - for cross-use 
between GEC companies. The working party found pockets, as might be 
expected in such a vast and varied conglomerate, where no systems 
engineering was undertaken consciously at all, and some of the companies 
were either unaware of, or positively opposed to, systems engineering. 
Others had varying degrees of interest in systems engineering, many wishing 
greater understanding but fearful of cost. Not too surprisingly, the systems 
companies were the main custodians of expertise and models, but even here 
there was a wide variation in practice and understanding. 
We, the working party, felt that categorization would help to clear the mind, 
so we developed the following figure:-
, 
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[ The Systems approach i 
./ " Holism, reductionism Social philosophy, business analysis 
.. 
"Management 
of Systems" 
ｾ＠
Manufacturing . 
systems engineering 
"Systems of 
Management" 
ｾ＠
The Systems Family Trl 
Although the categorization might be argued on purist grounds, it none-the-
less represents a valid industry view. Noteworthy is the subordinate position 
allocated to systems engineering vis-a-vis project management, for example, 
and the expression of holism as relevant to hard, but not soft, systems 
approaches. 
The working party developed a taxonomy of tools. It was clear to us that we 
needed to establish a spectrum of tool "needs" before proceeding to see if the 
needs were being, or indeed could be, satisfied. The taxonomy is presented 
below diagrammatically,'in the form of a tool shadowboard. 
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Systems Engineering Tool Taxonomy 
Operations 
Analysis 
Requirements . 
Analysis 
System 
Design 
Software! 
Equipment 
Engineering 
Solution 
feasibility 
& 
Requirements Design options, . . 
consistency interfaces, ConflgU!a.tI.on 
& tradeoffs & compatibility 
performance completeness- specifications 
System models 
Scenario 
Models ＱＺＺＺＺＺＺＥＺＺＺ［ｉＺＺ［ＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺｻｒ･ｬ｡ｾｩｑｬｪｳＮｱｩｰﾷＮｭｑＨｪｾｊｾＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺ ｩＨＺＺＨＺＺＺＺＱ＠
.... ; ....... ; .. d....... I Requirements tools I 
'llillliilfGnt&h ｾｾＡＺｾＡＺＺＺｭｾｩ､ｮｴｬ＠
Risk models II RAM! FMECA I 
Configuration 
management 
tools 
Integration 
& Test 
Test 
environment 
Environment 
sirnulatiom 
Threat 
Simulation 
Sub-system 
simulation 
Installation, 
Commissioni 
Acceptanc( 
Acceptance 
models 
The figure requires some explanation. The top row establishes the phases of 
any project as seen from industry'S viewpoint and as developed in Managing 
Systems Creation. The second row identifies the principal objectives of tools 
and models in the respective phase, so "solution feasibility and performance" 
is the objective that tools and models might assist in achieving during the 
Operations Analysis phase. Beneath each of the column headings are the tools 
/ models that the working party, drawn from all quarters of GEC, felt would 
be of greatest value - regardle&s of whether they were available, or even 
realizable. 
8.2. The "Missing Tools': 
Subsequent investigation showed that the "shadowboard" of tools was not 
evenly filled. Scenario models, software requirements tools, environment 
simulation, logistic models and many more were in abundance. 
(Requirements tools generally support functional decomposition, but do not 
execute the decomposition themselves - that is in the mind of the operator.) 
RAM/FMECA - Reliability, Availability, Maintainability /Failure Modes, 
Effects and Criticality Analysis - was undertaken quite comprehensively. On 
the other hand, the following were not in evidence:-
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System Boundary Models 
Functional Decomposition 
Functional to Physical Mapping 
Relationship Models 
Architecture Design tools 
System Design and Engineering Framework Models 
Risk Models 
The shaded boxes on the figure show the research areas represented in this 
paper; there is a high degree 9f correspondence, as follows:-
System Boundary Models System Dynamics 
Functional Decomposition Creative Entropy, N&S Sets 
Functional to Physical Mapping N2 Chart and cluster analysis 
Relationship Models N2 Chart 
Architecture Design ToolsVarious; see later sections and chapter 9 
Frameworks Creating and Conceiving Systems 
Risk Models Not addressed directly 
Although the methods, on the right, were found to be available in principle to 
meet the needs of design, on the left, the methods were not in a suitable form. 
N2 charts, for example, can be extremely cumbersome in use, having to be 
re-drawn manually whenever any entity is moved on the chart. Unlike a 
rectangular matrix, the diagonal nature of the N2 chart makes re-drawing a 
non-trivial task, and effectively renders its use as a means of forming and 
recognizing patterns impracticable for charts where N exceeds about ten. 
Unfortunately, it is the larger, complex, charts which are more interesting, 
and the more likely to contain "hidden" structure. . 
. The use of processing power is an obvious way to address the N2 charting 
problem; even here, however, limitations appear. A 25 x 25 N2 chart can be 
arranged in 0.5 x 25! different ways; it is possible to exceed sensible 
processing limits with quite modest N2 charts. 
In researching several of these areas, I realized that current methods used in 
industry were producing rigid, inflexible results. I therefore became 
interested in how Nature manages to "develop" such flexible, adaptable 
systems 
8.3. Nature's Approach to Complex "Design" 
Darwin proposed that Natural Selection is the mechanism by which living 
things evolve. Natural Selection favours the survival and breeding of 
offspring which are best-adapted to the changing and predatory 
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environment. The cornerstone of this process is variability between 
offspring. 
Natural Selection is a continuing process - natural systems are evolving now 
from generation to generation. But Natural Selection has also produced 
species such as Man that can evolve socially during their lifetimes, regardless 
of offspring. While lower orders are imprinted at birth with fixed behaviour 
patterns, higher order animals have less imprinting of rote and more ability 
to learn and adapt to the contemporary situation. This "lack of fixed 
rules"phenomengn is itself, undoubtedly evolving too, but at a very slow rate 
commensurate with the rate of evolution of other characteristics in higher 
order animals. So, if we have the wit to comprehend, we may be able to 
emulate Nature in some small degree and develop flexible systems which can 
adapt to their changing environments during their active lifetimes - a worthy 
goal. 
Cumulative Selection 
The key to understanding Natural Selection is cumulative selection. Consider 
a combination lock; suppose it has, say, three tumblers. If we set the first two 
tumblers correctly, but miss the third, then we have to start again at the 
beginning. Nature does not work like that Instead, nature produces a variety 
in offspring; although all offspring are similar, they all have some 
dissimilarities, too. Some of these variations favour survival-to-breed better 
than others, but the survivors do not "start again"; they still retain, and pass 
on, the vast majority of features which they shared with their siblings. Thus 
the basic model stays, but features accumulate beneficial changes, and lose 
disadvantageous characteristics. This process is called cumulative selection 
and is the basic mechanism underpining the operation of the three tools to be 
described below. 
The school of reasoning to which these tools belong is sometimes called 
genetic computing .. My work in this area is at an early stage, but has already 
drawn comment from the technical and non-technical press, see The 
Engineer (1989) an9 the Financial Times (1989), and from companies 
wishing to co-operate in the development of the techniques. SYSMORPH, see 
below, has been the subject of patent action. 
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*SYSMORPH - morphological design of aircraft, ships, rail 
carriages,etc 
.. 
*COMMORPH -physical layout of networks, communication 
systems, oil pipe-lines, routes of penetration and egress, corridors and 
pathways, circuit board layout, etc 
*TREEMORPH - shortest non-redundant path connecting a set of 
points 
*CADRA T - functional-to-physical mapping for organisational and 
management structures, systems engineering of advanced avionics 
architectures,etc : 
CAD TOOLS & THEIR APPLICATIONS 
The tools and their applications are explained in the enclosed papers:-
Creative Design by Cumulative Selection looks at the broad 
perspective of design tasks which cumulative selection could undertake 
from the design of rail carriages and airport lounges to . 
communications networks, printed circuit board designs and railway 
carnages 
BM I C3 Design by Cumulative Selection looks at the application of 
cumulative selection to the ab initio design of complete, complex 
platforms, such as an aircraft or a ship and to communications 
networks; the paper presents the idea of systolic cumulative selection, 
see below 
A vionic System Architecture examines the fundamental 
characteristics of avionics systems and generates sets of clustering and 
repelling influences that ｴｯｧｾｴｨ･ｲ＠ promote different types of avionics 
architecture 
8.4. SYSMORPH 
, 
SYSMORPH attempts to emulate in a very small way how evolution might 
work. A model of a system is drawn by a standard drawing routine from a set 
of "genes". Each gene codes for a variety of physical and behavioural 
characteristics in the model entity, which might represent a ship, an aircraft, 
a train, a car, a yacht, etc.The standard drawing routine then draws a set of 
offspring, each of which is the same as the original - the parent - except that 
one of the genes has been incremented or decremented. 
TIle offspring are passed through a simulated hostile environment and their 
relative performance, survivability and availability are rated, scored and 
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aggregated. There is also a cost model in SYSMORPH which aggregates the 
cost for each offspring. The offspring producing the greatest cost-
effectiveness ratio is selected to breed in its turn. .: 
It might be thought that interest would centre on the final configuration 
produced by a SYSMORPH run. However, the route by which the program 
reaches its destination can be just as interesting. The program can be used to 
identify the first, and by definition, most cost-beneficial, change to be made 
to an existing design. 
The SYSMORPH idea is exciting. Suppose, for example, it were possible to 
evolve the hostile environment? This approach, executed in a limited fashion 
only at present, I call systolic cumulative selection. Consider the following 
figure, which concerns itself with developing the initial design concept for a 
new fighter aircraft:-
SYSTOLIC CUMULATIVE SELECTION 
The process of producing offspring and subjecting them to a hostile 
environment is shown at the left and proceeds until a ｾｴ｡｢ｬ･＠ fighter design is 
reached. The hostile environment contained a model of an enemy fighter, in 
a Many-on-Many (M-O-M) combat model. Suppose now that the positions 
are reversed. The evolved fighter design is frozen and the enemy fighter is 
allowed to evolve in the same M-O-M combat model. Once its design plateau 
has been reached, the process can revert to the original state, to evolve the 
original fighter even further. 
Here we have the potential to undertake some advanced design concept 
development. In the fighter world, each new design on one side of the cold 
conflict results in a counter-design some ten to fifteen years later by the 
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opposing side. Using SYSMORPH systolic cumulative selection it may be 
possible to anticipate the counter. There is, of course, the potential for 
runaway, with assumption being piled on assumption. 
Such risks are evident, and safeguards can be taken. One safeguard is to start 
from a well-known design point and allow only small, traceable increments 
in design evolution to occur at each systolic "heartbeat". A second safeguard 
is in the use of trusted models, developed and validated over many years 
perhaps, as the simulated hostile environment; these are areas for research. 
,. 
8.5. COMMORPH 
COMMORPH was presented at the Third International Conference on .. 
Command, Control, Communications and Management Information Systems/ 
in May 1989, and immediately caught the attention of the British Army as a 
means of laying out mobile and transportable communications systems in real 
time, in the field. 
COMMORPH concerns itself with communication system trees, loops and 
networks. It too employs cumulative selection, but not in the same way as 
SYSMORPH. Together with its offspring, TREEMORPH, COMMORPH 
lays out communication networks according to some optimum objective. The 
process is best understood by example. Consider the following arrangement 
of points, which it is desired to connect by the shortest non-redundant route, 
i.e. no alternative routings permitted. 
r'I. WHATISTIIESHORlESTPATHCONNECTING f"'o. 
..... ALL POINTS WITH NO REDUNDANCY? .... 
THE CLASSIC STEINER TREE PROBLEM 
As the title suggests, this is a classic problem similar to the well-known 
travelling salesman problem, and equally difficult to solve by conventional 
means. Cumulative selection approaches the problem by scattering a number 
of potential connection junctions into the space between the points, joining 
junctions and points according to tree rules. The total length of all the 
connections is measured. Then each junction in tum is taken through a small 
figure-of-eight "dance", with overall length being measured at eight point 
during the dance. Junctions are repositioned after their dance at the position 
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on the dance offering shortest overall length. The tree gradually evolves to 
this:-
STEINER TREE SOLUTION 
As with most optimization techniques, COMMORPH and TREEMORPH may 
provide solutions which are locally minimal but not globally minimal. I have 
devised a series of "shake routines" which seek to nudge:the trees or networks 
to see if a global minimum exists that is shorter than the current offering. 
Such an approach carries no guarantees, of course, but practical experience 
using the tools strongly suggests that local-only optimization is apparent to 
the user, who may seek the global optimum - if needed - by manual 
intervention. .' 
The advantage of COMMORPH comes, not from addressing clean problems 
such as the Steiner Tree, but from more practical applications The process of 
optimizing may account for more than simply overall length - see Creative 
Design by Cumulative Selection, where the concept of optimizing to an array 
of mutually incompatible influences is addressed 
8.6. CADRAT 
The N2 chart has already been presented in the section entitled Binding and 
Coupling and will be seen again in the next chapter. CADRAT, the Computer 
Aided Design - Relationship Analysis Tool automates the processes involved 
in drawing and rearranging N2 charts, which can be extremely tedious for 
large matrices. But CAD RAT does rather more than simply rearrange. 
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Scoring N2 Charts 
It is possible to introduce the 
concept of scoring an N2 chart. 
To score a chart, one simply 
determines the distance of each 
interface from its associated 
entities in terms of the number 
of squares, and multiplies the 
number in the interface by 
some function of distance. The 
sum of all such scores for all 
interfaces makes the N2 chart 
score 
. , . 
...... ... " ....... , .......... , ........ 
, 
• • 
... -........... ｾ＠ .... .. ",'" ...... :--"--11 
" . :, , ' , 
. . . . . . . . . . . ｾ＠ . . . ｾ＠ . . . , 
Score = X • f(dx) + Y • f(dy) 
Scoring N2 Charts 
The process is illustrated in the figure. The number, X or Y in the figure, 
represents some characteristic of the interfa<;e as viewed from system level, 
such as strength of association, priority, etc.', determined in a systematic 
marking scheme. Typical functions, f, of distance would be direct 
proportionality, square or cube. The purpose of these choices will be 
explained below. ° 
If two interfacing entities are separated on the chart by a number of 
intervening entities, then the interface joining them will score high due to the 
distance functions, dx and dy above.If they were adjacent, their interface 
score would be low. It is therefore possible to arrange the entities on the 
chart such that the chart has an overall lowest score. In this configuration,all 
interfaces connecting entities will be grouped such that their scores are low; 
competition between entities, each trying to occupy the same position relative 
to a third entity will be resolved by the strength of their respective interface. 
The reason for the function of distance can now be explained. If the distance 
function is made a square instead of linear, ｴｨｾｮ＠ tighter clusters result. The 
cube function produces even tighter clusters. Examples of the effects will be 
shown in the next chapter. CADRA T refers to these distance functions as 
"First Moment", "Second Moment", etc. The reason for the title can now be 
explained, too. If the N2 chart is considered like a lattice, then the leading 
diagonal containing the entities is a central septum. Taking a linear function 
of distance about this septum equates to taking moments, and is a torque, or 
first moment function. Squaring the distance equates to an inertia-type, or 
second moment function. And so on. 
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Automatic Clustering of N2 charts with CADRA T 
The value of being able to score an N2 chart is insufficient of itself to be 
really useful, since for a matrix, say 25 x 25, the number of ways in which 
the matrix can be arranged is tens of millions. CADRA T uses Cumulative 
Selection and the scoring system to rearrange the matrix until it adopts the 
minimum score configuration The resulting configuration clusters 
associated entities according to the strength of that association. 
The ability to cluster automatically, and according to a selection of simple 
. rules, presents great architectural richness. Entities present emergent 
properties not visible in any other practical way, as clusters, often 
unexpected, appear. The clustering has, however, come about on the basis of 
relationships and strengths identified individually by the would-be architect, 
and the CADRA T tool simply reveals the structural implications of his or her 
supplied information 
CADRAT and Hierarchy 
Experiments with the CAD RAT prototype showed two unexpected features:-
During the testing phase, I entered known optimal solutions, but the 
machine occasionally returned seemingly non-optimal solutions 
Replacing the decimal numbers used as strengths with a simpler binary 
choice made very little difference to the resulting clusters 
Research into related ideas, Macgill (1983), suggested that the result using 
binary numbers was to be expected, since the existence of an interface was the 
strongest influence, and adding a strength number constituted a second order 
effect. The situation with the seemingly non-optimal solutions was more 
complex. First, the program behaved correctly; it produced a lower score 
configuration than the entered, supposedly ideal solution. But second, the 
program achieved this by placing some entities right in the middle of tightly-' 
bound functionally grouped clusters. . 
I eventually realized that the program was drawing in the two dimensions of 
an N2 chart, but attempting to resolve an issue in three dimensions; the entity 
being interposed between members of a functional cluster was better viewed 
as being above that cluster. 
It is therefore possible and useful to use the numbering scheme, not only for 
its original purpose, but also as a means of examining the vertical, 
hierarchical structure of an organization or, more generally, of an entity-set 
The CADRA T program now offers the opportunity to show and cluster a 
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, . 
section of the decimal interface numbers. By choosing the numbering scheme 
to represent, say, rank, seniority, authority, type of communication medium, 
etc, it is possible to view the N2 chart either as a whole, or as a set of 
component charts each with its own purpose, and to investigate clustering at 
different levels within the same hierarchy.The effect is like being able to slice 
horizontally through a pyramid and to operate within the slice 
Using CAD RAT to Develop Architecture 
. The clustering power of CADRA T enables the user to use his or her pattern 
recognition abilities in conjunction with the machine. Previous sections on 
Binding and Coupling introduced tightly-bound functional blocks, system 
nodes and the waterfall. Other features may be learned and are valuable in 
ins tiling structure and balance into the architecture. Consider the following:-
ｌｨ ＢＢＢＢＢｾＢＧｾＧＢ＠ • • , • ' It • • ｾ＠ .. .. .. ｾ＠ .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. .. .. • • • • • • 
.. .. .. .. ,:_ ..... L-_ ...... :- .... .. : ........ 
• 
ﾷｯｾＺｾｯｾＺ＠
.. ..".. .. '" 
ｾ＠ ｾＺｏ＠
• 
.... ｾ＠ ...... " ...... ｾ＠ ...... ＭＭｾｲＭＭＮ＠
, . 
, , . , 
.................. .................. J ........ 
Source Node Sink Node 
The entity on the row of marked interfaces supplies infonnation to all other 
entities; it is a source node. The entity at the centre of the column receives 
infonnation from all other entities, but provides no output. It is a system 
liability, as drawn. 
Supported Node 
Duplicated Node 
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The left-hand figure shows a full system node, i.e. the formation of a cross 
from a source and a sink node. A full system node is of concern because its 
failure disconnects the system into two separate parts. In this case, however, 
the shaded interfaces provide some alternative routes for information to flow 
should the central node become prejudiced 
The right-hand figure presents the example of a fully replicated node, a 
situation sometimes not detected in a large matrix prior to clustering. There 
are two nodes, side by side; if the system is subject to attack, then replicated 
nodes may be essential- military Alternate War HQs represent just such a 
case. Generally, however, the expense of such duplication cannot be justified, 
and the nodes can either be totally merged or, better, reduced to a supported 
node 
• • ｾＭＭｦＭＭＭＭｾＧ＠ - - - - ＭｾＭｏＭ f 0 ＭｾＭ ----. 
. ｾ＠ ....... \--.... ＮＮＮ［ＺＺＺＢＮＮＧＭｾＢ＠ ......... ""'- ........ '-. .................... ' ....... _ ........ 
, ? . 
, . 
Missing Interfaces 
Perhaps the greatest opportunity that CAD RAT's clustering offers is the 
detection of missing interfaces. I have mentioned architectural "balance" 
before; the figure shows architectural imbalance, since interfaces almost 
invariably occur in pairs, a "send" interface from entity A to entity B and a 
"reply" interface from entity B to entity A. These interface pairs appear also 
as corresponding links in control loops. A concept-developer seeing the 
above figure would have to question deeply the validity of the missing 
interfaces. While such missing interfaces can occur occasionally, for 
example, in the case of remote sensors which are totally open loop i.e. not 
controlled at all, they are rare and generally non-robust. Where the missing 
interface refers to human interchange, the absence of an interface in one 
direction suggests that A is passing information to B, quite unaware of 
whether it is being received or, if received, whether it is satisfactory. Such 
lack of feedback causes human links to fade. 
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The usual practice, then, on seeing missing interfaces either in a node or in a 
functional block, is to fill them in. Without a tool such as CADRA T there 
would not be such visibility of clusters, and the human skill at pattern 
recognition would not be brought into play. 
Summary 
The chapter first presented a "Tool Taxonomy" for systems engineering, a 
notional shadowboard showing the tools and techniques which were needed, 
although not necessarily available or satisfactory. 
Nature's approach to complex system design was examined, in terms of 
natural selection and cumulative selection. Four prototype tools were 
introduced which sought to emulate Nature's methods in a very simple way, 
and some of their potential was highlighted. 
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9. THE SEVEN-STEP CONTINUUM IN ACTION 
This chapter is effectively a paper within the thesis, presenting the results of 
applying the Seven-Step Continuum and the CADRA T tool in particular. The 
chapter is indicative of the processes, activities and results which would 
obtain in an integrated SEAMS environment although, in the examples 
below, each of the activities was carried out separately . 
. 9.1, The three examples 
The Seven-Step Continuum (SSC), so called because the sub-steps fonn an 
unbroken chain from soft issues to solid design concepts, can be validated as a 
useful approach by using it against real-world problems. Three different 
types of design concept development have been undertaken using the SSC:-
Air Traffic Control. The SSC was used with non-engineer university 
; undergraduate students, to explore a well-understood system, that for 
the control of air traffic at small airfields. This process was 
undertaken to establish the comprehensibility of the sse to non-
. specialists 
.' The Channel Tunnel. The sse was used with the same group of non-
engineers to explore the concept of a Crisis Management system for 
the Channel Tunnel (Chunnel). No such Crisis Management system 
exists at present, although I have worked in industry on the design of a 
putative solution. Confirmation of the validity of the evolved ｣ｯｮ｣･ｰｾ＠
was supplied by the Chunnel Head of Security.The use of the sse in 
this case was designed to explore its role as a concept generator 
'A detailed design concept, conducted in industry with engineers, 
analysts and designers at various levels of experience for an advanced 
avionic architecture. Validation of solution is not meaningful in this 
instance, but the efficacy of the sse as a route-map and concept 
generator can be assessed. 
Extracts from the work undertaken in the three projects will be presented in 
following paragraphs, to illustrate the sse in action against the varied 
problem-set. 
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ＹＮＲｾ＠ The Seven-Step Progress 
Understanding the Issues 
The Channel Tunnel stirs different emotions in many people; it is noteworthy 
that benefits to be anticipated by its introduction are seldom, if ever, alluded 
to in.public debate. An examination of the wider system issues following the 
SSC framework developed the following set of issues:-
.. Optional Transport Systems Emergency Services 
Reduced Channel shipping 
Reduced Ferry income 
Terminal road traffic congestion 
Increased rail freight> 300 miles 
Reduced road freight? 
. Increased car / passenger traffic 
.: Infrastructure 
Energy Generation 
Power Distribution 
Road / rail feeder links 
.·Food / waste / sewerage 
Fuel supplies 
Housing 
Ambulance/hospitals/staff 
Police / fire facilities 
New terrorist target 
Ecosystems 
Altered traffic patterns 
Petrol fume pollution 
Urban tunnels 
Assembly area conurbations 
Countryside noise 
Economic Systems 
Private Investment 
Export / import ratios 
Foreign exchange 
Wealth generation centres 
Exchange dynamics 
- speed of money movement 
The various issues influenced both the view of the Chunnel's objectives as a 
purposeful system and the activities that would need to be undertaken. Note 
that, although the SOl is a notional crisis management system, it is the issues 
facing the parent system, the Channel Tunnel itself, which are being 
developed and explored. 
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Chunnel Objectives and Drivers 
Increased cross-Channel Capacity 
VVeatherIndependence 
Faster long-haul road-rail freight 
Flexible / expandable 
Upgradeable 
Safe 
. Da:mage Tolerant 
Continuous Operation 
Affordable 
Profitable Business 
The activities which the Chunnel system will undertake include those which 
might, or might not, fall due to the, as yet unbounded, crisis management 
system. 
Domain Activities 
Carrying Passengers Carrying private cars 
Carrying freight . Carrying lorries 
Inspecting - freight, passengers, cars, lorries, luggage 
Assembling, ticketing passport checks Entraining / detraining 
Customs Immigration 
Shops and restaurant General repairs 
Maintenance of rolling stock, rail system, tunnel fabric 
Signalling Patrolling 
Guarding Intelligence gathering 
Issue of alerts and warnings Crisis Management 
Emergency repairs Passenger evacuation, etc 
Note how the subject of crisis management arose as a natural progression of 
thoughts about looking after the passengers and freight and maintaining 
system momentum 
At this stage in the concept evolution imperatives and doctrine should be 
composed - in extant domains, of course, they already exist. 
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Channel Tunnel Imperatives and Doctrine 
Safety and Confidence first 
Performance 
Availability 
Survivability 
Day, night, all-weather, all times 
Reliable - non-interruptive maintenance 
to tunnel, rolling-stock, etc, 
dedicated maintenance / repair crews 
reserve stocks, tools, power, lighting 
Protected Control facilities 
Perimeter fencing 
Dedicated police, fire service? 
Independent tunnels and controls 
Sanitized NO-GO zones 
Damage limitation and repair facilities 
The first Necessary & Sufficient set, Performance, Availability and 
Survivability emerges in the development of the parent system imperatives. 
It is against parent system objectives,imperatives and doctrine that the net 
contribution of any design concept will be measured. 
Lastly, before turning to the other projects issues, it is worth examining the 
potential of a crisis management system to occupy various fmite states 
CAN THE TUNNEL BE IN MORE THAN ONE STATE AT A TIME? 
ROUTINE 
OPERATIONS 
No imminent 
threat detected 
Unsafe 
CRISIS 
MANAGEMEN 
Damage 
Un-neutralised 
Threat to the 
system 
Chunnel Finite States 
Repair complete 
RECOVERY 
No access for repair, 
no resources 
The conclusion drawn from the deceptively-simple finite state/transition 
diagram is that the Channel Tunnel could be in several different states at one 
123 
and the same time, since some threats could be neutralized by localizing them 
such that they presented no immediate hazard to operations 
.. 
For Air Traffic Control (ATC) sound domain knowledge is essential; it is 
possible, however, for students to establish some measure of understanding 
simply by observing typical small airfield activities, where the complexity 
and apparent confusion of larger airfields and A TC centres is missing. A 
typical set of activities might include: 
General Flying Approaching 
Landing' : Taking off 
Marshaling Controlling Ground Crews 
Controlling ground movements Controlling approaches, take-offs 
Controlling airspace Replenishing 
Engine running Servicing and repairing 
Clearing runways (e.g. snow) . Bird scaring 
Extinguishing fires Recovering crashed aircraft 
Rescuing endangered aircrew, passengers Diverting 
Forecasting weather Assisting in airborne emergencies 
These and the many other activities routinely carried out at small airfields, 
lead naturally to the idea of resources (facilities, sources and indicators in the 
SSC, Step 1). Typical air traffic control resources - remembering that not all 
of the above activities fall to ATC since we looked atthe wider airfield 
system - include:-
Air space 
Taxi-ways 
Runways 
Approach Aids 
Local Aids 
Crash facilities 
Fire-fighting facilities 
Weather forecasting facilities 
Area radars 
Communications and radio direction finding 
. Traffic barriers 
I People barriers 
\ De-icers 
Crash barriers 
Fuel Bowsers and dumps 
Immigration controL ............. etc 
The need for each of these resources can be predicted by considering the 
activities above - the process is an example of Mindset, introduced earlier, 
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which concentrates the attention on a series of pertinent topic areas in tum. 
Sensors and indicators necessary to support the activities and implicit in the 
resources follow naturally in the same Mindset. 
Developing the Prime Directive 
ATC presents an interesting example of selecting an SOl Prime Directive 
(PD). There is a clear choice between ATC being an executive authority and 
being an advisory service. Corresponding PDs might appear as follows:-
,. 
"To mana.ge air operations safely and effectively" 
OR 
"To provide a safe, effective environmentfor aircraft operations 
The present policy, world-wide - i.e. a doctrine - is to vest the ultimate 
authority for the safety of passengers in the pilot and captain of an aircraft. 
This approach, sometimes difficult to reconcile with the dose control 
necessary to prevent mid-air accidents, favours the second PD. The PD is 
analysed semantically as follows:-
"To provide .•• " 
" f" ... a sa e ..• 
" ff t· " ••• e ec IV e .•• 
A supporting, resource-providing, 
non-authoritative role 
Threats and risks are known, 
excluded, neutralized or avoided, 
such as weather, collision, crash, 
fuel shortage, fire, airborne emergency 
Performs well, is capable, available, 
survivable/durable/robust 
" ••• environment for ..• " All the salient features and facilities 
relevant to :air activities 
" •.• aircraft operations" Approaching, leaving, local flying, 
taxiing, parking, loading / unloading, 
replenishing, repairing, diverting 
Aircraft operations may, or may not, include parking and often do not 
include repairs, so the semantic analysis above reveals issues which must be 
resolved. The purpose of the semantic analysis is to find and define the 
boundaries to the SOl's responsibilities - these bounds to responsibility are 
often major issues. An example for the Channel Tunnel Crisis Management 
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system illustrates the point: in this case, the semantic analysis forms a 
complete, if long, sentence - a ruse ｴｾ＠ make it more understandable:-
"To neutralize... To detect, locate, identify, render safe 
.. any .................................................. whatever constitutes a hazard 
• • . 1 
.. lmmlnent ........................................................... ln t le near-term 
.. threats ........................................................... to the status quo of 
.. to the passengers, ......... those·legitimately carried by the company 
............................... .in exchange for fares, 
.. staff, .............................. those.·in the paid employ of the company, 
.. fabric, .................................... : ........................... the tunnel itself, 
.. facilities, ................................. rolling stock, rails, signals, shops, 
............ offices, franchises, barriers, etc, 
.. and continued operation ...... and the uninterrupted transportation 
................ of passengers and freight 
.. of the Tunnel" ................ within the bounds of legal responsibility 
(Notes:- *"Imminent" is unclear : 
*Sequence of "passengers, staff, fabric, etc" is significant 
*"Continue Operations" implies continued revenue and confidence 
*No allowance has been ,made for the franchise workers) 
, So, the semantic analysis can put rather formal specification boundaries to 
the SOl. This is, of course both proper and important if the subsequent design 
concepts are to be useful. The notes, in the above example are particularly 
interesting - the people working in the franchises appear not to be covered by 
the Crisis Management PD; the emergence of such issues is one of the major 
contributions of semantic analysis. 
Finally, here is the PD for an advance avionics architecture which shows both 
PD and semantic analysis as before:- .. ' 
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Semantic Analysis 
To provide ...................... ; ........... A service to support .. . 
... an effective ............................. performance. availability of performance and survivability 
of performance. giving ..... . 
... means of .................................... a vehicle for conveying. processing and handling 
information in support of ............. . 
... concurrent management.. simultaneous awareness. understanding and husbanding of 
capability for ... 
. '
... mission ....................... ; ................ the end-purpose of the particular set of activities to be 
effected by the aircraft.. ...... 
... platform ...................................... the aircraft itself in respect of its ability to survive and 
support the mission and the ............ .. 
... resources ................................... sensors. emitters. weapons. power. energy. processing. 
. communications, reserves. reversions allocated to the 
platform and its mission 
IMPLIED 
The contained architecture should show a net positive contribution to the 
effectiveness of its containing platform • I.e. any negative aspects, 
such as carried weight, loss of payload volume, etc should be more than 
compensated for by the S-O-I 
Here the emergence of Net Contribution is apparent in the Implied Section at 
the bottom, since the architecture could occupy a significant proportion of 
the aircraft volume and payload - depending on the aircraft type, 
The significant ､ｩｾｦ･ｲ･ｮＵ･＠ between a root defmition in SSM and a Prime 
Directive in the SSC shpuld now be evident. The latter is the highest level of 
abstract description of the system's purpose or raison d'etre, while the 
former concerns itself with the defmition of systems in the "systems-
thinking" mode of analysis 
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Threat Elaboration 
Elaboration of the threat to achieving the PD invokes the N&S set of 
External, Internal and Environmental Threats. A typical elaboration, in this 
case for the Channel Tunnel, would be as follows:-
CATEGORY 
Natural Hazard 
Accident .. 
SPECIFICS 
Water Ingress 
Earth movement 
Rail 
SENSOR 
Moisture sensors 
Strain gauges 
Rail currents, CCTV, 
Guards 
Aircraft Crash ? 
Freight Hazard Noxious substances Auto-sniffers 
Explosives Sniffers, Detectors 
System failure Watertight Bulkheads Built-in Test (BIT) 
Power distribution BIT 
Signals / Points BIT / staff 
Communications On-line test 
Automatic braking Rail currents 
Ventilation BIT & sniffers 
Terrorist Posing as passenger ? 
Carrying weapons X-ray, detectors, sniffers 
.' Explosives in luggage " 
Explosives in freight " 
Disaffected staff Sabotage Sensors, patrols, 
inspections, passwords, 
initial staff selection 
In this example, threat elaboration has been coupled with the ideas of 
decomposing the broad threat and identifying both the sensors where they 
can be envisaged and - more importantly - the threats with no sensors 
. 
The Set of Management Processes 
An example of a set of management processes was given earlier for a notional 
- fire control centre, Below is a set for the advanced avionic architecture 
project. 
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Functional Categories 
Platform Management Mission Management 
6-D Flight Regime Contro Long-term Navigation 
Fire Control ,.-..------,... r-----""""'t- En - Route Evasion I 
En One C t I Engagement ｔ｡｣ｴｩ［ｾＱ＠ ｍ｡ｾｾＺｾｶｲ･＠ '1M.a.n.a.g.em.e.n.t. ... ____ ｾｓｩｴｵ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ Assessment 
Energy Management .--r-yo.__ Threat Detection 
Glass cockpit Presentation Co-operation 
Reactive Countermeasures Co-operative Tactics 
Short-term ｾ｡ｶｩｧ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ Routes of Penetration 
& Egress 
Evasion profiles 
Engagement Geometry 
ESM Interpretation 
EMCON Policy 
ResOurce Management 
Sensor Management 
Reconfiguraation 
-Fallback & Reversion 
Fuel Management 
Weapons Management 
BITE I Self Test 
Asymmetry Management 
IFR Planning 
Recovery 
In the figure it can be seen that Mission Management refers to the goals of the 
sortie, Vehicle Management refers to the aircraft itself, and Resource 
Management refers to the husbanding of resources in the aircraft in support 
of both mission and vehicle. In this case, the Management Set can be seen to 
support a sequence of activities associated with the mission which is evidently 
directed towards reaching some remote target or rendez-vous. Other 
projects develop the management set around different schema as follows. 
Elaborating the Management Processes. 
Once the activities of the Set of Management Processes are identified, they 
may be ･ｬ｡｢ｯｲ｡ｴｾ､＠ by any of a variety of standard techniques, including flow 
charting and data state design. Since the latter is less common in the UK, the 
. following ChaIlI1el Tunnel examples use that approach. It is, of course, 
necessary to have some form of strategy for the elaboration process; 
generally strategies for managing involve one or more of:-
, 
Zones or Areas of Segregation 
Layers of Phases of Operations 
Sequences 
Finite States 
In the case of a Crisis Management system for the Channel Tunnel, a layered 
defence against the intruder seems most appropriate - if only by trial and 
error. In such a scheme, a series of defensive screens is envisaged, as 
follows:-
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LAYERED DEFENCE 
Efforts are first made to exclude the threat. It must be assumed that these will 
not alWays be successful. Efforts are then made to contain the free threat, 
now internal to the SOL If contained, the next step is neutralization, and so 
on. 
Each of the layers can then be decomposed in tum; The following example 
shows the First Inner Layer:-
Similar elaboration of the other steps in this case lead to similar diagrams 
which, since they all emanate from the first diagram in this section, can be 
joined together into one large diagram describing the complete set of 
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processes. This picture represents the functional description of the SOl to a 
second level of resolution and provides the basis for subsequent software 
design.:But first, it is necessary to develop an architectural, or structural base 
on which to develop the functionality. 
Developing Organization and Architecture 
In any IDA system organization there will be internal and external 
organization. The major internal activities will be known from the process 
elaboration; these need to be connected with the external world, the parent 
and sibIing systems. I refer to these external features as the Principal Players. 
For the Channel Tunnel Crisis Management System they might be:_ 
Baggage Inspection Customs 
Immigration Local Police 
International Police Intelligence (part of CM) 
Operations (hub of CM)Security Control and Forces 
Emergency Services Damage Repair & Control 
Damage Repair Resources Logistics (part of CM) 
Activity Sensors (CCTV, etc) Environment Sensors 
Safety Controls (Bulkheads, train re-routing, etc) 
Routine Train Operations 
The PrinCipal Players are then grouped as follows:-
Establish an N2 chart, using intuitive groupings to begin 
Create quantitative cell values for each interface, either on a basis of 
urgency, importance of information, quantity of information, hierarchy or 
similar according to purpose 
Cluster using weighted cells 
# 
Cluster using sets of the un-weighted cells to explore in three dimensions 
Fin'd design weaknesses - incomplete clusters, system nodes, etc 
Strengthen architecture - add links, replicate or protect nodes, etc. 
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Some examples of the procedure first for a simplified Airfield Project, and 
then for the Channel Tunnel follow; first, the Airfield Project:-
Aircraft Ii: ! 7 .i.: ! ! ! 
General ｾ＠ I ! Numbering Scheme 
Flying ! : I i 
---t'--:-:-:::I:. ........................... ｾ＠ .................................. t ...... "" ................... i ...... ........ "' .. 9. Safety Critical ................. "' ...... .. 
Aircraft ｾ＠ i i 8 
ａｲｾ［ｴｾｧ＠ j I 9 I ｾＮｓ｡ｦ･ｴｹ＠ Imprtant 
................ t-__ -lL----; ................................ :a .......................... 1: ............. .. 
, i! 5 Safety Related 
:.: Landing I i 9 I 4 
Taking off , I 3.Routine 
i l .......................... l.............. 2 ﾷﾷﾷｾﾷﾷﾷﾷﾷｲﾷﾷﾷ＠ .. ·····1 ｾｾｾ＠ 7 I ｾ＠ U':'lalol . 
ｾ＠ ........................ • ........................ ｾ＠ ................................. :- ...................... t ............................ ... 
......... r 9 1 7 I 7 ｾｾｾｾｾｾｾｾＬ＠ 3 I i 
................... _.' ............................ ""Ii • ........................ -.: ............................... ,.,.T.ak.eo_ff"'r::-_::-:--,: 5 
• , ...................... c ............................ .. 
: , i i Controlling i 
I I I . 3 5 i 5 I' I I I ｍｾｾｾｾＺｾｴｳ＠ i 
........ "' ........ , .......................... 'C ............................ ,. ........................ iIIII .. "':- .............................. , __ ...... ＭＭＭＭＺＮｾ＠ ....................................... .. 
. . . : :: . 
I. S, mall ｾｩｲｦｩ･ｬｾ＠ - I. il 3. Aircraft 3 " f Taxying 
.... ｎＮＨｉＮｭ｢Ｎ･ｸｾｾ＠ ... lnt.ex. ｡ｾｾＮｳ＠ ....... J. ............. .t .............. ｾ｟ＭｴｉＭＭＭＭＭＬ＠
! ! ! ! ! !. 
i ! iii 113 ! i i ! ! ! 
Ground 
Marshalling 
The N2 Chart, or incidence matrix, is shown, in simplified fonn above, as it 
might appear after simply obselVing activities. The domain activities are 
represented in the leading diagonals, and the relationships between them gave 
been entered in the appropriate interface rectangles using the numbering 
scheme in the inset box. At this point, unclustered, the chart has been used 
simply to record, but already we can see a functionally bound block of 
activities at the bottom right hand comer, while "Controlling approach and 
Takeoff' has some of the features of a partial system node. We may 
rearrange the activities along the leading diagonal in detect further interface 
patterns, ,\S follows:-
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I 
· : ｾ＠ NODE 
·,,·,-,··,'-}-"',·········'r··' .•••••••• 
· : 
· : 
· 7 : · : 
· : · . 
· . ｉＭＭＭＭｾ｟Ｚ｟Ｚ｟］ＺＺ｟Ｑ＠ ............................. :-........................... .. ......................... ... 
Aircraft I 
Appoaching 9 : 
Airfield i 
ｦＱｉｉＭＭｾｾｾｾｾＡ＠ ......................... . 
Controlling 
Approach / 
Takeoff 9 7 3 
········· .. ｬｾＭＭﾷｲＭＭＱ＠
9 Landing/ Taking off 
.......... Functional········· .............. ｾＭＭＭｦｬｴ［ＺＺＺＺＺＺ［Ｍ［Ｍ［ｾ＠
Blocks 3 
. ! 
.................. 1 .......................... ｾ＠ ................ .. 
i i 
Small Airfield 
... Clustered Interface·s········· 
9. Sarety Critical 
8 
7.Safety Imprtant .. 
6 
5 Safety Related 
4 
Re-arranging reveals a cleaner node and another bound pair at the top left-
. hand comer. The node also couples the two functional blocks. This example 
is simple but highly illustrative; the activities have grouped in domain 
.' patterns with "free" flying, controlled flying near the airfield and the 
movement of aircraft on the ground as the three domains 
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The number of activities above was so small that the use of computer 
assistance was unnecessary; following examples all made use of processing 
power, CADRA T, to untangle the patterns. First, the Channel Tunnel Crisis 
Management System:-
INTERFACES AND INFORMATION 
1M MIG ｉﾷｉａｊｾ＠ Flt-DS FINDS FINDS 
-LIAISON CLST A1..ERTS Flt-DS FINDS Flt-DS 
- I::' I 
AlERTS A1..ERTS - INTER AlERTS MeAl Fa. AlERTS 
- La; I ｾｔｓ＠ l>IAIUS UAISON Flt-DS Fa. AlERTS ｾ＠
-
EMX I ｾｉａｉｕｓ＠S\<:S ｾ＠
ｾｉ＠ ｾｉａｉｵＺＺＮ＠ !)TATU: E\ENTS ｾ＠
:- N:TV l ACTlVI- A"" "VI- ACTlVI- r<CTIVI S£NS TIES ＱｾＢＲｾｾ＠ TIES TIES 
1- SFlY STA1l..S CNTR 
- INTEL ｾ＠ WNN3S 
ｾｓｓｉｓｔｎｃｉ＠ ｉｾ＠ IGTlVATE ｾ＠ CPS I "'-'''VI' ｾｉ＠ ［ａｾ＠ｾｳｳ＠ ｾｓｓｉｓｔｎｃ＠ DIRECT DIRECT 
ｾ＠ LOOS I 
UAISON ｾｾ＠ - g;yy FESR::S RP3 
STArus 1- QM.«3 FESR::S R>RS 
ｾｔｬｖａｔｅ＠ mR'f ----, ｾｉ＠
-
The process is started by collecting and collating all the information flowing, 
or likely to flow, between the various entities concerned with the 
Management of the Channel Tunnel. The above N2 chart is a typical example 
of such a chart at the early stages of design concept fonnulation for a simple 
system. Matrices with over 100 entities are quite common for more complex 
systems. (The abbreviations are, hopefully, self-evident, but in any event it is 
unimportant to read the detail; it is the overall pattern fonned by the 
interfaces that is more important at this stage.) 
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· IMMIGRATION 
CUSTOMS 
BAGGAGE INSPECTION 
INTERPOL 
LOCALPOUCE 
EMERGENCY SERVICES 
ENVIRONMENT SENSORS 
ACTIVITY SENSORS 
SAFETY CONTROLS 
INTELUGENCE 
OPERATIONS 
LOGISTICS 
SECURITY FORCES 
DAMAGE REPAIRS 
ROUTINE OPERA nONS 
111 
- 13 1 
,-
6 
-3 3 
Initial Chunnel N2 Chart 
6 6 7 
3 3 7 
3 9 
- I 9 6 4 1 
- ｾ＠ 4 
- I 9 
- 9 8 
-
-
2 
- 18 9 
- I 9 9 7 4 4 9 5 
- I 6 
I- I 3 8 7 
6 6 
I- I 
9 ｜ｾＭＭｉ＠
The second chart, above, introduces a marking scheme which rates each of 
the interfaces on a scale of zero (no interface) to 9 (strong relationship) as 
seen from the viewpoint of the proposed SOL In the example, the viewpoint 
being expressed is that of the putative Crisis Management System, as can be 
seen by the relatively low numbers being allocated to interfaces not directed 
into the SOl, represented here by: 
Intelligence 
Operations 
Logistics 
Damage Repairs (the SOl-associated action element) 
Some pattern is already visible in the Chart above; Operations has a number 
of interfaces and appears to be something of a local node. Perhaps CADRA T 
can reveal more pattern. 
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Clustered Chunnel N2 Chart 
BAGGAGE INSPECTION 
CUSTOMS 
IMMIGRATION 
INTERPOL 
LOCAL POLICE 
INTELLIGENCE 
EMERGENCY SERVICES 
ACTIVITY SENSORS 
SECURITY FORCES 
OPERATIONS 
ROUTINE OPERATIONS 
. SAFETY CONTROLS 
ENVIRONMENT SENSORS 
DAMAGE REPAIRS 
LOGISTICS 
0161 
- 11 3 
-
1 
1-
3 3 
3 3 7 
6 6 7 
P 9 
'6 19 
-
-
8 
3 7 
4 5 
1 4 
I 9 8 
I 4 
- 9 
- 18 7 
4 9" [7 9 9 
- 19 9 
2 - I 
9 8 
...., I 6 ,- (6 
6 ｾＭＭｉ＠
The clustered chart reveals some pattern at the upper left of the screen 
brought about by clustering Customs, Immigration, Interpol and the Local 
Police, but the expected square associated with a functionally-bound block is 
clearly incomplete. It is also clear from the grouping that the emergency 
services, although connected into Operations, has no connection with the 
Local Police - a clear oversight in the original chart, revealed by the 
clustering process. The node centred on Operations is incomplete in that it 
has interfaces missing in the limbs of the cross and it is asymmetric, with the 
left limb longer than the right Lastly, there is a partially bound functional 
block joining Action Sensors, Security Forces and Operations. 
All of these deficiencies are not only capable of repair, but are architectural 
weaknesses and should be repaired to instil necessary balance and structure 
in the 'architecture. Balance can now be seen, literally, as symmetry of 
pattern within the N2 Chart. The following chart repairs the omissions:-
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BAGGAGE INSPECTION 
CUSTOMS 
IMMIGRATION 
INTERPOL 
LOCAL POLICE 
INTELLIGENCE 
EMERGENCY SERVICES 
. 
: ACTIVITY SENSORS 
SECURITY FORCES 
OPERATIONS 
ROUTINE OPERATIONS 
'SAFETY CONTROLS 
ENVIRONMENT SENSORS 
, DAMAGE REPAIRS 
LOGISTICS 
D 
-3 
Enhancing the Architecture 
16 I 
1 3 3 7 
-
1 6 6 7 
.- P 9 3 3 
2 2 '6 19 4 1 4 
- I 9 8 
4 
I- I 4 
8 - J 8 9 8 
3 
1- 18 7 7 1 
4 5 4 1 9" 17 9 2 9 5 
- I? 9 
2 - I 
9 8 I- t 
6 1- 16 
2 6 ＲｾＱ＠
The added interfaces have been italicized to highlight their positions. Of 
course, now the clustering needs to be re-executed, since the new interfaces 
result in a non-minimal matrix score, or simply, the entities can be clustered 
rather better. The following chart re-clusters the new set of interfaces:-
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BAGGAGE INSPECTION 
CUSTOMS 
IMMIGRATION 
INTERPOL 
LOCAL POLICE 
INTELLIGENCE 
EMERGENCY SERVICES 
SECURITY FORCES 
ACTITY SENSORS 
OPERATIONS 
LOGISTICS 
DAMAGE REPAIRS 
ROUTINE OPERATIONS 
SAFETY CONTROLS 
ENVIRONMENT SENSORS 
I 
-3 
161 
I 1 
-
1 ,-
3 3 
2 2 
Added Links Reclustered 
-
3 3 7 
6 6 7 
P 9 
"6 19 4 1 4 
l 9 8 
4 - I 4 
-3 7 1 8 7 
8 8 19 8 
4 5 4 9 - [5 9 7 9 1 2 
1- [9 2 6 
6 I- I 6 
--.., I 9 
2 r- I 
9 8-.... 1 
Enhancing the architecture by adding links has significantly changed the 
optimum cluster pattern. In particular, a new functional block has appeared 
uniting Operations, Logistics and Damage Repairs. Common sense might 
have suggested that these three would be closely associated; happily, proper 
application of the CADRA T tool makes up for any deficiencies in that area. 
It was mentioned earlier that CADRA T could section the decimal numbers in 
order to examine the architectural pyramid layer by layer. This process can 
be very revealing, and can reveal weaknesses and enable remedial action to 
be proposed and tried. The tool simply takes any band of decimal numbers in 
the interfaces and reduces rtumbers in the selected band to unity, putting all 
others to zero. The chart can be clustered in this state to reveal the structure 
connecting peer activities. The following two Chunnel charts select two 
bands, 1 to 3 which, because of the numbering scheme chosen, looks at 
connections designated low priority as see from the Crisis Managers 
viewpoint, and 7 to 9 which conversely looks at the high priority links. The 
viewpoint caution is important; priority is very much in the eye of the 
beholder, and in this case the beholder's prejudice is revealed by the 
CADRA T clusters 
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BAGGAGE INSPECTION 
IMMIGRATION 
CUSTOMS 
INTERPOL 
LOCAL POLICE 
SECURITY FORCES 
nl FHUNNEL BINARY 
-
. 1 
.' 
LOGISTICS 
DAMAGE REPAIRS 
ACTIVITY SENSORS 
OPERATIONS 
SAFETY CONTROLS 
ENVIRONMENT SENSORS 
ROUTINE OPERATIONS 
EMERGENCY SERVICES 
INTELLIGENCE 
1 
-1 
1 r 
1 1 
1 1 
II ,- II 
IT I 1 IT [1 
-
,- I 
-1 
I-
1 
cu., r', 1 • 3 
I 1 
I 
- I 
..... I 
-- I 
ｾｾｉ＠
The chart ｾ･ｶ･｡ｬｳ＠ that, while Immigration, Customs, Interpol, Local Police 
and the Security Forces are all well connected at lower level, their 
connections with Crisis Management Intelligence is nil and with Operations is 
sparse, and via the Security Forces only, This is architecturally unsound 
because the Crisis Management Team must have low-level communication 
links with their essential allies in incident-containment. high-level links are 
well enough, but as shown at present, the Police would be hard pushed even 
to alert the crisis management team, and alerting is a priority 
communication, 
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The next figure shows the supposedly high priority links:-
0 
Chunnel Binary Cut 7 . 9 
BAGGAGE INSPECTION 
EMERGENCY SERVICES 
CUSTOMS 
IMMIGRATION 
INTERPOL 
LOCAL POLICE 
INTELLIGENCE 
LOGISTICS 
SECURITY FORCES 
ACTIVITY SENSORS 
OPERATIONS 
ROUTINE OPERATIONS 
SAFETY CONTROLS 
ENVIRONMENT SENSORS 
DAMAGE REPAIRS 
-
I I 
-
,- I 
-
,-
1 
1 
I 1 
I 1 
I- I 
-
I-
1 
1 
1 1 
t 
- It 1 1 
I- II 1 1 1 
1 11 
. ...., L 
1 1 -- I 
ｾＭＭｉ＠
This chart for high priority links shows Intelligence as rather more of a sink 
node than a source node, as evidenced by the asymmetric nodal cross about 
the activity. For example, Intelligence returns no information to the police, 
Interpol or any of the other agencies. This architecture may have clustered 
well under the full decimal regime, but the 3-D analysis reveals serious 
shortcomings which could be remedied quite simply. It is the ability of the 
c1ustering tool to reveal distinctive patterns with direct structural 
correspondence that gives such strength. 
After repairing architectural weaknesses the process of architectural 
development proceeds along a series of simple steps:-
The functionally bound activity blocks are candidates for physical 
juxta-position in the design concept so as to shorten and facilitate links 
and interfaces for the overall system. 
Such functional blocks can be collapsed to single functions in 
subsequent versions of the chart, which consequently becomes smaller 
as the architectural elements coalesce or aggregate, so gradually 
reducing the complexity. Collapsed functional blocks can, of course, 
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be reclustered to continue the architectural build-up. 
Where a member of a functional block cannot be physically located 
with the other members, as in the example where it alone is mobile, 
then the communication links with other block members should 
receive special attention, since they become extended and hence crucial 
to good operation. 
Nodes also demand special attention. In a hostile environment, nodes 
must be either hardened or replicated or both. In a benign 
environment, such measures are unaffordable and unnecessary, but it 
is as well to support the node (see section on CADRA T) with 
alternative interfaces around its centre-point. The node in the final 
decimal cluster, three figures above, is partially-supported. 
Some examples of the successive activities in developing design concepts for 
the Channel Tunnel follow:-
MONITOR PROGRESS 
COMMUNICATIONS 
SENSORS 
RATES OF ADVANCE/PROGRESS 
RATES OF UTILISATION 
INITIATE ACTION 
COMMUNICATE 
COMMIT RESOURCES 
PROVIDE FACILITIES 
TRANSPORT 
ASSESS SIWATION 
SENSORS 
SOURCES 
INTELLIGENCE 
ANALYSIIS 
COMMUNICATIONS 
DECISION 
CIRCLE 
IDENTIFY THREATS / 
OPPORTUNITIES 
THREAT PROFILE 
THREAT SENSORS 
FORCE BALANCE 
COMMUNICATIONS 
OPTIONS 
COURSE OF ACTION 
SAFETY LIMITS 
SITUATION DEPENDENCIES 
·CREATIVE CONCEPTS 
SELECT OPTION 
DECISION MAKER 
POINT OF COMMAND 
ｆｏｃｕｓｏｆｾｏｒｍａｔｉｏｎ＠
MEANS OF CONTROL 
REVIEW CONSTRAINTS 
RESOURCES 
FACILITIES 
LOCATIONS 
TRANSPORT 
COMMUNICATIONS 
CRISIS l\fANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS 
First the decision circle. Set against the circle are the principal factors of 
interest in the fonnulation of decisions. The various set of factors fall 
naturally to different skill-groups of people; Review Constraints for 
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example, is often the realm of engineers and logisticians, while Assess 
Situation might be more appropriate to operations staff 
INTELLIGENCE MAINTENANCE & REPAIR 
COLLECTION ---. SERVICING PLANS 
ANALYSIS I MAINTENANCE CONTROL 
EMERGENCY REPAIR CONTROL BRIEFING ｾ＠
CTION 
PLANNING 
CPRM 
: 
OPERATIONS COMCEN 
ALERT PROCEDURES EXECUTIVE CONTROL SWITCHBOARD 
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES SITUATION DISPLAY RADIO ROOM 
EVACUATION BRIEFING MESSAGE DIST. 
REROUTING RAILWAYOPS TANNOY 
TRANSPORT THREAT ALERTS, CCTVSTUDIO 
SPECIAL EQUIPMENT WARNINGS 
COMMUNICATIONS CHUNNELSTATUS 
PERSONNEL ETC 
CELL ORGANISATION 
The decision cirCle forms the basis for physical organization in larger 
organizations where cooperative decision analysis is necessary. The figure 
above shows a notional layout for the Chunnel Crisis Management Control 
Centre layout. CPRM stands for Contingency Planning and Resource 
Management, two functions which are often combined 
Having postulated a control centre and cell structure, it must be connected to 
the other system agencies in the manner developed in the N2 charts above:-
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LOCAl POLICE 
CHUNNELSECURIlY 
INTERPOL 
IMMIGRATION 
CUSTOMS 
MAINTENANCE CREWS 
REPAIR CREWS 
LOCAL POLICE ｉｾｔｅｌｌｬｇｅｾｃｅ＠ MAINTENANCE'" IIEPAiJl 
nVlClNG PLAN' 
MAINTKNANCB CONT1l0L 
DURG.Hey ABP4lll CON .... or.. CHUNNEL SECURI . Ｎ［ＮＮｔｙＮ［ＮＮＮＮＮＮＮＭＭｉｉＭＭｴｾ＠ ...:1_ .:J.... 
INTERPOL ::l...:.. 
IMMIGRATION . t-----:=-:--' ..... =rN .. ;.;..a ｾＭＭＭｲＭＭＭＭＭｴ＠
CPRM ｏｐｅｒａｔｬｏｾｓ＠ COMCEN 
CUSTOMS 
TRANSPORT 
AuaT .aoczouau IW1'I'CIIIIOAllD 
:RADIO ROOM 
MBIIAGB DIH'. 
DEPOTS ＬＬ［ＮＮＮＮＭｾ＠
SECURITY ; 
DDaGKNCY P.ocaOO .... 
.VACUATIO" 
REROl,.'1'1NG 
TRANSPORT 
InClAL BurrMll'NT 
COM\otUNlCATION' 
'UJONNBL 
aX1tct1T'lVB CON'ntOL 
llroAnO" DISPLAY 
1.IEnNG 
RAILWAY 0" 
1HJlBAT ALBan. 
WA.aflil}llllG. 
CIIt11'iNIlL .TA nJI 
.ROUTlNa 
·0.111' 
_aBCOVERY 
LlAIIO\'lll 
nc 
TANNOY 
CXTV InJI)IO 
REPAIR CREWS 
ETC 
TRANSPORT 
DEPOTS 
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The figure repeats the previous diagram in miniature and shows its in / out 
connections 
Having looked at logical external connectivity, the concept can now develop 
in tenns of communications capacities. This soon becomes an engineering 
task, but to begin it is necessary to establish the number of people operating 
within the Crisis Management Control Centre. Previous activities have 
developed the processes to be executed by some undefmed combination of 
man and machine. It is now necessary to estimate the amount of information 
to be handled and processed, and to invoke the use of machines where useful 
or necessary, particularly to relieve operators of routine, but important, 
tasks and to develop a cost-effective design concept. 
It is also necessary to consider the human activity structure within the 
Control Centre. Such centres can be viewed as three-tiered - see Systems in 
Command, enclosed - and there is also likely to be a need for shift working to 
provide continuous cover. It is useful to develop a human architecture 
viewpoint, as follows:-
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The numbers in the squares show the estimated staff numbers each shift, 
before allowances are made for leave, sickness, etc, and considering only one 
Control Centre; survivability considerations might suggest a standby control 
centre with its own operatives. 
Clearly, Crisis Management is highly labour intensive during a crisis. The 
concept of having such large numbers of people on duty twenty four hours a 
day, 365 days per year to anticipate a crisis is, however, unrealistic 
Summary - Channel Tunnel Design Concept 
It is interesting to note that the full analysis for Channel Tunnel Crisis 
Management does not favour a separate crisis management control centre on 
grounds both of cost and of inability to maintain tlie drive of the people 
involved over protracted periods when, hopefully, no crises occur. Instead, 
as the last N2 chart above amply illustrates, there is such a close liaison 
needed between crisis management and routine ｯｰｾｲ｡ｴｩｯｮｳ＠ management that 
the better approach is to combine the two. By providing dedicated crisis 
. management facilities in the operations room, and maintaining a cadre of 
highly trained individuals within the Chunnel work-force and within the 
emergency services, the same objectives can be met more effectively and 
economically. There is a risk that such a cadre will not be maintained, and so 
its formation and training would best be mandatory, externally inspected and 
comprehensively undertaken, with exercises and command team training. 
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Advanced Architecture Design Concepts 
This section touches on design concepts which are expanded and explained 
much more fully in Advanced Avionic Architectures, enclosed, which was 
presented at the Royal Aeronautical Society in March 1989. The concepts 
expressed in the paper have contributed to a major UK initiative in the realm 
of future aircraft design, presently the subject of ｭｵ｣ｬｾ＠ international activity, 
particularly in the US. 
Since the concept of clustering and linking is fundamental to architecture, it 
should be applicable to the most advanced of projects. In such cases, the 
challenge and demand might be much greater, but the concept should be 
similar. Following examples are taken from an advanced avionics 
architecture project concerned with physical relationships and positioning of 
avionics devices - boxes - inside the fuselage. There are.many influences on 
positioning:-
Antennae must be at the fuselage skin 
Receivers must be near the antennae to avoid unnecessary signal loss in 
the connecting cable 
Displays and controls must be near the crew 
Critical devices must be replicated and isolated to avoid a single hit 
from damaging performance 
Centre of Gravity must be maintained within limits, etc. 
As can be seen, while some factors tend to cluster, others. tend to repel. The 
CADRA T tool can accommodate this by a simple change of numbering 
scheme, as follows: 
9.Proximity Essential 
Proximity v. Important 
7.Proximity Important 
Proximity Useful 
5.Proximity Convenient 
4.Don't Care 
Distance Convenient 
2.Distance Useful 
1. Distance Important 
Effectively all that is happened is a shift of origin to the middle of the range; 
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this does, of course, exclude zero as an option and in consequence every 
interface is filled, making clustering by eye and simple matrix manipulation 
virtually impossible. To the CADRA T tool, nothing has: changed, however. 
With the more complex situation presented by avionics architectures, the 
usefulness of the First and Second Moment Options in the CADRA T program 
are realized. It also becomes swiftly evident that we are not in the realm of 
"right answers". There is no correct answer to architectural problems; some 
are simply better than others in some respects. 
Consider the following situation. An avionics system is 'comprised of a 
number of discrete modules which can be put together to build operating 
functions. There are 16 such modules in this case; they are as follows:-
A power amplifier (P A) 
Two antennae 
A special transmitter 
An special receiver 
A radar transmitter (Tx) 
A Communications, Navigation and Identification (CNI) transmitter 
A CNI receiver 
A radar receiver (Rx) 
Two TX/RX Controllers 
A frequency synthesizer 
Crew Displays and Controls (D & C) 
Weapons 
Adding the aircraft fuselage and the crew themselves completes the picture. 
The first of the resulting clustered N2 charts is as follows:-
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Advanced Architecture - First Moment 
The first moment cluster shows several interesting architectural features:-
The Transmitters have been grouped with one antenna and one 
controller "above" the Fuselage 
The Receivers have also been grouped with the other antenna and the 
other controller"below" the Fuselage .. 
The Fuselage is a pivot, around which the design clusters 
The Displays and Controls, the Crew and the Weapons have been 
positioned remotely from the Transmitters with their unwelcome and 
potentially hazardous radiation 
ｾ＠
The Controllers have been mutually separated for survivability . 
. 
The first moment clustering is interesting, but that may not be the end of the 
story, since first-moment clustering produces only a few, fairly loose 
clusters. The second moment cluster produces tighter clusters as follows:-
- - -. 
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Advanced Architecture - Second Moment 
The tighter clustering produces the following features:-
The Fuselage fonns a design pivot point as before 
All the Transmitters and their Antennae are grouped together "above" 
the Fuselage . 
. ' 
All the Receivers are grouped immediately "below" the Fuselage, 
some distance from their respective Antennae. 
The Frequency Synthesizer and one of the Controllers have grouped as 
common Tx / Rx facilities and indeed they serve both Transmitters 
and Receivers equally. 
As before, the Displays and Controls, the Weapons and the Crew have 
been isolated from the radiation, but rather more effectively in this 
case, by virtue of the way in which the radiators have been forced to 
the top. Note also that the Crew and Weapons have exchanged 
positions, the Crew now being furthest from the radiation' 
The two diagrams show differences that are more than subtle architectural 
variations, and, since there is no "right" answer, they present alternative 
clustering concepts. Thus the CADRA T tool is, at this level, an idea 
generator, a concept proposer, with the operator interpreting, choosing, 
modifying and perhaps rejecting as he or she proceeds. 
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9.3. Summary 
This chapter has illustrated some of the more unusual aspects of design 
concept evolution. Several linked techniques have been employed which are 
valuable, but the Seven Step Continuum is not based on any particular 
techniques or tools. It is a framework for developing IDA system design 
concepts from issues, and any methods which achieve tasks within the 
framework are valuable. 
The SSC has been formed by action research, and it is a living framework in 
the sense that its design is not fmalized and fIxed. It has also been tested on 
only three subjects, admittedly all different. To form a judgement on its 
efficacy would be premature. It is, however, reasonable to suggest that it 
shows promise. 
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10. BUILDING FUTURE SYSTEMS 
The enclosed paper, Building Future Systems, is an invited paper at the 1989 
MILCOMP Exhibition and Symposium, and is concerned with the present 
tendency to design and implement large-scale IDA systems which are 
obsolescent at delivery. 
10.1. Cost Effective Systems 
.. 
The process of procuring large-scale IDA systems is presently going:through 
a series of changes, brought about principally by past overruns on time and 
budget. The current mode is for fixed-price contracts, instead of the previous 
"cost-plus" regime. As the following figure, extracted from the enclosed 
paper Building Future Systems, shows, this change may not bring ｱｵｩｾ･＠ the 
expected benefits 
INITIAL EVOLVING CURRENT/LATE CONTINUAL' 
.... REQUIREMENT 
.. DEVELOPt-.1ENT 
"'" 
DELIVERED ioo IN-SERVICE 
... SPECIFICATION CONTRACT SYSTEM UPDATE 
£ 
I SYSTEM·I CONCEPT Continually Changing Environment, Operational ... £ Requirement & Technology 
... 
CAREFUL. FIXED-PRICE 
.' OBSOLESCENT CONTINUOUS 
PRECISE • DEVELOPMENT DELIVERED IN-SERVICE 
SPECIFICATION CONTRACT SYSTEM UPDATE 
CAREFULLY • SPECIFIED OBSOLESCENCE 
The moving "£" indicates that the cost must be borne, by one customerbr 
another. The dilemma facing customer and contractor is severe. If costs are 
to be held in check, the argument goes, then contracts must be based on -a very 
careful specification which will result in precisely that which is ｲ･ｱｵｩｲ･ｾＮ＠
Trying to carefully specify something as complex as an IDA system is, ' 
however, not practical for three reasons:-
The Heisenberg syndrome - the more detail is required in the 
description of any human activity, the more difficult that detail is to 
convey. An example is the inability to specify in detail the dynamics of 
a real-time situation display. Even if the customer has a well-formed 
understanding of the future requirement, the words do not exist to 
meet the need for detailed description 
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Supposing perfect definition were feasible, the resulting 
implementation would produce a time capsule; the external 
environment within which the system has to operate evolves during the 
period of development, making the newly developed system 
obsolescent at delivery. 
The more detailed the specification, the longer it takes and the more 
expensive it becomes, so making itself more likely to be outdated and 
unaffordable. This process is visible at present in the use of know ledge 
elicitation at the start of some major projects, in an attempt to tease out 
the softer issues at the start of the specification process. 
Chasing the illusion of the perfect specification clearly presents diminishing 
returns. Recognition of the problem has resulted in the introduction of 
prototyping as a means of resolution. Prototypes of IDA systems represent 
some aspects of the eventual system in reasonable detail while other parts are 
modeled in coarse grain. The display example given above is typical; a 
display representing the fmal display is produced, with the remainder of the 
system which contributes infonnation and dynamics to the display being 
simulated relatively crudely. A group of potential operators can sit in front 
of the display, can judge its potential and can modify the presentation to their 
consensus view. 
The prototype concept is a step forward; it involves the operators and users at 
an early stage and enables them to apply their domain understanding directly, 
without the vicarious interpolation of a knowledge elicitor. But even here 
there are limitations: consensus means compromise, and some operator needs 
may be sacrificed; the domain environment will still evolve during 
development; and of course, the operators were not facing the real situation 
in the real environment, so such very real emotions as fear were not brought 
into play. Fear can make the simplest of actions difficult to effect. 
So what is the answer? 
10.2. Evolving Systems 
Nature does not approach the problem in the same way: Instead, higher-
order animals are born rather helpless, with limited imprint, but with the 
ability to evolve socially. Could IDA systems be designed similarly? 
It seems likely that they can.There are two approaches which hold promise, 
as follows:-
Deliver systems into service that contain their own building 
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10.3. 
capability. For example, instead of designing systems with a set of 
fixed display formats, design systems with a facility for the users to 
format their own displays. On delivery, the desired set of fonnats is 
already available, but as situations develop, as users find new 
applications, or as environments evolve, the users can themselves 
evolve their displays in step. This approach, designing user-adaptable 
systems, is technologically feasible now, and could be much more 
widely applied to advantage 
Design Systems which can self evolve. Using the approaches 
outlined in the papers and the section concerned with Cumulative 
Selection, it is within technological capability at present to design 
systems which, for example, layout their own communications 
networks in response to the contemporary environment. If the 
environment changes, either because the IDA system is mobile or due 
to some hostile action, the IDA system can be designed in total can be 
designed to evolve towards the optimum dictated by the new situation; 
at present, only the human part responds effectively, rendering the 
man-made parts ineffective for the new purpose and environment. 
User-Arch itects 
Reference has already been made to the limitations implicit in knowledge 
elicitation. The alternative is to engage the users in system-building. They 
alone possess the domain knowledge. They lack, however, the training and 
skills which engineers and systems designers acquire. There is a need to 
bridge the gap between these two groups, and to develop a new breed - the 
user-architect - as illustrated below:-
IUSER) 
HUMAN SYSTEM 
-ROBUST 
-ADAPTABLE 
- KNOWLEDGEABLE 
- UNDER-VALUED? 
TEACH USERS TO BE 
SYSTEM ARCHITECTS 
DEVELOP "SMART" 
TOOLS FOR 
USER-ARCHITECTS 
I BUILDER) 
LIMITS TO KNOWLEDGE 
ELICITATION 
LIMITS TO EXPERT 
SYSTEMS AS A BRIDGE 
BRIDGING THE USER - BUILDER DIVIDE 
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It is an objective of the Seven Step Continuum, as an instantiation of a 
conceiving system, to bridge that gap. The tools, SYSMORPH, COMMORPH 
and CAD RAT described above and in the enclosed papers are also intended as 
supports for the bridge, since they require principally domain knowledge 
and understanding in their use and very little skill in operation. The 
information which the programs access may, however, contain much detailed 
engineering knowledge and understanding, and the outputs are certainly 
meaningful to designers and engineers. 
" ,Here, then, are the ways forward in the building of future systems: flexible, 
" 
evolvable systems, conceived by users and designers together, supported by a 
framework of a conceiving system embedded with engineer-developed, 
design concept tools, driven by user-architects. 
11. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The aims set out for the thesis, at the end of the first chapter were as follows:-
To review the present Systems Engineering Scene. It is a 
conclusion from the thesis that systems engineering is alive and, if not 
well, is at least showing signs of life in its embracing of soft issues. See 
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 
To identify shortcomings in that Scene. Shortcomings abound, 
not least in the lack of consensus over the substance of systems 
engineering. "Off-the-shelf' syndrome rules in many spheres The 
advent of software engineering tools, a bonus in their intended sphere 
of activities, threaten creativity and innovation if misused at the higher 
/ earlier levels of systems analysis. See Chapters 1 and 2 
To examine the contribution that' softer methods might make 
to systems engineering. See Chapter 2. The brief overview of SSM 
and parallel activities suggested that many of them were SUbjective, 
relying strongly on the skill of the practitioner to develop the issues in 
the problem situation. While this characteristic may be inherent in the 
understanding of soft issues, it leaves the less experienced analyst 
without guidance or direction. SSM presents its practitioners with a 
framework that is so loose that, while it might be all-encompassing, it 
is not always entirely helpful. There are, moreover, no associated 
methods, formal or informal, of handling the complexity of problem 
situation generated by the method. The elaboration of 
WeItanshauungen, seductive in their expansion of understanding, is not 
matched by a process of reconciliation between the various viewpoints, 
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which leaves the problem of choosing rationally between them 
unaddressed. SSM seems, judging by the nature of the method and by 
the examples presented by the many advocates, to be best applied to 
problem situations associated with existing systems, as opposed to the 
creation of new systems ab initio SSM has, none-the-Iess, a 
considerable potential its ability to unravel extant problems. Other soft 
methods, notably those of Eden and Janes, while still subjective, do 
offer means of handling complexity and in the process may identify 
previously-hidden emergent properties of the SOl; these methods 
offer more promise for the less experience analyst. 
To 'develop the essentially human and anthropomorphic 
nature of human-designed IDA systems .. see Chapter 4, in 
which it is contended that homo sapiens sapiens is not as unpredictable 
as suggested by many scientists and engineers, soft and hard, but that 
territorial imperative, dominance and submission, and many other 
reasonably-understood characteristics of human behaviour, make the· 
human animal rather more predictable than less. Lessons in individual 
and group behaviour are there to be learnt for IDA system designs 
from social anthropology, psychology, even ethology. Lessons are 
there to be learnt in the superb compromise that is the human body. 
Some of those lessons are presented in the body of the thesis, more in 
the enclosed papers 
.' 
To introduce the concept of a conceiving system as a bridge 
between enquiring systems and creating, or design & 
development, systems - see Chapters 5, 6 and 8. 
To present and justify a conceiving system for the 
conception of Information-Decision-Action systems - see 
Chapters 7, 8 and 9 
ｾ＠
To explore the the role of the user / operator in Conceiving 
Systems - see Chapter 10 
To achieve these objectives, in part, by presenting work 
undertaken in the last ten years and in so-doing to present a 
view of the confluence of Hard and Soft Schools - see below 
The methods presented in previous chapters for the conception and 
development of system architectures are essentially soft methods in that they 
address issues and seek solutions which are imprecise. That they are more 
pragmatic than the methods, or lack of methods, prescribed by such as SSM is 
both true and should be no surprise, since industry needs results. The Seven 
Step Continuum, shown in action in previous chapters, is unusual in that, 
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although it seeks a solution, it can show that no sensible solution exists along 
the path pursued by the practitioner, as with the Channel Tunnel Crisis 
Management System. Methods, such as the N2/ CADRA T approach, which 
introduce balance and symmetry into abstractions of the system cannot be 
described as "hard", but they are pragmatic. The decision circle (and the 
many similar paradigms to be found in IDA system design) evident in the 
body of the thesis and in many of the enclosed papers, is not a "hard" concept, 
nor are notions of territorial.imperative, tribal loyalties, social psychology, 
ethology and the many other viewpoints being expressed by today's leading-
edge designers 
.' 
It is my contention that the terms "hard" and "soft" are misleading and 
outdated. The views expressed by SSM devotees concerning hard engineering 
are passe caricatures of design practice. Equally, the hard engineer 
recognizes that human issues are at the root of design and, while he or she 
may not embrace the set of approaches generally called "soft", they generally 
have their own methods for addressing these issues which, because of the 
environment, need to be justifiable, traceable and suitable for team design, 
rather than individual design.: 
So, the so-called hard engineer uses soft methods and indeed the 
so-called soft analyst uses hard, reductionist methods too. Let us 
dispense with the polarization and use the best means at our 
disposal to meet the ｮ･･､ｾＧ＠
155 
REFERENCES 
Ashby, W. R., 1985, "Introduction to Cybernetics", Wiley 
Alford, M., 1985,"SREM at the Age of Eight; the Distributed Computing 
Design System", Computer, Vol. 18, No 4, pp. 36-46 
Bird, D. F., 1987, "International Standards in Military Communication", 
from "Advances in Command, Control & Communications Systems" 
published in book form by Peter Peregrinus Ltd on behalf of the Institution 
of Electrical Engineers, 1987: ISBN 0 86341 094 4, 
Boulding, K.E., 1982, "Review of Systems Thinking, Systems Practice", 
Journal of Applied Systems Analysis, 9 
Bronowski, J., 1973, "The Ascent of Man",BBC Publications, London, ISBN 
0563 104988 
Burrell, G., "Systems Thinking, Systems Practice: A Review", 1983, Journal 
of Applied Systems Analysis, Volume 10, pp 121-126 
Burrell, G. and Morgan, G., 1979, "Sociological Paradigms and 
Organizational Analysis", London, Heineman .' 
Coe, G. Q., and Dockery, J. T., "OJCS Initiatives in C2 Analysis and 
Simulation" ,from Science of Command and Control,AFCEA International 
Press Publication, ISBNO-9161S9-16-7 
Checkland. P.B., 1972, "Towards a Systems-Based Method for Real World 
Problem Solving", Systems Behaviour, Harper ansi Row 
Checkland, P B., 1981, "Systems Thinking, Systems Practice", John Wiley 
. 
Checkland, P B., 1971,"A Systems Map of the Universe", Journal of Systems 
Engineering, 1 (2) . 
Churchman, C.W., Ackoff, R., and Arnoff, E., 1967, "Introduction to 
Operations Research", John Wiley and Sons Inc, New York 
Coyle, R. G., 1977, "Management System Dynamics", Wiley 
DeMarco, T., 1978, "Structured Analysis and System Specification", 
Yourdon 
156 
de Broglie, L., 1951, "La Cybemetique, Theorie du signal et de 
l'Infonnation", editions de la Revue d'Optique, Paris 
de Neufville and Stafford,1971, "Systems Analysis for Engineers and 
Managers", McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York. 
Engineer, The, 22nd June 1989, "Design looks to Natural Selection", article 
by Martin Ince 
Financial Times, 18th August 1989, "Darwin's Theory Gives Birth to 
. Genetic Computer Programs", ｡ｲｴｾ｣ｬ･＠ by Gren ｍ｡ｮｵｾｬ＠
Forrester, J. W., 1961, "Industrial Dynamics", MIT Press 
Gane, C. and Sarson, T., 1979, "Structured Systems Analysis: Tools and 
Techniques", Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall, . 
Guilbaud, G. T., 1959,English translation fonn "La Cybemetique", Presses 
Universitaires, Paris 1954 
Hall, A. D., 1962, "A Methodology for Systems Engineering", Princeton N. 
J., Van Norstrand. 
Horgan, J., 1989, "Ethnograph as Art" Scientific American, Volume 261 
Number 1 
Hughes, J, 1986,"Structure and Design of Manufacturing Systems", Open 
University PT611, Unit 8 - Manufacturing Systems: Detailed Design", ISBN 
0335 109225 
Jackson, M.A., 1975, "Principles of Program Design", ,Academic Press 
Lammers, G. H., "C3 Effectiveness Studies" from "Advances in Command, 
Control & Communications Systems" published in booK form by Peter 
. Peregrinus Ltd on behalf of the Institution of Electrical· Engineers, 1987: 
ISBN 0 863410944, . 
Lano, Robert J. A "Technique for Software and Systems Design", North 
Holland Publishing Co. 1979. ISBN 0-444-85354-5. TRW series on Software 
Technology, Volume 3 ' 
Lano, Robert J. "Operational Concept Fonnulation", TRW series on 
Software Technology, unnumbered 
Levis H. J., and Athans, M., 1988, "The Quest for a C3 Theory; Dreams and 
157 
Realities,from Science of Command and Control,AFCEA International Press 
Publication, ISBNO-916159-16-7 
.. 
Macgill, S. M., 1983, "Cluster Analysis and Q-Analysis", Int J. Man-Machine 
Studies, (1984), 20, 595-604 
Manheim, M.L. and Hall, ｆＮｌｾＬ＠ 1967,Abstract Representation of Goals, 
"Transportation: A Service", New York Academy of Sciences and American 
Society of Mechanical Engineers, New York 
. MAP, Version 2.1,3 March 1985, General Motors Technical Center, 
Manufacturing Building, 30300 Mound Rd., Warren, Michigan 48090-9040, 
USA) 
Mayk, I. and Rubin, I, 1988, "Paradigms for Understanding C3, _ 
Anyone?",from Science of Command and Control,AFCEA International 
Press Publication, ISBNO-916159-16-7 
M'Pherson, P. K., 1980, "Systems Engineering: an Approach to Whole 
Systems Design", The Radio and Electronic Engineer, Vol 50 No 11/12 
Popper, K.R., 1972, Objective Knowledge, Oxford: University Press 
Roberts, N.,1983, "A Systems Dynamics Modelling Approach", Addison 
Wesley 0-201-06414-6. 
Ross, D. T., 1977,"Structured Analysis(SA): A Language for 
Communicating Ideas":IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, Vol SE 
3, Nol, pp 16-34 
Ross, D. T., and Schoman, K.E., Jr, 1977, "Structured Analysis for 
Requirements Defmition", IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, Vol 
SE-3, No 1, pp 6-15 # 
Rubenstein, Edward, "Stages of Evolution and their ｍ･ｳｳ･ｾｧ･ｲｳＢＬ＠ Scientific 
American, June 1989 Volume 260 No 6 
Shannon, Claude C, and Weaver, W., 1963, "The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication", Urbana: University of Illinois Press 
Sugiyama, K., and Toda, M., 1983, "Visual Q-Analysis(I): a Case Study of 
future Computer Systems Development in Japan", Cybernetics and Systems, 
14:185-228, 1983, Hemisphere Publishing Corporation 
Warfield, J. N., 1974, "Towards Interpretation of Complex Structural 
158 
Models", IEEE Transactions in Systems Management, Cybernetics, SMC -
4(5): 405 -417 .. 
Wilson, B.,1984, "Systems; Concepts, Methodologies and Applications", 
John Wiley and Sons 
Wohl, J. G., 1981, "Force Management Requirements for air force tactical 
command and control" 
.. 
159 
.' 
ENCLOSED PAPERS, REPORTS AND ARTICLES BY THE 
AUTHOR 
"Air Command and Control", MARCONI 81 SYMPOSIUM Proceedings 
"Avionics Systems Architecture", joint paper by Hitchins and D O'Dwyer, 
Proceedings of the Royal Aeronautical Society Conference on Digital 
Computer Technology for Airborne Applications, !5 March 1989, ISBN 0 
903409402- Note: paper written in two parts; Hitchins wrote the second 
part 
"BM/C3 Design by Cumulative Selection", Proceedings of the Third IEE 
International Conference on Command, Control, Communications and 
Management Information Systems: 2 - 4 May 1989, ISBN0852296380, ISSN 
05387-9989 
"Building Future Systems", accepted for MILCOMP 89 Conference in 
London, 26-28 September 89" 
"Creative Design by Cumulative Selection", submitted to the IEE for 
publication in the Proceedings, 22 May 1989 
"Design by Cumulative Selection", lEE M&D Digest No:1989/105, 26 April 
1989 
"General Theory of Command and Control, A", Proceedings of the Third 
lEE International Conference on Command, Control, Communications and 
Management Information Systems: 2 - 4 May 1989, ISBN0852296380, ISSN 
05387-9989 
"Getting SEAMS Straight", IEE M&D Digest No 1988/93, 17 May 1988 
"Heuristic Intelligent Threat Assessment System (HITAS)", described in 
"Automatic Airborne Threat Assessment, an EASAMS Company 
Publication, 1981 
"Human Element in C3I, The", Proceedings of the First lEE International 
Conference on Advances in Command, Control and Communication 
Systems: Theory and Applications: 16 - 18 April 1985, ISBN 085296308, 
ISSN 0537-9989 
Initial IDA Engineering Framework, developed as a management tool in 
Racal Defence Systems Ltd 
"Managing Systems Creation", 1986, lEE Proceedings, Vol 133, Pt A, No, 6, 
160 
September 1986 
"MOSAIC Concepts for the Deployment of Air Power in Europe", 
(Extended Version), part of "Advances in Command, Control & 
Communications Systems" published in book form by Peter Peregrinus Ltd 
on behalf of the Institution of Electrical Engineers, 1987: ISBN 086341 094 
4, extended from "MOSAIC Concepts for the Deployment of Air Power in 
Europe", Proceedings of the IEE International Conference on Advances in 
Command, Control and Communication Systems: Theory and Applications: 
16 - 18 April 1985, ISBN 085296308, ISSN 0537-9989 
." 
"System Survivability Science", EASAMS Ltd Company Publication No: 
M7101/DH/l, March 1989 
"Systems Creativity", 1987, IEE Proceedings Vol. 135,Part A, No 6, July 
1988 
161 
AIR ｃｏｾｍａｎｄ＠ AND CONTROL 
o K Hitchins 
Manager 
Forward-looking Studies 
EASAMS L im'ited 
As most people are aware, air power is normally 
split into four functional groups. Offensive 
operations are concerned with interdiction and 
strike, close air support, counter air and air 
superiority. Defensive operations are self 
explanatory: fighter interception, surface to air 
missiles, airborne early warning and the air 
defence ground environment (the radars). 
Maritime operations are usually comprised of" long 
range patrol, anti-submarine warfare, tactical aid 
in support of maritime operations and air defence 
of the fleet. Air transport operations are 
usually concerned with tactical transport; 
reiforcement and resupply and mobile forces. 
Unfortunately, this rather neat grouping conceals 
a multitude of problems. 
There are quite a large number of functions 
which are part of air power which cut across the 
apparently clean boundaries between the four major 
functions. Some of them are - reconnaissance, 
aircraft recovery, search and rescue, intelligence, 
contingency planning and resource management and 
so on. 
You might therefore believe that the functional 
groupings are not very valuable: that would not be 
the case. The functional groupings are extremely 
valuable for many reasons. They concentrate like 
skills; they enhance motivation and competition; 
they afford a very simple organisation; they allow 
simple measures of effectiveness by function; and, 
not to be overlooked, they allow the separation of 
the various functions into defence and offence; 
d'etante favours expenditure on defence as opposed 
to offence. From which we conclude; firstly, that 
effective air power will retain functional 
boundaries in the future and, secondly, during any 
prolonged periods of peace, defensive operations 
will receive continual funding and may tend to 
dominate other elements. 
May I turn aside briefly to mention a system 
design axiom and corollary and show how they 
relate to air power. The axiom states that a 
system comprised of elements which have been 
separately optimised will not itself be optimised 
and its corollary is that an optimised system will 
contain elements which are not ｯｾ＠ themselves 
optimal. The reason behind this is very simple. 
A group of elements, separately optimised, can be 
considered as producing an overall ｾｵｮ｣ｴｩｯｮ＠
labelled '4' in fig 1; this function No.4 has not 
been optimised: nor have the interfaces between 
the various elements of which it is comprised been 
considered in the context of the overall task, 
from which we conclude, in the context of air 
power, that improving the ･ｦｾ･｣ｴｩｶ･ｮ･ｳｳ＠ of air 
power requires a total system approach rather than 
the function by function development, which is 
more usual. 
If we are to improve the ･ｦｾ･｣ｴｩｶ･ｮ･ｳｳ＠ of a 
complex system such as air power we need some 
measure of effectiveness so as to discern when it 
has been improved. This raises a problem for 
which I do not offer a ready solution. As fig 2 
purports to show, the blue force, eg, has an 
overall effectiveness which is a function not only 
of its offensive and defensive capabilities but 
also of the orange's offensive and defensive 
capabilities. Moreover, blue defence and blue 
offence may not always help eaci1 other. They may 
tend to interfere with each other. The 
description of blue air power effectiveness is 
extremely complex. Please note that the diagram 
even at this level does not include all the 
supporting functions. Measures of effectiveness 
are extremely important and they are also, of 
course, extremely difficult to deduce and measure. 
･ｯｮｴ･ｭｰｯｲ｡ｾ＠ thinking on air power suggests that a 
comprehensive command and control system is needed 
to overcome the limitations imposed by existing 
functional demarcation between offence and defence. 
We must define the system that we are talking 
about. The system that we are describing as . 
requiring improved effectiveness is the one 
containing all the elements of air power within a 
major NATO command or a major subordinate command. 
I have used the NATO context for the whole of this 
presentation. The: system embraces sensors, weapon 
system and all three arms; land, sea and air. It 
is essentially a 'sharp-end' system. The design 
aim is to optimise the effectiveness ｯｾ＠ air power 
as a total system by improving the organisation 
and flow of timely information between the various 
elements of that air power. 
Fig 3 shows a general schematic diagram indicating 
the relationship between the various types of 
command and control systems. You will see at the 
top a major NATO commander, SACEUR in the case of 
Europe. and below him he has a major subordinate 
command structure. He has, in fact, got four 
major subordinate commands. They tend to 
communicate with each other, through a eGIS, a 
command and control information system which also 
embraces the command level below major subordinate 
command, called principal subordinate command. The 
structure tends to be horiZontal in contrast to 
that required for an air command and control 
system which tends to be a vertical, pyramidical 
type of structure, grouping together offensive/ 
defensive maritime, transport and all the other 
elements to provide a vertical input to the other-
wise hgiher level horizontal structure. " 
Fig 4 shows the air command and control system, 
or ACCS, capabilities and you will see on there 
such diverse requirements as orders of battle, 
contingency planning and resource management, 
nuclear, biological and chemical, emission control, ' 
electronic warfare, sensor fusion and so on. 
Air command and control systeI:lS are going to be 
extremely complex. There are a number of widely 
､ｩｦｦ･ｲｩｮｾ＠ parameters which ｾｾｬｬ＠ contribute towards 
the eventual architecture design, the more 
important ones - survivability and succession ｯｾ＠
ｾｯｭｭ｡ｮ､Ｌ＠ communications, interoperability, 
security, ｬｩｾ･＠ cycle costs, reliability, 
availability and maintainability (commonly known 
as the 'ilities'). The existing eelS and weapon( 
sensor ｾ｡｣ｩｬｩｴｩ･ｳ＠ will also have to be coordinated 
and brought together in order to provide the . 
system. Not only are these various factors 
different in their various degrees of emphasis, 
they are also really not comparable on the same 
basis. By this I mean they are of different 
dimensions. Most ｯｾ＠ them are also non-numerical 
dimensions. There is a need for specialised 
analysis techniques if we are to successfully 
design the organisation and structure of air 
command and control architecture. I would like to 
go through one or two of the factors which I have 
mentioned. 
Survivability is conventionally considered 
under three headings: avoidance of detection, self 
defence and damage tolerance. AVOidance of 
detection reallly means not making yourself very 
obvious, not radiating, having low thermal 
signatures or, conversely, placing yourself 
against a background which is very similar. This 
. can mean camouflage; it can also mean, to use Mark 
Twain's analogy, hiding a book in the library. 
Thus there are some views that command and control 
centres should be in urban complexes. Self 
defence is not a parameter which is readily 
achieved by a command and control headquarters, 
which by its very nature is passive. Damage 
tolerance covers a multitude of factors - hardened 
structures, electromagnetic pulse resistance, 
multiple or mobile war headquarters, succession ｯｾ＠
command, and change of location of command, non 
nodal organisation and communications, manual 
fallback to anticipate equipment failures, and 
standard operating procedures. Damage tolerance 
and sue oe are the prinCipal means by which 
survivability will be attained ｾｯｲ＠ command and 
control sys tems. .. 
Two interesting developments are shown in 
Fig. 5. One is the development ｯｾ＠ JTIDS - Joint 
Tactical ｉｾｯｲｭ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ Distribution System or MIDS -
ｍｵＱｴｩｾ｣ｴｩｯｮ＠ ｉｾｯｲｭ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ Distribution System as 
it is sometimes called and the NATO Identification 
System. As the diagram shows, communications will 
be a complex and very busy affair. One of the 
major areas ｯｾ＠ ､ｾｦｩ｣ｵｬｴｹ＠ will be identifying 
friend ｾｲｯｭ＠ ｾｯ･＠ when the opposing forces may well 
have a sophisticated capability for jamming or 
presenting themselves incorrectly as being friends. 
The advent of these new digital communications 
systems does ｯｦｾ･ｲ＠ very great potential for 
imprOving the coordination of air defence and 
of coordinating ｯｾｦ･ｮｳｩｶ･＠ and defensive operations. 
The wide range of communications systems and 
communications techniques which are expected to be 
employed in Europe during the next 10 to 15 years 
have really only one common feature; eventually 
they will all tend to be digitally based rather 
than analogue based as is the current situation. 
Figure 6, ｷｨｩｾｨ＠ appears to be a very busy 
diagram, is an N interface diagram. I would ask 
you not to look at the detail particularly butto 
half-close your eyes and see the patterns that 
emerge. Down in the bottom right hand corner you 
will see a complex interface pattern. This is the 
air defence structure. It is a close knit, mostly 
airborne element where the various participants 
communicate principally by radio. Radio links are 
shown as ovals as opposed to land-line links which 
are shown as circles. The other leading diagonal 
boxes are the various participants. You will see 
the major subordinate commander in NATO at the top 
left hand box. If you come down to the 5th box, 
you will find air command and control system 
headquarters. The ACeS headquarters is at the 
centre of a cross indicating its nodal nature in 
the system. The N2 diagram, which is being used 
here merely for communication with an audience, is 
in fact a powerful analysis tool. It has a 
potential ｾｯｲ＠ studying functional and physical 
partitioning in a non-numerical style which is 
generally a particularly difficult system design 
task. You will notice that there are certain 
interfaces which might reasonably be expected to 
occur. For example, the maritime operations· 
control has an ｩｮｴ･ｲｾ｡｣･＠ with the headquarters 
naval force. Similarly, the transport operations 
control has an interface with the beadquarters' 
land forces. You will observe that the major 
subordinate commander has interfaces with each of 
the various headquarters and with the AWACS. 
AWACS itself, or AEW, also appears as a node in 
the system indicating both its importance.and 
vulnerability • 
An alternative analysis technique is known as 
data state analysis. An example of that is shown 
in fig 7. Fighter recovery is presented asa 
logic dependency diagram showing the two different 
cases ｾｯｲ＠ recovery. One is priority recovery 
because ｯｾ＠ incapacity of the crew or the aircraft 
to continue. The other is a precautionary 
recovery; although the aircraft is fit to continue 
its operation, there is actually no need for it so 
to do. The logic of the diagram is such that it 
is ｰｯｳｳｾ｢ｬ･＠ to draw in a dotted line (such as the 
one that appears on the diagram) separating the 
tasks into two groups. Where the line goes is a 
particularly important factor because it . 
represents the physical separation of tasks. That 
means that there need to be criteria ｾｯｲ＠ deciding 
whether a process should be executed to one side 
of the line or to the other. One of the major 
tasks in analysing air command and control is to 
decide where the task should best be done. This 
diagram is the beginnings of such an analysis. 
A slightly more contentious example is shown in.· 
fig 8. This is the organisation of identification 
information. This diagram shows that identific-
ation comes really in two sorts. Firstly, 
automatic identification by systems or 
communications. That is an easy category to deal 
with. Secondly, unidentified tracks which are not 
so easy to deal with. The output ｾｲｯｭ＠ this 
organisational logic diagram is an identification 
message into the indirect sub system of NATO 
Identification System. 
That is all I want to say for the moment on air 
command and control systems in general. I would 
like now to turn to some forward looking e3I 
concepts. The first is HlTAS which is an airborne 
automatic threat assessment system for single seat 
aircraft. Next, a commander's central threat 
assessment system; third, answering the 
commander's "What - if?"questions. Finally, some 
advance Human !actor concepts. 
Taking Fig. 9 at block level only, this is a 
system intended to go into high speed, low level 
single seat aircraft. The top block is a thermal 
imager and its processor •. The bottom block i8 a 
radar and its processor. On tl1e left you will see 
non imaging sensors such as IFF, radar warning, 
laser warning and so on. The system which we have 
recently designed, takes the information from all 
these sensors and produces from them a composite 
picture in the multi sensor recognition block. 
This uses scene correlation, threat extraction, 
threa t recognition and correlation techniques. 
The threats, having been recognised, are then 
ranked and presented on a 3-D cognitive map. The 
outputs from the system are steer signals to evade 
the threats or reduce the degree of threat: 
automatic countermeasures and hazard warnings. 
Fig. 10 shows a typical dispiay which HITAS 
could present to the operator. The operator is 
at one of the focii of the bottom two ellipses 
and threats are represented in plan by M7, which 
is a missile, the Z's which represent anti 
aircraft artillery and an F for a fighter. 
Intended target positions are Tl and T2. The 
.cross-hatched area indicates the degree of an 
. impending threat. The system is designed to 
weave its way between various threats towards· 
the targets. 
Threat assessment can be executed at a much 
higher level than at the aircraft itself. Fig. 
11 shows raid threat assessment in a head-
quarters. This consists essentially of 
pairing the incoming raid groups with one's 
own vulnerable target list to assess where 
the enemy is likely to hit and· wha t damage 
he is likely to inflict. This is an area 
where computing can radically assist the 
commander in assessing the problem with which 
he is faced. 
Another area of great interest is the area 
of artificial intelligence and expert systems. 
A command and control information system data 
base being used for conventional operations 
can also be used with a separate processor 
for answering the high level questions 
which a commander might want to pose.. These 
include, for example, "what would happen if' 
I lost all my area SAM?", or "what would 
happen if I lost such and such a headquarters?". 
Such questions are typical of those with 
which a commander is regularly faced. 
Current command and control systems do 
not assist him. We have been working in 
this area and some of the work is 
concentrated into the development of macro 
models. These are large scale but ｶ･ｾ＠
simple models. One is being developed from 
ecological modelling which deals with com-
peti tion for terri ｴｯｾ＠ and the other is a 
2-dimensional adaption from kinetic gas 
theory which may sound rather strange, but 
. the results are quite reasonable. 
Fig. 12 is one of two shOwing some results 
from earlier modelling. This particular model 
1s the 2-dimensional adaption from kinetio gas 
theory applied to helicopter/helicopter 
battles. The graph shows a strategy in which 
the blue foroe has attaoked orange-held 
ｴ･ｲｲｩｴｯｾ＠ overtly and draws back suffering 
severe losses. 
In the next diagram, Fig. 13, however, 
blue has been more cunning and he enters 
orange-held ｴ･ｲｲｩｴｯｾ＠ covertly, groups his 
forces, masses them and then attacks 
orange in a coordinated manner. The result 
is that he inflicts considerable greater 
losses on orange forces. These models 
are at an early stage but it is our 
intention to develop them to the point 
where they form the heart of an 
intelligent system. 
Fig. 14 shows a typical operator 
sitting at the hub of a number of com-
munications systems. In more tactical 
systems, it is reasonable to suppose that 
the operator in a command and control 
systems spends much of his time inter-
facing with a computer system, a display 
system or a radar system or whatever. Our 
practical research in current projects 
shows that at higher level command and 
control, such as an ACCS HQ, this is not the case at 
all; the operator spends a very large proportion of 
. his time interfacing wi th other personnel, either 
directly or through the telephone. 
The number of occasions on which he uses AD? 
displays is relatively small. It certainly could 
be less than 25% in particular applications. This 
tends to place a different emphasis on ｴｾ･＠ way in 
which the man machine interface should be designed. 
Central displays, maps, wall charts and similar 
non high technology devices ｶ･ｾ＠ clearly have their 
.part to play in a modern command and control system 
and indeed the concept of a eelS operator is itself 
invalid in most cases. The eelS becomes a manage-
ment tool which may be accessed by any of a number 
of command team users. 
Fig.15 shows a concentrated data display ｾｯｲ＠
executive use. The two halves of the circle 
represent past and present situations, to give 
trend indications. The circles in this case 
might represent a ｳｵｭｭ｡ｾ＠ of 2-300 operational 
aircraft states, giving at-a-glance data to the 
commander. Such presentations can be useful for 
representing war consumables, POL and crews as 
well as large numbers of aircraft. 
In summary, this brief description of various 
elements of air command and control covers a wide 
range of acU vi ties wi th which EASAMS concerns 
itself, from the philosophy, balance and structure 
of air power through architectures of command and 
control, down to operational analysiS and studies 
to full systems implementation of weapon systems, 
with continuing emphasis on the human at the heart 
of the systems. 
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New avionic architectures are required to help provide cost-effective 
solutions to current and envisaged requirements for combat aircraft. 
Architectural concepts like those pioneered in the PAVE PILLAR programme 
will give greater flexibility in design but pose new problems for designers. 
In this paper the challenges facing the avionic systems architect are 
considered, the need for a powerful design methodology is discussed and a 
possible approach based on cumulative selection principles is described. 
INTRODUCTION 
There are three fundamental attributes for the operational effectiveness of 
a force comprising a number of weapon systems: 
Availability of the systems 
• 
Survivability of the systems in operation 
• 
Performance of the systems in the operational environment • 
There is also a vital fourth attribute without which it will not be possible 
to establish and operate a force: 
Affordability. 
Present operational effectiveness is threatened by the impact of 
increasingly hostile environments on the performance and survivability of 
weapon systems and by the workload imposed on aircrew in critical mission 
phases. Effectiveness is further threatened by the difficulty of keeping 
current systems available within reasonable cost constraints. 
More flexible and adaptable system architectures which take advantage of neW 
digital data handling technologies will help designers to provide cost-
effective solutions to meet increasingly onerous requirements, provided that 
a powerful architecture design methodology can be implemented. 
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NEW ｃｈａｌｌｅｾｇｅｓ＠ FOR THE ａｖｉｏｾｉｃ＠ SYSTEMS ARCHITECT 
Previous technological advances, particularly in data buses, microprocessors 
and microelectronic components have provided a route for progressing from 
architectures based on a central computer configuration to more flexible 
arrangements with multiple buses and distributed system computing. Improved 
sensors and displays have provided a greater capacity for acquiring data and 
displaying information to aircrew. However, these bus-based architectures, 
still with relatively conventional sub-system partitioning, and with system 
functions realised in equipment Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) do not have 
the potential flexibility in design, adaptability in operation or economy 
in-service that are necessary to meet envisaged future requirements. 
We have reached the end of the road with conventional architectures. If 
designers are to provide, with acceptable installation penalties, this 
flexibility, adaptability and economy, and the capability for through-life 
improvement that users will demand then new architectural concepts and new 
design approaches must be introduced. . 
Advanced Avionic Architectures 
Advanced architectures, which take advantage of new technology and are based 
on common Line Replaceable Modules (LRMs) and high speed data buses, are 
seen as keys to the development of a new generation of flexible, adaptable 
airborne weapon systems with an acceptable cost of ownership. 
In the US, the PAVE PILLAR programme has been set up to develop the 
foundation for the next generation of integrated avionic systems (Ref. 1). 
Implementation strategy is based on the system-wide utilisation of common 
LRMs with advanced microelectronics, integrated racks and fibre-optic 
communications. The modules support programmable processing, input/output 
and memory functions. Reconfiguration capability to meet mission 
reliability and moding requirements is a feature. 
In contrast to current systems with their subsystem groupings, three 
integrated functional areas have emerged from the PAVE PILLAR architecture 
as boundaries for resource sharing and reconfiguration. These are sensor 
management, mission management and vehicle management. 
PAVE PILLAR has been a catalyst for change in UK, too (Ref. 2). A PAVE 
PILLAR collaborative programme has been initiated with the US and an 
Advanced Avionics Architecture and Packaging (A3p) programme has been 
launched by UK MOD. 
Potential benefits in effectiveness and affordability from the adoption of 
the new concepts are considerable. However, it has been emphasised (Ref. 3) 
that the benefits will only be realisable if many factors other than the 
purely technical are considered." These include design methodology. 
Avionic Architecture Design 
For system designers, advanced avionic architectures will bring much greater 
flexibility and the chance to influence directly many system attributes 
which are important for effectiveness and against which a possible 
configuration must be evaluated. These attributes include: 
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Adaptability to mission role 
Failure and damage tolerance 
Interoperability within platform and force 
Efficiency in using system resources 
Effectiveness of man-machine interface 
Integrity in safety critical applications 
Invulnerability to electromagnetic hazards 
Fault detection and diagnosis capability 
Expandability for planned improvement. 
The penalty for this flexibility is that the designer - the system architect 
- may lose control of the design process and arrive at a solution which is 
markedly less than optimum. 
To put the search for an effective design method in context it is useful to 
outline the design approach. Avionic systems design is an iterative process 
with architecture design at its heart. Six stages can be identified: 
Design Boundarv. First the design boundary is delineated to define what is 
within the avionic field of responsibility and, equally important, what is 
outside it. 
Architectural Framework. Within the boundary an architectural framework is 
set up. This is defined in terms of basic system modules, their possible 
disposition within the platform and allowable interconnections. It may be 
based on an existing system or on new but experimentally proven concepts. 
However, it will always be necessary to establish both the range of viable 
options for allocation of functions within the framework and the 
architecture design goals to be met. 
Supporting information which will constrain the design includes system 
interface characteristics and hard system constraints. 
Interface characteristics and constraints may be operational or technical 
and will reflect requirements at many levels. They will be derived from the 
weapon system requirement itself, from conceptual design documents, from 
platform and weapon specifications, from force requirements and from fleet-
wide considerations. 
Requirement Analvsis. Analysis of the system requirement leads to a 
functional design concept and the identification of functional entities and 
their relationships at the lowest level of interest relevant to 
architectural design. 
Functional Analysis. System rules for functional to physical mapping during 
. detailed design are generated using functional analysis techniques. 
Architecture ｄ･ｳｩｾｮＮ＠ Viable options are generated for the implementation of 
entities by processes, data structures and data flows within the 
architectural framework. 
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Architecture Analvsis. The viable configurations are analysed to establish 
their impact on system availability, survivability, ｰ･ｲｦｯｾ｡ｮ｣･＠ and 
affordability. 
ｔｾｩｴｨ＠ PAVE PILLAR or even with simpler architectural sub-sets the task of 
establishing optimal avionic configurations for an airborne weapon system in 
a complex operational environment will only be manageable if tackled in a 
logical, systematic and efficient way. 
Beyond PAVE PILLAR, the proposed PAVE PACE initiative (Ref. 1) gives a 
glimpse of even more powerful architectures that might be available for the 
avionics designer in the longer term. These require massive processing 
power for display graphics, real-time artificial intelligence, advanced 
signal processing and selective automation. Powerful meta-functi6ns are 
envisaged. These are integrated affinity groups of functions implemented in 
families of parallel processing networks supported by a PAVE PILLAR 
communication framework. 
What design approach can the systems architect adopt when faced with such 
choice and complexity? 
THE NEED FOR A POWERFUL ARCHITECTURE DESIGN METHOD 
Architecture is burgeoning as a new science, fuelled by advances in 
processing, software structures, protocols and - in the case of avionics -
the quest for major advances in performance, availability and survivability. 
PAVE PILLAR has shown that the UK, once pre-eminent in design if not 
production, has been overtaken by more visionary concepts in the US which 
offer exciting prospects. 
British designers find themselves in a 'Catch 22' situation. Innovative 
architectures could be conceived, and UK designers have the skills. If such 
architectures were introduced, however, they could threaten the avionics 
industry status quo; subsystem manufacturers may lose elements from their 
traditional subsystems into a re-organised architecture. Thus architectures 
which might benefit the complete aircraft, might detract from company 
business for the designer; PAVE PILLAR could cause that degree of 
turbulence. Is PAVE PILLAR the optimum approach, however? Why have the 
subsystems been partitioned as they have? Why are the internal data bus 
communications so structured? To address such questions, and to move 
confidently forward to PAVE PILLAR and beyond, the UK needs to apply new 
concepts to the design of architectures. This section and the next look at 
one possible approach. 
To avoid the temptation of conventional wisdom, it is necessary first to 
abstract architectural design to the level of General Systems Theory. At 
that level of abstraction, an architecture comprises clusters and links. 
The clusters are composed of related entities. The links connect the 
entities within each cluster and there are cluster-to-cluster links too. 
Entities in an avionics cluster are operational and process functional 
primitives - a target detector, a tracker, a processor, a convertor, a 
display, a launcher, an attitude sensor, a velocity/acceleration sensor and 
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so on. Target detectors ｾｊｩｴｨ＠ different characteristics (spectral coverage, 
for instance) would be discrete entities. Links are abstractions of the 
internal communications implicit within the subsystem and the system 
architecture, and the links can also cluster between themselves. 
Clustering 
If the design problem starts with an amorphous set of primitive functions, 
then there must be some 'drivers' or influences which both encourage 
clustering and which also determine the number of clusters and their 
constituent functions. ｟ｾｳｯＬ＠ some clustering solutions will be better than 
others. (In PAVE PILLAR, ICNIA may be regarded as a cluster for which one 
of the drivers was the management of mutual radio interference between 
communications, navigation and identification.) There is, too, a particular 
number of clusters for any given number of functions which minimises the sum 
of internal cluster links and external cluster-to-cluster links; this is of 
significance with respect to interface, link length and weight reduction. 
Clustering algorithms influence the types of cluster. Where the nucleus of 
a cluster has already formed, unattached entities may be attracted on one of 
several bases: 
a) Strong association with one member of the cluster 
b) Association with N out of M of the current cluster members 
c) Association with all cluster members. 
These different clustering strategies result in different types of cluster -
strung-out, clumped and very tight; they also affect the number of clusters 
and the tendency for entities to be 'left over' because there is no clear 
association. It is noteworthy that (a), (b) and (c) above form a continuum 
of relationship, as the value of N goes from 1 to M; this factor may favour 
a particular solution method, as will be indicated below. 
Clustering Drivers 
Clustering influences must be real-world related for the function clusters 
to be useful. An incomplete list of influences is set out in Table 1. 
With so many different and often mutually incompatible drivers, the process 
of cluster optimisation is fraught with difficulty and special methods of 
accommodating influences, combinations and the mass of information become 
essential. 
Linking Drivers 
Links within and between clusters are also subject to real-world influence. 
Link bandwidth is a function of entity entropy - the classic dilemma of 
sending all the source information at a cost in bandwidth, or pre-processing 
to save bandwidth at a cost in reduced information content. Links can also 
proliferate beyond the basic need for connectivity to provide redundancy. 
Physical links can be greatly reduced by clustering, not only by the obvious 
cluster-to-cluster broadband link, but also in developing equally-sized 
clusters, by reducing the overall cluster infrastructure. These various 
factors can also be considered as underpinning a linking continuum, from 
simple trees giving singular point-to-point connections through loops to 
3.5 
networks and 3-D networks, giving increasingly redundant connectivity and 
reconfigurability. Examples of this continuum will be presented below. 
Sufficient groundwork has been laid at this point to enable the search for a 
method of architecture design. 
Table 1 Clustering Influences 
Influence Example 
Physical Juxtaposition - Displays and controls with crew 
- Antennae with rf front ends 
Physical Location - Radar and ESM antennae isolation 
- Communications antennae 
Functioning Relationships - Signal reception and signal conditioning 
Installation - Centre of gravity 
- ｓ･ｬｦＭ｡ｲｭｯｵｲｩｮｾ＠ (lower priority devices 
protecting vulnerable devices) 
Ease of Development - Self-contained subsystems 
National Fit - Self-contained EW fit 
Number of Clusters - Infrastructure reduction, moding control, 
survivabili ty, etc. 
Mutual Interference - JTIDS/GPS/TACAN/NIS competition for 
bandwidth and time 
- ECM/ESM lookthrough 
Like-to-like Attractors - Frequency synthesisers 
- Data processors 
- Interfaces 
Intra-cluster Access - Diagnosability/Maintainability 
Methodologies 
The initial attempt at a methodology follows the sequence: 
Decompose operational prime directive into functional primitives 
Cluster primitives into groups - modules, line replaceable units, line 
replaceable modules, etc. 
Link clusters 
Draw architecture. 
This simple approach couples the previously discussed features. Even at 
high level it has a major problem. The clusters and links are optimised in 
their own rights; it follows that the system (complete architecture) cannot 
be optimal since no optimum system can be comprised of separately optimal 
parts. 
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A better approach might be: 
a) Decompose prime directive into functional primitives 
b) Cluster primitives 
c) Link clusters 
d) Draw architecture options 
e) Measure architecture cost-effectiveness 
f) Select best architecture option 
g) Loop to (b) 
h) Continue until peak cost-effectiveness is achieved. 
While overcoming the optimisation problem, this new method contains some 
difficulties to be addressed. 
Functional Decomposition. Functional decomposition is not yet a formal 
process; given a prime directive for, say, a fighter to maximise the ratio 
of 'shooting opportunities to shot at opportunities', there is no consensus 
view on the processes which will decompose consistently, completely and 
without preconception and prejudice. This is an area presently being 
researched. 
Clustering Algorithms. The potential combinatorial explosion implicit in 
the large number of primitive functions, together with the diversity and 
mutual incompatibility of the many clustering drivers makes clustering a 
major issue. A new method is being researched, based on cumulative 
selection, which might contribute to solving the problem - see below. 
Cluster Linkage Generation. Again the structural combinations could be 
many, although this intraoperability structure may also be resolved in 
principle by cumulative selection. 
Formal Cost-effective Trade-offs. Cost-effectiveness is a much maligned 
term. Cost-effectiveness Analysis (CEA) is not always undertaken in a 
formal, justifiable and traceable manner, however. Figure 1 shows the high 
level structure of the approach. The figure shows Performance, Availability 
(of Performance) and Survivability (of Performance) combining to provide 
Effectiveness, which then associates with Cost; the combination and 
association processes are crucial. Often the combination process is some 
weighting and scoring system which weights subjectively and adds numbers 
algebraically even though they represent different dimensions and should be 
summed vectorially. Given a measure of effectiveness, CEA often resorts to 
dividing Effectiveness by Cost for each putative solution, selecting the 
highest ratio as preferred. This approach ignores thresholds and the 
utility of cost and effectiveness. 
CUMULATIVE SELECTION - A POSSIBLE APPROACH 
Cumulative selection is the process which supports biological evolution. 
Parents produce offspring which differ marginally from themselves and from 
each other. A hostile environment favours some differences and disfavours 
others; successive generations adapt and evolve towards a more survivable 
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and effective 'design', even as the environment itself changes. 'Design' is 
an inappropriate word; the process of cumulative selection is blind, it has 
no distant goal at which to aim. Instead it finds the best solution by 
gradually balancing a very wide variety of influences so that the being 
operates successfully within its niche. The process is ｾ＠ random. 
Successive generations retain the advances made by their forebears where 
these advances remain valuable. 
Developing the Concept 
Early research has produced a prototype tool (Ref. 4) which emulates 
cumulative selection in a hostile environment inter alia for aircraft 
platforms and for communication networks. The tool uses analogies to genes 
which code for design features; genes for Aggression, Stealth, Co-operation, 
Shell and Infrastructure code for weapons, low observables, communications, 
armour and internal processing architecture. With a drawing routine - which 
must have its equivalent in nature - the genes can be used to draw a 
platform. Offspring are generated by varying each gene in turn, for each 
offspring; each varies from the central parent in one, and only one respect. 
With five genes there are ten offspring as each gene can be increased or 
decreased. This process emulates the work of Richard Dawkins (Ref. 5). 
Dawkins did not include the next step, however. 
The ｯｦｦｳｰｲｩｾｧ＠ are subjected to a hostile environment compristng measures of: 
Performance 
Survivability: 
Avoidance of Detection 
Self-defence 
Damage Tolerance 
Interoperability 
Security 
Availability 
Affordability. 
Each measure is the output of an analysis or model. The measures interact 
with the respective gene settings to produce a CEA score for each offspring. 
The highest scorer becomes the parent and produces its offspring in turn. 
The process continues until successive generations produce the same CEA 
score. The initial SYSMORPH, the seed, can be set at any combination of 
platform features; choosing a currently favoured design enables the 
designer, while balancing a large and complex array of different influences, 
to see which one change would most improve his design cost-effectiveness and 
which would be the next most beneficial change. 
Figure 2 presents the new concepti the cumulative selection process 
contrasted with the conventional approach. The new approach, still uS,ing 
conventional - and trusted - air combat models, allows a much greater 
potential to handle complexity within the machine. 
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The process outlined in Fig. 2 is natural selection, that is, cumulative 
selection in a hostile environment. It has similarities to the mathematical 
technique of hill-climbing, but takes a different route to optimisation; 
this alternative route allows the operator/designer to monitor the 
developing fighter design step-by-step. 
In the real world the environment changes too, and a being must continue to 
evolve, if it can, to avoid extinction. In the computer-generated world of 
cumulative selection, that process of environmental change can be pursued 
too. Figure 3 shows a repeat of Fig. 2 at the left-hand side but now there 
is a new process. The fighter design of Fig. 2 was developed using a fixed 
enemy threat as an essential feature of the Many-on-many Combat Simulation. 
Once that fighter evaluation is stable it is possible in principle to turn 
the process around and use the evolved fighter as a counter to the enemy 
threat, which can be evolved in its turn. This process has been dubbed 
'Systolic Cumulative Selection' because it beats between the two halves of 
the process like a heart. 
Architectural Evolution 
If a fighter and its threat can be evolved, can the process be applied to 
the fighter's architecture and its threat? It seems reasonable to expect 
so. After all, the melee of fighters and threat aircraft is essentially a 
highly dynamic architecture of sorts, with entities, relationships and 
communications. Figure 4 shows the concept. A seed architecture, probably 
an initial design of the architecture team, is used as a start point, and 
offspring are generated. Architecture offspring will vary from their parent 
in respect of which primitives comprise clusters, capacities, 
connectivities, physical positioning within the aircraft, redundancy, etc., 
and 'genes' will code for all the basic characteristics which define 
'architecture'. The hostile environment will comprise models and analyses 
of architectural performance, availability of performance and survivability 
of performance within the physical framework of the current fighter design 
and structure. The preferred offspring will be the one with the single 
change most beneficial to the architecture, and that offspring will breed. 
As with the fighter and its threat, it should be practicable to evolve the 
architecture and its 'hostile' environment which is in effect the aircraft 
layout, the aircraft skin and whatever may traverse it, together with the 
'-ilities' including affordability. An evolved architecture might, for 
instance, weigh less and allow: 
• 
An increase in fuel 
An increase in payload 
Better aerodynamic performance in combat. 
So, in principle, there is potential for Systolic Cumulative Selection 
between the architecture and the fighter. See Fig. 5. 
At this point, it is necessary to emphasis that much of the foregoing is 
speculative. The basic processes have been tested in simple prototypes and 
Systolic Cumulative Selection has been addressed 'handraulically'. The 
processes do, on the other hand, seem to provide several invaluable 
features: 
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a) The processes emulate those pursued less formally by designers now 
b) Many disciplines can contribute separately to the definition of the 
hostile environment 
c) The process is very simple; each step is obvious, visible, methodical 
and traceable 
d) The process is none-the-Iess very powerful in its ability to 
accommodate complexity 
e) The procedure contains no 'black arts' and is understandable by user, 
operator, maintainer and designer alike. 
Cumulative Selection in Operation 
Finally, as a very simple example of cumulative selection, see Figs. 6 and 7 
which show how a network is evolved between a fixed set of source/sinks. 
Nodes or communication switches are randomly scattered between them and, by 
relocating each node in turn cyclically, the preferred positions are 
cumulatively selected until the minimum overall path length of the complete 
network is achieved. The process (which is a little more complex than the 
outline suggests) may be optimised not only for overall length but for 
number of nodes, degree of link redundancy (e.g. tree, loop or network), 
resistance to interference, and so on. As before, genes code for these 
basic characteristics and the balanced optimal solution is evolved in the 
simulated hostile environment. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The introduction of advanced architectures based on common module and high 
speed data bus concepts should have major benefits, particularly with regard 
to: 
• 
• 
Efficient use of system processing resources 
Capacity for on-line reconfiguration 
Maintenance costs. 
However, avionic architects will need a powerful new design methodology if 
all potential benefits are to be realised in practice. 
At a system theoretical level, an architecture comprises: 
• 
Functional entities 
Clusters of entities 
Links within and between clusters. 
Functional decomposition followed by iterative use of clustering and linking 
strategies and cost-effectiveness analysis provides the basis for a 
methodology. However, several practical difficulties must be overcome to 
handle the diversity of architectural options and the many conflicting goals 
and constraints. 
A potentially promising approach to solving some of these problems is the 
application of cumulative selection principles. 
3.10 
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BM/C3 DESIGN BY CUMULATIVE SELECTION 
PROFESSOR DEREK K HITCHINS 
CITY UNIVERSITY - LONDON 
INTRODUCTION 
Command and Control (C 2 ) systems are becoming 
more complex, with more processing elements, 
modules and infrastructure all needing to 
operate in reducing time as enemy performance 
improves. Our c2 systems are consequently 
taking longer to design and develop, during 
which interval threat, technologies, user 
procedures and policies will inevitably change. 
Present concentration on ever-more detailed 
requirements capture can be seen as 
simultaneously essential to control the 
complexity, but futile in its end result of 
delivering a carefully outmoded capability. 
Systems are arriving in service only to 
commence more-or-less immediate update, 
trying to evolve in pursuit of an 
accelerating threat. 
Design, development and in service processes 
are strained; our techniques for 
accommodating these difficulties are 
presently inadequate. CAD/CAE/CAM has 
concentrated on hardware and software and 
there is no real system CAD, where system 
might refer to a complete aircraft, ship, or 
BM/C3 set-up. In the absence of proper 
tools, fundamental design issues can be taken 
"on the nod". Should the C2 HQ be hard and 
static or soft and mobile? Should the new 
fighter weigh 9 tonnes or 10 tonnes? Should 
the communications network have four 
switching centres or five? And should all of 
these questions be treated in isolation or 
should they be intimately related? 
Perhaps we can approach complex system 
design in a different way. Nature does not 
seem to share our difficulties. After all, the 
most complex organism on the planet is 
ineffective for some ten years after delivery 
- we expect that to be so and nurture new 
arrivals accordingly as they evolve socially 
to meet an environment markedly different 
from that to which nature originally 
responded. The new arrival is provided with 
the ability to evolve socially and not, as 
with lower order animals, imprinted with 
immutable social behaviour patterns. 
Present approaches to BM/C3 design tend to 
adopt the "lower animal" approach by 
examining the way current systems and 
organisations operate and then encapsulating 
procedures, rules and methods into structure 
and software. Perhaps we can learn to adopt 
the higher animal approach and produce 
systems which are both imprinted ｾ＠ able to 
evolve in service. 
The aim of this paper is to introduce and 
explore the application of cumulative 
selection as a promising and exciting new way 
to approach the creation, design, 
development, management and operation of 
complex BM/C3 systems. 
CUMULATIVE SELECTION 
In his book, The Blind Watchmaker (1), which 
was shown as part of the Horizon TV series 
under the same title, Dr Richard Dawkins. an 
evolutionary zoologist at Cambridge 
University, developed the concept of 
cumulative selection. Dawkins was concerned 
with the argument between the Darwinian 
Evolutionists and the Creationists, with the 
latter propounding that the creatures of the 
world were all created at time zero and, 
while some might have died out since, none 
had evolved. Creationist argue persuasively 
that brains and eyes, for example, are far 
too complex to have resulted from sheer 
chance; the odds against are truly 
astronomical. Richard Dawkins showed that 
such awesome complexity could come about 
quite simply by cumulative selection. 
Cumulative selection arises because progeny 
inherit characteristics from both parents and 
are imperfect copies of either. Some 
imperfections adapt offspring to their 
(changing) environment either by enhancing 
their performance or their survivability. 
While the generation-to-generation changes 
might be quite small. their accumUlation over 
twenty or thirty generations can be 
spectacular. 
Richard Dawkins developed a computer analogy 
to cumUlative selection which he called 
BIOMORPH in which he could draw on a graphic 
screen an "organism" using a recipe into 
which he stirred analogues of genes to 
represent colour, size, numbers of leg 
branches, branching angles, etc. 
One parent BIOMORPH bred a set of offspring 
with, in each case, one and only one "gene" 
nudged either up a notch or down a notch. The 
operator sits in front of the screen, selects 
the offspring with the characteristic he 
wishes to develop and that offspring then 
breeds its set of progeny in turn. A truly 
incredible variety of shapes and patterns can 
be produced in this way, but - as Richard 
Dawkins noted - this is not what Nature does. 
Nature is blind to the future - it has no 
. target design that it wishes to develop. 
Instead, offspring survive and replicate 
according to their ability in the evolving 
environment. The process of change is 
cumulative selection, the drive for change is 
survival in a hostile environment. Each 
successive generation survives and breeds 
because it has features - marginal 
differences, perhaps - which improve the 
probability that it will replicate. A 1% 
improvement in camouflage may sound 
insignificant, but it will make the creature 
a little less detectable, a little more 
likely to survive and replicate. Successive 
generations are likely to sustain a greater 
proportion of adapted offspring,. and so on. 
This process is called, of course, Natural 
Selection. 
A simple prototype design tool, called 
SYSMORPH in deference to Richard Dawkins' 
precursor, has been developed to prove the 
principal of design by cumulative selection 
and to explore its value, limitations and 
basis for further exploration. A further tool 
is in development, called COMMORPH,which 
seeks to apply the technique experimentally 
in communication network designs, with the 
same intent. Following paragraphs will 
describe both these tools. 
SYSMORPH 
SYSMORPH Gene Selection 
The choice of "genes" for SYSMORPH is far 
from obvious. Genes do not act like a 
blueprint, in the sense that obtaining half 
the blueprint would describe half the 
structure. Instead, genes permeate throughout 
every part of the design, resulting in quite 
different features in different situations. 
A colour gene for example may affect colour 
over a whole range of internal and external 
body features. A size gene may differentially 
affect different parts of the body's limbs. 
And so on. Dawkins compares the genes with 
parts of a recipe - each instruction may be 
evident in some or all parts of the result. 
The concept arises of applying the process of 
cumulative selection in the design of BM/C3 
systems. There are two stages in such an 
approach; 
* Develop a parallel to Dawkins' BIOMORPH to 
enable design by cumulative selection under 
operator guidance - I call this "Selective 
Breeding" 
* Wrap a hostile environment about the 
cumulative selection process such that 
favoured offspring are selected by their 
fitness, so eliminating the operator - I call 
this "Natural Selection" 
After considerable trial and error, five 
genes were selected for the prototype 
SYSMORPH. The number was a reconcilliation 
between simplicity, orthogonality and the 
ability to both manually cross-check the 
calculations and to display the results on a 
graphic screen. The chosen genes were:-
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Aggression, the degree of overt hostility 
Stealth or Discretion, the desire to remain 
undetected 
Co-operation, the desire to act in concert 
with others 
Shell, the self protection gene to represent 
the degree of hardening or armouring 
Delegation, or the degree of node replication 
in the internal system strucures 
The objective of orthogonality between genes 
is important; without orthogonality it would 
be possible to over-emphasise attributes 
resulting from cumulative selection by 
accidentally accounting for the same factor 
twice over. 
The five genes taken together provide a 
robust set, adequate for the prototype but 
clearly short for a full-blown system. It 
is none-the-Iess surprising how much can be 
achieved with only five genes, suggesting 
perhaps that cumulative selection may not 
require a vast number of source genes to be 
effective. In view of the potential 
combinatorial explosion inherent in the 
technique, this is a suggestion to be 
welcomed. 
SYSMORPH - Selective Breeding 
Reproducing Dawkins' work was fairly 
straightforward once the genes had been 
selected. The process is based on a standard 
drawing routine which determines the basic 
"shape of a SYSMORPH -see Fig I - with the 
following features:-
* 
"". 
* 
* 
* 
An external structure, analogous to a 
Shell or Carapace. 
A set of weapons to be used for the 
achievement of the SYSMORPH's mission; 
these overt weapons reveal the presence of 
the platform to hostile elements in its 
environment and symbollically pierce the 
shell so that they are visible from 
outside the shell in consequence. 
A set of sensors to sense both the 
external environment and the threats it 
may contain. Since sensors may be either 
active (self-revealing in use) or passive 
(covert), active sensors are shown 
piercing the Shell while passive sensors 
rest underneath , inside the Shell and 
symbolically hidden from observation. 
A set of" communication facilities which, 
in use, reveal their presence to others in 
the environment and which also pierce the 
shell. 
An internal structure represented by the 
three contained boxes. These boxes vary 
both in individual size and in aggregate 
area to indicate the degree of autonomy 
and the capacity of the internal 
processing and communications architecture. 
It is straightforward, using the stylised 
drawing interpreter -which must have its 
counterpart in nature - to draw the shape of 
Fig 1, which is referred to as a SYSMORPH. 
Since a SYSMORPH is constructed uniquely from 
five genes, it is possible to generate 10 
offspring SYSMORPHs with, in each case, only 
one gene either increased or decreased per 
offspring. Figure 2 shows such a generation, 
with the parent SYSMORPH in the centre and 
the offspring SYSMORPHs surrounding it marked 
A to J. An operator sitting at the SYSMORPH 
tool can identify any characteristic he 
wishes to emphasise from among the various 
offspring, select the appropriate button, A 
to J, and that offspring will appear in the 
centre to be followed swiftly by its own 
offspring. And so on. The tool is simple to 
learn and fun to use but its value is 
limited, since essentially it is just a 
rather smart drawing tool, responding to the 
operators chosen target design. 
SYSMORPH - Natural Selection 
Natural Selection presents each of the 
SYSMORPH offspring with a hostile environment 
in which it has both to perform and survive. 
Each SYSMORPH has different gene values which 
respectively promote its abilities. However 
performance, survivability, etc, are each 
affected by more than one gene. Performance 
for example is related to aggression, to 
mobility, to co-operation, and so on. So a 
complex pattern emerges. 
The complexity is resolved by scoring each 
design driver (e.g. Interoperability, 
Affordability,etc.) in turn, weighting the 
driver score and then aggregating the 
weighted scores to give an overall figure of 
merit for each SYSMORPH. The SYSMORPH with 
the highest score reproduces. 
The process of setting up all these gene 
values, scoring arrays and weighting vectors 
is the task of EXECSYS, one of the programs 
in the SYSMORPH suite. The structure of 
EXECSYS, together with typical formats, is 
shown in Figure 3. The operator is presented 
with a model menu, presently ｣ｯｮｾ｡ｩｮｩｮｧＺＭ
* Fighter Aircraft 
* Tank 
* Frigate 
* C2 HQ 
* Android 
On selecting the required model he is 
presented with two arrays, with sample 
figures already inserted, which he may 
change. The first array defines the limits 
between which gene values may move, and the 
starting conditions of the original parent 
SYSMORPH. As the prototype is used to 
experiment, three start points have been 
incorporated so that the original parent may 
have few, median or many genes, the purpose 
being to confirm that the final outcome is 
the same no matter what the start point. 
The second array, the gene contribution 
matrix, defines the interaction between each 
gene and its environment, represented by the 
design drivers shown in the table. The matrix 
represents the inputs that, in a full system, 
would be derived from comprehensive 
simulations of combat, survivability, etc. 
Natural Selection - Analysis Methods 
Three methods are used to aggregate the 
weighted scores for each SYSMORPH. The 
reasons for using several methods are 
twofold:-
* There is no firm concencus on a correct 
method 
* Having three methods allows sensitivities 
to be analysed 
The first method is simple algebraic 
addition. To enable this, all cost figures 
are negative since their sum, by whatever 
means, militates against system conception 
and development. The second method is 
similar, but the weighted scores are summed 
algebraically and then divided by the 
affordability sum to give an effectiveness: 
cost ratio. The third, and least suspect 
method, is to sum all weighted scores using 
root mean square and to divide by the modulus 
of Affordability. Using RMS is less 
discomforting because it is a reasoned way of 
aggregating mutually-orthogonal parameters 
Which, to a significant degree, the design' 
drivers should be. This process, together with 
a coherent weighting strategy, are subjects 
of ongoing research. 
Natural Selection - Affordability 
ａｾｦｯｲ､ｾ｢ｩｬｩｴｹ＠ is a key issue in SYSMORPH, 
ｳｾｮ｣･＠ ｾｴ＠ balances the tendencies of other 
drivers to increase complexity, weight, etc. 
Cost is accrued by each SYSMORPH not only by 
the addition of weapons, sensors, 
communications, processing and armour, but 
also by the increasing size of the 
: platform/vehicle/HQ needed to accommodate the 
load, and by the increasing complexity of 
interfaces and infrastructure. 
The prototype SYSMORPH employs simplified 
cost models. For example, correlation can be 
shown between the total number of missiles 
and guns (WPNS) carried by a non-delta 
fighter and its All Up Weight (AUW):-
AUW(kg) ... 4632 * (WPNS)O.7645 
There is also a correlation between AUW and 
fighter cost which allows cost to be related 
to total number of weapons in the parametric 
cost model. 
The cost of systems engineering can be 
assessed broadly by noting that it increases 
with the number of interfaces (I), and that 
they increase as:-
I = k * P(P-I) 
where k is a proportionality constant 
P is the number of connected 
peripherals in the system 
For a fighter, then, the overall cost for 
each offspring can be formulated by summing 
the cost due to weight, the cost due to 
weapons and the cost due to systems 
engineering. Absolute costs are generally 
unnecessary, since the program is seeking to 
find the offspring with the highest 
effectiveness: cost ratio: so long as 
relative costs are properly maintained, the 
correct selection will result. 
SYSMORPH - the Program 
Figure 4 shows the main SYSMORPH program 
structure. At the centre are the features 
common to both modes, Selective Breeding and 
Natural Selection. Features to the right of 
centre are particular to the more complex 
Natural Selection process. The figure, which 
is a simplified version of the full 
prototype, is self explanatory. 
SYSMORPH in Operation 
Testing SYSMORPH is an interesting concept. 
When I had built the program, I proceeded to 
test it by inserting gene start-points and 
hostile environment conditions that were well 
understood and to which I knew the answer - a 
simple test that SYSMORPH would provide the 
obvious answer to the obvious question. It 
did not. It certainly produced the 
I eventual design characteristics which I 
expected, but the sequence of evolutionary 
steps which it took were not what I had 
expected. 
For example, see Fig 5. The figure is a 
typical printout showing the start point and 
the sequence of evolutionary steps that 
SYSMORPH followed in deriving a high-
performance fighter interceptor. One can 
argue that, by Iteration 15, it has produced 
a reasonable description, given the initial 
conditions, which started the aircraft with 4 
missiles, mainly passive sensors, little 
communications, medium armouring and partly 
distributed processing. By the end it has two 
missiles, only one passive sensor (which the 
program interprets as also meaning 5 active 
sensors), a plethora of communications, 
minimum armour and fully distibuted 
processing.It is not the end point that 
surprises, but that the first step chosen by 
SYSMORPH was to increase communications/ 
cooperation. 
The reason for surprise is that the start 
conditions and, particularly, the gene 
contributions, are an expression of the 
operator's (my) prejudices. In the absence of 
full combat models, I selected and weighted 
according to my experience. So, the program 
should have matched my intuition (which was 
to remove armour and to add active sensors 
first). The program, which I wrote, 
initialised and supplied with data, was 
disagreeing with me. 
The program was correct. On checking, there 
were no errors. What SYSMORPH was achieving 
was to balance all the factors which I had 
supplied more effectively than I was able to 
do mentally. SYSMORPH, even as an elementary 
prototype, seemed to be providing a stimulus 
to lateral and creative thought. 
Further testing of the prototype showed this 
deduction to be the case. SYSMORPH is good at 
taking a wide variety of different factors, 
each with some predictable impact on eventual 
design, and balancing their contributions 
objectively. The eventual design parameters 
produced by prototype SYSMORPH are sometimes 
less interesting than the route by which it 
reaches the end point, in the sense that the 
final outcome is often obvious from the bias 
introduced by the operator. So, conceptually 
we could introduce the parent genes of a 
current design for, say, a frigate and 
SYSMORPH (or at least a full-blown version) 
would tell us the first, most important 
upgrade we should introduce to enhance its 
performance/survivability/cost effectiveness, 
then the second, and so on. 
SYSMORPH - Limitations and Promise 
The present prototype is very limited - it 
was intended only to establish a principle. 
It has done so, rather unexpectedly well. But 
with only five genes, and without full 
simulation models representing threats and 
environments, its results are only a guide to 
future value. The principle does appear to be 
incredibly powerful, however, and the 
technique holds promise of revolutionising 
our approach not only to design, but to 
development and operations, as later 
paragraphs will show. 
SYSMORPH Potential 
The SYSMORPH idea can be applied in some 
highly creative ways in conjunction with 
conventional models. Consider the process of 
assessing a fighter aircraft's performance -
see left half of Figure 6. Conventionally we 
develop, perhaps over many years, rather good 
many-on-many (MOM) combat models and we then 
fly simulated new aircraft designs in the 
model, to assess likely performance. The 
results are analysed, limitations identified, 
and perhaps the fighter model is revised off-
line. 
Replace the fighter model with a SYSMORPH 
program, wrapped around the conventional 
simulation as shown in the right of Figure 6. 
A complete generation of slightly-differing 
SYSMORPH fighters is produced: each is flown 
in turn agains the threat, in an MOM 
simulation, and the best offspring is 
selected to reproduce. Cumulative selection 
will evolve the ideal fighter within the 
limits of the model representations.· To be 
sure, there is a tremendous use of the 
existing, conventional model - but that is 
good, since it is available and trusted as a 
reference. 
But that is only the tip of the icebergl 
Consider Figure 7, the left half of which 
repeats Figure 6 in condensed form. The 
response by an enemy to a better fighter will 
be to produce a better counter-threat - that 
is the way of the world. So, having evolved 
our SYSMORPH fighter, what is to prevent us 
evolving the counter-threat? Having evolved 
the threat to see what our SYSMORPH fighter, 
presently only on the drawing board, may face 
when it matures, we can then further evolve 
our SYSMORPH fighter to accommodate this new 
environment. I call this Systolic Cumulative 
Selection since it operates like a heart, 
beating between the two parts of the model. 
Evolving a fighter in the way just described 
is far from the ultimate approach. It is 
axiomatic that a system comprised of 
separately optimised parts will not itself be 
optimal. While evolving a fighter might be 
very attractive, it pales beside the prospect 
of optimising, for example, a complete Air 
Defence System, comprising interceptors, 
missiles, surveillance, identification, 
Command and Control, communications, etc. Yet 
that is the challenge which we should address 
since it will undoubtedly prove much more 
cost-effective than our present piece-meal 
approach. Can cumulative selection help? 
Probably, is the prudent answer. Not because 
,the technique will not work - it will. The 
question is more one of computability, since 
the number of genes or rules needed to 
describe such a complex system in adequate 
detail may be prohibitive when it comes to 
the computational task. Maintaining the level 
of abstraction is the key. And such 
presently intractable tasks as simultaneously 
optimising for cost, performance ｡ｾ､＠
architectural survivability of a C system 
do seem to be practical targets. 
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM MORPHOLOGY COMMORPH 
A classic problem facing wide-area 
communication system designers and tactical 
planners concerns the.optimum siting and 
numbers of switching nodes. Microwave links 
are expensive and it is essential therefore 
to limit the number of "shots" (links) and 
switching centres, consistent always with 
performance. unfortunately, the problem can 
.prove mathematically intractable for all but 
,the simplest of configurations of 
;source!sinks (the C2 centres). 
One analogue solution (literally) to the 
; optimisation problem invokes the phenomenon 
:of surface tension. In this approach, 
lpioneered some years ago at Southampton 
University, two sheets of perspex are drilled 
with holes corresponding in plan to the 
.geographic sites of the C2 centres. The two 
sheets are then separated by inch-long studs 
screwed through the drill holes, to form a 
sandwich, and the whole is dipped in soap 
solution. On withdrawal, the soap solution 
forms into planar bubbles which connect the 
vertical studs by the overall shortest 
. length. The technique is both ingenious and 
inconvenient. . 
COMMORPH tackles the problem in an analogous 
manner. Consider Figure B. It comprises ten 
source/sinks, C2 HQ in this instance. Their 
locations are determined, and it is desired 
to interconnect them by radio links. Eight 
switching/repeater nodes are scattered 
randomly into the area of the source/sinks. 
The COMMORPH core routine then manoeuvres the 
nodes gradually into an optimal configuration 
which might be a tree, a loop, or a fully-
connected network according to operator pre-
selection. The tree result is shown in 
Figure 9: the solution, once seen, is obvious 
of course. But notice how some nodes space 
.themselves evenly into straight lines (relays) 
while others form junctions (switches). 
The COMMORPH core process is essentially very 
straightforward. Each node is allowed to 
associate with the nearest source/sink: the 
nodes are then interconnected into a 
tree/loop/network configuration and the 
overall length of all the links is 
recorded. Next, each node is stepped in eight 
directions, each at 45 degrees from the rest-
point. At each step the node re-associates 
with the (then) nearest source/sink and the 
overall link length associated with that step 
is recorded. Eight overall link lengths 
result: the shortest is selected and the node 
is moved to that new position. The process is 
repeated for each node in sequence, until all 
nodes have been stepped, and the complete 
cycle is repeated until ｳｵ｣｣･ｳｳｩｶｾ＠ iterations 
show no reduction in overall link length. The 
process is simple cumulative selection. 
Hypnotic though the process described above 
appears on the graphic screen, it is only the 
core of COMMORPH. The original number of 
nodes was chosen arbitrarily, and what has 
been described was simply the development of 
the parent COMMORPH. Offspring are generated 
from this parent next, with differing numbers 
of nodes and the offspring which produces the 
minimum overall link length is evolved, again 
by cumulative selection. 
Nodal step-length is a crucial parameter. 
Were it too small, not only would the program 
take inordinately long to run, but sub-
optimal sticking points might be encountered. 
(These may prove interesting in the 
communications context and are the subject of 
present investigation). Step length is 
therefore varied automatically under program 
control, starting large and reducing with 
each cycle until an optimum appears to have 
been found. Step length is then increase to 
see if the configuration switches to a new 
mode. (This is analogous to shaking the 
bubble formed between the perspex plates, so 
giving it sufficient film/lattice energy to 
switch to the lowest energy mode). 
At this point we have simply emulated the 
soap bubble method. With the new approach it 
is possible to introduce a variety of 
factors in addition to minimum path length. 
In a manner similar to SYSMORPH, the network 
may be created from genes which code for node 
characteristics such as power, sensitivity, 
capacity, damage tolerance, camouflage, 
mobility and even mast height. A hostile 
environment might include terrain, 
electronic warfare, physical warfare, 
interoperability, security, affordability, 
and so on. The performance measure would 
generally be signal to noise ratio, which 
would account automatically for line-of-sight 
limitations imposed by terrain screening. 
COMMORPH Applications 
The applications to which such a flexible 
tool might be put range from circuit board 
design to satellite communications and are 
limited only by imagination. Two examples 
only will be presented:-
Mission Route Planning. When planning - or 
when actually flying - a route through 
hostile territory, there are many factors 
to consider. Takeoff, destination and 
return base will be known, and there 
should be good knowledge of terrain if not 
of enemy en-route defences. The problem is 
to derive a 3-D route plan to the target 
which minimises risk from being seen or 
attacked, which reaches the target, and 
which recovers with equally minimal risk. 
with COMMORPH, cumulative selection will 
find the route, either completely on its 
own or from some preferred start-point 
inserted by the operator. A full-blooded 
capability would need to be coupled with 
good knowledge of the enemy's defensive 
lethalities, and of the attacking 
aircraft's characteristics so that 
"balooning" over a projection was avoided, 
for instance. Lack of definition of enemy 
characteristics such as lethality ranges, 
for example, can be accommodated by 
employing systolic cumulative selection 
and evolving the enemy's defences within 
sensible limits and then returning to the 
original mode to fine-tune the flight path 
in the light of the evolved threat. There 
is potential for a real-time airborne 
planner here. 
Naval ASW screening. A sonar contact may 
ｲ･ｱｵｾｲ･＠ a naval battle group to reform 
into a defensive configuration, or screen, 
in response to the presumed enemy 
position. The rules for forming such a 
screen can be extremely complex in 
execution; ships could have been anywhere 
at time of contact, and could be involved 
in a variety of essential activities, 
ranging from picket to helicopter 
operations to defending against air, 
surface or previous sub-surface attack. A 
COMMORPH-type of program will employ 
cumulative selection to determine the best 
means of establishing the optimum screen 
from the present starting point taking all 
of the relevant factors into account. 
Again, systolic cumulative selection can 
be employed to anticipate enemy counter . 
moves to some degree. 
EVOLVING RULES 
Rules in a program can be thought of in much 
. the same way as genes: if we can evolve a 
I gene-based SYSMORPH/BIOMORPH can we evolve 
. rules? It seems likely that we can. Looking 
back at Figure 7, Systolic Cumulative 
Selection, ｾｩｧｨｴ＠ give a clue. The evolving 
SYSMORPH aircraft was indeed adapting to a 
changing threat, which is no different to 
responding to changing rules and is one 
measure of intelligence. It seems possible 
that, while cumulative selection has resulted 
in our own natural intelligence, it might 
also form a basis for us to develop artificial 
intelligence. 
The idea of evolving rules is seductive. 
Consider the applications. Conflict is an 
obvious one, but what about, say, project 
management rules as set in a development 
logic/bar chart. PERT and Critical Path 
Analysis would be no match for a replanning 
process based on cumulative selection. 
Research in the US at present is evolving 
manufacturing robot software rules by 
cumulative selection so that the robots no 
longer lock-up when faced with an unforeseen 
situation, but instead adapt to the new 
circumstance, within prescribed limits of 
freedom. Cumulative selection is being used to 
design aerofoils, low-drag car profiles and 
turbines in Germany and these advances may 
well generate new rules too. 
o 
Using in-built cumulative selection would 
enable us to deliver BM/C3 systems with the 
ability to evolve from delivery, using 
perfectly conventional, well-established 
rules and procedures as the initial provision 
to the user/customer. So, the system would 
probably be dated at the time of delivery, 
but the new users would provide contemporary 
threat and situation data to the system, 
which would adapt the delivered capability to 
the new circumstances. The concept is 
difficult, of course, and would need to be 
carefully controlled, but present performance 
is not sufficiently satisfactory that a new 
and promising approach should be overlooked. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The paper started by considering prospects 
for planning, designing and developing 
complex BM/C3 systems, which are presently 
often disappointing in their realisation, 
having been designed and developed over a 
protracted period and proving to be outdated 
and inflexible in use. The lack of creative, 
adaptive system tools which might reduce the 
impact of this shortfall was observed, where 
system referred to the major elements in a 
complex BM/C3 system. 
The process of cumulative selection was 
introduced, and its employment in SYSMORPH 
and COMMORPH described, both being primitive 
prototype design tools. The approach to, and 
limitations of, design by cumulative 
selection were assessed. It can be concluded 
that the approach has potential for 
encouraging insight, by allowing tradeoffs 
between a wide and incompatible set of design 
influences at a time during the creative 
process when such a need is most keenly felt •. 
In effect, the prototype SYSMORPH could be 
seen as a lateral thinker, while a full-blown 
version could be seen as a valuable design 
tool. Indeed, systolic cumulative selection 
may be a basis for developing artificial 
intelligence, much as Nature's cumulative 
selection has produced natural intelligence. 
Applications for SYSMORPH and COMMORPH 
included not only design, but also mission 
route planning, defensive screen planning, 
system architecture design and perhaps even 
the evolution of a complete defence system, 
subject to computability. 
Finally the paper looked at the potential 
application of cumUlative selection as a 
means of evolving rules intelligently so that 
systems may adapt their performance in 
response to changing environment, with the 
conclusion that the achievement of such 
capability looked feasible, was difficult but 
stood out as an exciting, unchallenged 
prospect. Application of rule evolving systems 
included project management systems to develop 
complex BM/C3 systems as well as within the 
systems themselves for evolving procedures, 
tactics and the prediction of outcomes. 
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BUILDING FUTURE SYSTEMS 
Professor Derek K HITCHINS, City University 
1. INTRODUCfION 
There is a problem with the way in which defence systems are being procured. The problem is 
not that insufficient care is being taken, nor that the various parties, specifications and 
standards are in any way deficient. Quite the contrary. It may be that the very diligence is 
contributing to the situation. 
That the problem exists, however, can be seen by standing back and looking at any number of 
sizeable procurements for all three services. To fmd a program that is not late and over-budget 
is unusual. To find a system delivered into service that does not almost immediately enter a 
modification/update programme is equally unusual. 
This paper seeks some of the underlying causes of procurement shortcomings and offers some 
innovative, even provocative remedies. Seen as a theme common to all systems, including 
human activity systems, is their architecture, structure or organisation. Seen as as a major 
hurdle to be overcome in designing good architectures is the involvement of the users as part 
of, perhaps as leaders of, architecture design teams. The paper seeks to validate the role of the 
so-called user-architect, and in so doing unveils a new methodology for creating innovative 
design concepts, the Seven-Step Continuum, which progresses from "soft" through "firm" to 
"hard" system concepts. 
2. CAREFULLY-SPECIFIED OBSOLESCENCE 
Figure 1 outlines the two predominant procurement strategies of recent times: at the top is cost-
plus; at the bottom, fixed-price. Cost-plus recognises the imprecision in requirement 
understanding and capture, and engages in an evolving development process which all-too-
often has proved to be prolonged and expensive. Although the system, when eventually 
delivered, may be satisfactory, the customer may have paid more than anticipated for 
development and production, and the relevant arm of the services may have had to 
accommodate operational deficiencies while waiting. 
Fixed price procurement engages in a fixed timescale and cost development. To achieve this 
goal, a very tight specification is sought and strict control is imposed on changes during 
development. Systems are expected to be delivered to time and budget. As Figure 1 illustrates, 
the principal difference between the strategies is in the transference of risk and expenditure. In 
either event, shortfall is inevitable. Both approaches have to recognise that the operational and 
technological environments are changing during development, leaving fixed-price, fixed-
specification solutions particularly vulnerable. 
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It is very probably impossible to specify any complex system with precision. To attempt 
accurate specification 3 - 5 years in advance of delivery is patent nonsense; this concept is, 
however, at the heart of present procurement strategy in an attempt to curb runaway costs. 
3. ISSUES 
The major procurement issues may thus be summarised as follows:-
* Procurement strategies seek to avoid late and costly systems but seem set to do little more 
than transfer the onus between purses of different procuring partners 
* Precise specification may not be possible but the very attempt at precision is extending the 
timescales of fixed-price systems, invoking rigid systems and must eventually be self-defeating 
as it extends the development cycle. 
* Knowledge elicitation is vicarious, imprecise and suspect - not to mention jargon-ridden. 
* System architectures are becoming more complex, resulting in extending timescales and 
threatened project predictability. 
* Punishing "late" fixed-price contractors is self-defeating; they will be unable / unwilling to 
provide in-service through-life support. 
4. WHERE IS ALL THIS ARCHITECfURE COMING FROM? 
The development problem seems to be getting worse, too. Figure 2 shows why. As we 
advance socially, we come to expect more of technology-based systems. International 
telephone systems are a classic example. Systems become both more capable in themselves and 
more interwoven. Defence systems in particular face increasing threat and reducing time-lines. 
One thing has not changed - the human frailties of designers. They still possess only one 
person's mental perception and capacity, requiring them to breakdown a complex system into 
understandable parts. The size of an "understandable part" having remained substantially 
constant, it follows that more complex systems must have more such parts, more 
communications between the parts, more infrastructure and indeed more architecture. 
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Fig 2: "ARCHITECTURE" GENERATION 
Until as little as 10 years ago, the architecture of most Information-Decision-Action (IDA) 
Systems was a crew of operators, a central processor and star-connected sensors and action-
elements (weapons). Such simple structures are vulnerable and of low performance, but 
essentially simple. Technology has enabled us to distribute, to avoid singularities and to co-
operate to enhance performance. Technology has not supplied system-architects, however, nor 
have we been blessed with a science of system architectonics. Presently there is no discemable 
engineering framework for designing such complex systems which owe as little to software as 
human anatomy owes to brain neurons. 
5. WHAT IS ARCIllTECTURE? 
To understand architecture it is helpful to return to basics. Figure 3 is basic. At the left hand 
side are a number of entities; they could be people, processors, avionic modules, ships, some 
mixture of all these, etc. There are no groups; there are no links; there is no architecture. 
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FJg 3: WHAT IS ARCHITECTURE? 
At the right, the same entities are clustered, infra-connected and inter-connected. Now there is 
architecture, evidenced by several features:-
* Clusters of Entities 
* Clustering "drivers" which result in purposeful clustering of some entities and equally 
purposeful repulsion between others 
* Connections within and between clusters' 
* Connectivity drivers which result in linking, link redundancy, protocols to facilitate linking 
and security to protect and isolate. 
Architecture brings structure and order to chaos; it underpins all system design, no matter how 
simple or complex. A proper understanding of architecture is essential for would-be user-
architects of whatever system. 
NB A return to the left hand side of Figure 3 will find the reader unable to "unsee" the 
architecture of the right hand diagram; this mind-set is a particular pitfall for architects. 
6. ARCIDTECIURE ISOMORPIDSMS 
System architectonics is both an art and a science. As an art, perhaps it owes its roots to the 
human facility for pattern recognition. Figure 4 shows several disparate system types, which 
share common features. Using anatomical terminology, consider a manned-aircraft. It has:-
* A Brain - crew, giving fight or flight initiatives 
* A Central Nervous System - processing, communications, etc 
* Visual/Aural Sensors- radar, Infra Red, L3TV, ESM, eye-sight 
* Energy reserves - fuel, accumulators, kinetic energy 
* Energy Converters / Muscles - generators, controls, motors 
* Pain Sensors - Built-in test, central warning panels, attention-getters, etc 
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Fig 4: ARCHITECTURE ISOMORPHISMS 
The crew themselves, as individuals, display the same anatomical features of course, but less 
obviously perhaps so does the fleet of aircraft engaged in some airborne exercise, with fighters 
under control of some AWACS aircraft. Here the architecture is spatially dynamic but perfectly 
evident, with central nervous system connections being completed by visual and radio links. 
Architecture isomorphisms are often to be seen so, embedded within each other like so many 
--
Russian dolls. Much can be learnt by an appreciation of human "architecture", much more 
sophisticated than any we presently seek to design. It is perhaps axiomatic that we design 
anthropomorphically - given the suggestion, we could do worse than learn from the best design 
on the planet. 
7. BRIDGING THE USER-BUILDER DIVIDE 
If we accept the concept of architectural isomorphisms at systems level, it follows that 
perception of isomorphisms, far from being an engineer's prerogative, is more likely by users 
and operators of IDA systems, owing to their everyday immersion in the relevant domain. At 
present there is something of a divide between users and system designers, due in part to their 
differing domains, but also to their differing training and particularly to a distinct lack of a 
common language. Users understand their objectives and aspirations; developers understand 
technology and its application. 
Knowledge elicitation is an attempt to cross the divide, but what price two or three weeks 
elicitation against twenty / thirty years field experience? Expert systems can prove limited too. 
What value encapsulated rules for a new system elicited from experts who never went to war, 
or who did but using out-of-date equipments against a long-past threat? 
The solution is evident:-
A. Teach users to be their own system architects 
B. Develop user-architect tools to help them work at system level, injecting user domain 
understanding, doctrine and knowledge into a fonnal but friendly engineering framework 
(C. Develop systems that evolve in service - but that is for another paper) 
8. USER-ARCHITECT C.A.D. 
User-architect tools are with us now in prototype, if we can recognise them - and they do not 
resemble software design tools. Figure 5 is an N2 (N-squared) chart, an incidence matrix 
showing the strength of relationship between eight entities, A-H. Were these entities to 
represent, say, the activities undertaken by Air Traffic Control at an airfield. or the different 
activities in a new RN frigate, operators would be ideally placed to understand and present the 
relationships between the activities and to prioritise those relationships. 
As entered. the relationships merely record that some coherent numbering scheme has been 
used to express priority, that some relationships do not exist and that entity "C" has a 
relationship with all other entities and is in some way special. The entities can be clustered to 
associate more closely those entities having the strongest relationships. In the process, the 
interfaces create different patterns which are comprehensible to both man and processor. 
9. CADRAT - CLUSTERING, LINKING & ENHANCING 
Figure 6 shows the result. There are two tightly-bound blocks - all interfaces filled - which 
inter-relate strongly; these are the precursors to two physical architecture blocks, they exhibit 
purposeful clustering. There is also the previously-noted node, connecting two halves of the 
system of entities which is a candidate for hardening or replication in anticipation of failure or 
attack. Finally, "D" and "E" - the "waterfall" pair - represent hierarchical control and reporting, 
revealing authority lines. 
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Fig 6. CADRAT - CLUSTERED MATRIX 
While this example is trivial, more complex examples can be addressed by user-architects given 
appropriate training and tools. Figure 6 was clustered by a tool called CADRA T, Computer 
Aided Design - Relationship Analysis Tool. CADRAT will repel as well as cluster, reveals 
missing interfaces, enables clustered entities to be aggregated to simplify architecture, and so 
on. In a more complex situation such as advanced avionic architecture, clustering and repelling 
drivers might include, respectively:-
Crew Accessibility 
Spectral Overlap 
Crew Armouring 
Minimal Signal Loss 
Resource Sharing 
CofG 
Space 
Fuselage window Space 
E-M Isolation / EMC 
No. of Connections. 
Temporal Competition 
Functional Similarity 
Physical Similarity 
Damage Tolerance 
Heat Dissipation 
Local Environment 
A 25-by-25 matrix with all interfaces filled to accommodate all the drivers is too complex to 
cluster by eye. User-architects can co-operate with engineers in establishing the relationships 
and priorities - CADRA T will then produce the architecture to their mutual satisfaction. 
10. SOFT-TO-HARD CONTINUUM CONCEPTS 
Soft methodologies have gained in popularity recently. They recognise that human activity 
systems are fuzzy, lack repeatability and cannot be specified or understood quantitatively. 
Attempts to use these methods as a basis for specifying IDA systems (systems in which 
user/operators are supported by technological systems, e.g. Air Traffic Control, aircraft, ships, 
tanks etc) have been fraught with difficulty. While SSM helps to unravel the problem, 
subsequent transition to a solution is more elusive. 
The soft-to-hard Seven-Step Continuum seeks to provide a smooth, seamless transition 
framework. What, then, should be the features of such a continuum? 
* Middle-Out Design - Early, exploratory work can be focused effectively using a "Template" 
which categorises essential information. By prescribing the information needed further on in 
the continuum, nugatory early work - characteristic of some SSM exponents - can be avoided. 
* Many Small Steps - For a continuum to merit the title, each step along the path should be 
small and easily understood. Small steps imply many steps; some steps may need tools and 
techniques to accommodate difficult, time-consuming or data-intensive tasks 
* Creative Entropy - This is a key concept, developing creative tension and completeness. The 
technique increases the net information content first by looking both at objectives and the 
threats to their achievement, and second by introducing a series of nested Necessary and 
Sufficient (N&S) Sets. An objective might be the strategy for achieving the Prime Directive of 
a System -of Interest (SOl); the threat would be to the achievement of that strategy. An N&S 
Set might be Performance, Availability (of Performance) and Survivability (of Performance); 
as a set, these three ensure Performance. 
So the continuum is underpinned by unobtrusive formality which permeates the processes and 
seeks both to expand and focus information in a creative, innovative framework. 
11. THE SEVEN-STEP CONTINUUM 
At the highest level, the Continuum comprises seven steps which progress from soft, through 
firm or mixed to hard system design concepts. The Seven-Step Continuum can be used 
iteratively. fIrst to develop concepts and then to develop designs. The Seven Steps are shown 
at Figure 7 - of course. 
Step 1 - Understand the Issues Softer 
Step 2 - Establish the S-O-I Requirement Template 
Step 3 - Develop Process and Structure 
Step 4 - Assign Man-Machine Roles 
Step 5 - Develop S-O-1 Performance 
Step 6 - Develop S-O-1 Effectiveness 
Step 7 - Develop the Preferred Design Concept 
Fia " SEVES-STEP CONTINUUM FROM SOFT TO HARD Harder 
There being no concensus of what constitutes a completed design concept. Steps 5.6 and 7 
develop increasing detail and concept robustness. For some. the fIrst four steps will suffIce; for 
others steps 5. 6 and 7 can be added as needed. Being a continuum. it follows that the steps 
comprise an extendable ladder; Step 6 cannot be undertaken if Step 5 has not been addressed, 
. and so on. 
The role and limitations of the user-architect are not clear at the high level of Figure 7. 
Following topics will unfold the Seven-Step Continuum, will decompose steps to aid 
understanding and will explore the limits of user-architect applicability. 
Bound the 
System-of-Interest 
(S-O-I) 
'10 .: STEP 1, LEVEL 1 • UNOERSTAND THE ISSUES 
- .12 STEP 1, LEVEL 1 - UNDERSTAND THE ISSUES 
. Figure 8 shows the fIrst level of breakdown. or decomposition. for Step l.The decomposition 
. _ shows four related tasks which. it would seem. are appropriate to user-architects except. 
perhaps, for "Bound the System-Of-Interest (SOl)". Even experienced analysts fInd this task to 
be excrutiatingly difficult, the trap being to identify the SOl boundary with some convenient 
physical or organisational boundary. Bounding systems is difficult and requires training and 
method; neither is beyond the scope of either engineer or user-architect, but the latter may have 
the edge due to his domain understanding. To appreciate Step 1 further, we must decompose it 
to level 2 
13. STEP 1, LEVEL 2 - UNDERSTAND THE ISSUES 
The second level of Step 1 decomposition is at Figure 9, where the numbers for each box are 
\Vork Breakdown indices. \Vith more detail revealed, the role of the user-architect and the 
essentially soft nature of the tasks becomes evident. Notice the use of Creative Entropy in 1/6 
15. SOl REQUIREMENT TEMPLATE 
The culmination of Step 2 is the completion, to a depth appropriate to purpose, of the SOl 
Requirements Template of Figure 11; the figure shows only headings. All earlier work should 
have been focused towards one or more elements in this template; all headings should be 
supported by comparable levels of detail. In this way breadth of understanding appropriate to 
purpose is also assured. 
Note the use of Creative Entropy and of N&S Sets:-
* Creative Entropy - Strategy for Achieving PD vs. Threat to Achieving Strategy: Measures of 
Effectiveness vs. Negative Contribution Factors: Semantic Analysis 
* N&S Sets - Management Set: two Threat Sets: MOE Set: Behaviour Set. 
It is the aim, in developing the Seven-Step Continuum, to extend these complementary 
concepts throughout the approach, providing a balanced development of design information 
.. with minimum wastage. 
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Cost External 
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: : Technology 
Fig 11: S-O-I REQUIREMENT TEMPLATE 
16 THE MANAGEMENT SET 
An example of one of the N&S Sets, the Management Set, will help to explain the role of the 
SOl Requirements Template. Figure 12 presents an outline of the Management Set for an 
advanced avionics system for a futuristic fighter. The three elements, Mission Management, 
Vehicle (Platform in this instance) Management and Resource Management focus attention in 
turn on different aspects of the avionics systems' activities in support of the Prime Directive. 
Mission Management looks ahead and plans to achieve the strategic objective of the mission. 
Vehicle Management preserves the means (aircraft and crew) of pursuing the Mission in a near-
term, tactical sense. Resource Management husbands and apportions resources in pursuance of 
the other two sets of activities. The Management Set thus can be seen as another variant of 
Perfonnance, Survivability and Availability, in respect of attaining the mission. The elaboration 
of the Management Set can be seen as appropriate to the user-architect in particular, since it is 
related to the "do" activities of the aircraft / crew combination, rather than to technology. 
Platform l\lanagement 
6-D Flight Regime Control 
Fire Control r-------,... 
Mission Managemenf 
Long-term Navigation 
En - Route Evasion I 
Engagement 
Situation Assessment 
Threat Detection 
Co-operation 
Co-operative Tactics 
Routes of Penetration 
& Egress 
Evasion profiles 
Engagement Geometry 
ESM Interpretation 
EMCON Policy 
IFR Planning 
Recovery 
Engine Control 
Tactical Manoeuvre 
Energy Management 
Glass cockpit Presentation 
Reactive Countenneasures 
Short-term Navigation 
Resource Management 
Reconfiguration 
- Fallback & Reversion 
Fuel Management 
Weapons Management 
BITE I Self Test 
Asymmetry Management 
Fig 12: THE MANAGEMENT SET -
AVIONICS EXAMPLE 
17. STEP 3, LEVEL 2 - DEVELOP PROCESS AND STRUcruRE 
Step 3 is elaborated in Figure 13. The tasks fall into two groups: at the left develop 
organisational architecture by clustering internal system activities and their external 
relationships and by linking those sets internally and externally. The internal SOl activities are 
developed on the right hand side, which is clearly the pre-cursor to functionality and to the 
purpose, intent and high-level design of software. Step 3 thus lays the foundation for 
architecture in the functional, physical and organisational senses. 
r-------:3:"::f2-ril>nes/Arcas 
Elaborate Set of Layers/P!tases 
Management Processes Sequences 
L.-__ ｾ｟ＭＭＬﾷｓｬ｡ｴ･ｳ＠
'--_....-_...1 315 
Activities 3/6 L..-__ --' 
Fig 13: STEP 3, lEVEL 2· DEVELOP PROCESS & STRUCTURE 
In both blocks, at left and right hand sides of Figure 13, techniques and tools are necessary. 
None of these is exceptional; CADRA T has already been introduced as one means of handling 
the complexity and of clustering according to rules (Tasks 3/8 and 3/9) and sound techniques 
exist to enable the intelligent user-architect to undertake the whole of Step 3. 
18. STEP 4, LEVEL 2 - ASSIGN MAN / MACHINE ROLES 
Step 4, however, moves towards a distinct need for specialised capability found presently in 
system design engineers. User-architect roles are associated with setting up the SOl Solution 
Template, the SOl Information Template and in the most difficult task of apportioning 
functions / tasks between man and machine. Clearly user-architects, by virtue of their domain 
knowledge, can contribute to all activities in Step 4, but principally to the apportionment of 
tasks, (4/9). This most difficult, perhaps, of all tasks, must have deep user involvement and is 
best handled by developing a variety of solutions and trading between them. 
·Volatil ,....--.:...--, 
.Stabl< Set-up S-?-I 
Informallon 
·Deduciblc 
.Doctriru Tem late 
4f2 4{1 
SET-UP S-O-I 
SOLUTION 
'ffi\fiU TE 4/1 
Apportion 
Functions I Tasks 
4fj To Man and Machin! 
cities I ｒ｡ｴｾ＠
4td 
Fig 14: STEP 4, LEVEL 2 • ASSIGN MAN·MACHINE ROLES 
. 19. THE SOl SOLUTION TEMPLATE 
The SOl Solution Template is designed to facilitate tradeoffs between optional design concepts 
- see Figure 15, which contains columns for differentiating judgemental criteria and for 
solution options. Options are ranked or scored against each criterion and the preferred option 
selected accordingly. The SOl Solution Template contains no specifics about each design 
. concept option; these are held separately. Instead, it carries forward the measures established in 
the SOl Requirements Template. Some factors from this prior template do not appear explicitly 
but are evident in the scoring / weighting process. Survivability and Availability are judged in 
relation to the Threat: Behaviour influences Performance, Security, Interoperability and others. 
The Solution Template is arranged to highlight cost-effectiveness; the effectiveness scores may 
be sub-totalled in each column to appear immediately above Cost, the first Negative 
Contribution. Net Contribution may be assessed comparitively by trading Effectiveness 
(Positive Factors) against Negative Contribution Factors. While a numerical scheme is useful 
to clear the thinking processes, the final assessment of Net Contribution is better effected using 
qualitative measures. The user-architect has much to offer in this selection Process. 
OPTIONS 
1 2 3 4 
E 
PERFORMANCE - Mission Management 
F - Vehicle Management 
F - Resource Management 
E AVAILABILITY - Reliability 
c 
- Maintainability T 
I - Re-Configurability 
v SURVN ABILITY - Avoidance of Detection 
E 
- Self Defence 
N 
- Damage Tolerance E 
s INTEROPERABILITY 
s USABILITY 
SECURITY, ETC 
c COST 0 
N N ADVERSE PARENT MISSION FACTORS 
I! T FAILURE PATTERNS OR 
A I CONSUMPTION T B DISSIPATION I U 
v T MASS I WEIGHT B I 
0 VOLUME I SHAPE, ETC N 
NET CONTRIBUTION 
Fig 15: S-O-I SOLUTION TEMPLATE 
20. USER'S ROLE IN THE SEVEN-STEP CONTINUUM 
The Seven-Step Continuum is being developed by applying it to real problems, so as to test its 
utility to system designers and user-architects alike. City University offers a BSc Degree in 
Management and Systems which attracts a cross-section of students from advertising. police, 
'the forces, leisure, management consultancy, finance and many more. Some students come 
straight from school - others are mature. The Course includes a section on Technical 
Innovation during which the students have been introduced to the Seven Step Continuum in 
developing design concepts for Air Traffic Control and a notional Channel Tunnel Crisis 
Management System, with surprising - indeed, very surprising success. 
The Seven-Step Continuum is also being applied to the design of concepts for an advanced 
avionics architecture, in this instance in support of a multi-disciplinary, multi-company design 
team of professional engineers, analysts and systems designers, facing a severe design 
challenge. The Continuum serves as a route map to keep the team heading in the right direction 
and to co-ordinate the various disciplines. 
Figure 16 shows a rough estimate of user-architect potential, based on the present, limited 
experience, to undertake each of the steps in the Seven Step Continuum, given training and 
tools which have been made available to the City University students. The potential for user 
architects is clear; while later tasks need more specialist support, the first three steps - which set 
the scene for the following activities and design - are more suited to user-architects than to 
traditional engineers and even in later steps the user-architect has much to offer at key points. 
Instead of the present dis-jointed process of declaring operational requirements and then letting 
designers, with their knowledge elicitators, loose in competing teams, there is a sound prospect 
of integrated teams, led by professionally trained user-architects and supported by system 
designers, tools and techniques, developing sound concepts with high-integrity and 
applicability in much less time and cost. 
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21. SUMMARY 
7 
STEP No 
Fig 16: USER'S ROLE IN THE SOFT-TO-HARD CONTINUUM 
The paper started by elaborating the Catch-22 situation facing defence procurers today. Fixed 
price contracting is driving for more detailed specifications which attempt to define soft issues 
in hard terms. These complex specifications are taking longer and proving less satisfactory as 
systems become more complex and their development cycles extend, resulting in systems 
which are increasingly obsolescent at delivery. Techniques such as Knowledge Elicitation are 
vicarious and offer, at best, a limited interpretation of the user's knowledge and understanding 
of systems practice, doctrine and relationships in his domain. 
How much better if users could bridge the gap presently separating them from system builders. 
The paper postulates three ways of bridging the gap: user-architects; intelligent tools designed 
by engineers to support those user-architects; and systems which evolve in:.service to 
accommodate changing environments and threats unlike today's static systems. Only the flrst 
two approaches only were addressed in the paper. (For an introduction to the latter approach, 
see"BM / C3 Design by Cumulative Selection",a paper in the C3MIS Conference of the lEE, 
April 1989, by the same author, ISBN 0537-9989). 
To explore the potential both of user architects and of prototype user-architect tools, a Seven-
Step Continuum for developing design concepts from soft to hard was unveiled and the user-
architect's role was assessed step-by-step to find his / her limitations 
CREA TIVE DESIGN BY CUMULATIVE 
SELECTION 
By Professor Derek K Hitchins 
City University, Department of Systems 
Science 
INfRODUCflON 
Cumulative selection is the process which in 
Nature, is responsible for the development of 
the Earth's profusion of life-forms, animal 
and vegetable. It has been suggested that 
such complex physical features as eyes could 
not have occurred by random chance. The 
probability that an offspring could in one 
gigantic evolutionary bound, develop an eye 
when neither parent had any such feature 
must be vanishingly small. ｃｵｭｵｬ｡ｴｩｶｾ＠
selection is not random chance, however -
see Figure 1. It arises because offspring are 
marginally different from either parent. It is 
the imperfection in reproduction that is at the 
heart of the matter; some offspring are 
inevitably better adapted than others, albeit 
marginally, to their changing environment. 
Those better-adapted offspring are able to 
survive or perform more effectively than their 
siblings and peers, and so they breed 
preferentially in turn. From generation to 
generation, beneficial features are retained 
and enhanced while disadvantageous features 
are suppressed and discarded. There is, 
however, no magical template representing 
some future ideal design. As Richard 
Dawkins states in his book"The Blind 
Watchmaker" (Reference 1), Nature is blind 
to the future. 
This paper addresses the prospect of 
emulating in some very small, but none-the-
less useful, way the natural process of 
cumulative selection as a new means both of 
designing systems ab initio and of creating 
systems able to adapt sensibly to their 
:hanging environment - perhaps the simplest 
:Iefmition of intelligence. 
APPLICA TrONS 
Applications for cumulative selection abound 
in principle, ｾｵｴ＠ are le.ss evident in practice. 
The process. IS becormng more widely used 
for the deSIgn of systems which are not 
readily susceptible to conventional ｭ｡ｾｨ･ｭ｡ｴｩ｣｡ｬｬｹＭ｢｡ｳ･､＠ analysis, such as ｴｨｾ＠
deSIgn of low-drag vehicle silhouettes 
and turbine ｾｮｬ･ｴＮ＠ guide-vanes - see figure 2. 
The paI?er wIll dISCUSS the other applications 
shown In the figure, which have in common 
that they potentially generate a combinatorial 
explosion of design options which have to be 
Ａ･｣ｯｮ｣ｩｉ･ｾ＠ against a plethora of mutualIy-
mcompatIble measures of effectiveness. 
Cumulative selection can thus be seen as a 
simple way of handling complexity. 
CAD TOOLS AND THEIR 
APPLICA TIONS 
Four prototype system-level CAD tools have 
｢･ｾｮ＠ developed to explore design issues 
usmg cumulative selection in a variety of 
guises.The four are introduced at figure 3, 
and they wIll be explained and described in 
following paragraphs.First, however, it is 
useful !o review the way in which the 
cumulatIve selection principle might be put to 
ｾｯｲｫＮ＠ The process is shown in figure 4. 
FITst, genes are postulated which code for 
pervasive system features or characteristics. 
These genes are used to draw or describe a 
pare!1t "org.anism" using a stylised drawing 
routme WhICh must have its equivalent in 
Nature. At the same time a hostile 
. ' 
enVIronment is usually generated in which 
offspring are going to be compared and 
evaluated. Offspring are generated and the 
best peformer I surviver is selected to sire the 
next generation. The process continues until 
some end point is reached where successive 
generations show no improvement; 
alternatively an intermediate end-point may be 
reached at which time the environment may 
be altered. 
PARENT SYSMORPH 
The first CAD tool to be examined is called 
SYSMORPH. Figure 5 shows a parent 
SYSMORPH, which is drawn using three 
behavioural genes and two structural genes; 
* Behavioural Genes. The Aggression Gene 
codes, obviously, for aggression; this is 
evidenced in the weapons to the right of the 
SYSMORPH which symbolically pierce the 
shell, since they are visible in use to an 
enemy. The Stealth Gene codes for passive 
sensors and against active sensors in the 
simple prototype. The Co-operation Gene 
codes for communications 
* Structural Genes. The Shell Gene codes 
for armour and for self defence features - it 
also implicitly codes against agility, of 
course, as for a tortoise or a tank. The 
Delegation Gene codes for internal structure, 
processing, interconnections, etc. 
SYSMORPH OFFSPRING 
Figure 6 shows the generated offspring, A to 
J, with the parent SYSMORPH repeated in 
the centre. Careful examination of each 
offspring will reveal that it differs in one, and 
only one, respect from the parent. "A" has 
one less missile."G" has on more passive 
sensor and one less active sensor."I" has 
increased armour. And so on. 
The hostile environment is a series of 
measures as follows:-
* Performance 
* Survivability - Avoidance of Detection 
- Self Defence 
- Damage Tolerance 
* Interoperability 
* Availability 
* Security 
* Affordability 
In a full version of SYSMORPH, each of 
these environmental factors would be 
represented by its own model, which would 
provide a score or measure for each offspring 
in turn. In the simple prototype, these various 
models are represented by look-up tables, 
serving the same purpose but in a much 
simplified manner. In either event, the factor-
by-factor evaluation is followed by an 
aggregation process which results in a cost-
effectiveness ratio being formed for each 
offspring. It is this ratio which is used to 
differentiate between offspring; the highest 
ratio selects the parent of the next generation. 
Affordability provides the ratio denominator; 
it is comprised off platform or structure cost, 
carried weapons costs and systems 
engineering costs, in order to give a sensible 
differentiation in cost terms. Reference 2 
contains further details of the evaluation 
process. 
NEW MODELS FROM OLD? 
The approach employed in the SYSMORPH 
tool can now be seen in perspective. As 
Figure 7 shows, the conventional process 
uses (for a fighter aircraft as ana example) a 
"trusted" combat model to represent the 
hostile environment, into which is placed a 
model of a proposed new fighter.The results 
are analysed, often off-line, and adjustments 
made to the fighter model prior to the next 
run. SYSMORPH does much the same, but 
the process is formalised and a rich variety of 
different embryo fighters is examined at each 
stage, with new generations being propagated 
until successive generations show no further 
benefit or until the operator is satisfied. 
Unlike more deterministic techniques, 
SYSMORPH is extremely easy to follow and 
understand, and every generation can be 
checked for sense; sometimes the first steps 
taken by the program are more interesting 
than its end point. 
Two important features emerge; in both the 
conventional and the SYMORPH approach, 
the reference is a trusted model representing 
the hostile environment, and the amount of 
computing (number of generations) depends 
on how near the start-point is to a good 
solution. With the SYSMORPH approach it 
is necessary to start with a working system 
which can then be optimised; SYSMORPH 
will not create a working system. 
SYSTOLIC CUMULATIVE SELECTION 
Having seen the essential. ｳｩｾｩｬＮ｡ｲｩｴｹ＠ to 
conventional procedures, the sImplicIty of the 
approach suggests that one further step may 
be practicable. If it is possible to evolve a 
fighter in a hostile - but stable - ･ｮｾｩｲｯｮｭ･ｮｴＬ＠
is it possible to evolve the ･ｮｶｬｦｯｮｭ･ｮｾ＿＠
Figure 8 shows ｴｾ･＠ approach, called. ｓｾｳｴｏｾｉｃ＠
cumulative selectlon because of the slffillanty 
to a heart-beat, with first the fighter evolving, 
then the environment, then the fighter again, 
and so on. Evolving the environment 
amounts to evolving the hostile fighters and 
ground defences which it contains and ｾｳ＠
essentially the same process as baSIC 
SYSMORPH. There is, of course, a potential 
for runaway if the process is allowed to free-
run; systolic cumulative selection needs to be 
carefully controlled by competent users, but 
the concept is exciting, creative, and 
promising. 
ADVANCED AVIONIC ARCIDTECIURES 
There is much interest in the avionics world 
resulting from recent step advances in 
avionics architecture design which promise 
remarkable improvements in reliability, 
performance ｾｮ､＠ weight r.eduction.lt. is 
possible to denve such architectures usmg 
systolic cumulative selection first to evolve 
the fighter and then - remembering that the 
fighter's envelope constitutes the boundary to 
the avionics architecture - to evolve the 
architecture. Later topics in this paper will 
indicate the "genes" that code for architecture 
and more detail is given in Reference 3. On a 
grander scale, the full air defence system of 
which the fighter is an alement is itself a 
dynamic architecture and may be amenable to 
design by cumulative selection too. 
RAIL CARRIAGE DESIGN 
The SYSMORPH approach is potentially 
useful in a wide variety of situations; one 
such, in principal if not yet in practice, is the 
process of rail carriage design. This is a 
sensitive and important subject and one 
requiring great expertise; such expertise 
would come not from SYSMORPH, but 
from the models and experts who created the 
hostile environment. FigurelO presents some 
of the many factors, often mutually 
incompatible, which must be reconciled in the 
design of safe, efficient , effective and 
affordable rail carriages. The role of 
SYSMORPH would be to aggregate the 
wisdom of the experts in their different 
disciplines and to evolve the optimum design 
solution in a formal procedural framework. 
NElWORKS AND TREES 
The second CAD tool is called COMMORPH 
and, as the name implies, it concerns itself 
with the shape of communications (or any 
other) networks. Figures 11 and 12 show 
COMMORPH in action on a simple network 
problem. Figure 11 presents the problem; to 
connect the source I sinks using four network 
switches using the shortest overall route. The 
process is simple; four switches are scattered 
randomly among the source sinks and 
allowed to connect first to their nearest source 
I sink and then to each other. Each switch is 
then moved in small steps from its start point 
in eight different directions, with re-
association occuring each time. The step 
incurring the least total-network length is 
selected, the switch relocated, the procedure 
steps on to the next switch, and so on. The 
four switches slowly migrate across the 
screen to take up the positions of Figure 12 -
not perhaps what might have been predicted. 
Figures 13 and 14 show a similar example 
with the program required to connect by a 
tree rather than a network. Note how the 
switch nodes (N) space themselves equally 
along a straight line, a natural consequence of 
the technique. 
The process is made much more interesting 
when terrain is included and the links are 
provided by radio. Instead of seeking simply 
a shortest overall length, that concept can be 
combined with exceeding a threshold signal 
path loss. Switches will now migrate to avoid 
obscuring hills and low-lying ground in order 
to achieve line of sight. 
The number of switches can now be seen as 
an important variable; in fact, the figures 
shown for networks and trees are effectively 
parents, since the number of switch nodes 
and the connective redundancy are 
architectural "genes". Offspring would 
present architectures with variations in these 
and other pervasive characteristics. 
THE CLASSIC STEINER TREE 
PROBLEM 
The Steiner Tree problem is a classic example 
of the difficulty facing analysts trying to 
calculate solutions to seemingly simple 
problems. It concerns the non-redundant 
connection of a number of major cities in the 
US by telephone; the task is to calculate the 
single, shortest route which does not connect 
any two points by more than one route. 
Reference 4 gives an excellent description of 
the problem, its difficulty and ways of 
solving it. Figure 15 shows a simple, regular 
test case comprising eight points in a 
rectangle to be connected by the shortest 
route. Figure 16 shows the solution as 
worked out by TREEMORPH using 
cumulative selection. The TREEMORPH 
program is very similar to COMMORPH, 
differing principally in the way connections 
are made between the migrating nodes and 
the fixed points-to-be-connected. Steiner 
points are characterised by being at the centre 
of three lines mutually at 120 degrees. It is 
thus possible to be fairly certain that the 
solution at Figure 16 is correct. For more 
complex and irregular patterns of points, it is 
possible to derive sub-optimal trees 
containing Steiner points without necessarily 
realising that a globally minimal set has not 
been reached. Various techniques are 
available for "shaking" the tree out of such 
suboptimal configurations. 
CADRAT 
The fourth CAD tool explores the 
relationships between system entities; these 
might represent subsystems, organisational 
groups, artifacts or - most usefully -
functions of a system. The relations are 
described on an N-squared (N2) chart; an 
archetypal N2 chart is shown at Figure 17. 
Functions and their inter-relationships in the 
top left diagram are mapped into the N2 
chart, an incidence matrix, in such a way that 
outputs from any function appear in the row 
containing that function while inputs to any 
function appear in the column containing that 
function. A two-way relationship, 
represented conventionally by a two-headed 
arrow, thus appears in two separate squares 
of the chart; each square not on the diagonal 
thus represents a potential unidirectional 
interface between the functions on the 
diagonal. 
Interfaces form patterns. Where a function 
has interfaces to and from every other 
function it appears at the centre of a cross; it 
is a node. F3 is such a system node, and 
reference to the top left diagram corulffi1S that 
the loss of F3 would indeed cut the system in 
two; system nodes are candidates either for 
protection or replication to enhance system 
robustness. Hierarchies are represented as 
waterfalls. Functionally bound blocks appear 
as blocks of interfaces with all the squares 
filled in - there are two examples on the 
figure. Functionally bound blocks are 
interesting because they represent an inherent 
grouping to be fostered, either by 
strengthening or protecting the interfaces or -
more usually in organisational terms - by 
grouping the appropriate functions together 
as a single physical group. This procedure 
results in the bottom left figure, simpler than 
the starting diagram, but topologically the 
same. 
Unfortunately when tackling a real-world 
problem it is indeed rare to collect 
relationship data and to find it nicely grouped 
as is Figure 17. The example of Figure 18 is 
more likely to be met. In this example, there 
are 25 military units scattered randomly on 
the diagram, giving 0.5xFactorial 25 
(=7.76E24) permutations of the figure, 
suggesting strongly that crude approaches 
such as simply generating every option 
before selecting the best are not very 
practicable. Cumulative selection is one of 
several ways to cluster the interface patterns 
economically into meaningful groups by re-
arranging the units; the result is shown at 
Figure 19, from which it can be seen that the 
clusters do indeed form sensibly. 
Valuable although this result is, it is perhaps 
surprising to find that the decimal values in 
the interface squares have little effect. Much 
the same results are obtained by entering a 
"1" for interface present and a "0" for 
interface absent. What, then, is the value of 
the numbers? They can be used to represent a 
variety of characteristics, including strength 
of relationship, urgency or immediacy, 
interface medium or protocol, and so on. If 
the numbers are used to represent some 
hierarchical relationship, then that hierarchy 
can be examined layer by layer simply by 
selecting a band of numbers. This is 
tantamount to "slicing" horizontally through 
the pyramidal hierarchy and looking at the 
cross-section. In most organisations, while 
authority moves vertically up and down the 
hierarchy, work and co-operation are 
achieved across the structure. Being able to 
take horizontal slices at various levels makes 
it possible not only to see this horizontal 
structure in bold relief but, by clustering this 
cross-section, the underlying organisation 
can be revealed. 
BUILDING LAYOUT 
Networks and relationships can be used 
together in the design of intelligent and 
functional buildings. Figure 20 shows two 
stories of a typical airport arrivals and 
departures building. There is advantage to 
both user and builder in grouping the various 
elements of the building in three dimensions. 
For example baggage in and out, passenger 
entry and exit, and services ducts should be 
near each other vertically. At the same time 
there are advantages to be gained by reducing 
walking distances, minimising congestion, 
reducing queuing delays and maximising 
passenger I baggage throughput, not to 
mention aesthetics of layout and appearance. 
COMMORPH and TREEMORPH tackle the 
nuts and bolts of shortest distances; there is 
even a right-angle variant of the Steiner Tree 
problem, useful for locating lifts, for 
example, so as to minimise the average 
walking distance to the nearest elevator. 
CADRAT can be used also to group and 
arrange the internal elements into sets that 
OptimISe their functional relationships. 
Aesthetics are presently beyond the scope of 
cumulative selection as described here. 
CURRENT RESEARCH 
Figure 21 shows some areas currently being 
researched. SYSMORPH faces the problem 
of combining measures of survivability, 
performance, interoperability and so on. It is 
unreasonable simply to add such measures 
algebraically, even if correctly scaled, since 
they are effectively in different dimensions. 
This concern leads to cost-effectiveness 
analysis, a term with little substance since 
many people claim to use it as a measure but 
few seem able to justify their method. 
One reason, perhaps, is that effectiveness 
embraces the concept of utility - how useful 
something might be presents a subjective 
view of its effectiveness. In the economics of 
marketing, the concept of utility dimishing 
with increasing numbers is prevalent. With 
no shirts, a man may find the present of a 
shirt of great utility. With fifty shirts, a man 
may find the present of a shirt of little utility. 
These concepts, enshrined in the logarithmic 
Fechner's Law, are potentially useful in 
SYSMORPH programs to prevent 
evolutionary "runaway". 
Shake algorithms have been mentioned; they 
seek to jolt a program out of a sub-optimal 
set. In the event, shake algorithms are 
perhaps more of a challenge than the basic 
programs they seek to supervise, since 
different sub-optimal patterns respond to 
different shake strategies. A battery of shake 
techniques may become necessary to resolve 
large scale problems. 
Last in the list, and perhaps the most 
interesting of all, is the concept of rule 
evolution, being researched in the US for 
robotic machines. Programs controlling 
robots exhibit behaviour principally as a 
result of "IF THEN ELSE" statements which 
form break-points. If such statements are 
considered as genes, it is possible to conceive 
programs which evolve towards an optimum 
way of achieving their purpose. More 
importantly, such programs are able to follow 
a changing environment provided that the 
change is reasonably continuous and that the 
rate of change does not outstrip the 
program's inherent rate of evolution. This is 
perhaps the flrst glimrnerings of true artificial 
intelligence - the ability to adapt sensibly to a 
changing environment. 
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I CUMULATIVE SELECTION J 
CUMULATIVE SELECfrON IS NOT RANDOM CHANCE. 
PROGENY ARE IMPERFECT COPIES OF PARENTS. 
IMPERFECTIONS ADAPT OFFSPRING TO THEIR 
(CHANGING) ENVIRONMENT 
SUCCESSIVE GENERATIONS RETAIN EVEN PARTIAL 
BENEFITS ACCRUED BY THEIR FOREBEARS. 
CUMULATIVE SELECTION IS BLIND; IT HAS NO 
TEMPLATE OF mE FUTURE ............ BUT 
CUMULATIVE SELECfION HAS PRODUCED ALL OF THE 
EARTH'S BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY AND 
INTELLIGENCE 
Flgwe 1 I 
I APPLICATIONS I 
Low Cd car profJles 
Intelligent Robotic software 
System Architecture 
- clustering 
-linking 
Management Organisation 
Turbine IGV design 
Ab initio design of 
- aircraft, ships,etc 
- rail carriages 
Building layout 
Network design 
Building Layout,etc 
Commonfeaatures:- Potential combinatorial explosion 
Many mutually incompatible measures of effectiveness· 
Ideal for initial design of complex problems 
I CAD TOOLS & THEIR APPLICATIONS I 
"'SYSMORPH -morphological design of aircraft, ships, rail 
carriages,etc 
"'COMMORPH -physical layout of networks, communication 
systems, oil pipe-lines, routes of penetration and egress, corridors and 
pathways, circuit board layout, etc 
"'TREEMORPH - shortest non-redundant path connecting a set of 
points 
'" CAD-RAT -functional-to-physical mapping for organisational 
. and management structures, systems engineering of advanced avionics 
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Identify "genes" which code for system characteristics 
Use the genes with a stylised drawing routine to draw the system 
Establish this first drawing as the parent. 
Create. an environment hostile to the parent in which it has to 
- perfonn 
- survive 
- propagate 
Generate different offspring by varying the "genes" slightly 
Subject all offspring to the hostile environment 
Select the "best" offspring to parent the next generation 
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.' A GENERA:! .. THEORY OF COMMAND.AND CONTROL. " 
Professor D.K. Hitchins 
City University, UK. Written principally when the 
author was Business Development Director at EASAMS 
Limited, to whom he is indebted for their continuing 
I support in the preparation of this paper. 
COMMAND AND CONTROL THEORY - CONCEPT AND PURPOSE 
There is, at the time of writing, no established 
general theory of Command and Control (C'). Indeed, 
there are many C· practitioners who would argue that 
the variety of C' applications and the variability 
inherent in this essentially human activity deny 
even the possibility of a theory. 
That Command and Control System analysts and 
designers continue to operate in this supposed 
theoretical desert, however, does at least imply 
that underlying C' mechanisms do exist. A sound 
basis for appreciating these mechanisms would, if it 
could be formulated, provide a valuable tool for the 
optimisation of designs, and could act as a 
benchmark against which to judge the effectiveness 
of solutions. 
A theory of C·, like any other scientific or 
engineering theory, should consist of several parts: 
A corpus of knowledge 
A set of postulates, axioms and laws 
Hypotheses which predict the performance of C' 
solutions, and which can be checked by 
experiment 
A means of evolving the corpus of knowledge 
and the rules as the predictions are proved or 
disproved. 
This paper is concerned principally with pursuing 
the second bullet, but in a particular way, as 
follows. 
Command and Control has become confused in many 
minds with its supporting technology. Purveyors of 
contemporary C· systems in particular can sometimes 
overlook the essence of C' - Command and Control is 
"of and by people". The theory which this paper 
will address concentrates on organisation and 
relationship, and does not address technology. On 
the other hand, it will set targets which technology 
may find useful, challenging or even unattainable. 
Where relationships appear to be axiomatic, they 
will be presented as so-called C· Laws; where the 
relationships are less certain, the term "postulate" 
will be used. 
COMMAND AND CONTROL - WHAT IS IT? 
What is C·? This is at one and the same time an 
easy and a hard Question. Command is the executive 
function - the decision-taking role. Command is a 
deep responsIbility, unlike most civilian 
counterparts, for the men under command. Command Is 
also the chess player. In war, however, chess is 
played with most of the opponent's board covered and 
the chess pieces do not always obey the rules. 
Control is the management of the Commander's 
decisions by instructing inaction, or instructing 
action elements to engage, disengage or move. 
". 
APPROACH TO DEVELOPING A C· THEORY 
Norbert Wiener in his seminal book Cybernetics (1) 
implied that all systems, living and mechanIcal, are 
both information and feedback systems. Taking a 
leaf out of Wiener's book, the approach adopted in 
developing a C· theory was to develop and explore a 
variety of different models of C·, using each to 
study different aspects of the subject. Types of 
models employed and their purpose include: 
Model Type 
• System Dynamics 
• Queuing Theory 
• Architectural/Structural 
Relationship 
• Control Theory 
• Timelines 
• Information 
C· Aspect 
• 
• 
• 
System Boundaries and Overviews 
Timeliness of Decision Taking 
Span of Control/UnderstandIng 
Infrastructure ComplexIty 
• Stability 
Timeliness Equations 
Amounts, Granularity and Rates 
of Information Transfer 
While Wiener is undoubtedly correct in hiS View, 
neither the Information nor the Control Theory 
models seems to be productive In generating C· 
theory; their value appears to lie more in the 
practical aspects of analysing partIcular systems. 
Other models are more helpful, however, and enable 
the following approach to be taken: 
• Since technology has potentIal variety almost 
without limit, attempting a theory to address 
technologIcal features is unlikely to be 
successful 
Instead, follow the line taken by Shannon, 
Nyquist and many others, and seek the ideal or 
perfect theoretical solution, devoid of 
technological context 
• Develop theorems, postulates and hypotheses, 
based on this ideal approach, which can be 
explored by experiment. 
BOUNDING THE CLASSIC C' SYSTEM 
The technique referred to as System Dynamics by 
N. Roberts (2) has as many opponents as adVocates. 
It undoubtedly has one distinct merit. it Is one of 
the few ways of bounding a system while at the same 
time providing an uncluttered overview. 
Figure 1 is an Influence Diagram of C' which 
presents Command and Control in action. The diagram 
is limited in its description of the processes 
inside the boundary. There are however five vital 
elements in the total system: 
a. Threats and Opportunities 
i b. Political Influence 
c. C· Decision - Military Control 
d. Action Elements 
Weapon Systems 
War Consumables (Fuel, Weapons, etc.) 
• Reserves and Reinforcements. 
e. The Enemy, with his equivalent a. to d. 
Figure 1 shows that superior control is actually 
exercised by politicians; they set the priorities 
and rules of engagement, and they influence the 
military doctrine which motivates the Commander's 
decisions. 
Figure 1 conceals the delays inherent in the 
decision and action processes. Such concealment is 
not fundamental in System Dynamics. Figures 2 and 3 
show the decision and action processes in more 
detail, with sequential and cyclic delays displayed. 
The interwoven dynamics now start to dominate, and 
new dimensions can be seen: repair cycles, 
replenishments, reinforcements and reserves clearly 
have a major influence on the Commander's options. 
These influence diagrams indicate an approach to 
more quantitative models. 
C· TIMELINESS 
A basic objective of C· is to meet the challenge in 
a timely fashion. This objective forms the 
substance of the first C· equation: 
Opportuni ty 
Volatility 
Perception + Communication + 
Decision + Planning + Action + 
Response + Translation + Minimum 
Engagement Window ••• (1) 
where: 
Opportunity volatility is the tendency for a 
situation of interest to evaporate, measured 
in units of time 
• Perception is the delay in noticing the 
situation (often Intelligence Analysis) 
• 
Communication is the delay in reporting 
Decision is the delay in electing for a 
particular course of action 
Planning is the delay in detailing the action 
Action Response is the delay in getting action 
elements to respond 
Translation is the delay in moving to the 
point of action 
Minimum Engagement Window is the time needed 
to apply the action effectively. 
The equation is illustrated in Fig. ｾＮ＠
Examples of volatile opportunities include: 
Ballistic Missile attack - Timing and duration 
of intercept window 
Train in a tunnel - Timing and duration 
of sabotage window 
• Ship changing head - Anticipation of 
optimum torpedo 
release point. 
Volatility is two measures in one - the period until 
the opportunity window and the duration of that 
window. The first reduces with time, the second is 
notionally constant. The elements on the right of 
the equation can be estimated from situation, 
derived from queuing theory and organisational 
knowledge or - in the case of translation -
calculated directly. 
Translation 
Delay 
Separation ( 2) Relative Closure Rate 
This apparently trivial equation takes on new 
dimensions when intercepting a bomber before it 
releases its stand-off weapons, sending a naval 
surface action group through a stretch of the South 
Atlantic or traversing a minefield to reach a vital 
sabotage tar get. 
QUEUING AND THE C' LAWS OF RATE EQUALITY 
Queuing Theory is a well-established technique used 
by, amongst others, E. Ruiz-Pata (3) and J. Martin 
(4), which stands apart from any C· Theory in its 
own right. However, Queuing Theory may lend insight 
as follows. Figure 5 shows a typical C·/Action 
Element organisation, with more-or-less random 
arrivals, at service stations, of deCisions to be 
taken, plans to be implemented, action elements to 
be replenished, etc. Simple Queuing Theory is used 
for steady state analysis; one of the 
characteristics of steady state for a serial chain 
of service stations is that the mean arrival rate 
must be identical at each service station. In the 
figure, this unique arrival rate is called 'Ax'. 
The figure shows 'Ax' plans from "Initiate Action" 
pairing (meshing) with 'Ax' Action Elements from 
"Replenish/Rearm". 'AX' reports of the action 
result in 'Ax' option adjustments per period - and 
so on. Both the figure and the concept are 
reminiscent of a heart which beats at a rate of 
'Ax', sending actions (arterial blood) pUlsing 
around one loop and plans (venous blood) pulsing 
around the other, In strict synchronisation. Mean 
planning and action rates must similarly be 
identical in the steady state. The figure, which 
omits overt enemy effects, inspires the following 
Law of Order/Action Rate Equality. 
C' Law of Order/Action Rate Equal1ty 1 
The sustained rate ot 
generating C' Act10n Orders 
The sustained 
rate of 
regenerating 
Action Elements 
A l1ttle thought suggests that the law is axiomatic, 
but it does not appear widely as a factor in 
designing C· systems. 
Figure 5 contains other useful concepts. It is, for 
example, straightforward in a practical case to 
calculate the number/proportion of action elements 
permanently "lost" in the recover - repair -
replenish cycle, in the sense that they are never 
available for action. 
Care must be taken in the application of the above 
Law, in terms of the granularity of "action 
element". The simplest definition is that one 
Action Element is the smallest unit for which the 
relevant C' HQ provides action plans. That unit 
might be, a pair of fighters (if they work in pairs), 
a Surface Actlon Group'comprising ｾ･ｶ･ｲ｡ｬ＠ ships or, a 
complete Corps i according to level of viewpoint and 
commtJ.nd. 
The Queuing Model suggests one other important Law, 
the Law of Action/Reporting Rate Equality. 
C' Law ot Action/Reporting Rate Equality 
The sustained rate ot 
regenerating Action Elements· 
The _ean C' 
Reporting Rate 
This Law may also seem self evident, but is rarely 
if ever observed in design. Instead, reports to 
higher authority are sent either at set and frequent 
intervals to ensure "fresh" information (even though 
higher authority may not be able to use the 
information at the time received), or are responses 
to unpredicted events. Note that reporting in the 
context of this Law has to provide Requisite Variety 
(see below); in addition to miSSion results, 
recovery rates, damage, repair prediction, 
replenishment levels of POL and War Consumables all 
vary as action elements go through their cycle, and 
are all candidates for reporting at 'Ax' (mean) 
reports/period. 
The Law of Action/Reporting Rate Equality is 
particularly valuable because it provides a basis 
for calculating the theoretical communications 
capacity which must exist between elements in a 
system. If we can define the VOlatile information 
which must be transferred, then this Law gives the 
mean rate of transfer of that information. 
DECISIONS AND REQUISITE VARIETY 
Command and Control is based upon structured 
decision formulation. Information is gathered, 
analysed and used to make decisions which result in 
actions. This deCision process has been 
characterised as the SHOR paradigm in J.G. Wohl's 
paper Force Management Decision Requirements (5) -
Stimulus - Hypothesis - Option - Response. 
DeCision-taking can be expanded into a cyclic 
process as shown in Fig. 6, where the deCision cycle 
is shown at the top. The lower part of the figure 
shows the tabulated decision cycle elements at the 
left hand column and the conventional organisational 
C· partitions at the top row. The cells in the 
table indicate some of the contributions these 
partitions make to various elements in the decision 
cycle. Even at this superficial level it becomes 
apparent that structured deCision-taking must 
account for a wide variety of factors and 
influences. There is, in Control Theory, the Law of 
Requisite Variety; the Law, from W.R. Ashby in 
Introduction to Cybernetics (London; Chapman Hall, 
1956), states: 
"Given a system with a regulatory process R, 
intended to maintain goal state 0, but 
affected by disturbance D: The goal state G 
can only be maintained if the regulator R has 
sufficient variety and channel capacity to 
counter the variety in D." 
For C', this means that the Commander must be able 
to match and react to anything that could affect 
efficient operations. The value of this law to an 
appreciation of C· cannot be overstated. 
Requisite Variety for Control must include: 
• Operations 
• Intelligence (by definition, information about 
the enemy or opposition) 
Logistics, especially war-consumable stocks, 
reserves and reinforcements 
Transportation, particularly for operations 
and logistics support 
Engineering, both in support of operations and 
to maintain C· facilities and communications. 
THE COMMANDER'S CONTROL MECHANISM 
There is a natural inclination to consult the 
general field of control theory for an answer to the 
control part of C·. The promise of a ready-made C· 
theory exceeds the practice, however, for a variety 
of reasons: 
The transfer functions within C· are not time-
invariant; they vary because they represent 
human behaviour and also due to enemy attack. 
As a result the system is essentially non-
linear. 
Methods of solving such complex systems as in 
Shinners' Modern Control System Theory and 
Application (6) (e.g. State Variable 
Analysis), while ideal for computers, obscure 
the observable physical entities in a C· 
system. As Fig. 7 shows, even a simple 
representation of C· becomes an eighth-order 
(or higher) differential equation and the 
routine reduction of such equations to sets of 
first order equations - while easing solution 
- detracts from the ability to formulate a C· 
theory. 
The "Russian Dolls" concept is difficult to 
introduce. In Fig. 7, for example, operations 
control would tend to contain the C· element 
of Fig. 7 complete, replicated at a smaller 
scale. Further replications and scale changes 
should appear in even greater detail and, 
conversely, Fig. 7 is only part of a greater 
whole. 
Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learnt. 
Figure 7 raises the spectre of stability of the 
control system. Simplistically, the system is 
potentially unstable when: 
G. H. + G. G. H. + G. A. G. (H. H. + H.) 
+ GI G. G. G. HI - -1 
(In practice, non-linear systems display a much more 
complex stability pattern.) (6). Simplistically, 
again, we can assess the general form of the various 
transfer functions and - for small inputs at least -
a piece-wise linear approximation might be found to 
particular solutions. These are a standard 
analytical processes Which will not be pursued 
further here. 
C· 'STRUCTURE, BALANCE AND FLOW 
Relationships, Links and Interfaces 
Using the deCision cycle and contribution tables of 
Fig. 6 leads to the idea of relationships between 
the partitions in a C· unit. Figure 8 shows an N· 
relationship diagram for a notional C· unit 
somewhere in the middle of a C· hierarchy, i.e. the 
unit has superiors and subordinates. These other 
features are alluded to by the dotted arrows outside 
the box; lines out of the right and In at the bottom 
have passed through subordinate formations, while 
lines out at the left and in at the top have passed 
through superior formations. 
The Na Chart is an invaluable device for 
representing relationships or interfaces. These 
interfaces represent infrastructure, and the 
analysis of N· charts will prove below to be a rich 
hunting ground for C· theory of infrastructure. 
SPAN - THE STRUCTURAL BUILDING BLOCK 
Span ｯｦ｣ｯｮｴｲｾｽｾｵｮ､･ｲｳｴ｡ｮ､ｩｮｧ＠ denotes the number of 
directly reporting subordinates; it will be 
symbolised as's'. s is usually indicative of 
individual human relationships, but can also be used 
to indicate, for instance, the number of subordinate 
formations reporting to, and controlled by, a C· HQ. 
For humans, research has ｳｨｾｷｮ＠ that s is sharply 
I bounded. Where one person has to control a number 
ot others, experiments show that the subordInates 
split Into groups if their number is seven or 
greater. There also seems to be some deep-rooted 
physiological difficulty in accommodating seven or 
more objects simultaneously. 
The maximum value of s can be affected by several 
factors. smax will be less than seven where the 
subordinates cover such a wide range of actiVities, 
skills and knowledge that the Commander would be 
stretched beyond his ability to understand. 
Alternatively, if some or all of the SUbordinates 
were very similar in their relationship, then the 
Commander - given sufficient time - might serVice 
each subordinate adequately. A Commander might, for 
instance, control a dozen identical missile 
batteries. He might be unable, on the other hand, 
to effectively control three subordinates where one 
was concerned with Intelligence one with Logistics 
and one with Engineering, due to their diversity. 
THE PYRAMID 
Using only the concept of span, it is possible to 
construct a pyramidal organisation as follows: 
1 
It\ 
• 
The figure represents a node, with's' 8ubordinates 
(span of control/understanding. s), reporting 
upwards to one superior. Many C· organIsatIons also 
include lateral ties, thus: 
_L 
It\ 
• 
The purpose of these cross-ties, mainly to speed C· 
reaction time, will be examined more closely later. 
Each Commander also has his Commander. For s • 2, 
,. oould dr.,,*-
At each node, the span 5 is two and there is one 
superior. This structure represents a military 
organisation archetype, which proves to be rich in 
providing InSight into C· theory. DrawIng links and 
nodes can become tedious, however, especially when 5 
is large. The organisation arChetype can be 
represented thus: 
• 
• 
• 
5 
s' 
s· 
A Commander has's' subordinates, each of whom has 
's' in turn giving ｩｾＬ｡ｮ､＠ so on. At the bottom of 
the pyramid there are sL subordInates, where L is 
the number of levels. For an organisation of 
individuals, we have: 
L 
Total Personnel· I sn 
n-O 
••. 0) 
L corresponds simply to the number of effective 
ranks in a military organisation. The equation is 
graphed at Fig. 9, from where it is possible t2 
compare actual force numbers, rank levels and s, the 
mean span of control/understanding. 
The pyramid organisation is in many ways an ideal 
for military organisations. Most organisations can 
be represented as pyramids, but the need to identify 
clear lines of command and to be able to transfer 
and reform groups swiftly into new organisations 
leads to standardised pyramidal structures of a more 
formal kind for military purposes. 
THE C' LAW OF EQUIPARTITION 
When the span's' would otherwise exceed an 
acceptable value, a Commander has to divide his 
subordinates into groups, each with their own 
leaders who report to the Commander. Is there any 
particular rule about the way in which the division 
process should be undertaken? There is a baSis for 
dIVision into equal numbers so that twelve 
subordinates would be divided into 4 + 4 + 4 rather 
than 2 + 4 + 6. The reason 1s to minimise 
unnecessary infrastructure. 
FIgure 8 showed an N2 chart with N(N-1) interfaces; 
these interfaces represent potential relationships 
or infrastructure. For N-12, the number of 
interfaces: 
I • N(N-1) 
• 12 x 11 
• 132 
Divide the leading diagonal elements of an N2 chart 
into two groups, each self contained, with all its 
internal interfaces, but with only two connections 
between the groups to represent commander-to-
commander interfacing. Let one of the groups have n 
elements: then the other has N-n. 
The total number of interfaces is now given by. 
1 - (N-n)(N-n-1) + n(n-1) + 2 
Simplifying: 
I • N2 - 2Nn - N + 2n2 + 2 
ｾｾ＠ • - 2N + 4n • 0 for a minimum value of I 
N 
n • 2" 
This result indicates that I is a minimum, when the 
Subordinate elements are split into two equal 
groups: 
For N • 12, I - 132 when the span is also 12, 
as above 
For N • 12, I - 6(5) + 6(5) + 2 - 62 when the 
group of elements 15 split into two equal 
groups; this 1s less than half of the 
potential interface complexity, and is indeed 
the minimum value. 
If ｾｨｾ＠ partitioning is asymmetric! we have Cor 
example:, 
N - 12, I - 4(3) + 8(7) + 2 - 70. 
It is a simple extension to show that the 
partitioning rule is true for three or more 
groupings too. Using N - 12 again, and splitting 
into three groups, gives: 
Equal Groups: I - 4(3) + 4(3) + 4(3) + 6 - 42 
Unequal Groups: I - 3(2) + 4(3) + 5(4) + 6 - 44 
I - 2(1) + 4(3) + 6(5) + 6 - 48 
Clearly, greater asymmetry leads to greater 
infrastructure. At this point we may formulate a 
new C' l.aw. 
C' Law of Equipartition 
.Partitioning subordInates into equal groups 
minimises infrastructure.-
C' INFRASTRUCTURE 
Figure 10 shows an N2 representation of a three-
level pyramid organisation with one superior 
Commander and three subordinates, each with their 
three subordinates. Because each Commander occupies 
one square in each block of squares, we can dispense 
with 'N' and use the more direct's' where N • s + 1 
• Each block has a side of length (s+l) 
• The interfaces, I, per block - s(s+1) 
Each Commander has 2s direct interfaces with 
his immediate subordinates 
Each Commander has 2(s-1) direct interfaces 
with his immediate peers. 
Since every Commander within a hierarchy finds 
himself with subordinates and superiors, we can add 
up the "local" interfaces with which he interacts 
directly. 
Subordinates - 2s 
Peers 
Superior 
- 2(s-1) 
- 2 
Co.-ander's Interfaces· _s ... (II) 
So, for example, when s - 3, a Commander has 12 
interfaces, or 6 direct two-way Channels. 
This identification of interfaces can be extended to 
consider indirect interfaces too, such as those 
between a Commander's immediate subordinates. 
Indirect interfaces are important because they 
provide information through intermediate nodes, and 
allow organisation flexibility. In a well deSigned 
organisation, all the indirect interfaces will be 
active to some degree; this is characteristic of 
tight functional binding. The sumation of direct 
and indirect links is defined here as 
infrastructure. 
Infrastructure can be viewed in (at least ) two 
lights, as Fig. 11 shows. On the left is a locally 
connected pyramid, and as the section though A-AI 
shows there is complete connectivity between 
subordinates of their immediate Commander. From 
Fig. 10 it can be seen that this degree of local 
connectivity, represented by the central block with 
Force 2 and Subs 2a-c, gives S(S+l) interfaces. At 
any level, there will be several such clUsters. The 
locally-connected ｩｮｦｲ｡ｾｴｲｵ｣ｴｵｲ･＠ amounts to: 
N 
ILC· r sn (s+1) 
n-l 
... (SA) 
where N is the number of subordinate command levels 
ILC is the locally connected infrasture. 
The right hand of Fig. 11 shows the same pyramid 
organisation, but totally connected at each level as 
shown by the section through B-8 1 • Clearly there 
are many more connections, as might be eXpected in 
an "all-informed" communications network. In this 
case the infrastructure amounts to: 
N 
ITC - r sn{sn+l) 
n-1 
... (5B) 
where ITC is the totally connected infrastructure. 
The two equations, SA and 5B, tabulate as follows: 
Subordinate II.C ITe 
Command Span -Levels Span 
3 5 7 3 5 
I 12 30 56 , 2 30 
7 
56 
2 q8 180 qq8 102 680 2 506 
3 156 930 3 192 858 16 '30 '20 q98 
-
qeO q 680 22 qOO 7 500 q07 680 5 887 700 
A high correlation (1.00) exists between these sets 
of figures for command levels and infrastructure, 
using the relationship I • B exp (M*L), where I is 
the infrastructure, 8 and M are constants. From the 
table, we may therefore formulate the C' Law of 
Infrastructure Expansion. 
C' l.aw of Infrastructure Expansion I 
At any point 1n a command hierarchy, infrastructure 
coaplexity increases exponent1ally with the number 
of subordinate command levels controlled from that 
po1nt. 
INFORMATION STRUCTURE 
The decision cycle may be stylised as a circle. See 
Fig. 12, in which the decision cycle can be thought 
of as being rotated by incoming information. The 
centre figure shows the deCision cycle as part of a 
layered organisation, and diagram C reintroduces the 
pyramid organisation, with s - 2. The structure 
presents many overlapping, interlocking control 
loops, but some steady-state characteristics can be 
perceived. 
For an information-decision-action organisation to 
be effective, there must be a vertical (upwards) 
flow of information. The Commander at the top of 
the pyramid cannot be interested in low level 
detail, which would overload him with irrelevancy. 
It follows that low level data must be discarded, 
and aggregated as it passes up the chaIn of command. 
The degree of compression must enable intermediate 
commanders to cope with the data from their 
subordinates, and to pass up the chain that which 
the next level needs. Too much compression will 
isolate the senior Commanders from essential data: 
two little will overload them. This appreciation 
leads to the following axiom: 
.' , .. 
I 
c· Law of Vertical Data Compression 1 
The degree of vertical 
data compression in a 
C· hierarchy 
The Span or 
Control/Understanding 
This law forms the basis for some interesting 
concepts, which follow below. 
MEAN PYRAMID DECISION DELAY 
The Law of Vertical Data Compression can be seen at 
work in establishing the mean decision delay through 
a pyramid organisation. 
Mean levels Traversed/ 
Mean Delay/Decision - Decision x Mean DelaylLevel 
A simple model for this decision process is shown 
below; '0' external decIsions enter at the bottom of 
the pyramid. 
Pyrallid Hodel People 
DISI. 
D/SI.-' 
Dec 181ons/Period 
1 
• 
.' D/SI.-· Co-and 
• 
D' 
DIS 
D 
At each level, Commanders refer l/s of their 
decisions upwards. 
!.avel. 
Consider an intermediate level; sn people make __ 0 __ 
decisions/period. sL-n 
D 1 D Decisions/person/period - -L- • - • -L 
s n sn s 
decisions/period, i.e. invariant with the level 
considered. 
Mean Levels/Decision 
Mean Levels Total Steps Taken 
Traversed/ • Total Decisions Referred 
Decision 
• 
o decisions take no steps 
D/S decisions take one step up and down again 
D/S· decisions take two steps up and down 
again 
L It 
Total steps • 2 
• r 
0 • .1!.. • 2D! ...!!.. 
sn o sn 0 
Total Decisions Referred - D ! 
o 
Means Levels traversed/decision 
1 
sn 
L 
2 r...!!.. 
o sn 
- -L--
1
---
L-
o sn 
Mean Delay/Level 
From Queuing theory, References C and D, assuming 
exponential and independent inter-arrival and 
service times 
.... -.. 
w· --II-A 
Where: w is the queuing and servicing delay, the 
waiting tIme 
II is the mean service rate 
A is the mean arrival rate 
II is a physiological constant for most people -
their maximum sustainable decision rate. 
D A is also a constant; A - -;r;- : D is an externally 
driven need for decision and, is assumed constant 
regardless of C· hierarchy. 
sL - AE, the number of action elements, also assumed 
constant regardless of C· hierarchy. 
.·.w is invariant with changes in span of control. 
This result is particularly surprising and is worth 
confirming, as follows: 
Span. 2 Span· -
People Decision Rate People Dec1slon Rate 
1 
-
1 
-
2 8 
[ , 16 , 16 I 
8 32 
16 6. 16 6_ 
o • Ｖｾ＠ • D • 6Q • 
The left hand of the panel shows s • 2, the right 
hand s - 4. 
For the left, command levels, L • 5, for the right 
L • 3; D and AE (Decision Rate and Action Elements) 
are the same, 64 and 16 respectively. The boxed 
numbers show the picture. In each case at 
intermediate level, 16 deCiSions/period coincide 
with 4 persons giving 4 deCisions/person/period. 
Hence the general conclusion that w is invariant 
with span is exemplified, and forms the basis for 
the C· Law of Decision Rate Invariance. 
c· Law of DeCision Rate Invariance I 
c· Decision Rate is invariant with changes in mean 
Span or Control/ Understanding, all factors 
external to the C· structure remaining constant. 
The full expression for Mean Delay/Decision can now 
be formed. 
L 
2 r ...!!.. 
Mean Delay/Decision 
o sn 
- --L--- • ----:0:-- ••• (6) 
r.L II-TE 
o sn 
This expression is somewhat intractable, but 
responds to numerical analysis as follOWS: 
For II • 7 
.I.E • 100 .I.E • 100 000 
Span D/AE • 3.5 D/AE • 5 D/AE • 3.5 D/AE • 5 
L 
" 
T I. N T I. N T I. N T 
2 7 1.89 .5Q 7 1.89 .95 17 2 .51 17 2 1 
3 • .96 .27 Q .96 • _8 10 1 .26 10 1 .5 
-
3 .6. .18 3 .6_ .32 8 .67 .19 8 .67 .33 
5 3 ＮｾＵ＠ .13 3 ,45 .23 ,7 .5 .,. 7 .5 .25 
6 3 .37 .11 3 .37 .19 6 • q ;,1 . 6 •• .2 
Where: L is the number of Command Levels 
N is the mean number of nodes traversed per 
decision 
T is the mean time per decision (arbitrary 
units) 
AE is the number of action elements 
D is the externally driven rate of decisions 
required 
ｾ＠ is the sustainable decision rate per node. 
As the table shows: 
Increasing the span reduces the decision delay 
Increasing the decision rate increases the 
delay time (D/AE • ｾ＠ results in infinite 
delay) 
The mean number of nodes traversed varies 
inversely with span 
The mean number of nodes traversed is 
virtually independent of the number of action 
elements (and hence of C· organisation size). 
C· Postulate of Decision Scale Invariance I 
For a gIven mean span of control, the mean number 
of nodes traversed by a decisIon Is 
independent of the C· organisatIon size. 
CO-OPERATION 
Within a hierarchy, tasks are achieved largely as a 
direct result of co-operation between peers, that is 
personnel at the same level within the hIerarchy. 
So, while decisions may be said to invoke vertical 
information flow, co-operation - it might seem, at 
least - moves laterally. 
WIthin the pyramidal organisation, peers are 
separated by organisational groupings. Peers who 
report to the same superior may be said to be 
separated by a factor of one. Peers whose superiors 
themselves report to the same superior in turn may 
be said to be separated by a factor of two. And so 
on. Separation, then, is simply the number of 
senior levels of command which must be traversed 
before one superior, common to both peers, is found. 
For co-operation between peers to be effective, 
authorisation will become necessary as plans and 
propositions are developed and, generally, that 
superior who is common to both peers wIll be that 
authorIty. Clearly, the greater the separation 
between any two peers, the greater will be the 
number of steps in the authorisation chain before 
the sought after author1ty can be forthcoming. 
At this point we may invoke either contingent 
probabilities or, more simply, Occam's Razor. 
William of Occam (1300-1349) expounded the principle 
that assumptions introduced to explain something 
must not be unnecessarily mult1plied. The longer a 
decision/authority chain, the greater the number of 
steps in reaching agreement and the greater must be 
the number of multiplied assumptions of agreement. 
From this point, we may formulate the following law: 
C· Law of Lateral Co-operation I 
In any C· Hierarchy, the effectiveness of co-
operation between peers is Inverse to theIr lateral 
separatIon withIn the hierarchy. 
This law, all too evident, lr( action in peacetime, 
. )" does not. refer, to willIngness' on the part of peers. 
Nor should it be taken as suggesting that across-
boundary co-operation is not viable. The so-called 
law does, however, bring into focus the 
effectiveness of the1r co-operation, resulting from 
the implicit infrastructure that their would-be co-
operation involves. The law also goes some way to 
explaining why co-operation seems more efrective 
between senior people - their lateral separation 
cannot be as great as that of their juniors, since 
the pyramid is narrower for more senior ranks. 
The Law of Lateral Separation is also the one we 
apply, perhaps instinctively, when we design new 
organisations and try to group together under one 
'umbrella' all of the key components for achieving 
the tasks we can anticipate. It is the tasks we 
cannot antiCipate which subsequently require co-
operation, and it is the Law of Lateral Separation 
which shows, perhaps more than any other, the 
weakness or rigid hierarchical organisatlon. 
INFORMATION MODELS 
At this point in the analysis, sufficient groundwork 
has been establiShed for an Information Model. From 
Queuing Models we have the Law of Action and 
Reporting Rates Equality to provide Information Rate 
data. The Law of Vertical Data CompreSSion provides 
a vertical flow viewpoint. The C' Law of Lateral 
Co-operation provides a lateral flow viewpoint. The 
C' Law of Infrastructure gives a view of the 
complexity of communications and relationships; and 
so on. 
Consider a General viewing an impending battle from 
a hilltop overlOOking his own and the opposing 
forces. He has a variety of information needs, as 
follows: 
Location of his own troops 
ｾｯ｣｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ of opposing troops 
ｾｯ｣｡ｬ＠ terrain ('going') which mlght affect 
mobility, screening etc. 
Balance between his and opposing forces 
• Relationships between his own force elements -
interoperability, complementary capabilities, 
etc. 
Etc. 
The list is long, but it is possible to categorise 
each item on the list, as 
Stable, e.g. Interoperability 
Dynamic, e.g. Movement of enemy forces 
• Deducible, e.g. Balance of forces 
Doctrinal, e.g. Keep cavalry in reserve as 
Force Multiplier. 
Such categorisation is useful, because it provides a 
basis for calculating amounts of stored information 
and communication system capacities; only the 
dynamic or volatile data needs to be communicated. 
The General would like to know as much about the 
opposing forces as he should known about his own. 
Ideally his storage and communication needs should 
be doubled to accommodate enemy intelligence, except 
for some deducible ractors which - again ideally -
should be the same, given full information. 
The General is interested, before and during combat, 
in both performance and in the continuing 
availability of that performance. We can therefore 
start to categorise information as shown in Fig. 13, 
which is evidently not comprehensive, ,and in 
particular we can identify volatife or"dynamic data 
as already seen in Fig. 12. 
The dynamic model brings to mind information theory 
and entropy. From information theory as used by 
Schwartz (7) we have: 
Information· ! log. n bits in T seconds 
t 
I Where information is a measure of conveyed content: 
T is the period of conveyance of a message 
T is the time interval «T) for 
passing/measuring parameters within the 
message 
n is the number of variable states, all 
assumed to be equally probable Which can be 
distinguished in each period t. 
We can therefore conceive an ideal C· system in 
which message probabilities are indeed all equal. 
We already have an expression for t, from queuing: 
t is the inverse of the Action Element Regeneration 
Rate, ｾｸＬ＠ which in turn equals both the mean Action-
order Rate and the Mean Reporting Rate. Then: 
H - -T • Ax • log. n (7) 
Where H is the maximum information content per 
message (bits) 
n is the number of distinguishable levels 
within unit time (granularity/quantisation) 
ｾｸ＠ is the mean Action-order Rate 
and the mean Action Element Regeneration 
Rate 
and the mean Reporting Rate. 
similarly C ｾ＠ -Ax • log. n ••• (6) 
Where C is the minimum required channel capacity in 
bits/unit time/message. 
Note: Reference to Fig. 5 will show that the use of 
Ax is inappropriate for activities not tied to 
the Action Element Regeneration Cycle, such as 
Intelligence Collection. 
Using these formulae, there is no obvious shortcut 
to identifying quantities of stored information and 
rates of conveyed information; the process is one of 
adding Hand C respectively for appropriate 
categories of information. The crucial parameter is 
granularity. 
Command Granularity 
As we have seen from the section on Infrastructure, 
there is a potential for information explosion if a 
Commander controls several subordinate levels 
directly. So, should a Group Captain control 
directly to wing level, to squadron level, to flight 
level or to section level? Should a Field Marshall 
concern himself directly with Armies, Corps, 
Brigades or Battalions? And so on. 
Figure lq addresses the problem. Each C· HQ falls 
into a three-layer structure, which usually relates 
to rank in some measure. The layers are: 
executive, management and specialist staff. As the 
figure shows, there will be an overlap with 
subordinate C· HQs and the optimum granularity for a 
Commander therefore seems to be up to and including 
two command levels below his own. Less will not 
necessarily be effective; more will risk information 
and communications overload. These considerations 
lead to the following: 
C· Postulate of Command Granularity 
Ideally a Commander operates 
two command levels below his own 
COROLLARY: Operating directly at more than 
two command levels below his own 
will risk a Commander· (a) 
operating beyond his span of 
understanding (b) neglecting 
parts of his command. 
Granularity and Thresholds 
As granularity coarsens, the need to convey 
information may reduce dramatlcally because any 
changes occurring since the previous report have not 
been sufficient to exceed the granularity threshold. 
This phenomenon can affect communication capacity in 
two complementary ways; first, the reporting rate 
changes, and second, the information content 
changes. Consider a requirement to report 
significant changes in visibility, with 10 000 
metres or further being considered "clear". Suppose 
the Mean Reporting Rate, ｾｸＬ＠ Is once per hour. Then 
applying Equation 8 gives: 
C ｾ＠ 10g2 10 000 • 13.3 bits/hour 
However, if the range of visibility is divided into 
1000 m bands, and visi bli ty is observed ,to change at 
200 m/hour, then the rate of reporting can be less 
than Ax; it need only be 1 report per 5 hours. The 
number of levels to be reported is no longer 10 000; 
it is only 11. Thus we can calculate: 
C ｾ＠ i log. 11 • 0.69 bits/hour assuming all levels to be equally 
probable 
This is a capacity ratio of nearly 20:1 deSigners 
evidently have quite extraordinary scope to 
influence capacity by controlling granularity and 
this approach can be applied to most items to be 
communicated - Fig. 10, second panel. 
Generally: 
where: 
c ｾ＠ ! . 1 _QR b1ts/period Q og. 
C is the communications capacity in 
bits/period 
••• (9) 
V is the Rate of Change of the variable to be 
communicated (assumed noise-free) 
Q 1s the Quantisation or Granularity with 
which the variable is measured 
R is the range of the variable. 
(Note: Volatile variables may be candidates for 
more frequent communication than at the rate 
AXj generally, there is no benefit in 
exceeding ｾｸ＠ since the actIon-planning loop 
cannot use the information. In specific 
cases, changes in important variables may 
necessitate special priorities.) 
, , 
Survivability 
Had the models of C· In this paper been principally 
of structural groupings rather than of sequential 
functions coupled by information flow, it might have 
led to the conclusion that C· Survivability was 
concerned with physical entities. As the functional 
I models have suggested; however, C· Survivability is 
concerned with the continuance of the complete chain 
of functions and information exchanges in the face 
of enemy activity. 
It is, of course, possible to map between the 
functional C· organisation and its physical 
embodiment into Sensors, Sources, Action Elements, 
HQs, Communication Centres and Links. Clearly, loss 
of some of these physical elements can disrupt C· 
and it is part of the process of system design at 
the highest level to minimise the impact of physical 
damage on C· functional performance. At its most 
basiC, this design process identifies functional 
nodes, defined here as singularities in the C· 
activity floW, and either replicates them to prevent 
their loss being catastrophic (which stops them from 
being classified as nodes), or protects them from 
being damaged. Protection ranges from hardening 
against attack or making elements mobile, difficult 
to detect and capable of evasion. 
These considerations lead to the simple but vital: 
C· Law of Survivability 1 
C· Survivability is inverse both to the number of 
sequential, functional nodes in the C· process and 
to the degree of their exposure. 
The Law addresses four points. First, if the C· 
chain is long and comprises many unique processes, 
it is more vulnerable than a shorter chain simply 
because the chance that damage will break the longer 
chain is proportionally greater. Second, each 
functional node is vulnerable by virtue of its 
uniqueness. Were a function to be replicated, it 
would be less vulnerable (and indeed it would no 
longer qualify as a node). Third, exposure 
indicates that the functional node (or at least its 
physical shelter) is detectable by an enemy. 
Fourth, exposure means also that the functional 
node's self defence is inadequate. It is implicit 
in the C· Law of Survivability that it does not 
refer directly to physical vulnerability; physical 
loss is only debilitating where it breaks the 
functional process. It is also implicit that 
survivability is not a constant; damage may be 
contained and repaired, functions may be restored, 
camouflage may be added, self-defences may be 
strengthened. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The paper set out to produce a set of CZ postulates, 
axioms and laws. The following proposed C· 
Postulates and Laws have been formulated: 
• 
• 
• 
Law of Order/Action Rate Equality 
Law of ActIon/Reporting Rate Equality 
Law of Equlpartition 
Law of Infrastructure Expansion 
Law of Vertical Data Compression 
Law of DeCision Rate Invariance 
Law of Lateral Co-operation 
Law of Survivability 
Postulate of DeCisiOn Scale Invariance 
Postulate of Command ｇｾ｡ｮｵｬ｡ｲｩｴｹＮ＠
Additionally, equations have been produced which can 
be used to predict ideal values for: 
CZ performance as a control mechanism 
Mean span of control 
Commander's direct communication links 
Commander's infrastructure links 
Mean hierarchy levels traversed per decision 
Mean hIerarchy delay per deciSion 
Information content per C· information 
category 
Communications capacity variation with 
information granularity. 
The equations can, hopefully, be used as: 
A benchmark 
In some cases, a warning to avoid 
combinatorial explosions 
A means of testing the Laws. 
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GETTING SEAMS STRAIGHT 
D. K. H'i tchins 
INTRODUCTION/SYNOPSIS 
Systems Engineering is lagging behind. Software Engineering debacles have 
fuelled a vigorous response in the form of software tools, fourth generation 
languages, relational databases and yet more exci ting plans; major Systems 
Engineering fiascos have, in fact, been even more spectacular but have as yet 
recei ved no corresponding attention. The paper presents SEAMS, a metasystem 
for developing complex systems; SEAMS is a Systems Engineering Analysis and 
Management Support environment. 
In the context of this document a system is a bounded set of interrelated parts 
which together form a complex whole. In practice, most systems of interest are 
"Information, Decision, Action" systems and :- while frequently containing 
processors and software - are wider in context than information handling and 
processing systems. A typical system might be an aircraft, a ship, a transport 
system, a power distribution system and so on. 
Interest in systems engineering is on the increase, after a period "in the 
wings". As systems become ever more complex, the need to handle that 
complexi ty is being recognised as an essential science and an engineering 
discipline in its own ri ght. Unfortunately, practi tioners are few and the 
multi-disciplinary origins of potential systems engineers limit the catchment 
area. There is a need, then, not only to update, revitalise and re-present 
systems engineering to new generations of engineers, but also to provide 
practising systems engineers wi th modern tools and methods to increase their 
productivity. SEAMS is intended to fulfil that need. 
The paper presents a Systems Engineering Code of Practice and a set of 
Standards as a basis upon which to build a SEAMS environment, shows the 
development stages which must be gone through, and presents a future vision of 
a fully implemented SEAMS environment in an organisation for implementing 
complex systems. 
THE NEED 
Social evolution is outstripping the ability of individuals to comprehend the 
more complex systems required by society. The technology which society 
promotes oan also be applied to the handling ot complexity, so giving 
indi vi duals both the perspectl ve and the power to manage the more advanced 
and sophistioated systems being demanded. 
As . society develops an increasingly complex infrastructure to support social 
evolution, so the demand and technology for larger, more complex and interwoven 
systems develops in step. Designers and engineers are not evolving noticeably 
as individual human beings however, and their need to breakdown (decompose) a 
system into manageable, man-sized parts has not changed significantly either. 
ｉｾ＠ consequence, the number of such parts is continually increasing and, as the 
figure shows, so too are the interface and intercommunication complexities. 
Such a proliferation of modular interrelationships would present a mounting 
problem were it not for the same technological advance as that which fuels the 
evolution being available to accommodate the resulting complexity. Computer-
supported tools, methods and techniques are either envisaged or are becoming 
available for requirements 
capture, configuration 
management, information 
handling, modelling, design 
and development. 
Whereas significant advances 
have been made in the 
application of modern tools 
to software engineering, 
systems engineering has yet 
to be adequately addressed, 
except perhaps for the 
specific example of 
Information Systems. Wider 
systems such as transport, 
energy and military platforms 
(tank, ship, aircraft) have 
no such support. This 
document outlines a remedy 
for that deficiency. 
2 SEAMS - THE METASYSTEM 
SEAMS Is a systems engIneering environment, Incorporating a total quality 
ethIc. As a system tor developing systems, it Is a true metasystem and is 
designed to learn tram mIstakes, so provIdIng an improvIng capability and a 
"corporate memory". 
Systems Engineering, Analysis and Management Support (SEAMS) is a systems 
engineering environment for the design and development of systems. SEAMS 
embraces the systems approach to total quality by providing a structured, 
disciplined approach to the development of complete systems optimised in design 
for their lifetime. 
If, as has been said, the essence of systems engineering is abstraction and the 
essence of abstraction is the model, then SEAMS should be seen in both veins: 
• SEAMS is a high integrity systematic approach to prodUCing systems. SEAMS 
is, therefore, a METASYSTEM, a system for developing systems. 
• SEAMS can also be viewed as a model for developmental control as later 
topics will show. 
The basic tenets of systems 
engineering are contained in 
SEAMS. Further, the concept 
contains the notion of a 
corporate memory - a near-perfect 
memory which learns from mistakes 
and introduces new methods, tools 
and techniques to avoid repeating 
old mistakes as well as 
accommodating new tasks. 
Systems - HOLlsnc. INTEORATEO 
Engineering • ORGANISED. ITRUCTUReD. D.ICIItUNID 
Analysis • INYlSTIGATID, ASSUIID, IYALUATID 
Management • O'LANNID, IIIIOUIICID, CONTIIOLLID 
Support • I'ROJICT-SPICI'IC. COMPANY-WID! 
3 THE CONCEPT 
Controlled system deTelopments comprise a phased progression of 
. specifications produced by defined project tasks which interrelate through 
standard procedures. SEAMS exploits this large degree of ｰｲｯｪ･｣ｴｾｴｾｰｲｯｊ･｣ｴ＠
commonality. 
Systems engineering projects are properly controlled by a sequential set of 
phases: 
• Operations Analysis 
• Requirements Analysis 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
System Design 
Subsystems Procurement 
Test and Integration 
Installation and Commissioning 
In-use Phases. 
Phases . are punctuated by 
specifications. Phases comprise 
a set of activities designed both 
to produce the end-of-phase 
specifications and to conduct the 
task work leading to the 
implementation. 
As the figure shows, a model of 
the controlled system development 
can be seen as formalised sets of 
procedures and specifications, 
with the procedures providing the 
relationships between tasks 
specific to the particular 
proj ect • It is perhaps, 
surprising that any system 
project can be sensibly viewed in 
this light, and that a very wide 
variety of projects can be 
accommodated by a common set of 
procedures and specification 
standards. It is this 
commonal1 ty that SEAMS seeks to 
exploit. 
4 THE SEAMS BACKPLANE CONCEPT 
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Different projects demand different methods. SEAMS must be adaptable to 
different system needs and it does not therefore contain specific tools. 
Instead, tools can be selected and employed particular to task. 
Systems proj ects can be large or small, complex or not so complex. It would be 
quite inappropriate to use tools suitable for large projects on small projects, 
or vice versa. Projects also have tasks quite specific to their requirement. 
The concept emerges of a three layer 
construction for each phase, as 
shown in the figure. The lowest 
layer is the procedural framework 
which provides sequence, 
relationship, purpose and flow. The 
upper layer contains the project 
specific tasks which must fit into 
the procedural framework. The 
binder between the upper and lower 
layers is the enabling layer which 
brings appropriate tools, techniques 
and methods to bear so that tas ks 
can be executed 
economic and 
prescribed by 
framework. 
in a comprehensive, 
timely manner as 
the procedural 
SEAMS is not a set of tools. It is 
an environment into which 
appropriate tools may be "plugged" 
as dictated by the job-in-hand. It 
is analogous in some ways to the 
hardware backplane familiar to 
electronics engineers. 
5 THE TOOL SET 
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The availability of Systems Engineering models, presently patchy, is being 
enhanced by the application of software and CAD-based tools for requirements 
analysis, configuration management, space modelling, display animation, etc. 
Models much less in evidence presently include risk models, interface models, 
human engineering tools and models of complete projects in their environment. 
The phases of Systems Engineering can be used as a framework wi thin which to 
generate a range of functions for which tools would be valuable. The figure 
shows such a taxonomy for Systems Engineering models, simulations and tools. 
Scenario models and event simulations are well represented in the SE cycle; 
most major proj ects have been addressed using models of one kind or another. 
Risk models, clearly valuable in concept, are much rarer in practice. Systems 
models - models of the system to be developed - appear to be less in evidence 
than in previous years, particularly within the defence industry. One possible 
reason for this trend is the waning role of the Defence Research and 
Development (R&D) Establishments, and the emergence of the major platform and 
system contractor. Where R&D Establishments previously promoted the 
comprehensive analysiS of potential system designs by modelling, major platform 
and system contractors now operate within a fixed price, short-timeframe 
environment which can little afford models which often explore future 
operations after the contract period has ended. 
Relationship models, which examine interfaces, information exchange, protocols, 
capacities, configuration and architectures are clearly needed at system level, 
but are not much in evidence. Requirements Analysis tools abound, on the other 
hand; Yourdon, DeMarco and Jackson Structured Design contribute in this area, 
al though their heritage is that of Software Engineering, and their 
applicability to System Engineering is less than complete. Human Engineering 
models range from display animation (e.g. rapid Man-machine Interface (MMI) 
prototyping) to physical models; further work in this area is needed to 
accommodate the most complex system interface, that with its operator/user.· 
Physical space models of installations are giving way to the more flexible but 
presently less tangible 2-D and 3-D CAD model. In some severe environments, 
customers accept systems on the basis of the performance of a system model, 
rather than by tests of the system itself. 
One model which appears to be almost totally missing in software or indeed any 
other form is that of the proj ect itself, in relation to the company and 
environment surrounding it. There is a real need to be able to assess the 
impact of change in the process of a proj ect. Changes in external economic 
conditions, in availability of external resources and technology, in the 
customers' requirements, in the future environment can all materially affect 
the developing project. When two or more of these external factors coincide, 
the need for a model becomes even more acute. A present example in the public 
domain is the impact of the Canary Wharf development upon the Docklands Light 
Railway proj ect which was conceived within a boundary which did not consider 
that development. A project model could allow such instances to be anticipated 
and accommodated. 
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6 THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING CODE OF PRACTICE 
Installation and 
commissioning 
Acceptance 
Acceptance 
models 
The proposed Systems Engineering Code 
engineering philosophy, principles and 
characteristic of good systems engineering 
good systems engIneerIng practice. 
of Practice contaIns systems 
tenets, features which are 
and, of course, the elements of 
There is presently no recognised code of practice for Systems Engineering, 
which is surprising in view of the variety of organisations practising as 
systems companies. A Systems Engineering Code of Practice should include 
principles, characteristics and practice; shown overleaf is a proposed 
composition in outline. 
Introduction to Systems Engineering is concerned with presenting the scope and 
objectives of Systems Engineering (SE). As presented, SE is the all-embraCing 
term and therefore incorporates systems design, development, implementation and 
their management. The target of the Systems Engineering approach has always 
been a holistic, top-down, life-cycle approach to total quality. 
Features of Systems Engineering include 
its dedication to abstraction and 
solution transparency for as long as 
INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
• Holistic - all project aspects 
• Full life-cycle 
practicable in design how many • Management of complellity 
projects have been damaged by 
preconcei ved assumptions leading to 
bottom-up design? A strong theme 
running through Systems Engineering 
is modelling, (the basis for under-
standing), analysis, prediction, 
estimating, visualisation, etc. 
Systems Engineering Practice 
concerns itself with phased, 
progressi ve, formal development 
and with creativity and quality 
going hand-in-hand to achieve 
controlled, risk-assessed 
innovation. The sophisticated 
does not overshadow the 
straight forward, however; 
Systems Engineering is about 
team work and that requires 
dedicated, integrated teams 
and (ideally) continual 
customer involvement to 
ensure a smooth develop-
ment and transition to 
use. 
7 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STANDARDS 
• Target - total quality 
FEA TURES OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
• Systematic, analytiC, progressive, 
measured, controlled 
• Highest Integ,lty: 
• Visible, traceable, 
• Justifiable 
• Top do"'n, ",Ith domain kno"'/edge 
e Abstraction and solution Iransparency 
• Models 
• Problem solving: 
• Measu,es of e"cellence 
• Generation of options 
• Tradeoffs 
• Bottom-up system Integration 
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PRACTICE 
• Sequential, phased development 
• Procedural standards for each phase 
• SpeCification standards for each pha.e 
• Creativity and quality built Into: 
• Phasing 
• Procedures and specification 
• Organisation and practice 
• Customer/user Involvement 
• Mode", methods, tools and techniques 
• Dedicated teams, e'llperienced antI/qualified 
• Independent quality assurance 
• Customer/user support through life 
Standards are proposed for Procedures, Specifications, Project Control, 
Quality Assurance and for review of the standard themselves. 
The figure shows the proposed sets of SE standards (in relief) and their 
interrelationships. A single phase, N, is shown as part of a sequence of 
system development phases. Phase N uses as its input the specifications from 
prior phases, and it in turn produces a set of specifications as its major 
controlling output. 
Standards for Procedures show how work should proceed during each phase. 
Standards for Specifications show how the prinCipal output from each phase 
should be specified. Standards for Project Control show how the execution of 
tasks ｾ､＠ the achievement of speCifications should be regulated. Standards for 
Qual! ty Assurance show both procedures and specifications for proj ect 
independent assurance of creati vity, design, development, proving and 
performance. Quality Assurance standards are shown conceptually as a feedback 
loop to manage quality. 
The whole set of standards is seen against the backcloth of 
Practice and, since no set of standards can be all-embracing, a 
included for reviewing all the standards. 
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8 SEAMS STANDARDS FOR PROCEDURES AND SPECIFICATIONS 
SEAMS standards exIst In eIght varIeties: Speciticatiorus and Procedures tor 
RequIrements, Development, ProJect Control and QualIty Assurance. 
SEAMS Standards are presented in a matrix of activity against type. Activities 
include: 
• System Requirements (Capture and Analysis) 
• System Design and Development 
• Proj ect Control 
• Quality Assurance. 
Types of standards are limited to two: 
• Standards for Specifications 
• Standards for Procedures. 
The total system comprises up to five systems, according to customer: 
• The user's operating system 
• The user's exercise and training system 
• The user's maintenance system 
• The in-company test and integration system 
• The in-company maintenance system. 
The basic framework therefore comprises a three-dimensional matrix wi th 40 
cells 1n 1t (four act1v1ties, two types of standard, five systems). Happily, 
the majority of standards apply equally to all of the five systems. 
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9 REALISING SEAMS 
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10 SEAMS PERSPECTIVE 
Integrated Project Support Environments (IPSEs) point the way for a higher 
order Systems Engineering Analysis and Management Support (SEAMS) 
environment, with an integrated set of tools, techniques, models and formats 
providing a comprehensive backcloth upon which to develop the future system. 
IPSE and SEAMS, not dissim1lar in concept, w1ll be quite different in 
realisation, and Software Engineering will then bootstrap Systems Engineering 
into a formal discipline. 
Foregoing topiCS have shown the need for, and the route for achieving, a sound, 
high-integri ty approach to the engineering of complex systems. The Software 
Engineering IPSE has led from underneath. The need is apparent for a 
corresponding, but wider capability at systems level to bring together under 
one integrated system those various tools, techniques and methods which 
together will form a SEAMS environment. 
SEAMS is an apposi te acronym; its purpose is to provide a continuous', 
supporting blackcloth of tools, procedures, models and methods to work within 
each project phase ·and to blend each phase into the next via the appropriate 
specification using a common project database. (Current jargon favours 
"seamless" for such concepts, and SEAMS should provide the c.ustomer/user wi th a 
seamless, complete system balanced and optimised to his needs.) Some of the 
tools are presently available for each phase, although they are far from being 
in an integrated set. 
SEAMS would comprise a project database, accessed through a series of 
workstation displays for each phase. There would be in SEAMS: 
• Operations Analysis Tools 
• Capability and Performance Models 
• Requirements AnalysiS Methodologies 
• Interface and Configuration Management 
• Life-cycle Cost Models 
• Survivability/Durability Models 
• Cost Effectiveness Analysis Tools 
• Financial Forecasting Models 
• Model/Skeleton Specification 
• System MRI and Drawings 
• Space Models 
• HF Models 
• Availability Models 
• Risk Models 
• Architecture Models. 
When SEAMS is realised, as it will be, then Systems Engineering will have a 
valuable focus for technique development as has been the case with the IPSE and 
Software Engineering. 
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SEAMS will become an integral part of company management, technical 
organisation and processing support. The cost of SEAMS will be justified by 
the enormous reduction in risk and corresponding increase in quality its 
introduction-will invoke. 
What will a future SEAMS environment look like? The figure shows the general 
concept; SEAMS is seen as an integral part of the company computing system. 
The non-SEAMS specific elements are shown above the' dotted line and include 
project control and Quality Assurance workstations; project control operates at 
a level "above" SEAMS in the sense of authori ty for proj ect time and budget. 
Quality Assurance operates properly outside the project on behalf of the 
company and the customer. 
SEAMS itself is seen as sets of workstations, dedicated to individual project 
phases, and as single workstations able to operate in any or all phases 
according to need; both workstation concepts w11l be needed to accommodate 
large and small proj ects. Workstations w11l call down appropriate tools, 
standard procedures and specifications from read-only sources, all formally 
quality approved and under Quality Assurance jurisdiction. Current project 
data, procedures, specifications and "tools-in-action" are held in file 
servers, and are called down to the intelligent SEAMS workstations for working. 
Major processing tasks can be delegated to a "number-cruncher" on the Local 
Area Network which (funds and technology permitting) could be anything from a 
powerful but conventional serial processor to an exotic parallel processor. 
Access to all facilities is envisaged from remote parts of the company, from 
individuals working as company consultants to external proJects, or from home. 
Work from home, for example, could be executed using a suitable PC and a secure 
modem, security being a keynote of off-site operations in particular. 
Obstacles to achieving SEAMS? Few technically, apart perhaps from a secure, 
distributed operating system, and that need is not too far from realisation. 
The principal obstacle probably arises in the business justification of the 
full expenditure, since it would be difficult to attach the full cost of SEAMS 
to a single project at project start up. For the faint of heart in this 
respect I consider the cost of countless recent major system projects which 
failed (or lost big money) qui te simply due to grossly inadequate systems 
engineering. The cost of SEAMS pales ....•.. 
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COMMERCIAL-IN -CONFIDENCE v/vi 
FOREWORD 
Automatic Threat Assessment is at the so-called 'leading-edge' of 
technology. Airborne Automatic Threat Assessment cannot be said to 
exist. This volume is therefore concerned more with establishing a 
blueprint for future designs, than in assessing contemporary systems. 
The volume is presented as a series of topics, which address 
particularly those areas believed to represent the more difficult hurdles 
in the path to successful design. The 1990s threat is prognosticated, so 
that readers may follow the design rationale from first principles through 
to a recommended design concept which can be seen at Figs. 5.10 and 6.4. 
Finally Topic 6. 2 lists the more significant, outstanding research 
studies, together with a series of tasks which propose a route to success-
ful designs in the future. 
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1 COMMERCIAL-IN -CONFIDENCE 
1 THREAT SOURCES 
1. 1 THREAT SCOPE 
The tb.reat comprises ,,·eapon and environmental hazards external to the 
aircraft .. ";hich are expected to exist in a Central European Theatre in thE 
1990s. 
This study is concerned with threats and it is necessary to define the SCOt 
of that term. 'A th:t>eat is that whioh may hazard the airoraft .. the piZot o. 
his mission.. and whioh is externaZ to the airoraft and its systems. ' 
An engine fire. therefore. would not be a threat in this context although it 
may have been caused by. say. a cannon shell which was a threat. Air-
craft system failures are accommodated by the aircraft's primary and 
auxiliary warning systems. 
Threats may originate from: 
• Enemy action 
• l\1isdirected action by own forces 
• Natural hazards 
This study is concerned principally with the Central European Theatre in 
the 1990s and beyond. Thus the threat characteristics are not limited to 
the parameters of present-day ｡ｲｳ･ｮ｡ｬｳｾ＠ weapons being introduced now 
will be obsolescent in ten to fifteen years. and new weapons and sensors 
will be in use. It is necessary therefore both to forecast the environment. 
and to recognise the limitations of forecasting by designing a reconfigurab 
system for threat assessment. 
For convenience. threats may be grouped into: 
• Groundfire - prOjectiles 
• Surface-to-air guided missiles 
• Nuclear radiation 
• Biological and chemical agents 
• Air-to-air guns and missiles 
• Beam damage weapons 
• Haz ards to flying 
Each of these will be addressed in more detail in succeeding topics to 
enable consideration of the characteristics of the threat as seen in the 
future scenario by extrapolation from current (especially US) technology. 
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Fig.1.1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
THREAT WARNING AND FAftlJRE WARNING 
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1 THREAT SOURCES 
1. 2 GROUNDFIRE THREAT 
The ZSU-23-4 and its successors will constitute a significant point defence 
threat against which avoidance is more likely to afford protection than 
armour. Small arms fire will be a constant threat against which some 
protection may be practicable, while' smart' rockets are a possibility. 
The principal anti-aircraft gun at present in the Warsaw Pact (WP) Armour: 
in the ZSU-23-4 SP, which as the title indicates is a tracked vehicle 
carrying four guns each of 23 mm calibre, purpose-built for pOint air 
defence. The guns fire mixed-belt ammunition, three high explosive 
rounds to one armour-piercing incendiary. with a muzzle velocity of 
970 mls (Mach 3.0) at a rate of 200 rounds/minute/barrel. The ZSU radar 
works in J - Band for target acquisition and fire control, with a range out 
to 20 km line-of-sight; Moving Target Indication (MTI) is fitted and there 
is an optical sight. ZSU-23-4 proved very effective in the Middle-East 
Wars, with a practical range of 2000/2500 m: four vehicles are allocated 
per Motor Rifle Regiment and eight per Tank Regiment so the ZSU-23-4 
is likely to be encountered when attacking WP armour. 
The ZSU-23-4 has limited range which could be increased up to a point by 
increasing the calibre to 30 mm or more. It seems likely that future point 
defence guns of this type will also employ thermal or millimetre wave 
passive imagers/trackers to obviate the need for self-revealing 
transmissions in clear weather. 
The size and composition of a 23 mm (or larger) shell are such that a 
high-performance aircraft is unlikely to sustain a hit without being 
seriously damaged, and there seems little purpose in attempting to provide 
external armour against such heavy calibre ｳｨ･ｬｬｳｾ＠ effective external 
armour would be very heavy and would reduce the aircraft weapon load. 
Internal armour and the use of. say, avionics. to shield vital flight . 
critical components, may offer some measure of protection however. The 
ZSU -23-4 and its successors are considered to be a significant threat 
therefore. particularly at ranges of less than 2500 m. Figure 1. 2 shows 
the parameters for a notional successor. 
Small arms fire will be an ever present threat; 7. 62 mm shells will be 
typical. The distribution of this hazard is likely to be both wide and 
unpredictable, so that warning with a view to avoiding the threat may be 
profitable only if the fire rate has exceeded some threshold and there 
is some prospect of reducing the risk by evasive- or counte r- action. It 
may be practicable to protect some parts of the aircraft against small 
arms fire, so as to absorb direct hits without incurring short- term 
danger. 
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One other possible development which may be read across from the 
contemporary US scene is that of laser- guided projectiles or rockets. 
'Smart' rockets are being examined and have considerable potential for 
point defence out to 6000 m or more - once a cheap reliable laser guidance 
head can be employed to reduce dispersion. Their advantage is their 
potential for saturating a volume of space or an area of ground. 
SENSORS 
CALIBRE 
FIRE RATE 
I THERMAL IMAGER ANDIOR MILLIMETRE 
WAVE RADAR ACTIVE ANO PASSIVE 
I :>30mm 
: 1000 Rounds I min 
EFFECTIVE RANGE: 3000-3500 m 
GROUNDFIRE 
THREAT 
SMALL ARMS FIRE 
LASER-GUIDED PROJECTILES 
Fig .1·2 POSSIBLE WARSAW PACT ANTI-AIR GUN - 1900 's 
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1.3 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE THREAT 
Battlefield Surface-to-air Missiles (SAMs) such as SA7 I SA9 and their 
successors will probably constitute the single biggest threat to anti-
armour/ ground attack aircraft in the future battle scenario. 
Warsaw Pact forces have a number of proven second-generation SAMs , 
including the SA6 GAINFUL, SA 7 GRAIL, SA8 GECKO, SA9 GASKIN and 
the (as-yet) unknown SA-X-I0. The SA7 is of particular interest in the 
battlefield scenario, being man-portable. This missile is a tail-pursuit 
infra-red (IR) tracker with an impact fuze ｯｮｬｹｾ＠ the range is said to be up 
to 10 km, and improvements have been made to withstand the distraction 
of IR flares. The SA9 comprises four GRAIL mounted on a wheeled 
amphibious vehicle. SA6 and SA8 are longer range SAMs: SA6 for example 
has a minimum range of 4 km and a maximum of 60 km, and is intended 
primarily for area air defence. 
Likely improvements to WP SA1fs may be forecast by comparison with 
the US STINGER and Alternate STINGER programmes. The STINGER 
employs Passive Optical Seeker Technology (POST) which is a 'two colour' 
image scan using both IR and ultra-violet (UV) to improve performance 
against countermeasures while Alternate STINGER is a laser beamrider. 
The successors to SA 7 and SA9 are likely also to employ more elegant 
guidance, control and fuzing techniques which will be aimed to nullify 
countermeasures and to conceal the launcher. SA 7B is believed, at present 
to have a kill probability against helicopters of about 90%. Similar 
performance can be reasonably anticipated against low-level, fixed-wing 
aircraft in ten to fifteen years' time. The deployment of SA 7 and SA9 is 
such that a future battle is likely to see more WP kills accomplished by 
SA11s than by guns. 
Figure 1.3 indicates the operational characteristics of a notional WP 
missile for the 1990s, based on current US developments. 
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RANGE : 'Skm 
SEEKER : IR, UV ,AND MILLIMETRE WAVE 
WARHEAD: CONTINUOUS ROD OR FRAGMENTING 
FUZING : PROXIMITY OR CONTACT. AUTO-SELECTED 
GROUND : OPTICAL/IR TRACKER WITH RADAR FOR 
SENSORS ALL-WEATHER TARGET ACQUISITION 
GASKIN GRAIL 
GECKO GAINFUL 
SA-X-10? 
Fig. 1.3 POSSIBLE 1990's WARSAW PACT SAM 
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1. 4 NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL THREAT 
Biological and chemical agents may be filtered out of supply air. Nuclear 
radiation may present a more significant threat. 
Warsaw Pact nations are known to employ chemical weapons in large 
quantities and the stockpiling of biological agents is suspected. Neither 
of these is expected to constitute an immediate threat to an aircraft or its 
pilot provided that possible effects are anticipated in design by filtering 
cockpit air, selected use of 100% oxygen, appropriate aircrew clothing etc. 
Nuclear radiation could present a more significant hazard however, since 
there is no means in current aircraft designs to detect radiation directly 
and hence avoid (or limit duration of stay in) an area of dangerously-high 
radiation levels. The use of tactical nuclear weapons and of enhanced 
radiation (neutron) weapons can be anticipated, and the pilot's efficiency 
could be permanently impaired within minutes of flying through dense 
nuclear radiation. Avionics solid state devices are also sensitive to 
radiation and' hardening' incurs both weight and cost penalties; the 
probability of serious avionics failure is also related therefore to the 
total radiation dosage received, and total hardening against this threat 
cannot be realised in small aircraft. (Hardening against neutron damage 
appears to be impractical in any event.) Even modest degrees of pr.otection 
may be expensive in both money terms and in reduction of payload/ radius 
of action. 
The detection of neutrons is more difficult than that of charged particles. 
Direct detection of neutrons is difficult because their lack of charge allows 
them to penetrate the open structure of atoms. ｈｯｷ･ｶ･ｲｾ＠ occasional 
direct hits on atomic nuclei may eject charged particles which can be 
detected by their ionisation trails within gases. 
10 (1 4) 7 . 
e. g. SB On, 2 a. 3L1 
Neutrons have a 932 s half life outside the atomic nucleus, after which they 
decay to one proton and one electron. Being charged particles, these 
are easily detected, but both travel distances of only a few centimetres 
in air. 
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1.5(a) AIR-TO-AIR THREAT - MISSILES 
Reading across from contemporary US developments suggests that 
significant improvements can be forecast in Warsaw Pact missile 
performance. 
Warsaw Pact nations employ a variety of air-to-air missiles: 
8 
• ACRID AA-6 has a range of 40 to 50 km in its semi-active, radar-
guided version, and of 20 km using IR-homing. It is currently 
fitted to FOXBAT. 
• APEX AA-7 has ranges of 35 and 15 km respectively for its 
radar and IR-homing variants. APEX is fitted to MIG-21 
FISHBED and MIG-23S/FLOGGER-B fighters. 
• APHID AA-8 has ranges of 8 km or more for its radar and IR 
models. It too is fitted to the MIG-23S. 
Current WP philosophy is to fit suitable aircraft with either a mix of 
missile types ｯｾ＠ a mix of missile guidance. MIG-25 carries four AA-6 
missiles - two with IR homing and two with semi-active radar heads. 
Alternatively, MIG-23S carries two AA-7 and t'\\'o AA-8. 
Developments in the US air-to-air missile scene, include advanced 
medium- and short-range missiles and the introduction of Anti-radiation 
Missiles (ARMs), which will be discussed in Topic 1. 5(b). The Advanced 
Medium-range Air-to-air Missile (AMRAAM) will employ inertial mid-
course guidance, active radar terminal guidance (possibly with a passive 
back-up system) and proximity fuzing, and will, of course, be fire-and-
foreget, with the carrying fighter therefore able to engage several targets 
simultaneously. The Advanced Short-range Air-to-air Missile (ASRAAM) 
is less well-defined, but active millimetre wave radar is being examined 
too (94 GHz) and the missile is also expected to be fire-and-forget and 
highly agile, with a wide firing cone, good short-range performance and 
all target-aspect launch success performance. 
The use of millimetre waves encourages the idea that the seeker head will 
also have a passive capability, using thermal radiation from the target in 
that band. This can be very effective against a clear-sky background, but 
would be less effective against a thermally-patterned background or 
through cloud, where the active radar performance would probably be 
more successful. Warsaw Pact air-to-air missiles in the 1990s can 
therefore be expected to have: 
• Active and passive seekers, possibly multi-spectral 
• High agility and good short-range performance 
© EASAMS 1981 
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Fire-and-forget performance 
Wide cone of fire 
All target aspect performance 
Good look-down capability and anti-clutter features 
Resistance to distractors such as flares, chaff and electronic 
jamming. 
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1. 5(b) AIR-TO-AIR THREATS - ANTI-RADIATION MISSILES 
Anti-radiation missiles could reduce NATO dependence on active target 
sensors and increase the threat of attack by passive seeker-head missiles. 
The introduction of ARMs could alter the tactical choice of sensors by 
denying or limiting the use of active sensors to either or both sides. The 
US High-speed Anti-radiation Missile (HARM) AGM-88A is an example: 
based on SPARROW it has an 'open-front' crystal receiver designed to 
seek radiation from ground radars over a wide frequency range. AGM 76 
STANDARD ARM and AGM 45A STRIKE are also air-to-ground ARMs. 
Other US developments include the use of long endurance drones or 
Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) which may patrol an area for five hours 
or more. seeking specific radars or radiation in general. There have 
been indications of surface-to-air and air-to-air ARM developments (e. g. 
BRAZO - or PAVEARM as it is known by the USAF) and interest has been 
noted in the radiation emitted by aircraft power generation and digital 
computer systems, as well as in their communications. local oscillators, 
and radar emissions. The widespread use by NATO countries of JTIDS/ 
Link 16 could reasonably be expected to increase WP interest in JTIDS/ 
periodic transmissions as a mid-course guidance signal for an air-to-air 
missile for example. Similarly, any on-board identification transponder 
which can be induced to transmit may serve as a suitable source of 
radiation, even although its emissions may be quite unintelligible. 
Nations of the WP have never been slow to exploit such obvious techniques 
as ARMs, and it is reasonable to anticipate. therefore, that ARMs will be 
introduced into the WP arsenal of air-to-air missiles (and possibly SAM 
too). if indeed they are not already covertly present. 
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1. 5(c) AIR-TO-AIR THREATS - GUNS 
Warsaw Pact aircraft will continue to carry large calibre cannons in the 
1990s because of their inherent flexibility. 
Most WP fighters carry a gun .. usually 23 mm calibre. The twin-barrel 
GSh-23 cannon is fitted to FISHBED-N and FLOGGER-B, for example, 
while FLOGGER-D has a six-barrel rotary 23 mm cannon. HIND-D, has 
a chin-mounted four-barrel GATLING-type gun, probably 12.7 mm calibre, 
and can carry a pylon-mounted 23 mm cannon .. and four rocket pods .. each 
32 x 55 mm, 'which could combine to present a formidable barrage in the 
face of a low-flying aircraft.. even although such aircraft might not be the 
HIND-D's principal target. The current air-to-air gun threat is therefore 
not insignificant, but generally, it is probably a relatively short-range 
problem only. Future WP aircraft are still likely to carry guns as these 
have the advantage of flexibility. For instance, they can fill the short-
range performance gap left by most air-to-air missiles, can be employed 
against soft skinned vehicles and personnel and - vital in many circumstances -
ean warn without actual damage, unlike missiles. 
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1.6 BEAl\1 DAMAGE OR DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS 
Laser damage weapons may present an essentially short-range ground-
based threat which is unlikely to be met on a widespread scale judging by 
the present state of development in the US. Soviet research and develop-
ment could be more advanced than US developments however. 
Current developments in the US and USSR are apparently concentrating on 
laser damage weapons for military applications. Charged particle beams 
such as proton beams defocus owing to mutual repulsion between the 
hydrogen ions, so their range is short (Soviet scientists have put charged 
particle accelerators into space for experiments, however, apparently 
with some success). Neutrons and gamma rays are difficult to collimate 
into tight beams and their delivery energies are presently below those 
needed to damage aircraft. Laser damage weapon research has con-
centrated on two spectral Ｑｩｮ･ｳｾ＠ 3. 8 J..lm, for the pulsed deuterium-fluoride 
chemical laser wavelength, and 10.6 J..lm for the CO2/helium/nitrogen 
continuous wave (CW) gas laser. 
A US deuterium-fluoride laser scored a notable success in 1978 by 
destroying a small, supersonic, anti-tank missile. (The speed of the 
beam obviated the need for any lead angle computations.) Further 
successes have been recorded since. Soviet scientists are known to be 
interested in both wavelengths, and have patented techniques for boring 
holes through fog using CO 2 lasers. Current opinions suggest that laser 
damage weapons could damage structure, avionics or warheads at ranges 
up to 5.5 km, but only at the expense of carrying bulky equipment required 
to generate the power needed to support the low power efficiency of lasers. 
Such weapons would therefore most probably be ground-based, although a 
US KC135 transport is currently being fitted with an airborne laser beam 
weapon. Perhaps a more widespread threat could arise from the action of 
lasers on thermal imager and direct view optics systems, including the 
human eye. Lasers in the visual and near-visual spectrum 0.4 to 1. 0 J,.lm, 
with modest powers, could damage a pilot's eyes, especially if he 
employed direct view optics: current laser deSignators operate in this 
band. Similarly, the increasing use of 10.6 J..lm CO 2 lasers for ranging, 
coupled with 8 to 13 J..lm band thermal imagers, suggests that the detector 
elements in the imagers could be attacked with some prospect of success, 
unless specific filters were interposed. The development of fast-reaction 
photochromic glass for visors and other optical devices would act both as a 
threat counter and as a threat warning, but could be used by the enemy for 
'spoofing'. The 1990's threat from beam damage weapons is therefore 
seen as likely to be sparse, and based on laser beams at one of several 
predictable wavelengths, with the weapon's radius of danger limited to 
some 5 to 6 km. . However, speculation is rife that Soviet beam weapon 
© EASAMS 1981 
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research and development is far more advanced than US work. The use 
of lasers as airborne weapons is possible .. not least because of their 
psychological impact on opposing crews, and in this role they are seen as 
air-to-air anti-personnel weapons, as anti-missile weapons, and possibly 
as an alternative to short-range gun and missile fits. 
Note: A comprehensive unclassified assessment of directed energy and 
particle beam weapons can be seen in the July 28th issue of 
Aviation Week and Space Technology. 
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1. 7 FLYING HAZARDS 
Natural haz ards threaten mission success in a similar way to enemy action, 
and so form a logical part of the threat spectrum. 
The anti-armour/ground-attack aircraft of the 1990s will require the 
ability to fly very low and to use terrain shielding in order to reduce risk 
of attack. There will be a. need to detect and avoid terrain and other 
haz ards such as masts, cables, bridges, etc., in clear weather, by day 
and night, and probably in poor weather also. The pilot will be able to 
avoid terrain by day .. in clear weather, unaided. but he may not be able to 
detect cables strung across a valley for example, until it is too late to 
avoid them. By day, therefore, threats arise from natural haz ards 
according to the speed and altitude of the aircraft, the degree of concen-
tration of the pilot on terrain and hazard avoidance, visibility and so on. 
The pilot's problems are compounded at night and by poor weather. 
These natural hazards constitute threats to the aircraft just as much as 
enemy action, and are therefore considered as part of the threat assess-
ment task. 
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1. 8 SUMMARY 
Some passive sensors will be able to detect a variety of threats. Other 
threats will necessitate special or active sensors, use of the latter putting 
the Ground Attack aircraft at risk. 
The threats to a ground attack fighter in the 1990s battlefield will tend to 
share various characteristics, as the table shows. There will be shared 
themes of: radar emissions for target acquisition and active gUidance/ 
homing, especially in bad ｷ･｡ｴｨ･ｲｾ＠ IR flash emissions during the firing 
of large calibre guns and missile motor burns; detectable air over-
pressures caused by projectile near-misses (or hits) at the aircraft and 
detectably high rates of change of local magnetic field as ferrous warheads 
pass nearby; ionised gas trials left by high temperatures of missile 
motors; and, generally, detectable levels of thermal radiation. where this 
term covers the band from 1 /.lm to about 4 mm. 
Notable exceptions to the themes of recurrence are means of detecting 
residual nuclear radiation, biological and chemical agents, groundfire 
and cables. Similarly, the ability to detect some threats in clear weather 
will be poor where the enemy uses passive sensors and camouflage. 
Not only mayan attacking aircraft need to employ active sensors, there-
fore. but it may need to activate them in clear weather in order to high-
light non-radiating targets/threats. This puts the 'hunter' at risk. 
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2. 1 RADAR WARNING 
Radar warning receivers may find less data content to analyse in signals 
received from the next generation Track-While-Scan (TWS) radars, while 
jammer emission analysis may expand. 
Radar warning is a valuable source of data especially when the sensed-
signals can be analysed to give indications of the enemy's mode of 
operation. For example, it would be valuable to know when a radar was 
in search mode, and when it changed to lock-on and fire control modes. 
Receivers for analysing current 'Warsaw Pact radars are available and 
provide useful, timely information. ALR 56 is a contemporary US 
electronic warfare (EW) management system which provides signal 
analysis, directiop finding. establishment of threat priorities, jammer 
blanking. look-through capability. etc •• in one centralised control package. 
The advent of TWS radar will reduce the quality of information available 
from radar warning receivers. A TWS radar need not lock-on to a target 
in order to provide its associated fire control system with data. The 
aircraft radar warning receiver may not. therefore. obseTve ｾｹ＠ change 
of mode or scan-rate when being tracked by a TWS radar. This will 
Significantly reduce the timeliness of the information available from that 
source alone. although it would still be of value to be aware of the radar 
scan and its type, direction range. and likely source. in order to facilitate 
correlation with other sensor data. Parallel developments in radar 
technology include the use of higher frequency, lower power, coherent, 
frequency-agile transmitters and more sensitive receivers, with narrower 
aerial beamwidths and single scan transmissions. Trese factors will 
combine to make the task facing the radar warning receiver designers 
increaSingly more difficult. 
Radar warning receivers can also analyse jamming signals designed to 
disrupt the aircraft radar, radio/telephony (R/T), data links, navigation 
aids, radio altimeter and transponders. It may prove possible to locate 
the source of jamming and to assess its objectives automatically to a 
much greater extent than at present. 
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2.2 LASER WARNING 
Laser warning is at an early stage of development and progress does not 
appear to be ｦ｡ｳｴｾ＠ owing to serious difficulties. 
18 
Laser warning systems are currently being developed but with some 
difficulty. Contemporary C02 lasers have typical parameters as follows: 
Beamwidth 
· 
o. 1 to o. 2 mrad • 
Mean Power • 500 mJ • 
Pulse Repetition Frequency 
· 
200 pps 
• 
Pulse width • 20 ns • 
Efficiency • 8 to 9% • 
Sidelobe Energy 
· 
10- 6 x Main Beam. 
• 
Thus energy per pulse is in excess of 1 ｍｊｾ＠ and the main beam would 
produce a circle of diameter 50 cm on an aircraft target at 5 km. 
To be sure of observing the laser ･ｮ･ｲｧｹｾ＠ an aircraft would require either 
a large number of sensors spaced over the aircraft surfaces to pick up 
main beam energy or a detector to sense the (lower) sidelobe energy. A 
sidelob"e energy detector would need a wide dynamic range in order to with-
stand full beam energy. At the same ｴｩｭ･ｾ＠ its low threshold would make 
it subject to nuisance trips, especially at low altitude where laser energy 
could be reflected off terrain. 
The design of a suitable laser warning system is clearly scenario dependent 
as well as aircraft dependent .. and at present an entirely satisfactory system 
is not known to exist. 
Detector head designs are known to include the etalon, which is a type of 
Fabry-Perot ｩｮｴ･ｲｦ･ｲｯｭ･ｴ･ｲｾ＠ giving sharp fringes and high resolving 
power, but little data is available on. support processing in extracting 
useful and reliable information from receiver laser signals. This paucity 
of data could well reflect a low success rate. 
Perkin-Elmer are under contract to the US Army however for the 
development of the AN! AVR-2 Laser Warning Receiver (LWR) for 
helicopters, which is integrated with the AN!APR-39 Radar Warning 
System. The LWR uses an etalon detector system covering visible, near 
and far infra-red. The system is required to detect" identify and 
categorise: 
© EASAMS 1981 
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• Ranger Coherent 
• Designator Coherent 
• Beam rider Coherent 
• Radar Coherent 
• \Veapon Coherent 
• Searchlight Non-coherent 
• Flare Non-coherent 
The detector should discriminate between coherent and non-coherent 
radiation to avoid false triggers due to natural or man-made non-laser 
illumination. Characterisation factors include: 
• Wavelength 
• Intensity 
• Pulse rate 
• Pulse width 
• Position. 
Four sensors are used per quadrant to locate the emitter. 
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2. 3 PRIMARY RADAR 
Many developments may be expected in radar technology. which should 
refine the information content available from radar. 
Primary radar may be required for target search. recognition and 
acquisition. Radar developments indicate that future systems will share 
certain characteristics: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Higher frequency. moving up to the millimetre wavebands and 
beyond - to IR scanning laser systems 
Narrow beamwidths 
Frequency agility 
Lower transmitted power 
More sensitive receivers (high quantum efficiency for optical 
wavelengths) 
Coherent .radiation 
Doppler beam sharpening 
Moving target indication 
Smaller mass and volume 
Extensive signal processing to give TWS. automatic target 
recognition. synthetic aperture performance. etc. 
Passive modes of operation to reduce aircraft total electro-
magnetic (EM) signature. 
20 
The increase in frequency. leading to finer beams. coupled with high 
resolution in range. will provide small equivalent radiated energy packets. 
so that target characteristics may become apparent to the eye. and the 
progressive introduction of computing power should allow systems to 
emulate. and in some cases exceed. human eye pattern recognition 
performance. 
Thus future airborne radar systems should be able to present far less raw 
data to the other aircraft systems and to the pilot; instead. more useful 
information should be presented. 
A move to 10.6 pm C02 scanning laser radar seems a logical progression. 
Relatively high lasing efficiencies and powers may be achieved. and 
weather penetration is good up to tens of kilometres. 'Aerials' will be 
small. and a suitably designed receiver might double as a thermal imager. 
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2.4(a) ELECTRO-OPTICAL SENSORS 
Electro-optical (EO) sensors fall into two groups according to their wave-
length passbands: visible and IR detectors employ photon detectors, while 
millimetre wave imagers will use more conventional thermal detectors 
and radar aerials. The imaging range of this latter waveband would be 
severely resolution-limited by the aperture size available in an aircraft. 
The need to reduce aircraft emissions will increase dependence on EO 
sensors. These could sensibly operate in one of four or five pas sbands as 
determined by atmospheric transmittance (see Fig. 2.1(a)). 
• 
• 
• 
• 
0.4 to 1 J,.lm - visible and near IR 
3 to 5 J,.lm - medium IR 
8 to 14 J,.lm - medium IR 
Millimetre wave passbands" especially 1 and 3 mm. 
Receivers operating in the last-mentioned passband would operate in a 
significantly different manner from the first three. Visible and IR 
radiation detectors are of the quantum or photo-electric type, and can use 
relatively small apertures to 'capture' sufficient photons for successful 
operation. However, millimetre wave detectors must employ larger EM 
field detectors (aerials) since the energy in those passbands is of the 
random thermal radiation type. Figure 2. l(b) shovvs the photon (hv) energy 
increasing with frequency, and the random thermal emission (kT) which 
is invariant with frequency but proportional to absolute temperature. 
Imaging in the optical and IR passband can employ photographic cameras, 
TV" optical scanners or (active) laser radar. Millimetre wave imagers 
would probably employ a scanning radiometer technique (passive) or more 
conventional radar (active). 
Other differences between the passbands include their theoretical 
information content (see Section 5. 1) and the contrast in mean levels of 
received energy from targets and typical backgrounds. Less is known in 
this last respect about millimetre waves than about the visible and IR 
bands. Additionally, the use of conventional image presentation of targets 
recognisable to the human eye would require very large apertures in the 
millimetre passband. To recognise a tank image at 3 to 4 km might 
require a circular aperture of more than 25 m diameter. Alternatively, 
a more sensible diameter for an aircraft of, say, O. 5 m, would limit 
target recognition range to less than 100 m. Evidently millimetre wave 
systems will not compete with thermal/visible spectrum imagers in 
presenting images to a pilot for visual target recognition, but their use 
for radar and passive detection of thermal radiation seems likely to 
expand rapidly. The ability to recognise targets by other characteristics 
of their reflected radiation pattern is being developed at present and will 
be available in new radars. 
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2.4(b) ELECTRO-OPTICAL IMAGING SENSOR CHARACTERISTICS 
The three principal imaging wavebands have such different characteristics 
that none is likely to be self-sufficient. The combination of visual 
spectrum with 8 to 13 J,lm Forward-looking Infra-red (FLIR) imaging seems 
the most likely future solution. 
The various passive imaging sensors have differing operational 
characteristics: 
a) Optical 
Optical sensors (TV) in the visible spectrum will work in light 
levels down to starlight# but not in total darkness. Images may 
be fully coloured# even in starlight# so offering to the pilot an 
image most compatible with his eyes. The characteristic 
radiation from hot targets is not discernible at visible wave-
lengths. Apertures for low-light TV may be quite large (>10 cm) 
to achieve sufficient photon capture. 
b) 3 to 5 J,lm 
Black bodies at 750 K emit their maximum radiation intensity in 
the 3 to 5 J,lm band. which is therefore particularly valuable for 
detecting hot targets. Atmospheric absorption in the 3 to 5 pm 
band is due mainly to CO2# not water vapour. and is therefore the 
most suitable band for imaging hot targets at longer ranges (>10 km) 
in humid conditions. Detectors can be tuned for terrain imaging# 
and apertures may be quite small. A hot tank at 3 to 4 km could 
be resolved by an aperture of some 5 to 6 cm# although cold 
targets might require a larger aperture to increase photon capture 
area. Imagers will work in total darkness. 
c) 8 to 13 J,lm 
Black bodies at about 273 K (0 °G) emit their peak energy in the 
8 to 13 J,lm band (see Fig. 2.2) which is ideally suited therefore 
to terrain imaging. This band also detects Significant energy 
levels emitted by hot objects# which can be consequently high-
lighted. Imagers will work in total darkness. Atmospheric 
absorption is increased by humidity so that only shorter ranges 
are practicable in high humidity conditions. However. this band 
offers improved imaging compared with the 3 to 5 pm band through 
some (battlefield) haze and smoke conditions. Resolution may be 
aperture limited: to recognise the image of a tank at 3 to 4 km 
would require an aperture of 20 cm or more. 
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2. 5 MISSILE \VARNING 
The most reliable means of missile warning will be active doppler radar, 
which, in future, may use scanning IR laser radar as a basis. 
Missile warning can be provided in several ways: 
• By detecting changing radar emission patterns (see Topic 2. 1) 
• By detecting the IR or visible emissions caused by rocket motor 
burn, and by atmospheric heating of the missile 
• By using an active doppler radar to detect the approach of a 
missile directly. 
Future radars may not change their emission patterns, and a future battle-
field scenario in Central Europe generally suggests widespread use of 
missiles so that 'burn' emissions will be ｷｩ､･ｳｰｲ･｡､ｾ＠ thus selecting the 
appropriate emission may not prove practicable. Therefore, the most 
reliable means of detecting an approaching missile is likely to be active 
doppler radar, which unfortunately involves self-revealing transmissions. 
The US has several such systems, including the AN/ALQ 156 and the F-15 
EAGLE'S ALQ 153/4 tail warning, both of which are pulse doppler radars 
designed to respond to missile approach by initiating countermeasures. 
(There will be little purpose in providing· warning against future missiles 
unless some effective countermeasures can be taken. ) 
Developments seem likely to include a move to higher frequencies, possibly 
employing scanning CO 2 laser heterodyning radar which offers good doppler 
performance, narrow beams and high quantum efficiency receivers, so 
enabling lower power transmissions to be both effective and less detectable. 
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2 THREAT DATA SOURCES 
2.6 HOSTILE FIRE INDICATORS 
The merits of a Hostile Fire Indicator (HFI) in a high-speed aircraft are 
questionable since countermeasures are at present doubtful. 
Ballistic warning systems or HFls usually sense pulses of atmospheric 
pressure associated with the nearby passage of a projectile; their use in 
the air has generally been restricted to ｨ･ｬｩｾｯｰｴ･ｲｳＬ＠ and the installation 
of reliable systems in these vehicles has not proved entirely successful. 
'Nuisance-trips' have resulted in thresholds being raised to such levels 
that relatively near misses might not be detected. 
The future of HFIs in high-speed aircraft would seem likely to depend 
more on the use which might be made of the warning than on development 
problems, however. The only countermeasure likely to be effective in 
the face of a large number of projectiles will be to evade ｴｨ･ｭｾ＠ this 
requires knowledge of the source of projectiles and of 'safe' directions for 
evasion. A future scenario is unlikely to be so neatly ordered that 
projectiles will come from only one direction and that safe routes inside 
enemy territory will be known. Moreover, the hostile fire is quite likely to 
emanate from point defence of the target(s) to be attacked (see Topic 1.2). 
A CO2 doppler radar for missile warning (see Topic 2.5) might be able to 
provide projectile detection too, for shells of 23 mm calibre and over. 
2 . THREAT DATA SOURCES 
2.7 NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WARNING 
There seems to be a case for the development of nuclear, biological and 
chemical detection systems for aircraft. 
Techniques for detecting some organic and hydrocarbon gases are already 
established and warning devices can be purchased for use in the home. 
However, the range of detectable chemical and biological toxins is not 
extensive, and little work has been publicised on militarised airborne 
detectors. Such detectors would provide a valuable source of battle area 
intelligence. Nuclear radiation detection techniques are well established 
but not in a form suitable for battlefield aircraft use, where simple Geiger 
Muller tubes and dosimeters will be of limited value. Instead, a radiation 
gradiometer would seem to be essential which will indicate the direction(s) 
of the radiation source(s), record exposure, compute danger levels, and 
provide warning, intelligence. and recording facilities. 
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2 THREAT DATA SOURCES 
2.8 CABLE \VARNING 
A suitable choice of primary radar would permit active detection of non-
radiating cables. The radiation from some power cables might permit 
useful passive detection. 
Power cables may carry sufficient current to produce a detectable 
magnetic field, enabling their radiation to be located using field detectors 
within 1 to 2 km, which may offer barely enough time for a slow-flying 
aircraft to take evasive-action. Current detectors are tuned to 50 to 
60 Hz mains power. There is no prospect of detecting non-radiating 
cables reliably without emission. A number of active systems are being 
developed, principally for helicopter use. CO2 scanning laser systems 
lead the field at present" but millimetre wave radars seem practicable 
too. It should prove possible to design the primary radar with the means 
to detect this particular hazard - which has grown in importance recently 
with the advent of wire-guided missiles which may leave festoons of wire 
across valleys. 
2 THREAT DATA SOURCES 
2.9 PILOT 
Threat assessment systems should not expect inputs from the pilot, but 
should provide warnings to him so that he may correlate against observation 
where that is possible. 
The pilot may sense a wide variety of threats. However" he is unlikely to 
be able to inject comprehensive information into the threat assessment 
system for intelligence gathering and correlation with other sensor data, 
owing to his potentially high workload. Such devices as Helmet Mounted 
Sights (HMSs) may enable him to inject a threat direction simply. However, 
categorisation of threats may prove more cumbersome unless, for example, 
the avionics contain a voice processor able to distinguish spoken threat 
categories such as 'Five T62 tanks' or 'ZSU-30-gun - 3 batteries'; this 
may be practicable in the future, but would push the current state-of-the-
art in its airborne application. Ideally, the situation should work in the 
reverse sense, with the threat assessment system detecting threats more 
ably than a busy pilot and drawing his attention to those. threats which are 
considered significant. 
Thus although the pilot is a source of threat data, it would be imprudent to 
depend upon useful inputs from him for correlation. Rather" he should 
correlate external to the threat assessment system by relating warnings 
to observations. 
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2.10 INTELLIGENCE 
Intelligence data will cover a wide variety of topics. but the mean rate of 
data transfer is unlikely to exceed greatly the rate at which the pilot may 
use the resulting information. 
Intelligence data will be pre-briefed or received in flight. probably via 
digital data link. Data will include: 
• No-go zones 
• Targets, ground and air 
• 
Defended areas 
• Weapon details 
• Safe corridors 
• Communications channels 
• Own ground force" details 
• Early warning (EW) data 
• Weather. etc. 
The amount of information which could be received in flight will be 
phenomenal: the capacity of one Joint Tactical Information Distribution 
System (JTIDS) net for example is 30 KbitsJ s and there could be some 20 
or 30 nets. However, scenario studies will limit the scope to that which 
28 
is usable by the avionics processors and the pilot - who has a very low 
information bandwidth of some 2 Hz. Intelligence data could also be trans-
mitted in flight for use on the ground or by other aircraft. to augment 
their target recognition capability for example. 
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3. 1 THE RATIONALE FOR CATEGORISATION 
The threat assessment system will have to satisfy so many constraints that 
flexibility will be the design keynote. 
Threats may be categorised in several ways: 
• Immediacy of effect 
• Operational implications 
• Risk and probability 
• Avoidable/unavoidable 
• Respondable/non-respondable. 
It is vital that the design concepts for a threat assessment system should 
reflect the interest of both the aircrew under direct threat and the need to 
execute the mission in hand. This raises some interesting questions: 
• Should 'minor' threats (whatever that term means) be notified to 
the pilot? He is going to face some risks in any event. 
• Supposing a 'minor threat' threshold is set prior to flight- could 
the pilot be inundated with irrelevant warnings? 
• Whi':!h is most important - the pilot, his aircraft, completion of 
attack or successful return to base? 
• Should the pilot be notified of a threat against which he has no 
countermeasure? 
• Under what conditions should countermeasures be initiated 
automatically? 
• Should the pilot be told that countermeasures have been initiated -
does he always need to know, when he may have other problems 
on his 11ands? 
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3 THREAT CATEGORIES 
3.2 IMMEDIACY OF EFFECT 
The employment of time or immediacy as a sole threat index is not 
practicable, although the data is relevant to relative threat weightings. 
30 
One parameter for comparing threats might be their relative timescales. 
A SAM radar, for example, may change mode indicating that a missile is 
about to be launched which will have an estimated time of tm seconds to 
impact. The attack aircraft might also detect that the tank squadron which 
it is about to engage is ､･ｦ･ｮｾ･､＠ by a ZSU -30 anti-aircraft gun and that the 
aircraft will enter effective gun range in tg seconds. 
This example raises several points: 
• The missile time, t m , will count down inexorably once launched, 
but the time to gun engagement, tg , can be changed by the air-
craft pilot as he manoeuvres. 
• The threat from the missile. once launched, will vary as a com-
plex function of aspect angle, altitude, speed, etc •• but could be 
considered as essentially constant when the missile is fired from 
within its launch success zone. 
• The threat from the gun will also be a complex function, but 
essentially it will increase as the separation from the aircraft 
decreases, being initially (probably) lower than that from the 
missile. 
Clearly, then, while time is a very relevant factor. there is little value' 
in its use as the sole selector of rank-order. or importance. (See 
Topic 3. 4(a) for further analysis of this problem. ) 
It is evident that the logic supporting a threat assessment system will need 
to be comprehensive, adaptable and responsive to changing situations even 
within the timescale of a mission. This flexibility will enable us in 'beg 
the questions', in some senses, since many of the choices will be left to 
the eventual operators of the system. Some queries remain, and will be 
discussed in following topics. 
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3.3 OPERATIONAL EFFECT 
The use of operational effect to categorise threats may prove conditionally 
useful as part of a set of threat parameters. 
Threats might be categorised according to their likely relative effects on 
the success of an operation. A successful operation could be defined as 
one in which the weapon load is effectively launched against a valid target" 
even if the aircraft is lost in the process. This definition will not suffice 
for a photo reconnaissance mission however, where return to base is 
essential at present. 
In either case threat categorisation could be problematical. Small arms 
fire" for example" could start an aircraft fuel fire" which would burn for 
some indeterminate time before the aircraft was affected operationally. 
This indeterminate time could traverse the time boundary marking a 
successful ｭｩｳｳｩｯｮｾ＠ in other words, the threat posed to a mission by 
ground fire is indeterminate, since the effects of ground-fire may take 
some time to accrue. 
Generally" however, the criterion of threat to mission completion is felt 
to be useful. In unemotional terms, a SAM which will arrive after aircraft 
free-fall weapon release is no threat to that part of a mission. It is of 
course a threat to crew ｾ､＠ aircraft, and the problem of warning still has 
to be addressed: EW might permit successful countermeasures but' spoil' 
the aircraft's attack routine, which mayor may not be repeatable. By 
itself" therefore" operational effect is an inadequate parameter" but it 
could well contribute to a more comprehensive threat index. 
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3.4 RISK PROBABILITY AND CONFIDENCE 
The establishment of orders of threat will necessitate the use of statistics 
and models l which will require validation to establish any degree of 
credibility. 
Inevitably, figures will have to be invoked to describe and specify threat 
risk probability and confidence. In order to compare the risk from attack 
by a SAM and an anti-aircraft gun l the following could be considered for 
each threat: 
• Probability of being in range 
• Probability of detection 
• Probability of engagement by the enemy 
• Probability of receiving a hit 
• Probability that one hit will defeat the mission object 
• Variation of probabilities with range and time, etc. 
With so many probabilities involved however, each likely to be poorly 
established, there is little point in performing comprehensive calculations, 
since the quality of the results will only reflect the summed uncertainty 
of each input' parameter. Instead, algoritluns may well serve to provide 
a model sufficiently accurate for comparison. (A simplified example of 
that approach is given in the next topic. ) 
Such models could assess alternative courses of action to reduce the threat, 
and could offer assistance to the pilot. 
The degree of confidence which can be placed in such assessments will be 
of paramount interest, and a compromise will be necessary between 
algorithimic complexity and computing brevity. Computations will be valid 
only at the instant of data sampling and will require real-time updating, so 
that time -consuming optimisation routines would require careful design. 
Es sentiaUy, some confidence will be generated when simulation has been 
validated against realistic scenarios l but at best any such system would 
depend upon intelligence assessment of threat parameters •. At worst 
however l it should prove preferable to leaving the problem for the hard-
pressed pilot. 
One major uncertainty will be that of recognising the potential target. The 
approach most likely to succeed l and which emulates human behaviour I 
is to correlate between different sensors and to build up confidence by 
integrating the repeated (snapshot) recognition process. This will be 
discussed in Topics 5. 5 and 5 .. 8. 
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3.4(a) COMPARATIVE THREAT ASSESSMENT - EXAMPLE 
Comparisons between threats may present conflicting information: an 
intelligent threat assessment system could evaluate alternative tactics to 
reduce the threat, and present options to the pilot. 
Intelligence and aircraft sensors supply the following data (example only): 
Surface-to-air Anti-aircraft 
Missile Gun 
a) Effective range 6000 m 3000 m, but see (b) 
b) Probability of kill/ round 0.25 1000 -:- (Slant range 
. 
in m) 2 
(Both arbitrary 
choices) 
c) Fire rate 1 per 15 s 800 rounds/min 
d) Lethality Single -hit kill Single -hit kill 
Aircraft data and the geometry are shown on the diagram. 
The two apparently similar sets of data present quite different problems: 
the missile problem is principally geometric in nature, with the calculations 
revolving around determining time before entering the lethality hemisphere, 
time in that hemisphere and hence how many missiles can be launched, 
each with the same kill probability. The anti-aircraft gun calculations 
are concerned with calculating the probability of kill which varies 
continuously with slant range to the target, throughout the overpass. 
The results given by the two simple models are interesting in themselves: 
Surface-to-air Anti-aircraft 
Missile Gun 
Time to enter danger zone (s) 16 47 
Time in zone (s) 60 40 
Number of missiles launched/ 
fired 4 533 
Total kill probability estimate 
(assuming each launch is an 0.68 0.773 
independent event) 
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The sample calculations show that there is a 68% probability of being 
killed by the missile battery, starting in +16 s and ending in +76 s, where-
as the anti-aircraft gun threat affords a 77. 3% kill probability starting in 
+47 s and ending in +87 s. So, the gun presents a potentially greater, but 
less imminent, threat. 
The approach employed suggests that the aircraft should carry real time 
simulation models of known threats, should use its sensors to locate and 
recognise those threats, and should analyse the threat implications by 
some form of simulation. The results of the analysis would not necessarily 
mean much to a pilot acting under pressure. However, he would have to 
make a decision based on two conflicting factors - lethality and immediacy. 
The simulation approach could help here, too. The computation could 
assess alternative tactics for presentation to the pilot. For example, he 
could accelerate to 300 ms- l , on the same track. The model would show 
the anti-aircraft gun risk reduced from 0.773 to 0.528 and the missile 
risk reduced from 0.68 to 0.44. The missile risk being less than the gun 
risk, the simulation could further determine a path of minimum risk 
between them, by steering to port, or of reduced overall risk by steering 
around the two zones. So, instead of offering confusing information to the 
pilot, he could be offered a choice of tactics to reduce or avoid the threats. 
If the system were aware of the pilot's objectives, these could also be 
taken into account. 
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SAM EFFECTIVE HEMISPHERE PLAN VIEW 
\ 
/ GUN EFFECTIVE 
ＮＭ｟ＯｾＯ＠ / HEMISPHERE 
/ 
'-I'-___ ANTI-AIRCRAFT 
GUN 
SPEED : 1S0ms-' 
HEIGHT : 100 m 
Simplified Gun Effects Model 
For gun, kill probability = ｾ＠ Iround 
d1 
where: 
d is instantaneous slant range from gun to aircraft 
and: 
k is an empirical constm t. 
Then: 
2 J....2 1 2' 111. d = (R - 2 vt .tt - h - s + v t ) 2 
and overall probability of a hit: 
P Q 1 _ [ 11" (1 _ k ) ] ｾ＠ -2 vt.JR2 h 2 _S 2 ＫｾｴＱ＠
as t varies from 0 to ｾ＠ JR2 -h2 - S2 \n intervals of llf, 
v 
where: 
and: 
f is the gun fire rate in rounds! s 
R is the effective gun range 
v is the aircraft velocity 
h is aircraft height 
s is acros s -trac k mis s distance to the gun. 
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3.5 AVOIDABLE/UNAVOIDABLE THREATS 
Unavoidable severe threats may be considered as candidates for display on 
a central warning system. 
Once it is established within the aircraft system that a threat is imminent. 
it may be categorised according to whether it need be experienced or not. 
A missile which is within a few seconds of impacting the aircraft. and 
against which countermeasures either do not exist or have failed. 
represents a high. unavoidable risk. 
Attacking a tank squadron, point defended by SAM and anti-aircraft gun 
batteries, represents a risk which the pilot's mission may decree should 
be taken. The risks differ in that the second is strictly aVOidable, and a 
'logical' system design could therefore sensibly recommend that the 
attack be broken-off if the risk exceeds some threshold. A logical system, 
in the first case, might recommend that the pilot take some drastic action. 
This type of unavoidable risk perhaps enters the area of immediate danger 
warning. and is on a par with an engine fire ｷ｡ｲｮｩｮｧｾ＠ it is therefore in a 
. separate category and could be considered for special display priority. 
3 THREAT CATEGORIES 
3. 6 COUNTERMEASURES 
Threats can be categorised by the availability of countermeasures. and by 
the need to initiate such countermeasures manually or automatically. 
Threats may be divided into those which can be countered and those which 
cannot. To some extent this division may be set by the pilot. since he 
may elect to 'run silent' and not use jammers, so that an approaching IR . 
missile might be in either group according to pilot selection. 
Countermeasures may also be considered for automatic initiation. The 
principle criterion for judgement could be response time; a threat for 
which a countermeasure is available and permitted by pilot . selection may 
be detected with such short notice that the pilot could not reasonably be 
expected to assess a display and respond in time. A severe threat which 
is imminent and to which the pilot has not responded (although notified) 
might be considered for automatic response in some circumstances. 
Clearly. there is a sensitive divide between allowing the system to respond 
'at the last instant' in order to preserve the pilot and his aircraft. and 
usurping the pilot's control by anticipating his response. There need be 
no difficulty if the system is flexibly designed and developed with co-
operation from operationally experienced crews. 
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4 THREAT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 
CHARACTERISTICS 
4.1 THE PILOT INTERFACE 
The introduction of an automated threat assessment facility must be 
accompanied by a comprehensive6 yet simply operated6 system for 
configuring the facility to suit the individual pilot6 the particular phase of 
flight and the contemporary threat environment. 
The severe operating conditions forecast for low-level battle zone flying 
in the 1990s will impose a high workload on the pilot of a single seat 
aircraft. Survival may necessitate high speeds at altitudes lower than 
those currently achieved with terrain following systems. Pilot-use of 
terrain screening may involve manual terrain avoidance in -two axes. 
In addition he will be faced with a burgeoning variety of threat sensors and 
weapons designed to detect and impede his progress towards his target. 
The pilot will therefore be faced with a widening range of tasks 6 and some 
assessments indicate that his workload will be unacceptably high. The 
obvious solution is to provide some levels of automated assistance in those 
areas where such assistance is both practicable and acceptable to the pilot. 
These two factors are not necessarily compatible6 and it seems reasonable 
to suppose that pilots will wish to employ much of their time flying head-
UP6 when in the battle zone6 in order to maintain the safety of their aircraft 
and an awareness of their situation vis-d:-vis other aircraft targets and 
threats. Ideally, therefore, automated assistance should be directed to 
assisting them with these principal tasks 6 head-up. Puring other phases 
of operations. and during exercises to build confidence in automated 
systems6 head-level or head-down displays may prove valuable and 
practicable. 
A concept emerges which favours two types of display: 
• Head-up presentation of essential data relating to aircraft 
situ ation 6 targets and threats only 
• Head-level and head-down displays which may be referred to, 
where supportive information is available6 to confirm or expand 
the head-up data. 
Moreover. the data presented head-up must be filtered to present only that 
'of interest to the pilot'; herein may lie difficulties6 since the term is 
essentially subjective; the pilot may prescribe parameters before6 or 
during early phases of6 a sortie which will define his limits of interest. 
Threats6 for example6 could be prescribed by significance level. 
imminence, potentiailethalitY6 closeness of encounter etc. Thereafter 
threats as such, need not appear head-up; instead, threat reduction 
measures could be presented to the pilot in the form of advised headings 
or steer signals6 or as an advice to initiate countermeasures. Even the 
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last category. initiation of countermeasures. need not appear if the pilot 
had confidence in their automatic initiation and had so configured the 
system. 
The threat environment is ､ｹｮ｡ｭｩ｣ｾ＠ not only are new weapons being 
continually introduced. but ｮ･ｾ＠ data is constantly being discovered about 
existing weapon performance. Moreover, the siting of threats in a battle 
zone may be known to the pilot through a combination of sensor data and 
. intelligence. Intelligence may be stale, so that a mission planned on such 
information may need to be replanned in real-time, using either observed 
data or information received in flight. The threat assessment system. if 
it is to be effective. must therefore .be highly flexible# since it must: 
• Accept new target/threat parameters easily. in its operational 
role., as well as during development 
• Correlate poorly registered intelligence. sensor. and pilot data 
in 'real-time' 
• Adapt to 'rules of the day' or even 'rules of the instant' under 
pilot control which may be imposed before and during a sortie 
• Provide high integrity advice to the pilot. and! or initiate 
countermeasures with similarly high levels of confidence. 
The next topic examines some control and display implications in more 
detail. 
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THREAT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 
CHARACTERISTICS 
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS 
Integrating the threat assessment system equipments should reduce the 
number of separate equipment controls and displays, but some will be 
needed for the integrated ｳｹｳｴ･ｭｾ＠ in particular, a Helmet Mounted Sight 
(HMS), Inject/interrogate, marker control, a head-Ievel/ -down threat 
display format and' attention-getters' seem likely req.lirements. 
The threat assessment system will bring together a variety of facilities, 
including possibly: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Forward-looking Infra- red (FLIR) 
Radar 
Radar warning 
Missile warning 
Laser warning 
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)/NATO Identification 
System (NIS) 
Cable Warning 
Manoeuvre Monitor, etc. 
Countermeasures - Jammers, flares, emission control, etc. 
Some of these have other uses; radar could have a mapping/ navigation 
role, for example.' Generally, however, their combined purpose can be 
described as 'Target and Threat Detection, Location, ;Recognition, 
Identification and Response'. From the pilot's point of .view, combined 
functions may be grouped as: 
a) Broad scan for threats and targets of opportunity. 
b) Search for planned targets, with evasion/ reduction of threats. 
c) Attack following a reduced-risk flight profile vis-a-vis terrain 
and threats. 
Category (a) might be applied during transit to, from and over the Forward 
Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), and into enemy territory, and implies 
no detailed pre-knowledge of enemy dispositions. Sensors would be making 
wide searches, and the pilot may wish to direct them towards visual 
contacts or detail of interest on radar or FLIR displays; there is an 
implied need for an HMS with an inject facility to mark spatial angles of 
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interest, and pilot controlled markers on radar, FLIR and possibly head-
up display (HUD). Recognition of a threat implies the need for counter-
measures; the pilot may wish to assess the threat himself and store/transmit 
threat data for intelligence purposes. The need thus emerges for some form 
of threat assessment display, for use when workload permits. The display 
need not be complex, but should encourage simple recognition of the threat 
situation, and enable the pilot to mark and store threats of interest. 
Countermeasures will be related to the threat; the display may conveniently 
indicate countermeasure plans formulated within the system, for pilot 
approval. These would include: planned threat reduction tracks; emission 
control advice; flare/ chaff ejection advice; and IR/ radar jamming advice. 
Such a display is deemed necessary for peacetime training and to foster 
confidence. An automatic mode is also suggested which would initiate 
countermeasures other than evasion. In either case, 'attention-getters' 
may be required, plus manual initiate facilities. 
Categories (b) and (c) imply planned operations in an area of high threat 
density. The pilot may have little time for head-down displays and would 
concentrate on finding a relatively safe and effective run- in to the target. 
He may require to know when the target has been acquired (if it is sensor-
discernible), and to make best use of local terrain and knowledge of threats 
to improve his prospects for survival. While the threat assessment system 
might be able to plan a reduced risk run-in to the target, it seems unlikely 
that such a path could usefully incorporate lmowledge of the terrain or that 
the pilot would wish to trust such a plan even if it were available. A 
compromise would seem necessary. in which the pilot would fly to take 
screening advantage from the terrain while the threat assessment system 
would advise which flight-path options offered .least risk. 
Thus while any steer display must sensibly operate head-up, a head-level 
or head-down display may still prove necessary to allow occasional pilot 
assessment of his overall threat situation. Moveover the threat reduction 
plan must operate in real-time. to give the optimum route to the target 
from any present position. Depending on the degree of sophistication 
required. this route could accommodate sequential targets. and could 
re-order them in real-time. 
The warning sensors may provide large quantities of data in areas of high 
threat density. It would be unreasonable to expect the pilot to assess all 
such data. and some filtering would seem appropriate, particularly since 
their range is such that detected threats could be many miles distant. 
Independent threat sensor displays are not therefore considered vital; 
instead. the threat assessment system should act as the correlator/ filter 
and should present data of immediate or imminent interest. The suggested 
head-level head-down display will satisfy some of this aim. but the need 
is foreseen for 'attention-getters' to warn of approaching missiles or 
hazards. These could be specific. for example pre- recorded vocal 
messages. or form part of a central warning system. 
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Positive identification of targets prior to attack may be required by the 
Rules of Engagement. A suspected target may be observed visually by 
FLIR or by radar. Once marked by the pilot, he may need some form of 
interrogate control, which could be associated with the marker button - on 
a rocker switch for example. 
The system sensors may need to be selective; radar or laser warning may 
need to be programmed to seek particular types of radiation. Generally, 
such requirements will either be pre-briefed or well established and seem 
unlikely candidates for prime cockpit panel area. 
As the threat assessment system design concept emerges in the next 
section, it will be seen that the pilot may also require the ability to spe cify 
some of the processor parameters, including: 
• Selection of learn and run modes 
• Setting of warning time and clearance factors 
• Selection of Single sensor data in multi-sensor mode etc 
• Selection of areas of interest for fine search 
There will also be a potential to display tabular ordered lists of targets 
and threats should they be required. 
The indication of targets and threats on FLIRs and radars seems most 
likely to take the form of simple characters of alphas superimposed over 
the displays in the correct spatial position. Thus a tank might appear as 
a letter T and a SAM battery might appear, 'say, as an S with continually 
reversing field indicating its dual target/threat role. In the air-to-air 
role, the radar may present an azimuth/ elevation C- scope display (in 
addition to a plan or B- scope range/ azimuth or frequency/azimuth display), 
It may prove useful to scale radar and FLIR so that their respective 
displays can be readily compared, or to produce a composite FLIR/ radar 
C- scope display at long- range, in order to reduce the number of 
independent displays. Such displays could also have recognition alphas 
overlayed on targets/threats. 
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4 THREAT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 
CHARACTERISTICS 
4.3 CORRELATION BETWEEN SENSORS 
Sensor correlation is essential for effective threat, location and recognition. 
Automatic threat recognition is an area of concentrated research and 
development effort at present. Few working systems have emerged from 
the laboratories, but those that are operating tend to employ more than 
one sensor. Correlation between sensors may not be simple, but it 
offers greater confidence. Single sensor data from, say, a FLIR might 
detect hotspots at long-range, but it is more difficult to analyse that 
hotspot with sufficient confidence to categorise it as emanating from a 
particular type of vehicle. Efforts are proceeding along the path of Single 
sensor signal processing, and it may well offer ｧｾ･｡ｴ･ｲ＠ promise for long-
range recognition. At shorter ranges, ｨｯｷ･ｶｾｲＮ＠ where two or more 
sensor inputs can be correlated.- a more confident recognition will be 
possible. A threat assessqlent system design may therefore be expected 
to contain both single sensor and multiple sensor capabilities. 
Threat sensors will include a variety of specialised devices in addition to 
imagers and radars. Radar and laser warning seem likely, in the fore-
seeable future, to give good recognition selectivity but poor spatial 
resolution. So, a radar warning system might recognise that the aircraft 
is being scanned by a particular Target Illumination Radar, but might 
locate that radar with an angular accuracy of no better than, say, 100. A 
radar might be able to search within that cone of uncertainty to locate a 
target to within 10 or so, and provide range data. Thus two types of sensor 
correlation emerge: 
a) Parallel correlation between sensors providing similar data but 
perhaps in dilferent spectral bands 
b) Sequential correlation in which the sensors provide complementary 
data, with one sensor effectively alerting the others. 
The threat system design must accommodate both types of correlation if it 
is to be effective at location and recognition. (Note the parallel to human 
behaviour, where a) might correspond to optical and aural data, while b) 
might correspond to peripheral flicker trigger followed by head-turn and 
detailed foveal examination. ) 
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4 THREAT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 
CHARACTERISTICS 
4.4 RESPONSE TO FAILURE 
Target/threat recognition introduces a new category of failure, failure to 
recognise with sufficient confidence, which requires special consideration 
owing to its safety implications. 
A threat assessment system should 'degrade gracefully', provide an 
acceptable low level of incorrect outputs, and should make apparent any 
failures. This last point is particularly important since failure to display 
a threat may encourage the pilot to follow a dangerous route which he . 
could easily avoid. 
The system should therefore contain redundancy, should select 'best' 
answers, and should provide 'best' advice. These requirements are con-
sistent with a multi-sensor configuration which can operate in single-
sensor modes. Superimposed on such a system will be means for: 
• Computing 'best' answers 
• Suppressing secondary outputs referring to the same threat. to 
reduce traffic and display loads 
• Detecting partial failure and suppressing or replacing the 
associated threat data 
• Detecting inability to provide data of adequate confidence 
• Advising the pilot of such inability 
• Detecting and indicating failure. 
This list includes the unusual category, which is neither success nor 
failure, of 'lack of confidence'. For example, the system could be 
designed to display only threats which had been recognised with greater 
than some arbitrary fixed confidence level. In a particular situation the 
aircraft might be entering a threat zone which had been recognised. but 
with a degree of confidence just less than that fixed level. The threat 
would be encountered but not displayed, while the system would not have 
failed in any conventional sense. Clearly such inflexible rules should give 
way to more elegant display criteria. 
The detection of routine equipment failures would be effected using the now 
conventional practices of passive and active on-line monitoring. built-in 
test facilities, etc. In some instances. the high packing density of micro-
processor devices may allow built-in redundancy so that apparent 
reliabilities may be considerably extended. 
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5 PROCESSING 
5. 1 SENSOR INFORMATION CONTENT OF ELECTRO-OPTICAL 
SENSORS 
44 
Sensible upper limits may be established for the information and capacity 
of future communication channels such as colour TV, thermal imagers and 
other EO displays. 
Information content (1) and capacity (C) are defined by Shannon as: 
I = T log2 n (bits) , C = .!. log2 n (bits/ s) T T 
where: 
T is the period of receiving data 
T is the minimum interval over which signals can change 
and: 
n is the number of distinguishable levels which could occur in time T • 
These simple relationships can be used to define the upper limit of 
information content which can be produced by various sensors, as follows. 
An EO TV display consists of N lines, an aspect ratio of 'a' (i. e. a x N 
black and white elements per line) and a frame rate of p/ s. Thus the 
number of elements is: 
N a 2 • 1 N x (a x 2") = 2' N , drawn ln p s, thus: 
the information content (I) = ｾ＠ N2 log 2 n bits, and: 
the system capacity (C) = ｾＮｰＧｎＲｉｯｧＲｮ＠ bit/s 
The value of n relates to the distinguishable variable states which can be 
displayed in the interval T. For an EO display this could be 'b' brightness 
levels, and 'c' shades of colour or temperature (radiation polarisation 
angle is not generally detected). The full expressions for maximum 
information content and capacity become: 
_a 2 () _a 2 I - 2 N log 2 b. c , C - 2 P N log2 (b. c) 
The number of raster lines displayed in an aircraft is likely to be higher 
than the domestic 580 lines (625 -line convention) because the pilot will . 
observe the display from as little as 25 cm. At this distance eye resolution 
is about 0.1 mm, so that a 10 cm high display would require some 1000 
lines to prevent individual lines from being resolved. Technical problems 
are likely to limit the number of lines to about 800, however. 
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Typical figures for the tv,,·o formulae would be as follows: 
Aspect Ratio a = ｾ＠
Number of lines N = BOO 
Frame rate = 25/s 
Brightness levels b = 7 
Colour shades S = 30. 
For a colour TV .. the information content per frame then becomes: 
I = 3.29 X 106 bits ( = 3.29 Mbits) 
and the capacity (C) = B2.3 Mbits/s. 
For a black and white thermal imager: 
S = 1 
I = 1.20 Mbits. 
C = 30 Mbits/ s 
These figures should not be confused with system bandwidth equivalent to 
!; rather. they indicate the maximum storage and processing tasks 
ｾｳｳｯ｣ｩ｡ｴ･､＠ with the ｳ･ｮｳｯｲｳｾ＠ so a single frame-store for an BOO-line full 
colour TV would require a maximum storage capacity of 3.29 Mbits. This 
upper limit is based on the premise that each pixel in the format contains 
independent data. which is generally untrue when terrain is imaged or 
targets are tracked. Some estimates suggest that domestic TV displays 
are. on average. well over 90% redundant in their content. (The concepts 
of data compression will be discussed in Topic 5. 3.) Current research 
work by the Hitachi Company has just produced a full colour frame store 
for 192 lines and 256 elements per line occupying only 18 kbytes. using an 
8-hit microprocessor to pack the data. This corrpares favourably with the 
usual commercial colour TV frame store of 2 Mbits for about 510 lines 
and indicates that research is active in this area. 
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5 PROCESSING 
5. 2 SENSOR INFORMATION CONTENT OF RADAR SENSORS 
The maximum information content available from an active radar is related 
to its particular function/mode/range, but in broad terms is greater than 
that obtainable from a passive sensor. 
For active radar a different approach is required to that outlined in the 
previous topic. The diagram shows a sector swept out by a radar beam. 
The number of discrete elements in the swept volume is given simply by: 
e cf> R 
6(jx 6cf> x oR 
These elements represent discrete echo locations, and the echoes can have 
a number of distinguishable levels, or cells, within the measurable 
parameters of amplitude, polarisation and frequency or phase. 
At present radar echo polarisation data is usually ignored, although the 
need to recognise and track targets is likely to change that; observing the 
response from terrain and targets in differing polarisations can provide 
useful data. The number of distinguishable polarisation angles (l/J) might 
have a value of about 18, to give angle measurements to within 100 • 
Amplitude data relates to target emissivity, reflectance, orientation and 
size, and is clearly complex in nature. The number of distinguishable 
levels may be about seven owing to the relatively high noise associated 
with such received signals. 
Frequency data will prove increaSingly valuable for moving target indication 
(clutter suppression), and doppler beam sharpening, etc. The techniques 
have different requirements. For air-to-air use, relative velocities of 
4000 knots (2078 m/ s) can be anticipated and accuracy of measurement is 
limited by noise. sampling rate and the separation between frequency cells. 
A typical upper limit might be, say, 2048 frequency cells, giving a 
relative velocity accuracy of better than 2 m/s (3.75 knots). For air-to-
ground use against stationary targets, doppler beam sharpening could be 
valuable, effectively to reduce azimuth beamwidth. A 6 m-Iong tank at 
3000 m subtends 2 mrad, so that a 10 radar beam (17.5 mrad) needs to be 
subdivided into about ten parts in order to resolve the target. Thus ten 
frequency cells might suffice, f = 10. 
Typical inforrrntion content and capacities for two notional radars are 
shown opposite. Compared with EO and radar, other sensors present 
small volumes of information, although that information might be uniquely 
valuable, such as radar or missile warning. The capacity of such 
information channels is nonetheless minor in terms of impact on 
proceSSing requirements. 
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NUMBER OF RESOLVABLE ELEMENTS = R X (J X cP 
hR he hCfJ 
Fig.5·2 RADAR SWEPT VOLUME 
Information = 68a x 6cfJefJ x ｾ＠ log2 (a IjJ f) bits 
Capacity = i bitsfs 
TYPICAL VALUES FOR RADARS 
Ground Target Air Target 
Search Search 
e 80° 800 
69 10 00 
ｾ＠ 800 400 
6cfJ 80° 10 
R 10 Ian 20 Ian 
oR 2.3 m Sm 
a Distinguishable amplitude levels 7 7 
1/1 Distinguishable polarisation angles 18 1 
f Distinguishable frequency cells 10 2048 
I (per single 'frame' 3.58 Mbits 147. Mbits 
C (upper limit) 10-100 Mbitsfs 50- 350 Mbitsf s 
Note: In principle. the capacity of airborne radar links could be much 
higher; at present it is limited partly by mechanical scanning 
constraints. which may be alleviated with the advent of electronic 
scanning in airborne radars. The capacity required of such 
systems may then be dictated by the rate at which the data can 
be processed within the receiver. 
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5.3 DATA COMPRESSION 
Large amounts of data justify the employment of data compression 
techniques, which can be quite simple in essence. Although storage 
capacity and transmission bandwidth can then also be reduced, some loss 
of spatial resolution must be anticipated. 
The amount of data potentially available from EO and radar sensors is so 
large that some form of data compression will undoubtedly be necessary. 
Data compression can be applied effectively to imaging devices in particular 
because of their high redundancy. Effective compression can Significantly 
reduce storage capacity and the bandwidth needed for tranmission. 
A wide variety of techniques is available: the general public is now familiar 
with satellite images of the earth which take the form of patchworks of 
small rectangles: these are produced by a data compression technique. 
Most techniques appear to reduce the entropy of the received signal with 
varying degrees of localisation. Essentially such techniques divide frames 
into groups of pixels horizontally and groups of lines vertically, and then 
examine the signals within the groups. 
Figure 5.3 shows how five successive groups of five pixels each migh:t be 
processed along a single line. The top diagram shows the data to be 
compressed: the centre diagram shows the linear regression line 
representing each group of five pixels: the bottom diagram shows the 
reconstitution (by interpolation) in black, against the original in red. The 
approximation is evidently reasonable •. The original data was specified by 
twenty-six pieces of information - 'y' co-ordinates for twenty-six pixels. 
The regression line approximation required only ten pieces of information 
- 'y' for the start and finish of each of five lines. The compreSSion ratio 
in this simple example is therefore ig = 2.6, which could be highly 
significant in terms of storage or transmission bandwidth. The recon-
stituted data erred by 11 squares in 150 = 7. 3%. More sophisticated 
techniques are employed in some applications. The regression analysiS 
need not produce a line: a curve or arc may be represented by polynomial 
coefficients which may still be less in number than the pixels they 
represent. Successive regression arcs can be designed to start and finish 
at one value of x and y, cutting the storage requirement ｡ｧ｡ｩｮｾ＠ (the 
technique then becomes known as I spline approximation'). Data reduction 
may operate across lines as well as along lines and may compress frames 
together, and so on. 
The techniques vary in their compression ratio and the validity of 
reconstitution. Generally, by reducing signal entropy, some data will be 
lost and with it some spatial resolution. This may be acceptable where 
there is strong correlation between adjacent pixels. Decreases in spatial 
resolution can be offset using edge enhancement techniques. 
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5 PROC ESSING 
5.4 DATA REDUCTION AND FRESHNESS 
Data may be reduced by discarding irrelevant portions, providing relevant 
details can be specified and detected. Convolution can discard stale data 
and provides a learning capability. 
The previous topic indicated that some forms of data could be compressed 
without significant loss of information; the advantages of reduced band-
width and storage capacity could offset minor loss. 
However. the amounts of information potentially available from sensors 
(see Topics 5. 1 and 5.2) would still be vast, to the extent that irrelevant 
data would need to be discarded prior, say, to correlation between sensors 
for threat confirmation. There is a number of techniques ｡ｶ｡ｩＱ｡｢ｬ･ｾ＠ their 
general theme is to identify characteristics of interest and to transfer 
these in preference to other information. For example, edges could be 
transmitted while surface detail with no changes, or small-scale variationE 
might ｮｯｴｾ＠ thermal images might be reduced by selecting detail at 
particular energy levels or radiation frequencies: radar targets might be 
selected from within a certain range ｢ｲ｡｣ｫ･ｴｾ＠ etc. Alternatively, data 
could be transferred ｰ･ｲｩｯ､ｩ｣｡ｬｬｹｾ＠ an image pattern might be stored only 
once in every 5 or 10 frames for example, so reducing mean processing 
rate requirements. Each technique has its application and incurs a 
reduction in information entropy which may. or may not, be acceptable 
in a particular case. The elimination of 'stale' information is also 
necessary: this can be carried out using some form of the so-called 
convolution integral: 
g(t} = j;(T}*h(t-T} dT •.• (I) 
-00 
or its digital equivalent: 
co 
g(t) ｾ＠ 2: f(n.6. T) 0 (t-n.6.T ).6. T 
n=-oo 
t 
Equation (1) is generally reduced to: g(t) = !f(T)*h(t-T) dT 
o 
whe re: h(t - T) is the system impulse response. 
• •• (2) 
The convolution integral may be thought of as a progressive weighting 
function, with more weight being given to current than recent samples, 
'older' samples being progressively reduced in effect. It has a similar 
effect to Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) persistence. 
The application of a convolution process in a system for compressing 
successive image frames would gradually erase stale information as it 
overlayed new signals. This would give the frame store an ability tanta-
mount to learning from what it 'saw'. 
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5.5 TARGET SIGNAL ACQUISITION 
Target signal acquisition is a sequential process which is best achieved 
using several sensors. The quality of recognition performance improves 
both with time and practice. 
Acquiring a target signal implies detection and recognition. In the context 
of this topic it is initially valueless to distinguish between a target and a 
threat, since in many cases targets will be threats and vice versa. 
The ability to detect a target automatically will depend on certain target 
characteristics: 
• Movement relative to stationary background 
• Movement radial to sensor (radar) 
• Characteristic shape and colour (visual spectrum spatial 
distribution and intensity) 
• Thermal shape (thermal spectrum spatial distribution) 
• Thermal intensity spectral distribution (temperature and surface 
characteristics) 
• Electromagnetic emissions (other than thermal and visual) 
• Etc. 
Human 'target' acquisition is highly developed, and possibly therefore 
worthy of emulation; it comprises a number of steps: 
a) Coarse detection of area of interest. This is generally achieved 
by locating a sound, sensing movement at the periphery of vision 
or from memory. ' 
b) Close search in area of interest. 
c) Tracking moving object to give stationary retinal image against 
moving background. 
d) Target recognition against some a priori stored model (memory 
of similar objects), and correlation between sensors (ears and 
eyes, rates of sightline movement, range estimates, etc.) 
e) Repeated correlation between target parameters and stored know-
ledge of targets. 
For example, a distant 'helicopter' travelling at Ml. 0 would be rejected 
as not realisable, and a fixed-wing aircraft would be considered instead. 
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Similarly, a fixed-wing aircraft in hover would be a Harrier or would be 
rejected. In both cases, recognition is not based on 'single-shot recognition', 
but employs an integration process to establish behaviour between 'frames' 
followed by an assessment of results. 
The target, or threat, detection/recognition process to be built into an 
aircraft would sensibly work along broadly similar lines to the human 
system. 
• 'Coarse' sensors such as radar warning and intelligence (which 
may be stale or inaccurate) may give early clues to target 
location. Additionally, high speed scans of areas of interest, 
and the use of MTI to highlight movement, would pick up hot or 
moving objects rapidly: some of these might be targets. 
• Areas of interest may be scanned more carefully using magnification, 
more precise algorithms, correlation between sensors, etc. 
• Tracking gates may be set about objects to stabilise them against 
movement of sightline or background. 
• A multi-sensor image pattern of the target may be formed and 
compared with stored data to classify the target as being a tank, 
a jeep, a fighter, etc., or possibly to classify as being a 
particular type of tank, vehicle or aircraft. 
The processes will involve correlation and ｰｲｯ｢｡｢ｩｬｩｴｹｾ＠ but then, human 
performance is far less than perfect in such circumstances. The quality 
of recognition will improve with increased tracking time and best use of 
sensor data. 
The human 'system' does not come ready-made, and practised operators 
achieve much better detection and recognition performance than those new 
to the task. The complexity of the task makes this understandable. On 
the same basis it would be prudent to design an aircraft system both with a 
basic set of target data, and with the ability to learn, to adapt, and to 
recognise new targets as they arise. This may not be quite so difficult as 
it would appear, provided the capability is built -in from the beginning. 
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5.6 ACQUISITION TECHNIQUES FOR STATIONARY TARGETS 
Many techniques are available, but good automatic performance may 
require a heuristic design. 
Target acquisition by any means (human or automatic) requires that the 
target should present recognisable characteristics. For example, man-
made objects often exhibit straight edges connected by areas of constant 
intensity. One technique used with TV or FLIR imagery is to search for 
these characteristics. The pixels in each raster line can be searched for 
sudden changes of, or plateaus in, intensity. The line may then be divided 
into 'segments' of interest, which are stored for comparison with adjacent 
lines and successive frames. The display field store may also be viewed 
in the Z-axis ｩｮｴ･ｮｳｩｴｹｾ＠ if the intensity of each pixel is stored as a number, 
then a scene may be reviewed to observe all objects presenting a prescribed 
intensity level. A 3-bit intensity word enables eight independent intensity 
level views to be presented, but of course they could be presented in 
selected pairs, threes, etc. Different intensity levels offer useful ､｡ｴ｡ｾ＠
for example there is a correlation between signal magnitude and distance. 
(Scene dynamic range is typically about 1000: 1, compared with a CRT 
range of some 20: 1. ) 
Colour contrast is used very successfully by the human eye to highlight 
tar gets against their background. The human eye can distinguish 130 hues 
across the visible ｳｰ･｣ｴｲｵｭｾ＠ a machine is unlikely to match that performanc 
in real-time. More useful, particularly at night, is the ability to determine 
the wavelength corresponding to the maximum intensity of thermal 
radiation from a body. This wavelength corresponds directly to black body 
radiation temperature. 
Using Wien's Displacement Law: 
A x T = 2. 9 x 10- 3 mK 
max 
Using spectral filters in the thermal band therefore, corresponds to dividing 
a viewed scene into temperature bands. In addition to the obvious merit of 
discriminating hot objects, this technique can be coupled with those above 
to look for edges, contrast plateaus, etc. at a variety of temperatures. 
Additionally, many man-made surfaces are flat and tend to reflect sky or 
sun radiation, which are both ｣ｨ｡ｲ｡｣ｴ･ｲｩｳｴｩ｣ｾ＠ sky temperature may vary 
between ambient clouds (237 K) and deep space (4 K), while sun temperature 
is of course, some 6000 K. A flat surface reflecting a clear night sky, 
for example, will emit a complex pattern compriSing internally generated 
thermal energy and reflected sky energy, both radiations being ､ｩｦｦ･ｲ･ｮｴｩ｡ｬｬｾ＠
absorbed by the atmosphere. The contrast between this pattern and its 
background may act as a means of detecting and recognising an object. 
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The features which comprise a particular man-made object may be con-
Sidered under several headings: it will emit and reflect radiations; it will 
present an intensity of signal relating to ｲ｡ｮｧ･ｾ＠ its dimensions will have a 
limit m ratio (length over heighth it may have hot spots in particular areas 
and at known ｴ･ｭｰ･ｲ｡ｴｵｲ･ｳｾ＠ and so on. Usmg these and similar techniques 
it is possible to detect non-moving targets against a background. and to 
classify them broadly into categories with some degree of assurance. The 
recognition process inevitably involves correlation (as in humans) between 
observed and stored characteristics. 
Systems presently divide into automatic target cuers. and semi-automatic 
systems. In the second case, a human operator may detect an object of 
possible interest, and cause the system to track it. This has potential 
advantage if the system has a recording ｭ･､ｩｵｭｾ＠ the characteristics of an 
object which is later confirmed as a target can be learnt by the machine. 
Since an object will present an almost mfinite number of aspect angles and 
dynamic contrasts, a heuristic technique may be preferable, or a valuable 
adjunct. to a pre-programmed system. Once the system has learnt those 
characteristics which correspond to targets of interest, it may then 
acquire targets automatically. By this means the system can learn about 
new targets, new camouflage techniques. etc. 
This topic has merely touched upon some of the techniques for acquiring 
stationary targets: many system deSigns are currently in development 
and some are in early service. The next 5 to 10 years should see a vast 
increase in operational systems which until now have been held back by 
the large amounts of storage and computing needed to operate in real-time. 
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5. 7 COGNITIVE MAPS 
The core of the threat assessment system should be a 3 -D map similar in 
concept to that stored and used in the human brain. 
Humans generate an internal cognitive map, which is a 3-D mental image of 
the space surrounding them. By this means it is possible to walk through 
unknown woods. or a strange town, taking a roughly circular path to 
arrive at the starting pOint. Similarly, it is possible to catch a ball with-
out watching hands, since their position is known ., instinctively". 
Humans walking along a busy street carry a mental zone in front of them 
such that avoiding action must be taken if another human or an object enters 
that zone. The zone accommodates intentions to turn right or left, and 
objects moving at different relative speeds. 
This zone has been investigated by researchers. who find it to be broadly 
elliptical in plan, with the walker roughly at one focus and walking in the 
direction of the other focus. A similar system is operated when driving 
cars: the elegant sophistication of the human system can be observed at 
busy roundabouts. 
Clearly it would be difficult to match the flexibility of the human cognitive 
map in an avionic system, but the principles may be emulated since the 
machine objectives will be similar to those of a human in combat. 
A 3-D map may be established in memory, with aircraft sensors indicating 
current position, height, track and velocity vector. Intelligence data may 
be written into the map, while sensors can present data for 'imprint' on 
the map. 
A zone, or zones, of interest may be generated on this avionic cognitive 
map. according to the systems knowledge of aircraft speed, track, height 
and objectives. Similarly. threats/targets will have a threat zone -
moving and elliptical in the case of enemy aircraft. When zones overlap 
a threat exists. with degree of overlap relating to degree of threat. 
This avionic cognitive map should form the core or hub of the threat 
assessment system, against which all other data may be related to measure 
its threat significance. The map will require inputs not only from 
navigation sensors but also from intelligence and from threat sensors: 
such information should be presented in the form of threat location speed, 
track, etc., and threat type, so that the appropriate dynamic threat map 
may be generated. While part of this cognitive map may be displayed, 
display is not an essential feature. and indeed much of the map 
information may not be amenable to display. A simple plan display might 
prove useful to the pilot, but in essence the system should operate 
automatically. 
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The figure shows a conceptual plan display, with the avionic system(s) at 
the bottom, heading towards the top of the page. The aircraft is surrounded 
by two zones, a dotted threshold zone and a solid threat zone, which will be 
examined more closely in the next topic. 
The missile system to the right would present an impending threat. The 
size of the enemy threat zones will take account of current aircraft height 
and vector. A climbing attitude will reduce the gun and missile threat 
circle diameters, for example, but may increase the fighter threat zone. 
Ideally, the system should be able to relate terrain at ground level to threat, 
since threats may be reduced in effectiveness by flying down a convenient 
valley, for example. However it is not likely that such sophisticated 
capability will be totally realisable in the immediate future, although a 
terrain contour map could be used to cue the pilot that such choices exist. 
If the aircraft system, depicted as S on the diagram, steered to port to 
avoid the missile threat, SIS two zones would also swing to the left and the 
guns (Z) would appear as threats. 
System knowledge might include T 1 and T2 as targets to be engaged, in 
which case the system would compute a path through the defences, as 
shown. F, the enemy fighter, will have moved from its current position 
as T 2 is attacked and will be in front of S, which is therefore unlikely to be 
taken by surprise. 
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5 PROCESSING 
5. 7 (a) THREAT ZONE CHARACTERISTICS 
The threat and 'own-aircraft' zones in the cognitive map will be designed 
to give threat advice relating to both imminence and potency of threat. The 
system will generate 'safe' paths between threats. 
The previous topic presented a cognitive map concept. The zones which 
might be generated within this map must be related to threat urgency: 
this is taken to mean some measure which accounts for both imminence and 
degree of risk. For example l a longer period spent in some zone X might 
be less of a risk than a shorter time in zone Y. representing a highly 
accurate weapon. 
The threat zones of the cognitive map therefore represent lethality volumes 
in three dimensions while kill probability at any point within the zone is 
held as a fourth parameter. 
The 'self' ellipses consist of a larger. dotted, threshold zone and a 
smaller solid clearance zone. Overlap between the volumes of the thres-
hold zone and a threat zone would cause a 'minimum risk flight path' 
routine to search for a path which would avoid overlap between the threat 
and clearance zones. In effect the routine would probe between the known 
threats for a minimum risk path to the target. Risk levels may be select-
able to reduce time to reach target. 
The major axes of the thrc shold and clearance zones will also be pilot-
selectublc 1 most probably on a time basis. The threshold might be set 
by the pilot for, say, 1 min 30 s, and the clearance zone for, saYI 45 s. 
The zone major axes would therefore increase with increasing speed. 
Zone minor axes serve to provide a safety margin to either side of the 
aircraft where possible l and to allow choice of the minimum risk path 
where risk is inevitable. 
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5 PROCESSING 
5.8 TARGET /THREAT RECOGNITION - OVERVIEW 
The recognition systems must be flexible and adaptable if they are to 
achieve a reasonable performance at useful ranges. 
Targets and threats are closely related, and in consequence, their 
respective detection and recognition share common facilities. One distinct 
difference between targets and threats concerns their recognition range. 
There is evidently greater emphasis on the need for long-range threat 
recognition: ideally, threats should be recognised at sufficient distance to 
avoid them, whereas targets may need to be recognised only at sufficient 
range to press home an attack. Of course, some threats are targets, and 
vice versa. The point may be illustrated by considering an attack against 
a 'tank' which turns out to be a tracked-SAM ｣｡ｲｲｩ･ｲｾ＠ clearly, a pilot 
would prefer to differentiate between the two beyond SAM effective range, 
rather than beyond a (lesser) anti-tank weapon release range. 
Bearing this close but distinct relationship between target and threat 
recognition in mind, the figures show two successive levels of Data State 
Design (DSD) for threat assessment only. At the first level, the system 
is presumed to include the processes of recognition, evaluation and 
response to threats. At the second level, the formation of a threat register 
can be ｳ･･ｮｾ＠ threats are ranked according to their relative significance 
before presenting them to the cognitive map where the bases for threat 
reduction can be established. Reduction can be achieved by evasion, or 
active countermeasures (chaff, flares" jamming and emission control" etc.) 
or both. Intelligence data can be used in real -time to indicate the 
suspected location of threats to direct countermeasures, and even possibly 
to adapt the threat models which will form the basis for threat recognition-
by-comparison. 
The processes involved in recognising targets, and on which the credibility 
of the processing task will be based, are not necessarily familiar. 
Following topics explore some aspects of target recognition with a view to 
indicating the magnitude of the processing task. 
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5. PROCESSING 
5. 8(a) LEARNING TO DETECT AND RECOGNISE 
Re cognition is required at long range as well as closer to a target; the 
techniques are quite different, so the system must operate in two different 
ways, Long- range target recognition lends itself to learning, while short-
range multi- sensor correlation is more likely to be pre- programmed. 
The threat assessment system will have (at least) two different classes of 
target model to which it will refer when trying to detect and recognise 
targets. The first model will be particular to its respective sensor, and 
will consist partly of a long- range representation of targets, as that 
sensor is expecting to see them. Figure 5.9 (a) shows a pictorial 
representation of radiation received'from an object which has been scanned 
many times; each line represents a large number of superimposed scans 
at particular angles. For ease of viewing, successive traces are shifted 
horizontally so that the image slants across the picture. The height of 
each trace represents intensity. A store would hold this data in digital 
x, y and z components. Clearly, the picture could be represented in store 
with considerable preciSion - it was in fact derived from just such a 
digital representation. However, this data represents the radiation 
received from one aspect angle, against one background, at one time. 
Radiation from a tank say, differs with angle, background, surface finish 
and camouflage, time of day, relative angle of sun, weather, ambient 
temperature, internal energy sources, and so on. Figure 5.9 (b) 
shows successive recordings of radiation received from an apparently 
stable object against a relatively low-noise background. All this data 
could be superimposed to form a single line of the Fig. 5.9 (a), but 
information would be lost in the process; it is the variability of this object's 
radiation that characterises it. 
A design compromise has therefore to be faced between compiling a vast 
store of detailed recordings of each of the likely targets, or of compre ssing 
the data and losing information in the process. Since the first option is 
impractical, the most sensible approach is to compress data carefully so 
as to lose predominantly irrelevant data. 
For example, the data in Fig. 5. 9 (a) might be stored by statistical 
means. Two orthogonal distributions could be formed, one along the slant 
and one across it. both passing through the peak. These would be stored 
as polynomials. Additionally, the variability represented in the lower 
figure could also be represented as a distribution, in this case uni-
dimensional, and similarly stored, together with radiation polarisation 
where useful. The process must still be repeated at various aspect angles 
and unde r a variety of conditions, but the use of distribution theory and 
polynomial representation would contain the size of storage and the speed 
of access needed, and would allow the system to provide quantitative 
statements of confidence in its recognition of targets. 
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The process of teaching the sensor to recognise targets can now be 
considered. The sensor's processing system would be provided with a 
learning mode, which would be run initially against scale models at 
various aspect angles, against various backgrounds, etc. This learning 
process would result in a primitive set of polynomial distributions which 
would then be refined in the air by flying the sensor over real targets, 
initially using a helicopter but later using a fixed-wing aircraft. In 
operational use. this second learning mode would enable pilots to mark 
and record 'new' targets for intelligence analysiS and future recognition 
both by their own and other aircraft. 
So far, target recognition has been considered as a long- range/ low 
resolution task: better performance might be expected at closer range/ 
higher resoltuion. In threat assessment terms this is questionable, since 
recognition at short range might be too late. Ideally, threats should be 
recognised at sufficient range beyond their lethality zone to allow evasion. 
Typical ground-based gun and missile ranges are given in Section I, from 
which it can be seen that lethality out to 3 to 6 km can be expected at low 
altitude; these figures could be doubled to allow sensible evasion margins. 
For a human operator to recognise the image of a tank at, say, 9 km, 
would require an imager resolution of about 50 Ilrad which, at FLIR wave-
lengths, and allowing for sight-line jitter, would require apertures of over 
40 cm - large by current standards. Thus a two-stage recognition process 
is envisaged, with closer recognition providing confirmation of the long 
range interpretation. (Long- range sensors would, of course, be correlated 
to provide best long-range recognition performance.) 
The second class of target model will be pertinent to the closer range 
recognition process, since it correlates relatively fine- grain data from a 
number of sensors. 
Thus a tank might be recognised by its aspect ratios (length: breadth: 
height) derived from a thermal imager; by the presence of tracks observed 
by an active radar with signal processing tuned to detect them; by the 
detection of a single barrel-like protrusion derived from a millimetre 
wave sensor; and so on. These target parameters would then be matched 
against a series of target models to select the best fit. This correlation 
model of the tank would be derived from intelligence in the first 
instance, and by observation of similar tanks or mock-ups in the field. A 
learning mode for this type of recognition can also be envisaged. The 
model's efficacy presupposes that the sensors can provide the appropriate 
. input data, at least in part. It is a design choice as to the best location . 
within the system of, for example, edge and contrast detectors for aspect 
and (hence) aspect-ratio determination, but generally sensors will be 
tuned to detect particular characteristics of targets, while the process of 
correlation between sensors will be centralised. 
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Fig. 5.9 (0) 
... 
Fig. 5,9 (0) 
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5 PROCESSING 
5.8(b) TARGET RECOGNITION TECHNIQUES 
Target recognition will be essentially a stochastic process involving 
correlation between observed data for a potential target and stored data 
for several target classes. Data can be manipulated and tested to give as 
high a degree of confidence in the recognition process as time (and the 
designer) might consider necessary. A simple example is provided which 
mimics human performance. with level of confidence or uncertainty be ing 
displayed as appropriate. 
Target recognition consists of comparing observed target parameters with 
some stored models or memory of targets and finding an acceptable level 
of correlation between observation and model. 
The process can be carried out on a single scan basis but is more likely 
to give sensible results using multi-scan comparison. 
Target parameters can be examined in two ways: questions can be formed 
to which the answer is YES or NO (does the target have a ... ?); or 
quantitative queries can be presented (what length-to-width ratio does the 
target have?). The second group can be rephrased as YES/NO questions 
and this type of question can be used to form a 'tree' or network of 
questions leading to the correct solution. 
Unfortunately, perfect correlation between model and observation is 
unlikely to be achieved and some form of stochastic scoring system 
therefore becomes necessary in order to provide confidence in the 
recognition performance. Many such systems can be devised; the following 
example is original, but only one of very many. Its principal merits are 
simplicity, high computational speed, and a human-like response when 
choice is either obvious or uncertain. 
Table 5-1 shows five elementary models of likely ground targets; Jeep" 
Lorry. Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC)' Tank and 4- missile SAM 
battery. Not all of the discernible characteristics are equally useful in 
classifying targets. For instance, a single barrel is a more valuable clue 
to recognising a gun than, say, the position of a hotspot on a vehicle which 
could be cold. Weightings have therefore been attributed to the various 
parameters according to some a priori understanding of the 'uniqueness' 
of the recognition parameter. 
The four columns A, B, C and D represent sample observed parameters; 
in no case is there complete agreement between the observations and a 
model vehicle. 
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The correlation coefficient (r) between each observed set (A, B, C and D) 
and the models which the set might represent has been produced using the 
relationship: 
where: 
and: 
x and yare the respective me"ans of observed and corresponding model 
values 
Ox and 0y are the standard deviations of all the x and y values. 
For example, observation A scores x = +80, and y = - 80 (inverse 
correlation) for Jeep, Lorry, APC, and SAM, but x = +80 and y = +80 for 
Tank (i. e. positive correlation). 
The results of this process are as follows: 
Order 
A I' = +0. 806 Tank 1 
- O. 186 APC 2 
- 0.318 SAM 3 
- O. 806 Jeep 4 
-0.956 Lorry 5 
B I' = +0.966 SAM 1 
- 0.423 Tank 2 
- O. 748 APC 3 
- O. 966 Lorry 4 
-1. 000 Jeep 5 
C I' = +0.610 Lorry 1 
-0.610 Jeep/ APC 2/3 
-1. 000 Tank/SAM 4/5 
D I' = +0.832 APC/ Tank/SA M 1/2/3 
- O. 832 Lorry/Jeep 4/5 
On the bas is of a single scan, it could be concluded that: 
• A is clearly a tank 
• B is clearly a SAl\1 
• C is probably a lorry, but the re is some doubt 
• D is neither a lorry nor a jeep, but is likely to be a tracked 
vehicle. 
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However, 'better' information will accrue by associating scan-to-scan 
results. Suppose that six successive scans show the following 'orders of 
likelihood' . 
Scan No. Jeep Lorry APC Tank SAM 
1 5 4 2 1 3 
2 5 4 1 2 3 
3 5 4 3 2 1 
4 5 3 2 1 4 
5 5 3 4 2 1 
6 5 4 3 1 2 
Totals 30 22 15 9 14 = 90 I 
It could be reasonably concluded that the column with the smallest total 
indicates the target - after all, a Tank was selected the first three times 
and the se cond three times. Some statistical criteria can be applied to 
test this 'obvious' result. The Coefficient of Concordance is given by: 
W = 12S ＨｏｾｗｾｬＩ＠
m 2 (n 3_n) 
where: 
m is the number of scans 
n is the number of models (Jeep" Lorry" etc.) 
S is the sum of the squares of the differences between observed and 
expected rank totals (18 in this case). 
whence: 
\V = 0.739 
which suggests that 'Tank' is a fair assumption on the data available. 
However, SAM was chosen twice and APC once, so what confidence can 
there be that it was not all random chance? Using SNEDECOR's F' Test, 
it can be shown that the data could quite easily have been chance; more scans 
are required before 'Tank l is confirmed or replaced as a 'confident 
recognition' . 
Thus a suite of tests can be established which can be used to process the 
data to give high levels of confidence that a recognition is possible, or that 
an object is not one of a predetermined set of known targets. Moreover, 
the system can be made adaptive, as the last paragraph implied by deferring 
judgement until sufficient data has built up a satisfactory degree of 
assurance. 
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5 PROCESSING 
5.8(c) TARGET RECOGNITION BY BEHAVIOUR AND ASSOCIATION 
Targets have recognisable performance parameters and they tend to form 
groups. Both factors may assist in recognition and identification. 
Contemporary recognition systems often base their analyses exclusively 
on the radiation received from a target. Various combinations and dis-
tributions of electromagnetic radiation will characterise targets up to a 
point, but other approaches may contribute also. 
Human recognition is largely concerned with observing an object in 
relation to its background or in relation to other objects: a moving object 
is very much easier to detect than a stationary ｯｮ･ｾ＠ an aircraft's range 
can be estimated by relating its angular subtense to that of the trees near 
it, and so on. Indeed, once denied such clues, human performance falls 
off rapidly. 
It is not difficult to build similar capabilities into a threat assessment 
system once their potential is appreciated. 
An imager may detect movement relative to background either by locking 
to an object and observing ground motion, or vice versa. A digitised 
version of the image may be analysed pixel by pixel in a relatively 
straightforward but lengthy process so as to detect frame-to-frame move-
ment. This technique also enables lock-follow in passive sensors. 
Once movement is detected, velocity can be estimated and the object may 
be compared with simple target performance models (as a precursor to 
recognition) to eliminate impossible solutions. 
More subtle perhaps is the use of association. It is known from intelligence 
sources that certain types of target associate with other vehicles. A SAM-
battery has an associated array of vehicles for workshops, power supplies, 
accommodation and cooking. A possible SAM detection may be more 
credible if such association is observed. Association can also be used to 
estimate range, which is generally difficult over uneven terrain, by 
comparing the dimensions of known objects with those of a nearby 
recognised target. 
Negative associations also ･ｸｩｳｴｾ＠ but are generally less useful. Lorries 
and jeeps do not float and so cannot be superimposed on water. Some tanks, 
paradoxically, can float and their so-doing may be used for recognition by 
as sociat ion. 
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5 PROCESSING 
5. 9 THE OUTLINE PROCESSING SYSTEM 
The processing task will be large by current standards. Learning modes 
and operational reprogramming will need to be built in. High integrity 
performance will be required in some areas. While the task appears 
feasible, there are many grey areas where more work will be essential 
to arrive at an operational system. 
Task Groups 
The third level DSD opposite gives some impression of one processing 
ｯｲｧ｡ｮｩｳ｡ｴｩｯｮｾ＠ other arrangements could be conCeived. There are six 
major processing groups: 
• FLIR image processing 
• Radar image processing 
• Multi-sensor recognition/ correlation 
• Threat ranking 
• Response planning 
• Haz ard detection. 
(Radar, laser and missile warning sensors will also have their own 
processors.) There are significant tasks associated with transferring 
image data from radar and FLIR to the multi-sensor recognition/ 
correlation process: such data could take the form of simple video, to be 
digitised in the threat processor, or could be digitised at source. Scene 
correlation requires that the data from each sensor be allocated to the 
'correct' store location ｾＧｩｳＭ｡Ｍｶｩｳ＠ the other ｳ･ｮｳｯｲｾ＠ in other words, the 
two scenes have to be registered, each to the other. 
These data then have to be refreshed, superimposed, discarded and 
manipulated so that comparisons can be made between observed patterns 
and stored models. This will be a time-consuming process, and research 
work suggests that the process of highlighting patterns and matching them 
with models is unlikely to be achieved in a typical frame time (1/25 s for 
a FLIR), using contemporary serial airborne computers. A combined 
approach appears viable, employing array processors on the one hand, to 
speed computation, and operating on every third or fourth frame only, 
for example. Recognition times of several seconds can be anticipated, 
since the need to compare between successive samples will be necessary 
to establish confidence. This essential uncertainty in recognition time 
must be allowed for in the real-time configuration. 
The FLIR and radar are expected to have their own signal processing 
capability, not only because it will provide useful long-range and 
reversionary capability, but also because the specialist manufacturers 
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will be best able to design to their particular requirements; they will also 
have a strong selling motivation. For these reasons l both sensors are 
expected to provide some limited stand-alone performancel with imagery 
and target/threat recognition and overlay outputs. Transfer of these latter 
parameters into the multi-sensor processor has to be achieved; one 
technique would be to interlace them with the scene data (either digitised 
or video). 
Threat ranking should be straightforward, at least in processing terms. 
once the ranking criteria are established. It may well be best to leave 
some ranking criteria to crew selection. Others will be derived from 
intelligence sources concerning threat lethalities and engagement ｺｯｮ･ｳｾ＠
these may need rapid revision in the light of fresh experience, so new 
data must be readily assimilated by the ranking processor when in 
operational use. 
Similarly, threat models will require rapid update and the ability to accept 
new categories; learning modes have been discussed which will dictate the 
need for comprehensive automatic statistical analysis l reduction and 
storage of large quantities of signal data. 
Response planning will require high integrity and reliability, to avoid 
nuisance trips. AlternativelYI speed of response must be the essence of 
its performance. The countermeasure plan is the simpler partl since its 
characteristics can be established and verified with little risk. The 
evasion plan evidently requires careful design and testing, coupled with 
an understanding of its limitations vis-a-vis local terrain. Terrain 
avoidance data would clearly be valuable in this ｲ･ｳｰ･｣ｴｾ＠ a millimetre radar 
might provide terrain avoidance cable detection, and mapping facilities. 
The manoeuvre monitor is envisaged as an aid in combat or evasionl to 
warn the pilot that he will hit ground unless he changes his current 
manoeuvre. Its principles are established. 
Areas of Uncertainty 
There are many grey areas where further work is required to establish 
techniques and validate performance. A reasonable assessment would be 
that the processing task is large l but seems achievable using innovative 
as well as contemporary methods and designs. Included among the grey 
areas are: 
• Model-characteristic analysis and storage, with respect to the 
various combinations of aspectl incident, radiation, internal 
radiation l background terrain, obscuration, etc. which will be 
met in practice. 
• Pattern recognition algorithms with acceptable run times and 
sufficient power to differentiate between similar - though vitally 
different - targets. 
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• Statistical algorithms which reconcile recognition confidence with 
processing time, and which perform in a way which non-specialists 
can readily appreciate. 
• Adaptive pattern tracking algorithms. 
With these and other problems unresolved, it would be imprudent to 
speculate concerning numbers for computing storage, cycle times etc. 
In practice it will be possible to trade these factors against performance. 
confidence and time delays, so there seems little doubt that such systems 
will ｷｯｲｫｾ＠ how well, will require demonstrator tests to establish. 
Preliminary Processing Concepts 
Some preliminary figures can be estimated - see Topics 5. 1 and 5. 2. 
Frame stores would be required, both in the sensors and in the multi-
sensor processor (MSP). That in the radar might form part of a scan 
converter. The FLIR design is difficult to predict. owing to the uncertain 
timescales for the introduction of high-density focal plan imaging matrices. 
However. the FLIR will require a frame store of some kind in order to 
search for thermal patterns. The sizes of such frame stores may be 
limited by packing the data using the methods already described, such as 
spline approximation. Typical frame store dimensions might then be: 
• FLIR - 1 Mbit 
• Ground search radar - 1. 2 Mbit 
If the sensors compress their data to limit storage requirements, this 
compressed version of the images may be conveniently transferred to the 
MSP for correlation. The MSP frame store is seen as a 3 -dimensional 
(3 -D) storage block: X and Y co-ordinates would represent spatial angles 
from the aircraft, while the Z co-ordinate would contain FLIR and radar 
data appropriate to each X-Y ｣ｯＭｯｲ､ｩｮ｡ｴ･ｾ＠ the stores would inevitably be 
larger than those in the imaging sensors. 
Threat extraction would then consist of searching through this store for 
patterns which compare in some degree with stored, multi-sensor models. 
The time taken for this exercise may be reduced if the search were 
concentrated around particular co-ordinates - hence 'co-ordinates of 
interest' would be transferred from single sensors to range detection and 
tracking in the MSP. The processes are nonetheless seen as lengthy. 
Threat recognition/ correlation would combine the information from all 
sources to achieve the best recognition confidence available within the 
system. There would therefore be inputs not only from the threat 
extraction process but also from laser warning, radar warning, etc. 
These various sources would be compared and an assessment made of 
their combined viewpoint. which implies weightings and stochastic analyses. 
The sources also have widely differing resolutions; radar warning might 
give relatively crude spatial resolution, but precise recognition data 
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compared, say, with FLIR. The processing tasks associated with this 
work would use established principles and are not foreseen as a major 
hurdle once the various weightings and combinatory logic are established 
during development. 
Threat ranking would consist of a straightforward computing task of 
ordering the recognised threats according to their relative significance. 
where Significance is a combined measure of imminence and potential 
lethality. taking account of current track. speed and height. Hysteresis 
would need to be built-in to the procedure to reduce oscillation between 
threats of similar and changing significance. The 3-D cognitive map would 
present a less conventional problem however. This map is seen 
conceptually as a 3-D store representing the space in front of the aircraft. 
Ground will fill the bottom planes. Drawn into the map would be: the 
most significant threats taken from the threat rank ｲ･ｧｩｳｴ･ｲｾ＠ together with 
their engagement volumes and lethality dataj two 'self' zones representing 
own-aircraft track and clearance volumes: and planned target co-ordinates. 
The map would be 'sliced' along the aircraft velocity vector to produce a 
2-D display to the pilot. showing threat areas varying with attitude. height. 
speed. etc. 
The threat response plan would be designed to reduce the threat by evasion. 
by countermeasure. or both. The evasion plan would consist of algorithms 
designed to construct a minimum risk route between the threats. towards 
the target. Such algorithms can be complex (see Topic 3.4(a)) and may 
incur protracted run times. so that this task is seen as likely to require 
a dedicated processor and store. However. the techniques are well 
established. so that no new ground need be broken. The outputs from the 
evasion plan would consist of an overlay showing the route plan on the 2-D 
map and a steer display. most probably head-up. The degree of steer 
signal authority would require careful study. At this stage it is considered 
as simple left/right advice, but pitch and speed signals may be necessary 
too. 
The evasion plan would provide a suitable input point for hazard avoidance 
signals which may require to override other steer advice. Hazards may 
be detected by sensors - cable warning or radar principally - or by a 
manoeuvre monitor. The resulting hazard warning may be a candidate 
for the central warning system. 
The countermeasure plan would be designed to: 
• 
• 
• 
Curtail electronic emissions from active sensors and 
communications which might attract anti-radiation missiles 
Provide advice on the firing of chaff. flares and on jammer 
initiation 
Trigger such active countermeasures automatically when enabled 
by the pilot and required by the situation. 
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These requirements suggest that there would be a need to establish priority 
within the processing complex, so that lengthy recognition processes did 
not impede timely countermeasure response. 
The conceptual processing system therefore emerges as an arrangement 
of inter-related activities, some of which are predictable in content and 
duration whilst others will be stochastic and unpredictable. The latter 
must not be allowed to impede the former, and so the conceptual design 
tends towards a multi-processing organisation, perhaps with micro-
processors, programs and data being functionally divided rather along 
the lines suggested by the conceptual diagram of this topic. Image 
recognition will require very fast processing performance. 
Work associated with many of the processes described above is in the 
research and development phases at present. Much more work will need 
to be done before a proven system emerges. 
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6 THREAT WARNING SYSTEM - OUTLINE DESIGN 
6.1 INTERFACES AND COMMUNICATIONS 
The design keynote is confidence in target/threat assessment: this implies 
retention of high sensor entropies6 which in turn results in the need for 
high data rates. 
Figure 6. 1 and the Key to Fig. 6. 1 show the principal interfaces .of a 
typical.design, before physical grouping and ｰ｡ｲｴｩｴｩｯｮｩｮｧｾ＠ they should be 
viewed with Fig. 5. 10. 
ClearlY6 there is a close functional relationship between the radar, its 
processor and scan converter6 the FLIR(s) and its (their) processor(s), 
the target/threat processor and the electronic displays and controls. A 
major design option concerns the transfer of thermal and radar scenes to 
the target/threat MSP. Figure 5.10 showed the scenes being transferred 
for centralised correlation. There are three options: 
a) Dispense with scene correlation, and simply correlate data from 
the FLIR and radar processors6 which will highlight co-ordinates 
where targets are recognised by single sensors. 
b) Transfer digitised frames of data - practicable if each sensor 
has its own recognition performance6 requiring integral frame 
stores and data compression. 
c) Transfer the data as raw video - after scan conversion for the 
radar. 
It will also be noticed that the interface chart6 Fig. 6. 1 shows one MSP 
for recognising both threats and targets: this is logical provided the 
recognition processes are similar6 which seems likely. 
However 6 a crossover in performance is ｡ｮｴｩ｣ｩｰ｡ｴ･､ｾ＠ single sensor 
recognition is expected to operate more successfully at longer ranges, 
and with lower confidence levels, than multi-sensor recognition. 
Confidence is the key to the design implied at Fig. 5. 10; by correlating 
unprocessed data it is hoped to retain the essential characteristics which 
will enable high-confidence, Shorter-range target recognition. Using 
Option (at much of the basic data is lost in single sensor processing6 so 
that6 at closer ranges6 correlations may simply not occur at all. 
For example, a camouflaged tank with a hot spot may not be recognised 
by radar and would not appear in the radar recognition ｬｩｳｴｾ＠ in 
consequence there would be a total lack of radar input using Option (c), 
while the FLIR would continue to give some single sensor recognition 
performance. 
© EASAMS 1981 
COMMERCIAL-rn -CONFIDENCE 
83 COMMERCIAL -IN -CONFIDENCE 
For this reason of confidence, Option (a) as shown in Fig. 6. 1 is unlikely 
to provide a good solution. 
Option (b) seeks to take advantage of the digitisation and data compression 
which will be necessary in the radar and FLIR(s). If this pre,..processed 
data were to be transferred directly to the MSP, that unit would not need 
to duplicate the exercise, which will present a Significant task. Fig. 6.2 
shows one way in which Option (b) might be mechanised, and Fig. 6. 3 
shows the equivalent interface diagram, which is evidently simpler than 
that of Option (a). The high- speed (capacity) bus would multiplex data 
from all the sensors on to one bus. Clearly, the bulk of data would be 
that provided by the radar and ｆｌｉｒＨｳＩｾ＠ other data would be inserted 
between frames passed from these sensors, and, if necessary, between 
scans. 
One reason for considering a separate bus for target/threat data is the 
nature of the warning sensor outputs. This is sporadic in nature, with 
periods of long' silence' being interspersed by bursts of rapid and 
important data. To mechanise sporadic data through the avionics bus 
would incur a heavy, inefficient overhead since the sensors would require 
frequent interrogation, largely giving nil returns. 
Option (b) could also be mechanised using a lower capacity bus and two 
direct digital links between the radar and FLIR and the MSP for the transfer 
of image frames. 
The potential disadvantages of Option (b) are: 
• High capacity digital links will be required in the aircraft 
• The digitisation and compression performed in radar and FLIR 
might be unsuited to the MSP ｴ｡ｳｫｳｾ＠ reduced signal entropy and 
hence spatial resolution, might prejudice the MSP performance. 
Hence a different mechanisation seems ｰｲ･ｦ･ｲ｡｢ｬ･ｾ＠ this is shown at 
Fig. 6.4. The high capacity links simply pass raw video, and the duplicated 
digitisation overhead is accepted. The MSP is used as a gateway between 
the target/threat and avionics buses, and the target/threat bus extracts 
the inefficient overheads caused by warning sensors from the avionics bus. 
The MSP could also act as its own bus controller. The associated, and 
relatively simple, interface diagram is at Fig. 6. 5. 
On present evidence the scheme represented by Fig. 6.4 is the preferred 
conceptual design. It will not require' special' digital ｬｩｮｫｳｾ＠ video could 
be passed via coaxial cable or optical fibre. The MSP need not be 'tuned' 
to the output formats of radar and FLIR. There is no unnecessary loss of 
signal entropy prior to image signals reaching the MSP. The use of a 
. separate bus for target/threat data reduces avionics bus loading, as does 
the use of the MSP as a gateway. 
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KEY TO FIG. 6. 1 
ａｬｴｩｴｵ､･ｾ＠ heading, attitude, present position 
Altitude, heading, track, speeds, attitude .. present position 
Altitude, heading, track, ｳｰ･･､ｳｾ＠ attitude, present position 
Altitude, heading, track, speeds, attitude, present position 
Altitude, heading. track, speeds, attitude. present position 
Laser, radar, missile, cable warning data 
Laser, radar, missile .. cable warning data 
Synchronisa tion 
Video or digitised frame 
Video + plots and tracks + target threat recognition lists 
+ synchronisation 
As C6 for recording 
Video or digitised frame 
Video + plots and tracks + target threat recognition lists 
As DB for recording 
Mode Control (automatic) 
! 
Mode Control, fire search request, pointing commands 
Mode Control, fire search request, pointing commands 
2-D Cognitive map display + target/threat recognition lists 
+ steer signals 
Chaff, flare and jammer comm<l:nds 
Emission suppress command 
Intel data for recording or transmission 
Mode control (manual) 
Manual radar controls - including mode, marker, pointing 
angle. scan pattern. sweep. etc. 
Manual FWR controls - including brightness, contrast. 
reverse contrast, pointing angle, magnification; 
Mode select. including learn/ run, directed search, etc. 
Manual controls 
Manual controls 
Suppression of rad alt, doppler etc 
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H2 
H3 
H6 
H7 
H8 
15 
16 
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KEY TO FIG. 6,1 (Cont'd) 
Suppression of active cable warning etc. 
Radar transmission suppression 
EMCON indicator 
Active radiation suppression 
JTIDS/COMMS suppression 
Response rules l target/threat locations and parameters 
Intelligence text 
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THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN C3I 
D.K. Hitchins 
Pacal Decca Systems Ltd 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea that ｣ｯｭｭ｡ｾ､Ｌ＠ control, communication 
and intelligence (C I) systems can be likened 
to a body is not new. Proponents of C3 
Counter Measures (notably Major Ceneral Doyle 
E Larson USAF until recently Commander, 
E3ectronic Security Command) often view enemy C I systems as having brains, nervous 
systems, muscles and of course vulnerable 
points which can be attacked to best effect. 
C3 I systems bear the mark of their designers 
and their simian heritage in many apparent 
ways. For instance the bandwidths of our 
communications systems are generally 
comprised of channels designed to accommodate 
human aural or ｶｾｳｵ｡ｬ＠ bandwidths. 
In more subtle ways, however, we can learn 
from the biological and social evolution 
which has shaped our internal construction, 
our i nd tv i dual cha racter i sti cs.. and our group 
behaviour patterns. Since CjI systems are 
essentially supporting human interactions, 
such understanding would seem a promising way 
of deriving successful designs. 
The aim of this paper is to ｳｵｧｧｾＶｴ＠ a new 
persjective and to offer a new mental model 
of C I systems which may enhance our approach 
to system design. 
A c3r DESICNERS VIEW OF THE HUMAN STRUCTURE 
Even at a cursory level, parjllels can be 
seen between our developing C I designs and 
the way in which the human frame has evolved. 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect, 
conceptually, is the balance which has 
evolved between opposing pressures. For 
example, the body has three different 
structural techniques to enhance 
survivability with hardening of the central 
control and sensor processing (cranium), 
protection of the trunk communication system 
(spine) and of the respiration and energy 
transfer centres (lungs and heart) and 
multiple redundancy of purifying systems such 
as kidneys. However these essential features 
are not allowed to impede the essential 
mobility and flexibility of the deSign, since 
these two also favour survival. Such 
conceptual analogies can be useful ｾｮ＠ forming 
a modified mental model of C31 system 
deSigns, which in nature seem invariably to 
compromise between oppOSing objectives. Some 
further examples will illustrate the pOint. 
Speed of Response versus Central Control 
From touch sensor through the brain to motor 
takes between 0.2 and O.q seconds for a fit 
adult. Since this is inadequately slow in 
emergenCies, the spinal reflex arc 11nks 
sensor to motor directly, without prior 
reference to the brain which 1s informed in 
parallel. Figure 1 shows both tne·· spTnal 
reflex arc (Robert Barrass (1» and the 
command and control analogy. For the human, 
stepping on a thorn results in a pre-
programmed fast response to limit damage with 
the brain being informed in slower time. 
Similarly the surface-to-air sensor and 
missile may need to respond too rapidly to 
allow time for direct higher control. 
Croups of instructions may apparently be 
learnt within the human central nervous 
system so that a pianist or typist for 
example, may execute. string of actions as a 
single command and thus overcome the delal{s 
which would otherwise be incurred. In C'I 
terms this technique would be similar to 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). An 
alert mechani.sm (adrenal in) heightens 
responsiveness to danger and prepares the 
human for fight or flight in a :umilar way to 
Alerting and Early Warning 1n cj systems. 
Integration versus Sensor Optimization 
Body subsystems are so well integrated that 
it is not senSible in many cases to define an 
Ｑｮｴ･ｲｦ｡｣･ｾ＠ The spinal cord and the brain 
form a single processing and communication 
system while eyes and ears may be viewed more 
as extensions of the bra1n rather than 
separate features. The1r colocation near the 
brain at the highest point for best 
visib1lity and simplest sensor fusion 
reconciles the dictates of wide base for 
triangulation, day/night performance and 
shortest signal path for rapid response. 
Processing 
The brain comprises two mirror image halves, 
each capable of independent action but 
coordinated through a joining nerve ·cable", 
the corpus callosum. The information ｣ｯｮｴ･ｄｾ＠
of the brain has been estimated at some 10 1 
b1ts (Carl Sagan (2)) and conscious thought, 
contained in the cerebral cortex, is divided 
between the two hemispheres. The right 
hemisphere is mainly responsible for pattern 
recogni tion, intuition and creative insight, 
while the left hemisphere is the seat of 
reason, analYSis, critical thinking and 
understanding of speech. Together these two 
halves provide the means for generating and 
testing ideas, generally without an overlap 
in function which could lead to ､ｩｳ｡ｧｲ･･ｭｾｮｴｳ＠
and unresolvable internal conflicts. 
Training and Develppment 
The system when in1t1ally delivered has basic 
autonomic and reflex responses, but 1s so 
designed that it may develop its full 
capacit1es .rter an in-eervice training 
per10d of some ten or more years. The design 
would lack flexibility and adaptab1lity 1f 1t 
were delivered with too much ｰｲ･Ｍｰｲｯｧｲ｡ｭｾｩｮｧ＠
as is the case with 10lier life-forms 
Strangely we expect our CjI systems to ｢ｾ＠
effective from the beg1nn1ng of their lives 
and are d1saPPointed when unreasonable 
expectations are not realised. 
LEARNING LESSONS FROM THE HUMAN DESIGN 
The analogy between human body is so 
consistent that it 1s tempting to carry it 
further. Indeed the activ1ty can become so 
rewarding that it ceases to be the compar1son 
of analogies. ｾｮｳｴ･｡､＠ when seeking new ｷ｡ｹｾ＠
to tackle a C I design task, it can.be 
fruitful to examine the principles eltployed 
1n the human deSign which hiS, .fter all, 
evolved over tens of millions of years. Some 
ｾｸ｡ｭｰｬ･ｳ＠ will indicate the concept. 
iain Gate Theory and Communications 
.li1.Il.1mization 
It has long been known that response to pain 
in humans is very much related to situation. 
For example, swimmers have suffered such 
severe injuries as the loss of legs due to 
shark bites without feeling pain at the time. 
Patrick Wall, Professor of Anatomy at 
University College, London, has recently 
developed the Pain Gate Theory which provides 
a consistent explanation of this phenomenon; 
Figure 2 refers. Pain signals from, say, the 
foot are passed to the brain via the pain 
gate only if: 
o The brain is prepared to receive them 
o Local influences permit. 
Thus a runner may ignore, or genuinely not be 
conscious of, blistering of the feet when he 
is in competition, and indeed can run 
virtually "on autopilot" provided his rythm 
remains undisturbed. Meanwhile the brain is 
concentrating its not unlimited capacity on 
calculating strategy and tactics, and on 
conscious self-condi tioning. 
Is there a Similar mode of operation in 
military C I systems? To a less 
sophisticated degree the military tactic of 
minimizing communications is a similar 
concept. The minimization instruction is 
employed under stress to reduce 
communications to those essential for 
operations; less urgent background 
communications are either deferred or sent by 
slower means. Howev3r, unlike the Central Nervous System, the C I proceSSing system is 
not generally reconfigured to concentrate 
power on the urgent problem in hand. Perhaps 
this is behind the apparent ability of humans 
to respond to crisis situations without 
collapse due to total overload. 
Figure 2 also shows a diagram which mimics 
the pai n ga teo The sy stem is mul ti purpose, 
but is shown only in its Emergency ProceSSing 
Hode. A mul ti-task processor is shown, with 
groups of Input/Output (110) ports, each with 
dedicated functions. An emergency signal 
from the Sensor in Area E reaches the multi-
task processor only if: 
• Local Emergency Control deems the signal 
to have exceeded a threshold and closes 
swi tch E1 
• The mul ti-task processor has prepared 
itself to process any signals from Zone E 
and has set switch £2 accordingly 
This decision, whether or not to look towards 
Zone E, is part of an adaptive polling 
process, in which the overall situation as 
determined by the Situation Assessor adapts 
the polling schedule. 
Emergency Alarms are hard-wired to one of the 
Multi Task Processor output ports, and the 
initiation of an alarm is fed back to the 
si tuation assessor. An Executive Controller 
is shown as a means of scheduling, 
interrupting and reconfiguring the Hulti-Task 
Processor: in practice the Executive 
Controller could form part or the Hulti-Task 
Processor. 
Figure 2 does not represent a typical 
contemporary C3I design. Are there any 
lessons to be learnt? Perhaps: for exarr.ple, 
the bundle of cables from the emergency 
sensors is unlikely to be arfected by cross-
talk, since communications are not operative 
unless an emergency both exists ａｮｾ＠ is or 
interest. In a networked system the required 
communications capacity would be reduced. Of 
significance in large C3 1 systems, the 
ｾ･ｮｴｲ｡ｬ＠ I/O proceSSing task would be greatly 
reduced, leaving Hul ti-Task Processors more 
time to concentrate on relevant activities. 
Perhaps most important of all, the design 
concept prevents the situation assessor from 
being distracted by information wh1ch is not 
relevant to the immediate problem of 
·survival. 
: 
Sensor Design 
!The human eye is highly evolved a;d has a 
!vlriety of interesting characteristics, 
including a curious susceptibility to 
impulsive jamm1ng. The same optics in the 
eye are shared by a variety of sensor 
elements (rods, cones, etc) providing: 
• High resolution over the limited foveal 
area 
I 
• Peripheral flicker vision alerting (PHA) 
to detect and call for concentrated 
attention to movement outside the high 
resolution area. (PFVA is of course the 
cause of some limitations in the design of 
multiple raster-scan displays where 
looking at one display allows the flicker 
from adjacent displays to be evident) 
• Separate colour sensing 
• Separate low and high ambient light 
sensors. 
Additionally, the eye-brain combination 
provides: 
• Analogue to Digital conversion at the 
retina 
• Specialized detection of vertical, and 
horizontal edges 
• The ability to 11nk up features and, 1n 
some little understood way, recognise 
patterns. 
• Oi stance measuremen t by bi nocul ar vision 
textural changes, focal d1stance, 
perspective and rates of change of sight 
lines to var10us objects. 
The size of the eye is 1150 relatively small, 
which reduces the probabili ty of acci dental 
damage: operation at, say, infra red 
frequencies would increase eye area and de-
optimize the general purpose day/night 
design. Again, perhaps the most interesting 
des1gn features are the optimization between 
opposing requirements, and the degree to 
wh1ch eye/brain performance develops after 
birth and 1s tuned to the environment rather 
than fully developed in utero. 
Complementary Communications 
The human body employs two principal 
communication systems: neural control by the 
transmission of nerve pulses and hormonal or 
chemical control. These two control 
mechanisms are quite different both in their 
·relative speeds and in their functions; but 
·-it seems to be a standard philosophy of human: 
system design that balance (homeostasis) is 
achieved by opposing forces or ･ｦｦｾ｣ｴｳＮ＠
Neural control travels at about 100ms- and 
is used for real time control mainly of 
skeletal muscles. Hormonal Control is carried 
via the blood and is therefore available in 
every tissue and to every cell. Action 
depends upon target cells responding to the 
chemical agents while non-targets are not 
affected. Hormonal control can operate in 
the time it takes for blood to circulate the 
body - some 30s - or may operate over much 
longer periods stretching to years (1). 
Hormonal control regulates alert responses, 
combats invasion by foreign substances, 
regulates growth and development, etc. 
The C31 equivalent of the neural control 
system is evident in near-realtime C31 design 
although the human control system is very 
much more sophisticated and employs non-
linear feedback "mechanisms". Hormonal 
control has some counterparts as in broadcast 
alerts and damage repair organizatiol'tS, but 
generally the elegance of hormqnal control 
has yet to be matched in CJI designs. 
However, if we were to push the analogy a 
little, and note that blood is, inter alia, 
the carrier of energy to the muscles and 
organs then we could suggest that mains power 
supplies might form a useful non-secure 
communications bearer at least within an HQ 
since almost everyone has connections to the 
supplies. Street-lighting has for many years 
been switched on and off by signalling 
superimposed on the power lines, so the 
concept is far from alien. 
C3I AND CYBERNETICS 
Comparisons between human body design and C3I 
systems can be continued almost idenfinitely_ 
and to advantaJe, but it is equally revealing 
to consider C I systems or even fleets and 
armies as organisms with communication 
equipments transferring information between 
groups of users/operators. 
The human element in modern C3 1 systems i! 
most appareft in the command function. 
Analysis of C I must, therefore, start at the 
commander, his particular ｰｵｲｰｯｳｾＬ＠
environment and constraints. The total eJI 
system can be viewed as an extension of the 
commander in much the same way as the remote 
manipulating equipment used for handling 
radioactive isotopes in a laboratory is an 
extension of its operator's functions. 
Command is ｾ･ｲｨ｡ｰｳ＠ the least understood 
element in e I. It is necessary first to 
consider the decision making process, a small 
part of command. Military decision-making is 
a cyclic process as is illustrated in Figure 
3. 
The decision cycle is based on situation and 
resource data from lower formations, and on 
intelligence which may arrive from a discrete 
source. Commanders' decisions result in 
orders and information to subordinates, and 
may involve liaison with other commanders; 
see Figure 4. Command occurs at many levels, 
so that the structure must have height, see 
Figure 5. Each commander between ｨｩｾｨ･ｳｴ＠ and 
lowest levels has superiors and subordinates, 
I
Wr.iCh leads to a pyramid structure or, viewed 
from 'above', a spiders web with the 
commander-in-chief at the hub. See Figure 6. 
I 
lEach of the decision cycles must interact 
with several others, and usually at three 
levels. At the same time, each decision 
cycle has its own enVironment, speed of 
response, areas of responsibility and even 
litS own personality. Taken as a whole, the interacting deciSion cycles can be seen as Inodes in an organism whose purpose is to 
:provide information to, and obey the orders 
from, a commander. 
Unfortunately the representation of Figure 6 
is limited; the true representation is 3-
dimensional and would involve many crOSSing 
,lines. 
N2 Charts 
Figure 1 shows a simple ･ｸ｡ｭｾｬ･＠ of N2 chart 
(Robert J. Lano)(3». N charts are 
particularly valuable for both the 
reprefentation of interfaces and the analysis 
of e I structures, ･ｬ･ｾｴｲｯｮｩ｣＠ and human. 
Figure 1 shows how the N chart works. The 
ｃｨｾｲｴ＠ is divided into N rows and N ·columns 
(N rectangles). Leading diagonal squares 
represent enti ties, other squares represent 
interfaces. The interface from father to 
mother - No. 1 - is "love and stability" 
while from child to father (No.8) come "love 
and problems". As important as annotated 
interfaces are blanks; why does father have 
no interfaces with teacher? 
c2 Hierarchies and N2 Charts 
figure 8 ｳｨｏｾｳ＠ a generic e 2 hierarchy 
committed to N chart, and the figure can be 
seen to integrate the concepts of Figures 4 
to 6 inclusive without overlapping lines. 
Interfaces can be seen to arise in pairs; B1 
pairs with A2, Ell with D5, etc. These pairs 
represent the lower "legs" of Figure 4. 
Formations at the same level liaise and 
exchange intelligence - D2 and B4 - and also 
form interface pairs. Missing interfaces 
indicate a hierarchy; Air Bases report 
exclusively to Air Operations Centres which 
report in turn to the Joint Operations Centre 
(JOe). Multiple interfaces indicate a node; 
the JOC has interfaces with all the single-
service Operations Centres and constitutes a 
node although liaison between operations 
centres provide some reversion should the JOC 
become inoperative. Indeed speed of response 
requires that operations centres talk 
directly to each other, in direct analogy to 
the spinal reflex arc of Figure 1, with the 
JOe as the higher centre of thought being 
informed in parallel. Blocks in which all 
the interfaces are filled represent 
functionally - bound groups which are best 
considered as2 a single formation; air defence with its C, Airborne Early Warning, 
fighters, SAM and ground sensors tends to 
form functionally bound group in military 
operations for example. 
A generic N2 chart for Air Defence is shown 
in Figure 9; two tightly bound functional 
blocks are shown, one for the Air Defence 
Ground Environment (ADGE) and the second for 
airborne forces. By one of the basic 
theorems of sociobiology, the more closely 
related an ind1v1dual is to others around him 
in the population, the more likely he is to 
act altruistically and ｣ｯｯｰ･ｲ｡ｾｩｶ･ｬｙ＠ towards 
them (Nigel Calder (II». The N chart, which 
in Figure 9 appears to represents machines 
but in reality represent interpersonal 
relationships transmitted by landl1ne or 
radio links, highlights closely related 
groups; this concept will be enlarged ｵｾｯｮ＠
I a teL The fig u rea 1 so i nth i sin s tan c e 
reveals the nodal nature of the Airborne 
Early Warning (AEW) aircraft, through which 
all air-ground operational communications are 
seen to flow. Were such an organization to 
be instituted, the AEW would need either 
replication or protection to reduce system 
vulnerabil1 ty. 
e3 ! Design Driyers 
The design of C3I system is influenced 
considerably by notions of functional 
binding, loose-coupling between unlike 
formations, and the avoidance or protection 
of nodes. Several key themes compete to 
j1nfluence both the overall and the detailed 
,design, including: 
, 
ｾＮ＠ Survivability 
:. Sec uri ty 
• Flexibility and Expandability 
'. The Man-Machine Interface (MMI) 
• Operational Availability 
• Mobllity 
• Responsiveness/Performance 
• Communication Capabilities and 
Interoperability 
• Capital and Life Cycle Costs 
• System reconfiguration, etc. 
Reconciling C31 system architecture with 
these criteria is the art of system design. 
The operator has to remain the focal point 
however. 
ｾ＠ BEHAVIOUR ｉｾＳＱ＠
Having examined lessons from cybernetics, 
there may be value in examining groups of 
people interacting in pursuit of an overall 
objective. 
Ieformation Reduction 
A central theme in C3I design is that of 
information reduction, which we may view 
Initially at the individual level to 
establish a potential model for group 
behaviour. 
If we presume that an individual has a 
considered response time of, say, 0.5 seconds 
(from sensor through brain to motor), then 
his "bandwidth" may be estimated at 2Hz. In 
other words he will respond to varying 
stimuli at about 2 responses per second. 
The input sensor bandwidth to the individual 
is certainly much higher than 2Hz when we 
consider vision, hearing, smell and touch; 
the individual can discard, condense or 
review extraneous data as a background 
activity, and can concentraje on the matter 
in hand. So it must be a C I system, where 
input bandwidth from sensors and 
communications generally far exceeds the 
combined capacities of the operators. 
The key to understanding the process of 
selecting relevant information is to be found 
in the Decision Cycle of Figure 3 and in the 
operators organization into role cells in 
order to support elements of the decision 
cycle. The elements of the decision cycle 
can be mapped on to an HQ organization in 
generic terms as follows: 
function 
Identify Strengths and 
Weaknesses 
Principal HO 
ｾ＠
Intelli gence, 
Operations 
Assess Threats 
Establish Options 
Analyse Options 
Select Preferred Option 
Allocate Resources 
Initiate Attack/Respond 
to Threat 
Assess Situation 
Intelligence 
Operations 
Operations 
Commander 
Commander 
Operations 
Commander 
Supporting but essential groups include 
logistiCS, engineering, communications and 
plans, which present information - often of a 
constraining character - which limits the 
options. 
The organization will generally ｾｯｭｰｲｩｳ･＠ a 
number of such groups organized into cells 
which operate upon the information base, and 
which intercommunicate in support of the 
decision cycle. 
It is likely that the cells will devolve into 
a 3-tiered structure as shown in Figure 10; 
this seems to be a "comfortable" structure 
for organizations, possibly related to the 
son, father, grandfather structure of family 
11fe. Alternatively, it may be thought of as 
redolent of the 3-tiered human brain, with 
the commander making 'high level decisions at 
the "fight or flight" level, operations staff 
conducting the routine of warfare management 
and specialist stafr interpreting and 
relaying orders, situation reports and 
requests between lower uni ts and the HQ 
information base. Taking the cell-
organization and the 3-tiered structure 
together presents an overall picture of HQ 
organization. The cell structure can be 
almost tribal in nature, with (for example) 
Intelligence rarely communicating with 
Engineering who in turn keep themselves at a 
distance from Logistics. On the other hand, 
the 3-tiered structure evidences a 
specialist-manager-executive sandwich, and 
there may be three or more shifts operating 
over 24 hour periods. Reconciling these 
territorial and ｦ｡ｾｬｬｙ＠ imperatives is 
fundamental in a C I design to ensure 
harmonious inter-personal relationships. 
Span of Control/Understanding 
Humans have some little understOOd barrier 
beyond the number six. If sets of random 
dots are presented to • test subject for less 
than 1/2 second, and he is asked to state the 
number of such dots, most subjects will 
answer correctly for up to 5 or 6 dots per 
seti few subjects can operate conSistently 
above 6. A commander with more than six 
immediate subordinates tends to neglect some 
and concentrate on others, particularly if 
the subordinates have different functions; it 
has been suggested (3) that the cause is 
man's limited spans of interest and attention 
and lImited depth of understanding. It may 
also be that 7 has in the past been a typical 
family unit, requiring each member to have 
close ties with about 6 other family members. 
Certainly groups of seven or more people tend 
to split into subgroups. 
Span of Control can be used as a simple guide 
to sizes of forces. If a general has '5' 
subordinat-". who each 1n turn have'S' 
In mlliYary circles it would be improper of 
the operations officer at HQ to query a 
logistics depot; that is the prerogative of 
the HQ Logistics Officer, and properly so 
since he will put the response in 
perspective, being of the same "tribe". 
Instead, the operations officer obtains 
logistics information from the HQ logistics 
officer who has compiled that information 
from "raw" depot data, other sources and his 
own experience. Thus military protocol, 
which exists for sound reasons, can be 
properly observed and reinforced in a 
function - mapped distributed system, using 
the important concept of data ownership (see 
also - Doherty and Derbyshire (5». Each 
workstation, besides its own securi ty fences 
has a DBMS of containable dimensions; each 
can be developed in relative isolation from 
the rest; fa il ure in one worksta tion has no 
effect on others; and so on. function mapped 
systems are however not only simpler to 
develop; they promise to be much more 
effective too because they mirror the users' 
organization and because each workstation is 
local, under immediate control, and simply 
"more human"l 
C31 - A GLIMPSE INTO THE fUTURE? 
L.F. Richardson was a British Meteorologist 
interested in war (2). For the years between 
1820 and 1945 he collected data on hundreds 
of wars, which were published in "The 
Statistics of Deadly Quarrels." Richardson 
was interested in the time interval between 
wars that claimed a specified number of 
victims. He defined an index M, the 
magnitude of a war, measured by the number 03 consequent deaths. H = 3 corresponds to ｾＱＰ＠
= ) 1000 deaths; H = 6 corresponds to (10 :) 
1,000,000 deaths; and so on. Richardson 
found that the more people killed in a war, 
the less Ii kel y it was to occur. Hi s graph 
is shown at figure 13, where (by the totally 
invalid process of extrapolation) it can be 
implied that the destruction of the total 
world population (H = 10) will not be reached 
for about 1000 years. Starting from 1820 
this suggests that M : 10 will not be reached 
until the year 2820. The advent of nuclear 
war seriously prejudices the extrapolation 
and can only turn the rising end of the graph 
towards the horizontal. Incidentally 
Richardson also extrapolated towards M = 0, 
suggesting that the graph represented a 
continuum, with individual murders occurring 
about once every 5 minutes worldwide. The 
concept of a continuum may not be trivial; 
war may indeed be a group expression of 
individual motivations. 
e3I To ｐｲ･ｶ･ｯｴＯｍｑ､･ｲ｡ｴｾ＠
Richardson's work does remind us of the 
underlying 1nev1tability of war. It fas ｢･･ｾ＠
suggested that current interest in C CH - C 
Counter Heasures - is grossly misplaced at 
least in respect of strategic HQ, since enemy 
strategic HOs will form vital links for the 
channelling of essential situation data 
upwards to the political controllers. It is 
certainly true that war results In more 
deaths as it becomes more impersonal as 
ｒｩ｣ｨ｡ｲ､ｾｯｮＧｳ＠ curve implies. Perhaps then 
future C I systems will see a re-emergence of 
more personal forms of communication 
inc 1 u d i n'g TV sot hat com m un i can t s can 
appreciate not only tone of voice and 
graphics but also visual cues as well. 
Perhaps by showing the carnage of battle 
directly to those responsible for its 
initiation, we can restore some of the 
natural reflexes which inhibit us from 
inflicting damage beyond the pOint of 
observed submission. 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of the paper has been to promote a 
new perspective on CjI designs. The mOdified 
mental model presented has allowed the 
extraction of certain pOints of ｩｮｴ･ｾ･ｳｴ＠ as 
follows: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
ｔｾ･＠ close relationship between sensors and 
C I is such that they should be considered 
as comprising one system, as by analogy 
the eye is part of the brain 
C3 I systems take many years to develop and 
of necessity mUch of this development must 
occur, as by analogy with th.e human 
infant, post delivery 
Study of3 biological deSign can reveal useful C I design alternatives as for 
･ｾ｡ｭｰｬ･＠ the analogy between pain gates and 
C I alerting mechanism, and the potential 
of power supplies to carry information 
throughout a wide subscriber population 
Analyses of group behaviour show that our 
military organisations form both nodes and 
functionally bound groups. These 
groupings may be expressions of our deep-
rooted territorial imperjltives and should 
be given due weight in C I designs by the 
adoption of philosophies such as function 
mapped architectures 
In the final analysiS, decisions are made 
by individuals who can operate at no more 
than 2 decisions per second. No matter 
how much money is invested in enhanced 
communications, data processing and 
display technology, the finite human 
capability remains the limtir.g factor 
The concept of strategic c3 CM may not 
always favour the best lnterests 3 0f antagonists, since successful C CM 
operations may prevent governments from 
becoming aware in time of submission by 
either of the opposing military groups 
L.r. Richardson's model of the inevitable 
escallation of3war emphasises the need for ever better C I systems, so that we may 
limit the seemingly inexorable trend 
towards overkill in conflict. 
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SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
Managing system creation 
O.K. Hitchins, M.Sc., C.Eng., F.I.E.E., M.R.Ae.S., A.M.B.I.M. 
Indexing terms: Engineering administration and management, Project and production engineering, Management 
Abstract: The pape'r introduces systems methodologies to illustrate the span of systems engineering activities 
and the system management structure appropriate to creating a complex and enduring system. Information/ 
decision/action (IDA) systems provide a vehicle to demonstrate a variety of methodologies in operation. This 
class of system includes individual humans, companies, governments, computer-based data systems and, para-
doxically, the system design/management team intent on creating the respective systems themselves. Systems are 
viewed as having seven ages: conception, design, development, implementation, transition utility and senility 
(which is followed by replacement). System creation invokes five subsystems: the operational facility, two devel-
opment subsystems concerned with test-and-integration and incompany support, and two deliverable inservice 
subsystems for user/operator training and through life maintenance. System creation team structure is shown to 
comprise operations analysis, requirements analysis, system design, equipment engineering, software engineer-
ing, test and integration, and installation and commissioning; the systems approach emphasises the first three of 
these in particular, to reduce the generation of ab initio design errors. Functional decomposition and design 
option tradeoffs are demonstrated by example, and the establishment of end-to-end system dynamics is intro-
duced using the ISO open system interconnection philosophy. System management organisations are outlines, 
and the allocation of resources by time within the project team structure is explored pictorially. Transition into 
operational use is highlighted as an area of special concern and, finally, the key issues of the systems manage-
ment approach are identified. 
Introduction 
Much has been published on the subject of systems engin-
eering, its methodologies, techniques and benefits. Rela-
tively little has been produced on the management of 
systems engineering projects; this paper seeks to remedy 
that shortfall. 
The paper is presented in 'storyboard', Each page of 
text is accompanied by a diagram, which contributes 
directly and without separate explanation to the topic 
under discussion. A suitable procedure is to read the first 
section of the text, examine the diagram and then return to 
the remaining text for expansion. 
The word 'systems' is so widely used that it has become 
necessary to provide a taxonomy. The broad class of 
systems considered in the paper is that in which humans or 
groups of humans gather information, reach agreements 
and make decisions based on that information and imple-
ment consequent actions. This information/decision/action 
(IDA) classification has been selected not only because it is 
so wide in application, but also because it contains prob-
ably the most difficult categories of system design manage-
ment, those concerned with multi-user/machine 
interactions and human factors. 
The paper may be read at several levels. For example, it 
may be viewed as an embryonic company procedure docu-
ment, or a largely pictorial description of IDA system cre-
ation. On the other hand, the principles and graphical 
techniques employed in the paper can be viewed as simple 
examples which might be re-employed in a much wider 
context, from detailed analysis of production organisations 
to the broad design of management systems. 
In a similar vein, the paper could be viewed as arguing 
the case for systems engineering as a separate discipline, 
and in a way it does. Nobody questions the role of the 
architect in civil engineering, although his individual 
engineering skills are no different from, and may be no 
better developed than, those of the civil engineering con-
tractors. His major contributions are creativity, structure 
and balance within constraints imposed by a particular 
situation. And so it should be for the system designer; he 
too covers a broad span of disciplines and seeks to bring 
creativity, structure and balance to design. And he too 
deserves separate recognition. 
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January 1986 
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1 Information/decision/action (IDA) systems 
This paper is concerned with the creation of the wide class 
of IDA systems which share the characteristic that they all 
involve human decision making. System creation to 
support this decision process must reflect the complex 
nature of the human relationships between the system user 
and operators. Effective management of system creation is 
characterised by its own skills and techniques. 
ｾｾ＠
\ \ 
- HUMAN-CENmED 
- EXTERNAl CLOSED LOOP 
-INFORMATION BASED 
Fig. 1 Information/decision/action systems 
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Fig. 1 shows the information/decision/action class of 
system with which this volume is principally concerned. It 
comprises sensing, communication, assessment of the 
sensed information, human-based decision and consequent 
controlled action. 
The class of system embraces a very wide variety of 
members, including: 
(i) individuals and groups of humans 
(ii) piloted vehicles 
(iii) companies 
(iv) governments 
(v) air traffic control 
(vi) finance and banking 
(vii) management information 
(viii) command and control information 
(ix) intelligence 
(x) IDA system management of creation. 
Excluded from the class, by virtue of their fully automatic 
nature, are process control systems not requiring human 
decision. However, process control may occur in the sub-
systems from which information/decision/action (IDA) 
systems are constructed, particularly in sensing and execu-
tion subsystems. 
IDA systems are generally highly complex. Complexity 
arises principally from the intimate relationship which 
must be established between the IDA systems's com-
ponents and the human organisation which it is intended 
to serve. The decision support subsystem in particular can 
comprise many operators, each with his own formation 
handling facilities, concerned with different aspects of an 
overall decision process. The 'real' decision process is 
occurring, then, between the system operators, while the 
system in the Figure must provide carefully tailored 
support to each individual in the decision ｣ｨｾｩｮＮ＠ This 
paper is concerned with the means for creatmg that 
synergy between operator and system in a cost-effective 
way, using the system management approach. 
2 System lifespan 
A system will evolve during its lifespan and should be 
designed with that ability from the outset. ｅｶ･ｮｴｵｾｬｬｹ＠
system senility will set in, however; good system desIgn 
seeks to delay the onset of senility and to support ease of 
transfer for the collected information from the old to the 
new system. 
Fig. 2 shows eight phases in the life of a ｳｹｳｴ･ｾＬ＠ ｦｾｯｭ＠ con-
ception to eventual replacement. System creatIon IS usually 
'NEW SYSTEM 
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ｾ＠
Fig. 2 System lifespan 
344 
a shorter period than system operation. The creation 
process must, then, recognise from the outset that the 
system will evolve during its useful life, and 'design for 
evolution' is essential. 
Transition is the period of introduction of the system 
into operation. Designers often envisage a system only as 
they expect it to be during its operational state of utility. 
Achieving this goal requires special facilities and pro-
cedures which may be peculiar to the transition phase, so 
that the human operators can transfer smoothly and with 
enthusiasm from the old to the new system. 
An objective of system design should be to stay the 
onset of system senility, the causes of which will be dis-
cussed later. The onset of senility is to some extent, 
however, a self-fulfilling prophecy. Conception, design and 
development of a new system may be so protracted that 
senility must be anticipated, and the new system may be 
ready before the old really needs replacement. 
An appreciation of the terminal phases of a system's life-
span is valuable in the system creation process. As the 
figure shows, the new system will interface with the system 
it replaces and information will be transferred to the new 
system during start-up. It is, therefore, sound practice in 
that context to design for ease of replacement, so that 
information collected and stored, perhaps at great expense, 
in the old system can be transferred to, and retained in, the 
new. 
3 System life cycle 
System designs contain the seeds of their own eventual 
decline. The management of systems creation generates 
system options and balances their merits against life-cycle 
cost so as to maximise the period of cost-effective system 
utility. 
Fig. 3 consists of a graph with axes of cost per unit time 
and effectiveness. The progress of a typical system is 
plotted against these axes. Rising costs, with no capability, 
start the cycle for development and implementation. 
During transition the system starts to become effective and 
the rate of expenditure may fall. The period of utility is 
marked by rising effectiveness and, in mid term, rising cost 
of ownership. Finally, effectiveness starts to tail off with 
costs still rising into senility and ultimate replacement. 
The Figure also shows some of the causes of the cost-
effectiveness cycle. Designs are usually frozen early in 
development, and it is common for hardware in particular 
. to be dated even before entry into use. Protracted develop-
ment and implementation also result in a mismatch 
between the evolving user requirement and the more static 
i 
w 
_NEW TEOWOLOOVAVAIlABLE 
-NEWIN'l'EAF1..CESmREPI..A.CED 
COMPLEMENTARY SYSTEMS 
Fig. 3 System life cycle COSTITlME 
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design, so that design changes can be needed during tran-
sition as well as the period of utility. The new system wiIl 
also interface, in the wider system context, with comple-
mentary systems which are at different phases in their life 
cycles, and new replacements will arise as situations 
change. 
These changing requirements can be accommodated 
only by providing inherent and accessible flexibility and 
spare capacity in the system design. Even these pledges to 
adaptability must all be redeemed eventually, at which 
time the system can no longer evolve in step with the 
changing wider system and must eventually decline. 
The system design approach recognises these evolution-
ary factors and trades off performance and continued per-
formance, on the one hand, against life cycle cost, on the 
other. The generation of system options and the tradeoff 
process are a fundamental responsibility of systems man-
agement. 
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4 Project subsystems 
Each system is comprised of at least five related sub-
systems, and the operational system should contain its 
own reversionary, fallback and transitional capabilities. 
Inservice and incompany subsystem compatibility can be 
promoted to maximise life-cycle cost effectiveness. 
Systems and their eventual users need to be supported. 
Consideration of a system project shows that it comprises 
at least four major subsystems in addition to the oper-
ational system required by the customer. These four are: 
(a) The Test and Integration Subsystem needed to 
prove the developing operational system's elements 
(b) The Incompany Support Subsystem needed to 
maintain both the test and integration facilities and the 
developing operational equipments 
(c) The Inservice Support Subsystem which provides 
spares, test facilities, training, documentation and develop-
ment facilities for the user's operational and inservice 
training systems 
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(d) The Inservice User Training System (to train oper-
ational users) comprising trainers, simulators and analysis 
elements, and usually separate from the operational system 
per se. 
Of special note is the composition of the operational 
system; it should comprise the five integral subsystem as 
shown in the Figure, so that it contains its own reversion 
(secondary system to operate when the primary system 
fails) and its own transition features, as well as the ability 
to detect faults and exercise operators. 
A design which is intended to be life-cycle cost effective 
will capitalise on the potential similarities between the 
inservice and the incompany support systems and between 
the user training and the test and integration subsystems. 
For example, the customer's need for automatic test facili-
ties in service can influence the choice of incompany test 
facilities, so that test access, test techniques, test software 
and test hardware are compatible. This approach offers 
IN-5ERVICE USER TRAINING 
SUB-5YSTEM 
- TRAINERS 
- SIMULATORS 
_ ANALYSIS FACILITIES 
IN-5ERVICE 
SUPPORT SUS-5YSTEM 
- STTEfATE 
- SPARES 
• DOCUMENTAnON 
-TRAINING 
Fig. 4 Project subsystems 
shorter timescales and reduced costs, as well as more har-
monious transition and eventual contractor support. 
5 System project team structure 
System creation comprises seven phases which can be 
reflected in the team organisation. The resultant teams are 
bound to each other through the formal use of specifi-
cations which are developed, agreed and maintained in co-
operation with the customer. The team management is 
ideally established so that system design and development 
must be proven to the satisfaction of an independent test 
authority within the project, supported by the QA 
authority. 
The system creation process comprises seven major 
phases. Project organisation provides seven equivalent 
functional groups. These tightly bound functional groups 
provide discrete outputs as shown in Fig. 5. Coupling 
between the groups is provided by formal specifications for 
each of the five subsystems shown in the previous topic. 
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The progressive elaboration of specifications is an essen-
tial if unromantic basis for effective system creation; the 
specifications are agreed stage by stage with the customer 
and evolved as both the users and the system creator's 
ideas develop. 
The user requirement specification (URS) delineates the 
user's overall requirement regardless of solution (solution 
transparent). The system requirement specification (SRS) 
defines those parts of the user's requirement which the 
system will satisfy, again in solution-transparent terms. 
System design results inter alia in performance and 
design requirements (PDRs) which specify, in detail, (but 
again solution transparent) the hardware, software, inter-
face and performance parameters of the individual ele-
ments of the system. These PDRs are used as the basis for 
bidding, development and test. All of the specifications 
come together as the basis for customers' acceptance of the 
system. 
The project may be thought of as moving in time from 
left to right on the Figure. Thus, operations and systems 
+ 
t t ｾ＠ t • 
• Fig. 5 System project team structure 
requirements analysis should be early transitory phases. 
Personnel may also move with the project by transferring 
between teams. In particular, those responsible for system 
design should, where practicable, prove their design in test 
and integration to the satisfaction of an independent 
authority provided within the overall management struc-
ture, usually the Test and Integration Manager with the 
Quality Assurance Manager. 
6 Systems engineering activities 
Management of system creation emphasises operational 
analysis, requirement analysis and system design and it is 
essential to provide objective traceable justification for 
system design. Most of the truly expensive mistakes are 
made early in a system project, which amply justifies the 
emphasis and requires that the system designer and 
manager have to be masters of a variety of skills, especially 
that of compromise. 
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Fig. 6 shows a complete systems project structure with 
project support added to the seven chronological functions 
of the previous topic. Project support exists throughout 
the project life. 
Operations analysis, requirement analysis and systems 
design can be seen as containing 'wider system' activities, 
and emphasis on these three areas is characteristic of effec-
tive systems creation. Following topics will highlight man-
agement methodologies in these areas particularly. 
The activities shown under the various headings are 
generic as far as is practicable. However, the application of 
IDA systems requires highlighting of the human factors 
and information handling areas in particular. The system 
designer, in particular, has to master a variety of trades 
including: 
(i) architecture analysis 
(ii) computer science 
(iii) control theory 
(iv) human factors 
(v) software structures 
(vi) logistics and maintenance. 
His principal skill must be in none of these areas, however; 
it must be in the ability to weigh and balance the many 
factors impinging on, and influencing, a design. The good 
system designer will not leap at the first solution he comes 
across. Instead he will: 
(a) generate optional system designs which meet the 
system requirement 
(b) compare each of the options against the required 
design characteristics 
(e) select and justify the preferred solution. 
Most of the major mistakes in system design are made at 
the start, hence the system management emphasis on oper-
ational analysis, requirements analysis and system design. 
7 System tasks and skills 
The work to be done by the systems functional teams can 
be logically 'decomposed' in stages. As an example, Fig. 7 A 
shows stage one for operations/requirements analysis and 
systems design and Figs. 7B and 7C show stage two, the 
beginning of formal work breakdown, which highlights the 
system skills associated with each particular system. 
OPERA1l0NS/REQUIREMENTS 
Fig. 7A Tasks and skills: first level 
SPECIFY TEST & 
INTEGRATION 
REQUIREMENTS 
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The activity areas indicated in the preceding Section must 
be systematically structured so that the creation process is 
controlled and balanced. One technique for developing a 
logical workflow is the R-Net (requirement network) pub-
licised (but not fully documented) by Robert Lano of TRW 
in a series of lectures he gave for the Technical Marketing 
Society of America in 1979, in London. Fig. 7 A shows a 
high-level R-Net for operations and requirements analysis 
combined, and for system design. The R-Net is entered at 
the top and branches marked '&' must all be pursued, 
while branches marked • +' are alternatives; there are no 
. +' branches in these examples. The R-Net is much 
simpler than, say, a PERT Chart; items in parallel between 
two vertical &s can be executed together, serially or in any 
order. The Figure is concerned simply with their logical 
relationship. 
Figs. 7B and 7C are also example R-Nets, but at the 
next level of detail. They tbo address operations/ 
requirements analysis and system design, and are topo-
graphically mapped identically to the first Figure. Each 
block in the second-level Figures is marked with a work 
breakdown structure reference number which refers to a 
full description of the work to be done, skills required, 
resources required, outputs etc. 
Examination of the R-Nets shows not only the tasks to 
be carried out, but also presents the skills which are partic-
ular to the system design process. The Systems Creation 
Manager is responsible for promoting and encouraging a 
dynamic, creative, even lateral thinking, environment 
during the early system design phases so that a full and 
balanced set of design options can be generated, reduced, 
massaged and detailed. Thereafter, the continuing gradual 
evolution of the preferred system design will require that 
the original concepts and tradeoffs be traceable, which, in 
turn, means that system design will persist at some level 
throughout the project's life. 
Following Sections will highlight areas and method-
ologies of special relevance to system design. 
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Fig. 7B Operational requirements 
analysis: second level 
H/W = hardware 
S/W - software 
SRS = system requirement specification 
URS = user requirement specification 
Fig. 7C System design: second level 
HQ - headquarters 
CCTV - closed-circuit television 
DBMS - database management system 
ISET - inservice exercise/training 
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8 Functional decomposition 
A common language is essential for effective dialogue 
between end-user and analyst/designer who must analyse 
the primary, reversionary and fallback systems on the 
same basis to ensure compatibility, and in a way that the 
end-user finds simple to understand. 
Functional decomposition, part of operations and require-
ments analysis, is the systematic, progressive detailing of a 
function without regard to physical interfaces or other 
constraints. It is essentially a top-down creative process, 
which should proceed hand in hand with the potential 
end-user because it describes either his current tasks or 
future wishes. 
As functional decomposition brings together end-user 
and analyst, a common language is needed which is at 
once easy to follow and quite specific. 
The example shown in Fig. 8, data state design, pre-
sents data only in the bubbles and unspecified processes in 
the arrows. Successive detailing of a function, as shown for 
the simple case, 'allocation of resources to tasks', even-
tually leads to individual data pools which may represent, 
in some cases, database entities. However, it is important 
to realise that the IDA system requirement is comprised of 
only a part of each function; the dotted line separates out 
the system functions from the overall user requirement 
while keeping their relationship intact. 
Fallback will probably require that each user function 
continues at some level, even when the end-system is 
'down'; the data state design is also used as the basis for 
designing the reversionary (limited system performance) 
and fallback (no system performance) modes of operation 
so that these are compatible with the primary mode. Fall-
back in an IDA system generally consists of the operators 
working without part or all of the system. For fallback, 
they will need nonvolatile information during downtime. 
They will similarly need an alternative communication 
medium to receive and send volatile information. Fallback 
information system design may be layered to accommo-
date differing degrees and durations of main system failure. 
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Design drivers/option tradeoffs 
Each IDA system is unique in realisation. Each design is 
influenced from the start of its creation by a variety of 
mutually inconsistent design criteria. An objective, visible 
and traceable means of comparing system-design options 
and balancing the many design influences is essential. 
Each IDA system may have the same basic elements, but 
each is unique in realisation; the interfaces with the wider 
system and the characteristics of the particular require-
ment ensure that uniqueness. Classic systems approach 
requires the generation of objective measures of system 
excellence. Fig. 9 shows some of these principal design 
influences or design drivers for IDA systems. 
Utility is concerned with performance of the primary, 
reversionary and fallback systems. Availability to the end-
user is based on high system reliability and ease of main-
tenance. Adaptability, the staff of longevity for the system, 
is comprised of flexibility for evolution and expandability 
for growth. Interoperability is concerned with communica-
tion (in its true sense) between end-users in the wider 
system. Usability is the compatibility in design between the 
end-user in his working environment and the system. It 
includes the psychology of the end-user's perception of the 
wider system. Survivability for systems in harsh or military 
environments is a powerful design influence; it comprises 
avoidance of detection, self defence, when detected, and 
damage tolerance, when damage is sustained. Security is 
important for personal, financial, banking and military 
information systems. 
Comparison of design options is a necessary feature of 
the systems approach. This is often undertaken using con-
ventional weighting and scoring methods, which suffer 
from two principal deficiencies: the weightings are subjec-
tive, and the simple algebraic summation of weighted 
scores for different criteria is often invalid. The technique 
shown in Fig. 9 has been developed by the author to 
overcome these limitations; it is called rank matrix 
analysis (RMA). RMA ranks design options criterion by 
criterion and statistically analyses the resultant rank 
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Display system options (example only) 
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graphics 
Performance 5 4 2 
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Probability of random occurrence < 1 % 
Fig. 9 Options and tradeoffs 
matrix for significant divergence from random (null 
hypothesis). Ranking is often the only objective compari-
son possible between options at the early stage of design. 
In the example, optional operator display configurations 
are compared and the pattern is shown as very unlikely to 
be random. Option e, the preferred option, is undoubtedly 
the most expensive, but cost effectiveness must be judged 
system-wide and over the full life cycle, not piecemeal, sub-
system element by element. In practice, RMA and conven-
tional weighting-and-scoring methods are often best used 
together, and their results compared. 
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10 Architectures and interfaces 
System performance, survivability and resilience are 
founded on the basic architecture, which is comprised of 
nodes and links. Design of a flexible architecture is at the 
heart of effective system creation, but is often dismissed as 
obvious or unimportant. The most far-reaching conse-
quences can accrue from adopting a poor architecture at 
the start of system creation. 
System structure, architecture, topology, etc. are the basis 
for eventual performance in design but are astonishingly, 
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Fig.10 Architectures and interfaces 
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often cursorily dismissed as 'obvious' or unimportant. 
Architecture is concerned with the identification and 
linking of nodes, nodal replication for survival and mobile 
operations, information replication for resilience, and the 
mapping of functionally bound' subsystems on to physical 
architectures. . 
Top left of Fig. 11 shows a related set of entities. These 
could be people, organisations, software modules, distrib-
uted processors, The right-hand side of Fig. 11 shows the 
interfaces between these entities are represented in an N-
squared chart [1] so-called because it comprises N rows 
by N columns giving N-squared rectangles. The leading 
diagonal represents the N entities, leaving N-squared-N 
interface rectangles. Each of these lies on the X -Y co-
ordinates of two entities. Upper right rectangles represent 
'down' interfaces in the hierarchy, while lower right rectan-
gles represent 'up' interfaces. 
The N-squared chart reveals three distinctive interface 
patterns in the organisation hierarchy. F l' F 2 and F 3 have 
all mutual up and down interfaces represented; F 1, F 2 and 
F 3 comprise a tightly bound functional group, which 
would be a candidate for physical cohesion in design. F 6 , 
F 7 and F 8 form a similar functional/physical group. F 3 is 
at the centre of an interface cross; it has interfaces to all 
entities and is a unique system node. Failure of F 3 isolates 
both halves of the organisation. F 3 is a candidate for relia-
bility improvement, replication and/or protection. The 
third N-squared feature is the waterfall chain of command 
which shows orders 'rolling' down the organisation. 
Finally, the topography at bottom left shows that the 
original hierarchy is essentially simple and highlights its 
underlying fundamental characteristics. Using the N-
squared technique, particularly for large systems, permits 
the most complex architectures to be analysed, and their 
interfaces to be identified and controlled. 
11 Interoperability 
The advent of layered communication/information proto-
cols promises to enhance performance and flexibility as 
well as interoperability. End-user compatibility may 
emerge as a new problem once the protocols are in place. 
System design seeks to promote smooth continual flow. 
For production lines, the flow would be components 
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modules and facilities contributing to the end product. For 
IDA systems information flow is the factor which tran-
scends and unifies communication, processors, displays 
and operator interfaces. 
Interoperability in IDA systems is essentially between 
human operators in the wider system community. A 
number of protocols is being developed which support this 
dialogue, the chief of these being (for IDA systems) the 
International Standards Organisation open-systems-
interconnection (ISO OSI) seven-layer protocol shown in 
Fig. 11 [2]. This protocol consists of layers which buffer 
and isolate interoperability functions so that each layer 
interacts only with those immediately above and below it. 
The potential for evolution and growth is greatly enhanced 
by this 'damage limitation' layered protocol approach. The 
three lowest layers are concerned with the establishment of 
a networked communication facility. The transport layer 
provides an 'envelope' inside which information is sent 
over the network. 'Session' binds and unbinds groups of 
communicants. 'Presentation' formats, translates and pre-
sents information. 'Application' manages both the commu-
nication and information facilities in support of the 
end-user's particular activity. 
As Fig. 11 shows, there are several layers needed above 
the seven-layer protocol to ensure that the human oper-
ators truly understand each other. The major obstacle to 
interoperability is not inability to understand - that can 
be detected and remedied; the principal risk arises from 
a mistaken belief that full understanding exists and that 
there is, therefore, no cause for concern. 
It is not generally realised that the OSI concept can be 
very widely applied; it is not restricted to fixed-site 
computer-based transaction-processing systems but can 
readily extend to tactical, mobile real-time systems too. 
12 Test integration and simulation 
Test and integration require that the developing system be 
immersed in an environment to represent the extremes that 
might be met in practice by the end system, so that all 
system algorithms, capacities and performance can be 
established, tuned and proved. Simulation of scenarios, of 
nonavailable end-system components, and of system 
response will all be needed. 
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The process of system creation will bring together hard-
ware and software for test and integration. In any system 
of significance, the full testing of the system, man- machine 
interface, communications, software algorithms, etc. will 
necessitate the construction of a rig to represent parts of . 
and interfaces to the wider system. 
Progressive rig proving will require equipments and 
facilities to be interconnected, stimulated and analysed. 
There are three distinct elements to this process. Some 
equipments may not be easily obtained and their behav-
iour must be simulated. External events which activate 
system functions must also be artificially represented (e.g. 
radar returns to represent a situation which might only be 
met under extreme operational conditions). Finally, the 
response of the end-system which the rig represents must 
be simulated (e.g. the response of the eventual operator to 
the radar returns may change vehicle orientation and, 
hence, instruments and displays on the rig must be made 
to change too). 
The process of simulating the local and wider 
environment surrounding the system under test can neces-
SIMULAlED 
SUS-SYSlEM 
Fig. 12 T est, integration 
and simulation 
sitate a set of simulation facilities which is more elegant in 
its way than the end-system itself. The development of 
naval and air real-time systems, in particular, requires 
elaborate simulation, which includes natural and man-
made interference, garble and loss of information, simu-
lated defects and the combination of situations and condi-
tions most likely to 'break' the system. 
13 System management organisation 
Preceding Sections concentrated on the systems engineer-
ing aspects of system creation; the mangement of systems 
engineering is vitally important too, and will be high-
lighted in following Sections. 
Unlike product companies which are physicalIy parti-
tioned in support of production, systems companies may 
be functionally partitioned around a project base. Pro-
gressive development of a systems company may lead 
through matrix management to the formation of a consul-
tant's group. 
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Systems companies and product companies will generally 
be organised quite differently. For the product company, 
the production facility often represents a significant, and 
immobile investment in real estate and mechanical 
equipments. For the systems company, emphasis is on 
system-level design and software development, test and 
integration. As a result, product companies tend to be 
physicaIly partitioned with goods inwards, stores, develop-
ment laboratories, production areas, etc. Systems com-
panies tend to be functionaIly partitioned around projects 
and groups of projects. 
Fig. 13 shows a typical systems company organisation. 
On the right-hand side of the Figure a number of projects 
can be seen (a, b, c, etc.) at various stages of their progres-
sion through the company. The projects are grouped into 
two areas, probably according to customer category. 
As systems companies grow, the projects mutuaIly 
compete for resources. Fixed resources, such as the test 
and integration areas and software development facilities, 
may require separate managers. A matrix management 
organisation can grow as shown under the heading 
'resource managers', with all project resources centraIly 
managed. 
As projects wax and wane some resources will tempo-
rarily become surplus. A good resource manager may 'seIl ' 
these surplus personnel resources of expertise as consul-
tants outside the company, and the growth and eventual 
independence of a consultants group can be expected. 
14 System project manning 
System creation is presently labour-intensive, particularly 
in the areas of system design and software development. 
The various system creation activities tend to overlap in 
time, and it is to be expected that a considerable degree of 
work wiIl continue during transition, post delivery. 
The passage of a system creation project through a 
company has been presented, so far, as comprising sequen-
tial phases; in practice that may be an oversimplification. 
Fig. 14 shows a typical set of manpower profiles for a 
systems project, with milestones along the top. The deriva-
tion of the requirement and the design can be seen, leading 
to equipment and, particularly, software engineering activ-
ity. The need for a design improvement is mooted, and it 
has consequences in equipment, software and test and inte-
gration areas. User training is shown during the develop-
ment ; end-users can usefully be incorporated into test and 
integration, both for their training and to smooth the path 
of customer acceptance of the system. 
Noteworthy points include: 
(a) the continuance of system design throughout the 
project 
(b) the labour intensity of software development 
(c) the overlap of the various functional activities 
(d) the major requirements of the project postdelivery, 
particularly for inservice support facilities. 
Attempts to cost major systems generally underestimate 
costs, often because the estimators believe that the system 
will be developed and completed according to a fixed 
schedule, and by a due date. [n practice, this would be 
quite exceptional. The proces of transition is not entirely 
within the control of the sy tem-creation manager, who 
wiIl nonetheless be responsible for tuning the system to 
meet the users' expectations and needs. 
15 Transition 
Transition is a greatly underrated phase of systems cre-
ation. Causes of slow or ineffective transition can be identi-
fied and ameliorated but essentially instant switchover 
from old to new system is an unreasonable expectation. 
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Transition factors Probable cause(s) Remedy 
Slow transition • Poor requirements • Discrete transition subsystem 
analysis 
Inoperative interfaces to • Interface evolution 
'wider' system 
• Close control of interfaces 
through life 
User resistance • New system 'unattractive' 
• Advantages not evident 
• User-friendly design 
• Co-operative implementation 
Customer dissatisfaction • Requirement has changed • Employ system flexibility 
• False mental image • Early prototypes 
Poor hardware • Infant mortalities/ • Design for reliability 
reliability • Poor design • Modular portable software 
Poor software reliability • Inadequate testing • Thorough tests & trials 
• Inadequate user trials 
Late support facilities • Subordinate • Emphasise cost of delay 
to primary system 
Fig. 15 Transition 
Transition has been highlighted in the preceding Sections; 
it is undoubtedly the most underrated phase of system cre-
ation. We expect to nurture a newborn infant, but a 
newborn system must be instantly capable. 
Fig. 15 shows a number of reasons why instant capabil-
ity will not occur. The potential remedies have a constant 
theme: 
(a) continual attention to wider system interfaces 
(b) attention to human factors at all levels 
(c) co-operative user/creator design and evolution 
(d) thorough test and trials prior to transition 
(e) flexibility. 
But, in essence; it is unreasonable to expect perfection. 
Instead, perhaps the systems creation process should 
indeed plan for a period of inservice nurture, with old and 
new systems running side by side and a gradual controlled 
transfer occurring from one to the other; such approaches 
have been tried with great success, but the desire for an 
instant 'switch' is hard to resist. 
16 The systems management approach 
The systems management approach is widely applicable, 
but is not yet widely applied. In some ways it is generated 
by an attitude of mind, but the benefits to be gained from 
this comprehensive, high-integrity approach require that it 
be considered as the separate discipline it truly is. 
Wide applicability - - -
projects, companies. economics 
Cost effective - - - through-life optimisation 
High integrity - - - Methodical. comprehensive 
Unique - - - a discipline in its own right 
Fig. 16 The systems management approach 
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The systems approach has almost universal applicability, 
but is not widely applied at present outside of the defence 
industry. Its applicability extends to development, pro-
duction, administration, organisation and detailed design, 
although this volume has been limited principally to large 
IDA systems and management methodologies for large 
systems creation. The systems approach aims to be cost 
effective throughout the system life, but the pattern of 
expenditure differs from the bottom-up approach of select-
ing off-the-shelf, which is simple, tangible and generally 
unsatisfactory in realisation. It has also to be said that the 
systems approach can be misapplied, with generally expen-
sive results; 'top-down' design can only be truly effective if 
it recognises the pragmatic limits of the 'bottom' towards 
which it is aiming. 
Systems creation has to be based on integrity; it is a 
complex co-operative, systematic endeavour which 
requires continual customer involvement, plus a large 
element of forward thinking and planning to produce a 
satisfactory and comprehensive solution. 
Lastly, the systems approach is different; it should be an 
amalgam of top-down and bottom-up; it designs back-
wards from senility to conception; it balances many incon-
sistent constraints; it designs for change and changes the 
design; it is concerned with architectures, survivability, 
topology and the wider system; it is, in fact, a discipline in 
its own right and is undoubtedly the way ahead as systems 
become more complex and intertwined. 
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-OOSAIC - OONCEPrS FOR THE FUI'URE 
DEPWYMEN1' OF AIR PCWER IN 
EUROPEAN NA'IO 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
Air ｾ･ｲ＠ in Europe is conventionally deployed in sUPIX>rt of - the 
anticipated Land Battle. Since World War 2 (WWII), the many roles of 
Air Paver have developed sanewhat independently: NAIX;E (Nato Air 
Defence Ground Environment) for example is the extant Air Defence (AD) 
element which draws the nations I AD forces together. 
NA'IO is actively analysing the requirements for, and shape of, the 
future Air Canmand and Control System (ACCS) which is required to 
ameliorate deficiencies in present Canmand and Control (C2) of air 
po.Yer, particularly in the Central Region. These deficiencies are 
concerned with such fundamental issues as offensive/defensive 
integration, survivability, mobility and fratricide reduction. 
Even as these early ACCS considerations are getting underway, 
technological advances are driving both the threat spectrum and threat 
. counters to evolve at an ever-increasing rate. There is, therefore, a 
prima facie case for examlning the underlying deployment of air power 
in these dynamic circumstances: otherwise, it may be that a future 
ACCS will be faced with the task of accommodating deployment 
deficiences rather than providing the essential Force Multiplier. 
It is timely, then, to consider alternatives to current force 
deployment in European NA'IO, to assess those alternatives and to 
consider the impact that they might have on air p:::wer C2. This paper 
introduces 3 interlocking concepts which together present a radical 
option to current air power deployment conventions, which is 
consistent with threat and technology trends and which at the same 
time addresses same present day shortcomings. These so-called MOSAIC 
Concepts emphasise survivability and "moveability" as the key issues; 
integration of offence and defence is seen as a fundamental part of 
survivability, since neither perfect defence nor perfect offence is a 
viable military stance. 
2 .0 THE CHANGING EUROPEAN MILITARY SCENE 
At the highest level Western Europe could find itself in one of the 
follONing states: Peace, Tension, Theatre Conventional War, Global 
Conventional War, Theatre Nuclear War or Global Nuclear War. 
Transition from one state to another could be triggered by a number of 
factors: sane are shown in Figure 1, in which the six states are 
represented by boxes, and the causes of transition between states are 
at the commencement of arrONS. For example, Menace causes transition 
from Peace to Tension: Invasion escalates Tension into Theatre 
Conventional War, and so on. Of particular interest is the basis for 
transi tion from Theatre Conventional, to Theatre Nuclear Waq it is 
shown on Figure I as Rollback. 
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Rollback, orderly withdrawal by NA'ID ground forces in the face of 
superior odds, is designed to provide sufficient time for a political 
solution to be set in place. Should Rollback be far too fast, or the 
political solution fail to materialise, then it is possible that NA'ID 
would be obliged to use nuclear weapons to stem the tide. For 
Rollback tq be too fast Dnplies that key land features or 
installations \\Ould be forfeit. Amongst those key installations may 
be included fixed air power facilities: radars, Control and Reporting 
Centres (CRC's), Sector Operations Centres (SOC's) runways, fuel and 
ammunition dumps. It therefore follows that forward siting of fixed 
or immobile air assets will contribute to the earlier need during 
Rollback to resort to non-conventional weapons and hence to a lowering 
of the nuclear threshold. 
With a swing in the tide of conflict, NATO forces might wish to pursue 
retreating forces into their own territory. Irrrnobile air assets \\Ould 
limit pursuit effectiveness in this instance, by becaning 
progressively further behind the line of battle. Fixed air assets 
clearly have limitations when supporting a mobile war. On the other 
hand, the growth of such fixed assets has not seemed unreasonable over 
a period of thlrty years of ｰ･｡｣･ｾ＠ static facilities have been 
developed, util1sed, superseded and discarded with no recourse to 
mobility other than perhaps the occasional exercise. 
The advent of new systems into the military inventories of both sides 
renders any canplacency ill-advised. Improvements in tactical weapons 
delivery accuracies and the use of space borne sensors and weapons are 
two factors of relevance to the fabric of future Air Power in European 
NA'ID, and both President Reagan's Strateg ic Defence Ini tiati ve and 
Chairman Gorbachev's move to eliminate nuclear weapons may result in 
fundamental changes in future NA'ID strategy. The only certainty seems 
likely to be one of ｣ｨ｡ｮｧ･ｾ＠ for Air Power this implies flexibility, 
mobility and survivability as being key issues. 
3 .0 AIR PCWER IN CONI'EXT 
The concept of indivisibility of air };OWer is writ large upon the 
minds of many air forces. Originally, the concept argued against 
naval-air, army-air, and independent air forces such as those of the 
UK during WWI. Indivisibility also refers to the concept that 
offence, defence and sUH;X:>rt cannot sensibly be considered in mutual 
isolation. The original concept is not ack.n<::Mledged ｜｜ｏｲｬ､ｷｩ､･ｾ＠ navies 
and armies often have their o.-m air forces, and there are cCXjent 
arguments in favour of such specialist and available air sUfP)rt. The 
second concept is more relevant to the discussion and will be 
eX};X)unded below. 
Figure 2 shows Air Operations as comprising three major arms; offence, 
defence and sUPPJrt. sane of the activities and characteristics of 
each arm are also sho.-m. Examination of the characteristics shows: 
o Air Defence shields vulnerable Offensive and Support Air as well 
as itself. 
o Air Defence is relatively short range and presently tied 
predominantly to fixed Air Defence Ground Environment (ADGE) 
facilities. 
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o Hence overall flexibility and high speed mobility are hampered by 
the relative J..JTn1'Obil1ty of Defensive Air, which is only partly 
overcame by the use of point defence weapons such as RAPIER and 
JAVELIN during bridgehead operations. 
There are, therefore, grounds for re-examining closer integration 
between the elements of air y;:over. If the objective is to enhance the 
overall effectiveness of air power then, as Figure 3 shows, a systems 
approach is needed. The figure shows the same three major air power 
divisions: (1) Offensive (2) Defensive and (3) Support Operations. 
Optimising each of these divisions individually need not result in an 
optimally effective air arm overall; an overall objective must be 
established for optimisation of Air Power as an entity. 
Integrating all the elements of air power \<,QuId be impracticable in 
most circumstances, however. Figure 4 shows four classifications of 
operations, Offensive, Defensive, Maritime and Air Transport, with 
major activities peculiar to each class. Maritime Operations, with 
its Long Range Maritime Patrols (LRMP), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
and Tactical Aid in Support of Maritime Operations (TASMO) is clearly 
set aside from the others in its roles, its tasks and its sphere of 
operations. Closer examination reveals that each of the others is 
also independent, and requires not only its own aircraft and weapons, 
but discrete procedures too; each attracts different personalities and 
characteristics amongst the air crew. It can also be seen that 
function grouping: 
o Concentrates and develops specialist skills. 
o Affords a simple organisation. 
o Enhances motivation and completion. 
o Allows simple measures of effectiveness by function. 
o Divides Capital funding into defensive and offensive. 
The last item proffers a ｴｾｧ･､＠ s\oX)rd. Since the second \<,Qrld war, 
several periods of detente have arisen; during such periods it is 
politically more acceptable to spend money on defence than on offence. 
Spending on defensive facilities thus becanes continual and defence 
can be developed and optimised in isolation fran its 
spasmodically-funded offensive counterpart. Taken to its limit this 
process lowers survivability both of air power and the land/sea battle 
it supports, by placing undue reliance an a defensive potential which 
cannot sustain itself in the face of continual attack. 
The interrelation between the various elements of air power is 
illustrated in Figure 5, which is a System Dynamics view of air 
operations conducted in the face of an advancing enemy ground threat 
which is threatening to overrun forward air assets on the ground. In 
the so-called Influence Diagram technique, a 'plus' or 'minus' sign at 
the arrowhead signifies that source of the arrON will enhance or 
diminish the focal feint in question. Thus Successful Air Defence 
Engagements (top centre) reduce (minus) the Advancing Enemy Ground 
Threat (bottom centre) by improving conditions for Air Superiority 
Operations. In the figure, enemy Command and Control (C2), radar and 
bases are at the right. The very simplicity of this abstract 
representation of air operations highlights the ｾｲｴ｡ｮ｣･＠ of: 
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o Balanced offensive and defensive operations. 
o Carmon and dynamic C2 where offensive and defensive effort and 
resources can be co-ordinated. 
o Mobili ty for C2 and Radar units, bases and defOts. 
o Fratricide Reduction. 
Clearly any future deployment solution should recognise the close 
interrelation between areas of air power, while tempering the move to 
full integration at execution/operations level with the need to 
preserve specialisations. 
4.0 THE 'IHREAT FACING AIR COMMAND AND o)Nl'ROL 
Advances in C2 are threat driven. The threat in the future air/land 
battle is developing swiftly; tactical threat developnents can be 
categorised slinply under three headings. 
o Launch vehicle 
o Delivery vehicle 
o Warhead, weafOn and pay load 
Launch vehicles include tactical ballistic mdssiles (TBMs) and crUise 
missiles which may be expected from any elevation. In the time frame 
of ACCS we must expect spaceborne weafOns too; these could take many 
forms and arrive from any direction. 
'Conventional' warheads will include chemical and fOssibly biological 
payloads as well as high explosive devices, and the variety of nuclear 
warheads is well catalogued. 
Two very significant threat trends concern the detectability of 
threats; voluntary-ernission control (V-EMCON) and Stealth. V-EMCON 
reduces or elilninates the detectable voluntary emission including not 
only ccmnunications, but also lX>ppler radars, radio altimeters and 
radiating rMEs (Distance Measuring Equipnents). Stealth seeks to 
reduce radar cross-sectional area, and encourages V-EMo)N, and the use 
of terrain to screen essential transmissions such as those from 
Terrain FollCMing Radars (TFRs). For entirely pre-planned missions 
even TFR and radio altimeter emissions may be unnecessary in the 
foreseeable future. 
There are clear pressures on the future ACCS and its associated 
subsystems, including sensors, carrnunications and weapons if the aims 
of Aces are to be realised: 
o Increased vulnerability to new all round threats. 
o Need to operate in a degraded mode after sustaining damage, 
fOssibly from nuclear chemical or biological weapons, and in the 
future from beam energy weafOns. 
o Reduction in attack warning tline, leading to increased risk of 
fratricide, and to reduce defensive weapon effective range. 
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Thls last point is expanded at Figure 6 which has ty..Q parts. At the 
left is a graph showing target height against an approximate number of 
ground radars needed to provide contiguous radar cover in a 300 
kID-square as shown in plan at the right. As target height reduces, 
the number of radars rises towards infinity, classically pursuing the 
law of diminishing returns. Advances in terrain follCMing aircraft 
performance are continuing to reduce operational heights, and terrain 
screening can reduce pick up range even more dramatically. The plan 
at the right of Figure 6 shows a notional detection range of 25 kID as 
requiring 36 radars to cover the 300 kID square. The reSUlting 50 kID 
squares form colLnnns and correspond to about the expected daily WP 
rate of ground force advance. Thus, in the given simple scenario, 
either six ground radars (one column) would be overrun per day, or (if 
mobile) they would move swiftly to the rear and redeploy. Simple 
although Figure 6 may be, it amply illustrates ty..Q important points; 
the usefulness of ground radars is being restricted by enemy tactics, 
and those radars near the FEBA/FLOT should be mobile. 
Threat evolution is driven by the same technology which will provide 
the counters, al though a time delay may arise between develq:rnent of 
threat and of counter. Figure 7 illustrates the balance in C3 trends, 
with the air threat at left. Remaining columns shCM selected Sensor, 
Communication and C2 improvements fuelled by recent technological 
improvements. Taken together these improvements accumulate increased 
overall effectiveness. Canmand and Control is of and by military 
personnel, hCMever; major contributions to improved effectiveness will 
come fran irrq:>rovements in organisation, ｣ｾｲ､ｩｮ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ and procedures 
which best employ and protect limited resources. 
5.0 AIR COMMAND AND CONTROL DEFICIENCIES 
Deficiencies in the current command and control of air power in 
European NA'lU have been identified, and may be summarised as follCMs: 
o Lack of timely, secure and adequate information leading to an 
inability to derive tilnely and high quality command decisions. 
o Lack of co-ordination between all elements of air power, but 
especially between offensive and defensive air. 
o Vulnerability of sensors, ccmnunications, processing, HQs and C2 
personnel to physical and electronic attack. 
o An unacceptable fratricide rate due principally to the lack of 
high-integrity identification and weapons control. 
In the light of threat developnents, it can also be seen that the very 
nature of our air power deployment in European NATO is suspect, 
principally because: 
o Facilities (sensors, canmunications, airfields) are almost 
entirely static. 
o Air defences assume that air threats cane fran the East and are 
oriented accordingly. 
o Current hierarchical C2 organisations contain nodes and are not 
designed to tolerate damage. 
FollCMing sections introduce MOSAIC which specifically aims to improve 
Survivability and Mobility but which also addresses the central issue 
of Fratricide. 
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6.0 INl'OOoocrION TO OOSAIC 
6.1 Air PCfnler Deployment Options 
There are several ways in which air power may be tactically deployed. 
Figure 8 illustrates the, tenns and concepts employed here. Many 
forces employ layered air defence, in which offensive air power 
operates behind the relative safety or discrete defensive layers, 
comprising, for example, belts of Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), long 
range interceptors, and short range interceptors. Layered air defence 
is perhaps at its most practical in naval use where the battle group 
presents a concentrated target. In Central Region, the targets to be 
defended are widely dispersed and a 360 degrees azimuth defensive 
layering "-Ould not be practicable due to size and cost. The layered 
system therefore covers only an arc, facing into the ground threat 
axis. 
Laned defence (top right) presents lanes in the direction of the 
threat axis and is of use principally where there is no significant 
mix of weapon systems. Long range interceptors, for example might 
operate furthest from home, while shorter range interceptors operated 
nearer the safe area from where offensive and support air must 
operate. Laned defence can be integrated with layered defence by 
making layers contain lanes. 
Area and overlapping point defences do not presume a threat axis. 
Area defence covers vital points as sets within an area, while 
overlapping point, as the name implies, concentrates on r:oint defence. 
In terms of concentration of force, point defence must be attractive 
when resources are limited and threat direction unknONI1, but of course 
it requires definition of what r:oints are considered vital, which may 
prove to be a far-fran-trivial problem. IDSAIC concepts employ an 
area and point defence philosophy to protect vulnerable air assets on 
the ground from any direction. 
6 .2 The OOSAIC Concepts 3 
OOSAIC considers the evolving threat and the current C I shortfalls 
and takes these various influences to their natural conclusion in 
reaching a design for ACes. IDSAIC is an acronym, representing: 
Moveable Semi-Autonarous Integrated Cells. 
Each of the "-Ords is separately important to the concepts, and the 
whole acronym is also appropriate. The aim of the MJSAIC concepts, of 
which there are three, is to greatly enhance survivability by 
selecting organisational structures which will continue to operate 
effectively in degraded mode. To achieve this, the structures must 
be: 
o Moveable - either mobile or transportable - so that they may avoid 
targetting and overrun. 
o Semi-Autonomous - 50 that loss of Superior control can be 
acCCl1100dated by co-operation laterally with other groups in the 
structure and, in extremis, total isolation can be accarncdated 
for a pericd. 
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o Integrated - in two senses: first to contain offensive, defensive 
and support elements in each group and so constitute a complete, 
highly survivable, fighting unit: second, so that the groups, 
although having the potential to operate semi-autonomously or even 
autonomously in degraded mode, normally act as one under superior 
control. 
o Cellular - so that individual cells which, by definition are 
moveable, may be grouped together - interfaced - swiftly, easily 
and in various ways to reconfigure the superstructure. 
6.3 The Ground Environment MOSAIC (GEM) 
Figure 9 illustrates the GEM concept which addresses offensive / 
defensive integration am survivability directly by providing self 
contained cells and by recognising that neither attack nor defence is, 
of itself, a tenable military role. Each M)SAIC, containing its 
indigenous air defence, offensive air and air support, can be 
redeployed. At Figure 9A ten cells form a layered MOSAIC which 
corresponds to conventional layered air defence except that offensive 
air and support air are not sheltering in a safe area, but form part 
of the layer. Figure 9B moves three cells to accommodate changes in 
ground threat axis, am 9C shCMs area and overlapping ｾｩｮｴ＠
configurations, remembering that since each cell has its own 360 air 
defence, the resulting MOSAIC also offers omni-directional air 
defence. Figures 9D and 9E show the flexibility needed to fall back 
in the face of advancing ground forces and to configure killing zones 
if such were appropriate. 
The concept of cell mobility to reconfigure tactical deployment 
clearly has potential for providing second echelon support to front 
echelons experiencing undue pressure. Survi vabili ty too is 
potentially very greatly enhanced; anyone cell remaining after an 
attack has the ability to rove and to keep fighting. Sheltering of 
offensive air behind a defensive screen has been superseded for two 
reasons. 
o The threat axis for air attack will not be known in the future, 
and certainly need not coincide with the main ground thrust so 
that point/area defence of offensive assets is the only viable 
option. 
o A rapid WP attack which broke through a conventional, layered 
defensive screen would find offensive assets both concentrated and 
vulnerable. 
(Other aspects of GEM and the two remaining concepts will be expanded 
after all three concepts have been introduced). 
6.4 The Sensor MOSAIC (SEM) 
The SEM concept is illustrated at Figure 10, where it is compared with 
current philosophies at top left. The SEM concept concentrates on 
freeing air C2 from its ground fetters and on integrating target data 
fran airborne sensors. 
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Current C2 for air power is strongly ground centred' in (largely) 
static facil1ties. Ground sensors are linked together to form an 
integrated sensor picture, to which it is hoped to add the radar 
pictures fran NAE'1"1, WACS or perhaps aerostats (tethered balloons) or 
airships. This ground centred concept must be doubtful for the 
following reasons: 
o The ground based sensors will see less and less with the advent of 
V-EMCDN, Stealth, TBM and Cruise Missiles. 
o Static ground sensors and their equally static intercommunication 
links will be early targets. 
o NAEW radar and the links with ground C2 will be prime targets for 
electronic and physical attack (with ａｒｾ＠ for example). 
The SEM concept recognises the introduction of track-while-scan radars 
and E01 Resistant Corrmunications Systems (ERCS) such as JTIDS into 
airborne service. Figure 10 also shows that the excellent lookdown 
capability of these radars forms a patchwork, or MOSAIC of coverage, 
with some valuable system qualities when canpared with ground based, 
static sensors: 
o There is a number of discrete sensors, each switching on and off 
as the crews pursue their operational roles. 
o The density of such sensors increases near the air battle. 
o Distances between sensors is . relatively small near the· battle, 
reducing the effects of jarrrning, especially on the ERCS. 
o The sensor population is dynamically stable as fighters go 
off-station and are replaced. 
o The sensors follow the air battle, unlike their ground based 
counterparts. 
For the SEM concept to be realised, the various sensor inputs must be 
brought together. The rrost likely candidate to undertake the 
integration is the NAEW/AWACS which, because it may be out of contact 
with the ground environment, assumes a1.nost implicitly the role of Air 
Action Group (AAG) co-ordinator. Taking this notion to its logical 
conclusion, we see that the Sensor MOSAIC concept can free air I?O\'ler 
fran the ground shackles which currently restrain it and limit its 
essential flexibility. The AAG is analogous to the naval Surface 
Action Group and in like manner it may have offensive as well as 
defensive elements, may rrove with the action, and may acquire 
temporary autonomy when conditions dictate. 
6.5 The C3 MOSAIC 
The Ground Environment MOSAIC and the Sensor MOSAIC may enhance 
flexibility, mobility and survivability, but they clearly present a 
challenging C2 task and the corresponding ccmnunications facilities 
will require careful analysis. 
These aspects are the subject of the third concept, the C3 WJSAIC 
which is rrost directly relevant to current AOCS endeavours. The C3 
MOSAIC has the essential task of binding and controlling the moveable 
GEMs and the AAGs. 
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Figure 11 introduces the concept, shONing a three-tiered structure 
with cell C2 controlling its own defence, offence and support and 
reporting to its respective Cell Group C2. These Group facilities 
control a varying number and population of cells during mobile 
operations, and are themselves capable of moving their defence, 
offence and support facilities. Above Cell Group level there may be 
either a further grouping or direct reference to the MSC (Major 
Subordinate Commander). 
Certain salient features become apparent from Figure 11: 
o The functional groups within each level have substantially similar 
divisions into operations, intelligence, plans, logistics and 
engineering; 
o Within a base, cell or cell group control there will be continual 
interchange between the functional groups; this implies tight 
functional binding. 
o Between cells and between levels, hONever, canmunication is 
specifically coupled by function; operations will speak externally 
to operations (as sho..m), intelligence to intelligence, but not 
intelligence to engineering or operations to logistics. (This and 
the previous features are common to all sophisticated C2 
organisations). 
o The sensor M)SAIC requires a number of line of sight air/ground 
communication gateways to accommodate AAG mobility. 
o The communications structure allONS one cell group to control 
another's cells, and also allo.;s a cell to control an adjacent 
cells base facilities should the need arise (battle damage, mobile 
operations etc •• ) 
o In providing this cross coupled communication system, the emphasis 
moves away from vertical communication in support of a simple 
command hierarchy to.;aras a 'rectangular network' of vertical and 
lateral communications, with the communications channels group by 
function (operations, intelligence, etc •• ) 
7.0 EXPANDING '!'HE M)SAIC CX>NCEPI'S 
The conceptual issues raised by M)SAIC are fundamental and if fully 
embraced \>,1Ould impinge on a.l.Irost every aspect of air IXJtl€r. Before 
assessing MOSAIC, it may be useful to consider some of the key 
implications of the three interlocking MOSAICs: 
o Moveability of cells, cells controls, weapon systems, resources 
and support infrastructure. 
o Interopability between cells and their controls. 
o Communications and interfaces to permit and enable moveability and 
interopability even post nuclear exchange if necessary. 
7.1 Moveability 
Moveability (Le. mobility and/or transportability) of ground-based 
sensors is not a new concept, but it does have design implications. 
The need for enhanced performance, for example from antennae, must be 
reconciled with ease of breakda..m and transportation. Similarly the 
size of CRC/sacs in terms of personnel facilities, po.Ner supplies, 
hardening, air filtration, etc., must be limited by ｭｯｶ･｡｢ｩｾｩｴｹ＠
dictates. These problems are generally understood. Less well 
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understood perhaps are the implications of moving canplete squadrons 
of aircraft with their supporting infrastructure, air traffic control, 
aircraft protection, recovery facilities, fuel, weapons, avionics 
maintenance, etc •• There are however ample precedents in the several 
ways employed by armies and, particularly, by navies. 
Navies carry their total air power infrastructure on board ship, 
including runways, surveillance, air traffic control radar, recovery 
and support. Their aircraft are adapted to the purpose but, as 
aircraft such as the Sea Harrier, F14, FlS and E2C Hawkeye illustrate, 
the process of adaptation need not inhibit performance. In a"" 
MOSAIC-ACCS, aircraft might be similarly adapted. 
One approach to air power moveability, therefore, is to emulate the 
navy approach, at least in part. The transp::>rting of runways is not 
out of the question, using special track laying vehicles and adapted 
aircraft, but there are many extant airfields which could be used, and 
autobahns have already been considered for sane types of aircraft. 
There are also VSTOL aircraft designs for the future which could ease 
the problem further. Alternatively, the armies of the world have also 
been mobile since warfare began, and their approach is not dissimilar 
to MOSAIC in many respects. The use of step-up Headquarters, so that 
one HQ may operate statically whilst the second is on the nove, in 
leapfro:1 fashion, is tried and trusted, and could be considered for 
sane air force applications, although it does carry penalties of 
increased manning. 
Looking at navy and army moveability in this way, it becanes apparent 
that MOSAIC seeks to bring air power moveability into line with the 
capabili ties already present in navy and army air po.ver, and in so 
doing impinges on the design of ground sensors, HQs and aircraft. 
Paradoxically, mobility may reduce manning levels to accOTll'OCldate 
transport requirements. Air Power composition seems likely to 
rebalance to meet the moveability requirement: more short/medium range 
STOL transports would be necessary to move cells rapidly during 
Rollback or advance, when road/rail links might be choked or severed. 
MOSAIC also encourages the development of multi-role fighter aircraft 
and aircrew; at present such aircraft change between roles with 
relative difficulty, and the aircrew often find the change even more 
difficult. In MJSAIC, the anphasis on canbined offence and defence 
within each cell would be sensibly accompanied by a rationalisation of 
spares and weapons to reduce the lo:1isticS transPJrtation b..lrden, aoo 
by an ability of each fighter type/aircrew to perform a second role. 
This follows logically from the fundamental objective of 
survivability; if, in extremis, the cell must be able to function, 
then too as crews and aircraft are lost, remaining crews and aircraft 
must have the flexibility to attack, defend and redeploy allrost at 
will. 
7.2 Interoperability 
Interoperability has many meanings in practice in addition to the 
interoperation between facilities in different nations. The IDSAIC 
concepts highlight a current problem in interoperability which is 
illustrated by Figure 12. Ideally, and subject to security protocols, 
Operator 'A' should be able to access not only his o,.m parochial 
information but also that of his counterpart Operator 'B' in another 
cell, perhaps in another region. One operator could be in an 
aircraft, another in a mobile HQ. 
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-It might be {X)ssible in principle to oblige roth operators to store 
and display information identically, but in practice, due to language, 
operational and personal differences, each operator will tend to 
prefer his o,.m display formats. Thus Operator A in viewing a file 
from Operator B's database will expect the display to appear as 
Operator A's other files appear. For example, an aircraft readiness 
tote from a remote region should be formatted identically with a local 
aircraft readiness tote. 
As Figure 12 shaNs, this objective requires many factors to be in 
place: 
o An ACCS-wide data dictionary. 
o ACCS-wide canmunications protocols, including file transfer 
protocols, such as the ISO Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
Seven layer protocol. 
o Agreed information requirements for operators on an operational 
function-by-function basis. ' 
o Common or compatible display standards. 
o A common understanding of the words and symbols transferred 
between systems. 
Even then, difficulties can be foreseen, since operators 'A' and 'B' 
may wish to discuss the different displays of identical information 
which they respectively view. This problem is likely to be resolved 
only by common training and practice. 
The need for standard protocols and has been rrentioned and is as 
obvious as it is difficult to achieve. One concept which would bind 
the various coornunications bearers together in underpinning a carm:>n 
theme is that of an ACCS-wide Tactical Data Interchange Language, 
which may be called TADIL-ACCS. We already have TADIL A, TADIL C and 
TADIL J in association with NATO LINKS 4, 11 and 16. If the valuable 
TADIL concept is carried to its logical limit, then the problems of 
interoperability and rroveability would be considerably eased. The 
TADIL-ACCS concept is not closely coupled with the ccmnunications 
bearers; figure 13 illustrated the point, with a TADIL ACCS track. 
message being formulated by an airrorne radar and being borne CNer a 
variety of bearers via NAEW, air/ground gateways and ground to ground 
links before initiating a track. display. 
The TADIL-ACCS philosophy thus engenders: 
o TADIL-ACCS based subsystem designs in aircraft and ships such that 
messages are formulated at source (button press) in TADIL-ACCS. 
o TADIL-ACCS based processing and display systems on the ground. 
o TADIL-ACCS bearer systems, such as MIDS, LINK 11, LINK 1, etc •• 
For full mobility in the MOSAIC sense, TADIL-ACCS addresses only part 
of the problem, the real-time operational task. There will be a need 
for a parallel data interchange for Intelligence, Logistics, 
Engineering and Plans as well as for operations; each function will 
require an Information Interchange Language. There maybe, therefore, 
a need for LOGDIL for logistics data; ENGDIL for engineering data and 
INI'DIL for intelligence data to provide interoperabili ty at all C2 
infrastructure levels. With such a set of languages and with 
compatible databases for each cell, the prospect of rroving a cell and 
"plugging-in" at a new site becanes realisable. 
7.3 Communications 
Ccmnunications to supp:::>rt the MOSAIC concept must be battle damage 
tolerant and yet have sufficient capacity and flexibility to 
accaT111CX3ate Cell Jroveability and the full bandwidth of carmunication 
in peace time. 
At present, voice communications, while Jroving towards digital 
modulation, are nonetheless diverse as Figure 14 illustrates, and the 
consequent need for translation between systems is very real now, and 
would be exacerbated by MOSAIC. 
CaTUTIunications survivability can be tackled in a variety of ways, 
including: 
o Hardening 
o Non-nodal organisation 
o Multi-nodal organisation 
For OOSAIC, hardening must be reconciled with mobility. Non-nodal 
communications such as the TDMA variety of JTIDS would prove essential 
to MOSAIC for air-to-air and air-to-ground communications 
survivability. The situation on the ground is the Jrost interesting 
however. At present, the commercial pressures for communications, are 
causing PSTN to burgeon and to adopt fibre optics· for cost ease of 
maintenance and capacity reasons. This closely woven communications 
backcloth will, in the near future, offer a ready made solution for 
ground to ground bearers, provided of course that the military can 
either adopt or adapt the CCIlT protocols. Las t , but not least, HF 
radio communications would be a vi tal link in the communications 
chain, especially post nuclear exchange. In particular, ground wave 
may be the only effective ccmnunication in emergency, and as such 
would be core to the OOSAIC concept for survivability. 
To summarise, Figure 15 shows the oammunications interface complexity 
of MOSAIC and emphasises the need for systematic control on an 
ACCS-wide basis. As the figure shows, there are sets - of 
interconnected functional blocks which appear as 'tiles' in a MOSAIC. 
o PSC and Cell Controls form a carmand group. 
o Cell Control, Cells (and the SOC/CRCs inside the cells) form a CIS 
Functional Block for near-real time oontrol. 
o SOC/CRC and NAEl'J form a real-time control. 
o Finally NAEW, fighters and tankers form the Air Action Group 
(MF) • 
The figure also shows two NAEWs to avoid one NAEl'J becaning a node, and 
to allow data relay when the AAG is out of communication range. 
Replication of NAEW will be an essential plank of survivability, 
implying that future NAEW will need to exist in greater numbers and 
cost less than at ｰｲ･ｳ･ｮｴｾ＠ the USNs E2C sets an example, with its 
small size and cost, at least relative to AWACS,MAEW. Although Figure 
15 is MOSAIC based, it is noteworthy that a very similar diagram could 
l:.e drawn for any ａｃｃｓｾ＠ the interface problem is significant in any 
design, r-oSAIC simply highlights the needs. 
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8.0 IMPLDtENI'ING OOSAIC 
8.1 Military and Political Obstacles 
European NA'IO is a patchv.ork of different nations, organisations and 
infrastructure mapped on to widely differing terrains from Norway to 
Greece. No one part of the organisation is perhaps any more canplex 
than the fuming and acquisition of equipnents on a NA'IO/national 
basis. Thus OOSAIC faces t\tIO i.mrnediate implementation hurdles; it 
seeks to move cells according to overall military needs rather than 
political foundaries and those cells are unlikely to be equipped with 
the same aircraft, radars and communication. 
MOSAIC also prejudices the current organisation of power within 
individual national air forces. For OOSAIC to be implemented requires 
a greater degree of delegated authority than is presently accepted 
wi thin NA'IO air forces in order to allcw for r-oSAIC Cell and AN:; 
potential autonomy. (This mirrors the relative authorities of, say, 
an air base commander and a ship's captain; the latter generally has 
much greater local authority consistent with his relative 
independence) • 
Land forces in Central Region have their organic Air Defence SlIMs. 
Naval forces in the Baltic and Mediterranean also form part of the AD 
fabric. For MOSAIC ln particular, with its dynamic rrobility, these 
land and nava,l elements of air power present a special need for 
coordinated battle management. 
Last, there are certain features of air IO'ler employment which lem 
themselves to central rather than distributed control and management. 
These include: reconnaissance, interdic tion, recovery, search and 
rescue, electronic warfare, in-flight refuelling, contingency 
planning, resource management, joint service coordination and many 
others. The degree to which delegation of these presently unified 
facilities can, or need be, effected is uncertain. Instead it may be 
that some functions should stay centralised and be kept "above" the 
MOSAIC tactical level. 
8.2 Army, Navy and National Cells 
MOSAIC lends itself to the introduction of national cells, with 
defined operational capabilities and interfaces, but with few specific 
requirements within the cell. So, we can envisage a number of 
established Norwegian, Greek, Italian, UK and US cells, say, capable 
of being integrated into a OOSAIC layer using standard interfaces to 
communicate laterally and hierarchically. Further, the connection of 
land and naval MOSAIC cells can be envisaged, and this concept reveals 
one of MOSAIC's underlying strengths; such land force and naval cells 
already exist in current practice, are already mobile and already 
integrate offence, defence and air transport support. 
8.3 Applicability 
These simple extensions of the r-oSAIC concepts can overcane many of 
the basic military and political obstacles to funding, preserving 
national interests within NA'ID am coordinating land, sea and air 
pcwer. A full embracing of MOSAIC in place of our current 
evolutionary approach might be ill-advised however. MOSAIC is 
unlikely to find universal applicability across European NA'IO, with 
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its widely differing threats, terrains and political 'Objectives. 
Rather MOSAIC can be seen as most relevant in areas where mobility of 
the ground battle will be greater, notably in Central Region and its 
bordering areas. In other areas, a move towards same mobility might 
introduce a mixture of fixed and MOSAIC like features. 
8.4 Transition and Cost 
Since MOSAIC is different from current systems, it is reasonable to 
suspect that transition to MOSAIC would alter tirnescales and cost 
vis-a-vis the present plans. 
The MOSAIC concepts outlined in this paper describe a complete, 
eventual system which might not be in place for several decades. 
Having set the end target, it is possible to backtrack to our present 
baseline and to define transition stages. 
For example, MOSAIC would contain few static radars other than perhaps 
OTH-B and satellite trackers. Since most radars would be mobile, we 
can establish mobile radars, CRCs and SCX::s as constituting part of 
Phase 1. Similarly new aircraft designs such as the European Fighter 
would be affected by the need to operate fran prepared strips, or to 
use arrester-gear on landing. Such requirements might also form part 
of Phase 1. 
The establishment of a canrnunications master plan would constitute 
part of Phase 1, with the definition of TADIL-ACCS, the definition of 
protocols, interfaces am gateways, of data dictionaries, display 
standards and information requirements and the location of nodes for 
plug-in points during deployed operations. 
A mobility plan would interlock with the Corrrnunication Plan, but would 
also address resource dumps, runway availability, maintenance 
facilities, power supplies and the administration inherent in mobile 
operations, and already well knam to navy and army personnel in their 
respective spheres of operation. 
The Air Action Group concept, which mirrors its naval and army 
counterparts, is not an essential feature 1 it requires considerable 
study by experts to establish credibility. The underlying Sensor 
MOSAIC, however, is a technical enterprise offering Air picture 
Survivability which does not depend for its value on the Af:>{3. Until 
recently, the sm would not have been practical1 nCM it is, given·. the 
appropriate airborne communications and NAEW processing. 
Specification of requirements could form an early part of Phase I, 
since. the sm can operate in isolation fran the other r-DSAICs. 
Cost is difficult to estimate but could conceivably be reduced in a 
MOSAIC-ACCS. On the one hand, mobile facilities are of themselves 
often simpler, on the other hand more such facilities may be needed 
and the communications infrastructure must be provided. It is 
reasonable to suppose that, overall, more money will be spent at the 
execution level, and less will be spent on the higher levels of 
ccmnand and control due to the integration of offence, defence and 
support. Thus the burden of expenditure will shift towards the 
"cutting edge" of air pcMer. 
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9.0 MOSAIC S'I'REN:n'HS AND wEAKNESSES 
So far MOSAIC has been introduced and discussed in relatively absolute 
ｴ･ｲｭｳｾ＠ no canparisons have been undertaken with alternatives, and 
indeed no evaluation process has been considered. One structured 
approach to comparing options is shown in Figure 16 which, inter alia, 
identifies the principles of Air Weapons Employment, and option 
assessment, both of which will be enlarged upon be1ON. At the highest 
level, then, it may be asked whether MOSAIC is consistent with. the 
Principles of Air Wearons ｅｭｰＱｯｹｭ･ｮｴｾ＠ that question is addressed at 
Figure 17 in part, from where it can be seen that the three MOSAIC 
concepts find their strengths chiefly in: 
0 Flexibility 
0 Concentration of Force 
0 Unity of Effort 
0 Survivability 
0 Maintenance of the aim 
Potential MOSAIC weaknesses are also apparent, and are addressed 
belON. 
9.1 Economy of Effort 
MOSAIC could require some increase in manp:wer in particular cases 
ONing to the need for mobility. If support personnel contribute to 
Economy of Wearons Employment which in one sense they do, then MOSAIC 
would not score in those particular cases. The term usually applies, 
however, to accuracy of weapon delivery and sufficiency of damage; in 
this context MOSAIC is no worse or better than current systems. 
9.2 C2 at Highest Practicable Level 
The C3 MOSAIC is based on the assumption that operation may be 
necessary in degraded rnc::de. M)SAIC would therefore draw a compromise 
betwen C2 at highest level and sufficient delegation to allow 
effective suax: - Succession of Ccmnand. The key issue centres on the 
word "practicable" and requires further assessment. 
9.3 Comparative Assessment 
Since the basis of MOSAIC is to restructure the deployment and 
grouping of the elements of air pcMer, it is essential to compare. the 
OOSAIC approach with that which would l:e achieved by evolution fran 
the present systems, and indeed to compare M)SAIC with other concepts, 
as previously suggested by Figure 16. 
To effect a sensible comparison it is necessary to establish a set of 
criteria against which to judge and a methodology for trading 
advantage under one criterion, with disadvantage under another. 
Figure 18 divides assessment into two areas: performance and 
survivability (of performance). Performance is concerned both with 
the effectiveness of forces and the ease of ccmnand and control. 
Survival too is subdivided into Survival of facilities and personnel 
on the one hand, and the ability to fight on the other. 
Each of the broad headings of Figure 18 is capable of considerable 
elaboration. Certain key issues are discussed belCM. 
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9.4 MOSAIC Fratriclde Reduction 
Fratrlcide presents one of the lTOst intractable problems facing the 
employment of air power. The M:)SAIC concepts offer surprising and 
unexpected potential to reduce fratricide levels significantly, for a 
number of reasons: 
o Own offensive forces IDuld be "mixed-in" with defensive forces, 
and \lX)uld not therefore traverse a complete layered air defence 
when going to, and returning fran, a target. On average, and 
viewed simplistically, they IDuld overfly only half of the 
friendly defensive positions from which they are at risk, offering 
"at a stroke" potential for a major fratricide reduction. 
o The close coordination of offence and defence essential for 
fratricide reduction is made possible at cell and cell group ｬ･ｶｾｬ＠
in OOSAIC. 
o The lateral communications and the possible inclusion of land and 
naval forces in the MOSAIC concept lend themselves to effective 
developnent of the Indirect Sub-System (ISS) of NIS, the NA'IO 
Identification System, which will contribute directly to 
fratricide reduction. 
MOSAIC offers sufficient scope for fratricide reduction that for this 
reason alone it may be \lX)rth pursuing MOSAIC concepts further. 
9.S Availability 
Operational availability of weapon systems and sensors is likely to be 
affected by movement of bases, and generally the effects may be 
adverse. This aspect pales to insignificance, hCMever, when set 
against the rise in survivability offered by t-nSAIC which, in any 
conflict, would rapidly over compensate for loss in availability, and 
in the employment of less sophisticated ground systems which tend to 
be more reliable. 
9.6 Force Management 
Because MOSAIC presents many rrore options, and because it tends to 
operate with smaller groups in many cells, force management will be 
rrore c.orrplex than for static conventional systems. It also has the 
potential to be inrneasurably more effective by rapidly redeploying 
rrobile units - the essence of Force Multiplication. 
9.7 Airspace Management 
Centralisation of military air lTOvement plans and 'actuals' within 
MOSAIC Cell Groups will assist with Airspace Management, which will 
nonetheless remain a largely intractable problem owing to the separate 
interest of civil and military air traffic. 
9.8 Avoidance of Detection 
Moveability as the keynote of the GEM is concerned with concealement 
of Battle Order and avoidance of detection in the sense that cells 
should be able to set up, operate, break dcwn and lTOve in the time it 
would take an enemy to detect, locate, target and attack. The use of 
PSTN. carmunications, passive sensors, LPI radars and LPI 
communications are all contributors to Avoidance of Detection. 
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9.9 Self Defence 
The MOSAIC concept engenders complete fighting units as cells, 
including self defence, which is therefore one of the key benefits of 
MOSAIC. 
9.10 Damage Tolerance 
Within each MOSAIC cell, damage tolerance may be prejudiced by 
lessening the degree of hardening consistent with the need for 
moveability. Ho.vever, the multi-nodal nature of the MOSAIC cell 
pattern provides overall structural damage tolerance in another way, 
since the separate cells can operate, in the final analysis, 
autonarously. MJSAIC thus enhances Damage Tolerance of the Air PCMer 
overall. 
9 .11 sumc/COI.OC 
The C3 MOSAIC provides a natural ease for both SUOOC and COI.OC (Change 
of Location of Cornnand), since the lateral ccmnunication facilities 
will provide the basis for alternative carrnand locations and the 
multi-layer cellular structure presumes SUCOC as a means of 
degraded-mode operation. 
9.12 SOPs 
Standard Operating Procedures are the intertia which will keep the 
flywheel of operations rotating when the command and control driver is 
absent. For MOSAIC, SOPs would be doubly important to promote 
semi-autonorrous and autonorrous operation as the C2 fabric became 
progressively disrupted by battle damage. 
10.0 MJSAIC IN ACTION 
Before drawing to a close, it is interesting to look into the future 
and envisage an engagement in which MJSAIC concepts are in action 
under a future threat. Figure 19 ShCMS a collection of systems, same 
real, sane conceptual. At botton centre is a Ground Enviranent !1»SAIC 
(GEM) being threatened by a ground force at right and by a 360 air 
attack. The GEM contains all of the essentials to attack, defend and 
redeploy autonarously if need be. One GEM cell has been vacated at 
right as part of Rollback and is reforming at left. Immediately 
overhead are NATO Early Warning/Air Command Aircraft, acting as focal 
points for Air Action Groups, long-range radar sources and 
ccmnunications relays, at left a NA'ID Emergency Air Canmand Post 
(NEACP) aircraft is I;Ostulated, containing a senior battle ccmnander 
to coordinate, inter alia, MOSAIC activities. 
In space are a set of satellites for navigatiion, carmunications, 
nuclear flash detection (IONDS is the US Integrated Operational 
Nuclear Detection System), surveillance, intelligence, missile 
IR-flash launch detection (IME.WS is the US Integrated Missile Early 
Warning System) and missile/warhead engagement. Fighting Mirror is 
one of the SOl concepts for such engagements but is modified in this 
representation. In the full SOl concept a ground based exctmer laser 
directs energy at a mirror in geosynchronous orbit, which reflects 
that energy to a second, lONer orbit mirror and thence on to a Jroving 
ballistic missile or warhead target, delivering up to 50 Megajoules 
per square metre and vaporising the metallic target covering. In 
Figure 19, only one mirror is ShONn for simplicity. 
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At mid-left, in addition to the excimer laser" are satellite trackers, 
C2 HQ employing US military satellites and two long range radars, 
(X)BRA Dl\NE and PAVE PAWS, the latter being a phased array warning 
radar said to be able to detect a grapefruit-sized target at 1000 
miles. PAVE PAWS is a so-called JANUS radar because it can COITq?rise 
t\<wQ back-to-back phased array antennae. 
The scenario of Figure 19 is interesting in several respects, 
o Only Fighting Mirror is truly futuristic; with the exception of 
OOSAIC, which is not technolCX;3ically innovative, all the other 
systems are operational now. 
o The space sensors cover, interalia, areas of direct interest to a 
future ACes, M)SAIC or otherwise. 
o Although the space sensors and weapons may have a strategic label, 
the speed and accuracy of responses implicit in their 
implementations renders them of great tactical importance too. 
11.0 (x)NCLUSIONS 
The presentation and assessment of MOSAIC have: 
o Provided a conceptual ACCS design solution which is consistent 
with the evolving threat and political factors, yet which 
addresses some current Air C3I deficiencies. 
o Highlighted the implications of full Irobility, and in so doing 
illustrated the implications of any significant degree of Irobility 
in any future ACes concept. 
o Introduced new concepts which arise out of M)SAIC, but which may 
have much wider application: 
-the Air Action Group 
-TADIL ACCS and the other interchange languages. 
o Identified the potential for very significant reductions in 
fratricide using M)SAIC. 
o Presented a set of high level criteria by which MJSAIC and other 
ACCS concepts may be judged. 
o Assessed OOSAIC against the Principle of Air Weapons Employment 
and found it to be substantial. . 
o Indicated that transition to MJSAIC is practicable and offers a 
highly survivable, effective and flexible Aces. 
One major value which can be achieved from analyses such as MOSAIC is 
that, in driving system designs tCMards their logical limits, existing 
concepts need to be reassessed and new concepts may be intrcduced 
which, 1 ike TADIL-ACS and SOl interfacing, are of value to any future 
ACCS design. 
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-A SYSTEM COMPRISED OF ELEMENTS 
WHICH HAVE BEEN SEPARATELY OPTIMISED, 
WILL NOT ITSELF BE OPTIMISED-
COROLLARY 
-AN OPTIMISED SYSTEM WILL CONTAIN 
ELEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT, OF 
THEMSELVES, OPTIMAL-
REASONS: 
(A) 4 IS A NEW FUNCTION. ITS 
OPTIMISATION HAS NOT BEEN ATTEMPTED. 
(B) THE INTERFACES BETWEEN THE 
ELEMENTS 1, 2 AND 3 HAVE NOT BEEN 
CONSJDERED IN THEIR CONTEXT OF 4. 
CONCLUSION: 
IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR POWER REQUIRES A TOTAL SYSTEM 
APPROACH. RATHER THAN A FUNCTION-BY-FUNCTION DEVELOPMENT 
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1. Attainment of a favourable 
• • N/A MOSAIC contributes by surviving air situation 
2. Aexibility •• •• .. Principal objective 
3. Concentration of Force •• •• • . Principal objective 
4. Economy of Effort ? ? ? Mobility means more personnel, 
5. Unity of Effort •• •• .. combines offence, defence & support 
6. C2 at highest practicable level • •• ? C
3 Mosaic presumes degraded 
7. Offensive action N/A N/A N/A operation as a potential need 
. 
8. Survivability •• •• .. Principal objective 
9. Surprise • • N/A Reconfigurability and the AAG 
10. Pre planning N/A N/A N/A contribute to surprise 
11. Maintenance of the aim •• •• •• Principle objective 
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1 THE BASIC SURVIVABILITY EQUATION 
The approach is to formulate a stochastic equation based on contingent probabilitiea.. This leads to a separate threat 
and counter-threat (survival) categorisation. 
• Interaction between enemy perception and stance vs own vulnerabilities 
• Process must separate features into enemy threat and own survival capability 
• Probability approach gives basis for national separation/categorisation 
• Shows multi-faceted survivability, related to enemy and to own performance. 
Basic Survivability Equation - Contingent probabilities reveals a coherent structure of threat and counter-threat 
features. 
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• Threat resources • Hardness • Nodes 
• VP Perceived • Security 
worth • Self-defence 
• Military' stance weapons 
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Target density 
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THE BASIC SURVIVABILITY EQUATION 
&)EASAMS 
2 AVAILABILITY/SURVIVABILITY PARADIGM 
A basic mathematics can be developed which mirrors the established Availability aathematics. The new mathematics 
assumes that the interval between successive attacks is random. As with Reliability, this assumption needs to be tested 
in particular cases. 
• Availability mathematics based on m (Mean Time Between Failures) and MOT(F) (Mean Down Time due to a Fault) 
• For Survivability introduce lid" (Mean Time Between Damage Inflicting Attacks) and MOT(D) (Mean Down Time due to 
inflicted Damage) 
• Then the equivalent of Reliability is Durability, 
the equivalent of Maintainability is Repairability 
• Approach founded on assumption that the interval between attacks is random - reasonable in complex scenarios. 
Survivability Mathematics - Availability mathematics provide a model for survivability calculations. 
AVAILABILITY PARAMETERS 
• Reliability (R) - EXP C-tlm) 
m = Mean time between failures 
t .. Elapsed time 
• Availability CAl .. m 
m + MDT (F) 
MDT CF) .. Mean down time due to a fault 
• Maintainability: ease of fault repair 
MDT (F) = Fault detection and 
location time + 
Fault repair 
time + 
Recovery 
time 
C!)EASAMS 
SURVIVABILITY PARAMETERS 
• Durability CD) .. EXP C-t/d) 
d .. Mean time between damage-Infllcthlg attacks 
t .. Elapsed time 
d 
• Survivability (S) .. d + MDT CD) 
MDT un = Mean down time due to Inflicted damage 
• 'Repairability': ease of damage repair 
MDT (01 .. Damage detection + Damage repair + Recovery 
and location time time time 
AVAILABILITY I SURVIVABILITY PARADIGM 
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3 LAYERED DEFENCE MATHEMATICS 
The use of sequential layers to improve intercept performance is practiced. Probabilistic considerations show regions 
where loss of a layer due to attack would make greatest inroads into system performance and hence survivability. 
Notional single layer performance suggests between three and six layers as sensible. 
• No one defensive barrier can be 100% effective - so we consider multiple barriers which targets pass through 
sequentially 
• The graph shows lines relating overall kill probability to single layer"kill probability (Q) for multiple layers 
(L) - law of diminishing returns as more layers added 
• Overlay shows maximum increment/decrement loci for either adding another layer or losing one in combat -
decrements reduce as number of layers increases 
• Practical performance parameters for individual layers quite uncertain - anywhere between 5% and 95%. Choose 50i. 
mean (insensitive area - 35% - 15% gives substantially same answer) 
• Conclusions: 
One layer inadequate 
Two layers highly vulnerable to losing one layer 
No value beyond six layers 
Therefore 3 ( L ( 6. 
• • 
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LAYERED DEFENCE THEORY AND THE MAXIMUM INCREMENT/DECREMENT ZONE 
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4 FUNCTIONAL SURVIVABILITY 
Timelines generate sequential functions coupled through information exchange. Survival equates to maintenance of the 
sequence and its information flow. System management aids both performance and hence survivability. Functional-to-
physical mapping is the crucial step in design for survivability and the key element is 'functional redundancy'. 
• Each layer follows the same sequence of events from examining intercept options through to attack and reattack -
if possible 
• Each function must survive in a layer, for a layer's performance to survive 
• Managing one intercept system or one layer or one battle invokes the transverse features, i.e. sensors, 
configuration, resources, Rules of Engagement (ROE), performance, etc. 
• The key to survivability is mapping these multi-layered functions to a physical ｡ｲ｣ｨｩｴ･｣ｾｵｲ･＠ that can sustain 
repeated damage without loss of functional sequence - hence replicated. functions, or 'functional redundancy' 
• Timelines suggest minimum number of layers consistent with performance. Hence from probablistic considerations, 
three/four layers are optimal and cost-effective. 
Functional Survivability - Functions are time sequential and survival equates to maintenance of information flow between 
functions. 
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Weapon Inlllatlon Kill 
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aSSignment and assessment 
monitor 
• FUNCTIONAL SURVIVABILITY - Physical facilities will be overrun 
• OPERATOR CONTROL - Full automation is unacceptable 
• FUNCTIONAL-TO-PHYSICAl MAPPING IS key BMC3 design task 
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5 BASIC SURVIVABILITY MODEL 
The interaction between the components of survivability is complex and is unquestionably a subject for modelling and 
simulation. As the simple influence diagram shows, such a model/simulation should be dynamic and comprises three parts: 
a physical/functional map, a physical survivability component and a threat component. 
• Simplest model is system dynamics influence diagram 
• Objective is to maintain system operating functions. These are provided within physical elements, but there need 
not. indeed should not. be a one-to-one mapping 
• A high degree of functional replication, coupled with reconfigurability can reduce the rate at which functions are 
lost - and damage repair can reduce the effect further or even reverse it 
• Enemy interaction can occur at many points. Avoidance of detection seeks to deny intelligence, including 
targetting data. Self defence, itself vulnerable to attack, protects physical elements, and damage control and 
repair may be subject to enemy attack, too. 
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BASIC SURVIVABILITY MODEL 
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6 SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE/MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
Measures of Performance (MOPs) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) for survivability are not generally well formulated, 
but practitioners seek quantitative indices. The overall 'battle survivability' measure can be broken down into three 
component ratios of merit, with physical-to-functional loss rate being key. 
• Overall survivability is measured by the ability of the system to perform its function in the face of attack. 
Since repair is possible during/after attack, the situation should be viewed dynamically 
• The overall ratio can be broken down into (at least) three component ratios 
• Architecturally, the most interesting is the ratio of Vital ｐｯｩｮｾ＠ Losses to Function Losses. This ratio contains 
the essence of design for survivability and it can be seen in isolation from specific details of enemy capability. 
Architecture Survivability - The overall index relates area attack to 10s8 of system function. The ratio of Vital Point 
Loss to System Function Loss is the key architectural design driver for survivability. 
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Overall system survivability measure = 
Where: 
d(AA)/dt 
d(FL)J dt 
d( AA)J dt = Rate of area attack 
d(FL)f dt = Rate of system function loss 
Then: 
d(AA) d(AA) d(VPA) d(VPL) 
--= x x--d(FL) d(VPA) d(VPL) d(FL) 
Where: 
(a) (b) (c) 
VPA = Vital Point Attack 
VPL = Vital Point Loss 
Ratio (a) Measures avoidance of detection 
Ratio (b) Measures self defence 
Ratio (c) Measures system damage tolerance 
RATIO (c) IS THE PRINCIPAL DESIGN DRIVER 
FOR ARCHITECTURAL SURVIVABILITY 
.. ARCHITECTURAL SURVIVABILITY IS 
ENHANCED WHEN THE IMPACT OF 
PHYSICAL DAMAGE ON SYSTEM 
FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY IS MINIMISED" 
ARCHITECTURE SURVIVABILITY 
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7 MONOPOLISTIC ARCHITECTURES 
Contemporary Battle Management, Command, Control and Communications (BM/C3) system designs are low survivability. Cost 
and reluctance to delegate may be causal. Often their nodality is believed to have been overcome by physical 
replication, but organisational, spatial and spectral nodes may still abound. 
• Contemporary Defensive Systems (CDS) pay lip-service to survivability - expensive, complex, etc. 
• CDSs also have inherent functional nodes, even where physical nodes may have been replicated 
•. The figure shows physical nodes - sensor correlation/fusion, weapon control - and functional nodes -
reconfiguration, target allocation and sensor management 
• Physical replication is valueless on its own, e.g. BM/C2 standby must have full functional capability. 
Note: Sensor spectral nodes - enemy visible in only one band is observed via a sensing node. 
ＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺＺｾＮ［］ｾｂｍｾＯｾｃｾＳｲ［ｒ［･Ｚ｣ＺｯｮＺｦ［ｩｧＺｵＺｲＺ｡ＺｴＺｩｯＺｮＺＺＺＺＺ＠ ｾ＠ ｅｾｳｾｮｮｳ＠ ::::::::::: 
ｾ＠ L J 
"'\ S J 
"'\ X 
./ 
• Sensor 
management 
I 
fI- ｾｉ＠
Sensor 
correlation 
ｾ＠
f 
Nc 
Spec 
nod 
de 
ral 
es 
Standby 
BM/C2 HQ 
I 
Semi-node 
• Target 
allocation 
f 
Node 
--1\ 
" Weapon 
control 
Coverage 
nodes 
FUNCTIONAL MONOPOLY 
"A 
B 
C 
&)EASAMS 
8 FUNCTIONAL DELEGATION 
Survivability of the system requires bottom-up design. Redundant autonomous units are provided with superior BH/e2 only 
to inhibit their autonomy. In extremis, each fighting unit can operate alone (ultimate system survivability). 
• In the figure, three autonomous, self-contained and complete fighting systems are shown. Each could provide some 
capability throughout the whole sphere of action 
• Superior BM/C2 provides resources, co-ordination and the 'engage inhibit' or 'do not fight' control. In its 
absence, all fighting systems will continue to fight 
• Superior BM/C2 is replicated (it has few functions and is relatively inexpensive) but should its functions be 
neutralised, they are replicated again directly between the fighting systems. 
Bottom Line. Survivability means spatial, spectral, functional and engagement redundancy and overlap. Above all, it 
starts at the bottom with autonomous units and provides superior control only to inhibit their autonomy. 
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MANAGEMENT AND DESIGN 
Systems creativity 
O.K. Hitchins, MSc, CEng, FlEE 
Indexing terms: Engineering administration and management, Project and production engineering, Management 
Abstract: The paper identifies the important area 
of creativity in the design process as least amen-
able to definition, being comprised of seminal 
ideas which must fall into a fertile ground of 
expert domain knowledge coupled with a progres-
sive management environment. Creativity is pre-
sented as an essential element in design which can 
be taught and encouraged, however, and the paper 
presents creative design 'seeds' for decision-based 
systems, flow-line manufacture and maintenance 
processes and management information systems. 
Concept evolution techniques are presented as a 
structured decomposition methodology. The first 
example of creative design presented in the paper 
is of the design of a notional systems engineering 
company which is unusual to most readers in that 
it contains no manufacturing or production, and 
preconceived ideas of company organisation are 
likely, therefore, to be misleading. The application 
of state-variable analysis to the cash flow of a 
start-up defence company follows, and the appli-
cation of systems dynamic to intercompany com-
petition is presented. Creativity is not restricted to 
initial design; flow-line analysis using queuing 
theory for intensive flying of training aircraft is 
demonstrated as a means of resequencing activ-
ities to reduce mean throughput times. And finite 
state/transition analysis is used on the grand scale 
to examine the potential for European conflict. 
Finally, the author presents the principles of cre-
ativity and suggests that, far from being peculiar 
to engineering, one finds parallels in music, com-
position and the arts. 
Introduction 
The spark· which represents a creative idea or concept 
often passes unnoticed, and dies unrecognised. Industry 
needs such ideas; they need to be encouraged, nurtured 
and used as the seeds of our future products, services, 
structures, organisations and capabilities. Among engi-
neers, however, the idea of creativity might conjure up 
some artistic concepts which they would consider alien to 
their craft. 
Systems creativity seeks to present the process of con-
ceiving, designing, developing and implementing cre-
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September 1987 
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atively in an engineering environment. Identifying and 
nurturing the spark necessitates the right organisation, 
techniques, tools and tenets, the principal elements of 
which are presented by example. This paper is the sequel 
to Reference 1. 
1 Ingredients of creativity 
Creativity is a blend of many things: youth and experi-
ence, discipline and freedom, knowledge and serendipity. 
These elements, coupled with energy and ability, and set 
in the right environment, are the basic ingredients of cre-
ativity. Luck? Luck is opportunity meeting preparation. 
Creativity is a difficult concept with which to grapple, 
especially in an engineering environment. Certain ingre-
dients are often seen in retrospect to have combined to 
result in a seminal idea, design or solution to a problem. 
Fig. 1 shows these ingredients, and, while some may 
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Fig. 1 Ingredients of creativity 
Creativity requires a blend of many constituents, set in a disciplined framework 
appear to be in conflict, in practice they go together as 
follows: 
(a) Experience and youth: A blend of youthful energy 
and ideas is a valuable basis for generating creative solu-
tions, provided it is tempered by sound experience. Expe-
rience alone will rarely be innovative. Mixed teams give 
the best results. 
(b) Discipline and freedom: There is a time for both; 
freedom of thought and expression, positively encouraged 
and set in a formally disciplined procedure, will identify 
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and find solutions to problems quickly. Brainstorming is 
a form of disciplined freedom. 
(c) Domain knowledge and serendipity: Domain knowl-
edge implies a good understanding of the sphere of 
endeavour in which the solution to a requirement must 
be created. Serendipity implies chance or luck. And both 
have a valuable role to play. The good fortune which 
stumbles across an idea must recognise the idea and view 
it in the context of its own domain. 
The remaining ingredients of the nonexhaustive list are 
also important. Ability coupled with intellect is essential. 
Some are creators, some are improvers, some are critics; 
all have their role. But the creators will invariably be able 
and energetic. To be effective in a sophisticated engineer-
ing environment, these creators need force multipliers; 
tools and techniques allow creators to be more pro-
ductive and co-operative. 
2 In pursuit of creativity 
Creativity can be incorporated into a systematic pro-
cedural framework, the so-called top-down systems 
approach. Optimising the preferred solution is often left 
out of this otherwise well-established process. 
Fig. 2 shows an almost classic, systematic approach to 
finding a solution to the problem at hand. A top-down 
approach requires a complete understanding of the 
requirement and the objectives. So often this solution-
transparent requirement analysis is ruined by premature 
assumptions: 'we'll use our standard product .. .', 'what 
we did last time was .. .', 'sell the hardware first, we will 
sort out maintenance later .. .'. 
understand 
the 
requirement 
establish 
1----' the 
objectives 
Fig. 2 In pursuit of creativity 
Procedure and discipline must control the quest 
generate 
optional 
solutions 
generate 
effectiveness 
criteria 
The generation of optional solutions to the require-
ment should occur ideally in isolation from the gener-
ation of effectiveness criteria, and strict discipline is 
needed during trade-off to avoid 'massaging' effectiveness 
criteria to suit preconceived notions about the best 
answer. Preconceptions are the enemy of creative innova-
tion. Trade-off techniques have already been presented in 
Reference 1. 
The final box in the Figure is the one most often over-
looked. It would be rare indeed for the preferred option 
to excell against all criteria; indeed, such a result implies 
either that the problem was trivial or that the optional 
solutions were inadequate. Following topics will show by 
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example how this systematic problem-solving approach is 
applied in practice and how optimisation is achieved. 
3 Creative seeds 
Most creative ideas in engineering require a seed or 
kernel of an idea to form effectively. The decision cycle 
and the flow line are two common kernels for structure 
and organisation systems. 
Real solutions in engineering can very often be formed 
about a conceptual seed or kernel. The two most 
common, the decision cycle and the flow line, are shown 
in Fig. 3A. 
(a) The decision cycle: Decisions follow a natural pro-
gression in many real situations, starting with an assess-
ment of the situation at the top of Fig. 3A. The 
ubiquitous decision cycle is at the heart of management, 
command and control, driving a car, running a football 
team, structuring an expert system etc. A company 
board, for example, shares the decision cycle elements; 
economic threats are identified by the financial director, 
while constraints may be presented by the operations 
director, and so on. Thus, structured decision-making can 
be constructed around the decision cycle. The decision 
cycle can also be straightened out, in which case it 
becomes a flow line. 
(b) The flow line: In process control of information 
flow, products or concept evolution, a central line of flow 
is invariably present. Fig. 3A shows the central line in a 
computer integrated manufacturing (CIM) flow line (after 
an idea from DEC), in which components are bought, 
received, inspected, assembled, stocked, distributed and 
trade-off ｾＭＭｉ＠
preferred 
option ｾＭＭｉ＠ optimise 
sold. All elements not on the central path have as their 
purpose the maintenance and enhancement of flow. In 
the example, sales information is used to plan future pro-
duction, and marketing identifies the need for new pro-
ducts. By working outwards from the flow line it is 
possible to organise commercial, personnel, accounting 
and all other company functions in support of the central 
theme, so providing unity of effort. 
The vigour of these simple, even simplistic, concepts 
can be remarkable and this is due, in no small part, to the 
ease with which everyone in a group can relate to the 
decision cycle or the flow line. Retention of simplicity is 
more difficult (but a valuable goal) as the experts and 
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Decisions and the ftow of activities and processes are inherent in all creations, be they artefacts or organisations 
typical nodal interaction 
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Fig.38 'Linked decision cycles 
pyramid - shaped command structure 
nodal interaction within a 
simplified command structure 
market 
sell 
Decision cycles from discrete elements within an organisation can be linked into networks. The representational tcchnique is better replaced by an N1 chart 
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Representing linked decision cycles in an N 2 chart allows a high level of abstraction to be maintained, while providing a powerful tool for architectural analysis 
specialists start to fill in detail and suggest alternatives. 
Obscuration of the fundamental concept will defeat the 
creative concept. 
Figs. 3B and 3C show how decision cycles may be 
linked to represent a decision hierarchy, and how that 
hierarchy can be better represented using an Nl chart. 
The example chosen shows a joint command and control 
information system can be constructed from linked deci-
sion cycles, each representing an individual command 
post or HQ. 
4 Concept evolution 
There are certain fundamental techniques used to evolve 
concepts which experience shows to provide the most 
effective results. In practice, it is very difficult to adhere 
to these tenets in the face of pragmatic short-term solu-
tions. 
System design is based on certain fundamental tenets 
which give the approach its strength. Five of the most 
important tenets are shown in Fig. 4. 
(a) Highest level of abstraction: It is vital to avoid 
being confused by irrelevant detail at the early stage in 
concept formulation. A car is, at the highest level, a 
means of transporting people by road. In the same vein, 
what is a tank? 
(b) Functional before physical: Functional decomposi-
tion requires the most careful selection of functions. To 
partition a human (sic!) into senses, nerves and brain is 
to employ physical, not functional partitioning. To iden-
410 
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Fig. 4 Concept evolution 
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A methodology is essential to the evolution of concepts if we are to be creative, 
not repetitive 
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tify human functions as propagation, survival, communi-
cation and co-operation is to provide a basis for 
understanding why we have such types of sensor, nerves 
and brain. To partition a distributed information system 
(DIS) into sources, communications, processing and sinks 
is to overlook its purpose; it is not incorrect, simply 
unhelpful. 
(c) Tight Junctional binding: It is valuable to group 
together people, resources, features and skills which have 
the same objectives and many mutual interfaces. This 
concentrates effort, clarifies, simplifies and economises. 
(d) Loose coupling: Conversely disparate groups of 
people, resources, features and skills with different objec-
tives should be coupled loosely (separated), generally by 
the exchange of carefully defined data. They should not 
share functions. 
(e) Breadth beJore depth: This tenet is linked with the 
first - high level of abstraction. It is vital to ｾｰ｡ｮ＠ the 
'complete' problem at the higher level, before moving to 
the next level of detail. So often, it is all too easy to dive 
into that part of the problem we believe we understand, 
emerging after much (nugatory?) effort to find that we 
have been pursuing the wrong path. Worse, we may have 
invested so much effort that there is no going back, men-
tally or practically. 
5 Creating the creative framework 
This and the three following topics illustrate the systems 
creativity approach by postulating the requirement for, 
and producing a resulting design of, a systems company. 
Familiarity with organisation is seen as the major obsta-
cle to a good solution. 
If the system approach is sound and general purpose, it 
should be applicable over a wide range of endeavours, 
from the Severn barrage to a PCB design, from exploring 
the solar system to photo-microlithography. As a simple 
example, we can turn the systems approach in upon itself 
(Godel's incompleteness theorem undoubtedly applies) 
and use it to design a systems company's divisional struc-
ture. This approach to creating a creative framework 
inside which creative ideas may be nurtured is outlined in 
Fig. 5. The trap to be avoided is overfamiliarity with con-
ventional organisation: we know the solution to similar 
problems too well. 
Familiarity can present real difficulties. For example, 
how do we functionally divide a house? If we choose, say, 
bathroom, bedrooms, lounge, dining room and kitchen as 
the obvious partitions, then subdivision in each room will 
contain much the same elements, e.g. lighting, plumbing, 
• Create a creative organisation 
• Design a systems company 
(no manufacturing) 
• Objectives 
• growth 
• synergy between divisions 
• concentrated skills 
• market led 
• Pitfalls 
• familiarity with conventional organisation 
• Approach 
• treat as any other system 
Fig.5 Creating the creative framework 
Because the Cramework/organisation has to be created, that process is a good 
basis Cor a case study 
power, central heating etc. Thus, the 'obvious' divisions 
for a house which are physical, not functional, are 
unhelpful, because they have resulted in tight coupling 
and loose binding, the opposite of our objective. Our 
familiarity with the problem has led us astray. In essence, 
we did not divide the house by its functions; we divided 
the house by its occupants' functions ｾ＠ and that is a 
common trap. The same hurdle has to be overcome with 
divisions in a company. The following Section will con-
tinue with this 'case study' by generating four archetypal 
divisional organisations. 
6 Systems company structure options 
The four archetypal divisional organisations are outlined 
at the highest level of abstraction. None of these options 
is seen as preferred at this stage. 
The four archetypal divisional organisations shown in 
Fig. 6 and are as follows: 
(a) Project phase divisions: This structure is used by 
most production companies, principally because of the 
high tooling, stock and WIP investment required for pro-
duction, which dictates maximum utilisation and inven-
tory turns. A systems company has no large-scale 
production, however, and so the usual pressure does not 
apply. 
(b) Customer-mapped divisions: This structure maps 
directly on to the customer's domains of activity. While 
excellent in marketing terms, the structure distributes 
engineers and resources in every division with identical 
capabilities, and is hence not necessarily effective in 
implementation, because it requires much lateral flow of 
engineers between divisions. 
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tify human functions as propagation, survival, communi-
cation and co-operation is to provide a basis for 
understanding why we have such types of sensor, nerves 
and brain. To partition a distributed information system 
(DIS) into sources, communications, processing and sinks 
is to overlook its purpose; it is not incorrect, simply 
unhelpful. 
(c) Tight Junctional binding: It is valuable to group 
together people, resources, features and skills which have 
the same objectives and many mutual interfaces. This 
concentrates effort, clarifies, simplifies and economises. 
(d) Loose coupling: Conversely disparate groups of 
people, resources, features and skills with different objec-
tives should be coupled loosely (separated), generally by 
the exchange of carefully defined data. They should not 
share functions. 
(e) Breadth beJore depth: This tenet is linked with the 
first - high level of abstraction. It is vital to ｾｰ｡ｮ＠ the 
'complete' problem at the higher level, before moving to 
the next level of detail. So often, it is all too easy to dive 
into that part of the problem we believe we understand, 
emerging after much (nugatory?) effort to find that we 
have been pursuing the wrong path. Worse, we may have 
invested so much effort that there is no going back, men-
tally or practically. 
5 Creating the creative framework 
This and the three following topics illustrate the systems 
creativity approach by postulating the requirement for, 
and producing a resulting design of, a systems company. 
Familiarity with organisation is seen as the major obsta-
cle to a good solution. 
If the system approach is sound and general purpose, it 
should be applicable over a wide range of endeavours, 
from the Severn barrage to a PCB design, from exploring 
the solar system to photo-microlithography. As a simple 
example, we can turn the systems approach in upon itself 
(GOdel's incompleteness theorem undoubtedly applies) 
and use it to design a systems company's divisional struc-
ture. This approach to creating a creative framework 
inside which creative ideas may be nurtured is outlined in 
Fig. 5. The trap to be avoided is overfamiliarity with con-
ventional organisation: we know the solution to similar 
problems too well. 
Familiarity can present real difficulties. For example, 
how do we functionally divide a house? If we choose, say, 
bathroom, bedrooms, lounge, dining room and kitchen as 
the obvious partitions, then subdivision in each room will 
contain much the same elements, e.g. lighting, plumbing, 
• Create a creative organisation 
• Design a systems company 
(no manufacturing) 
• Objectives 
• growth 
• synergy between divisions 
• concentrated skills 
• market led 
• Pitfalls 
• familiarity with conventional organisation 
• Approach 
• treat as any other system 
Fig. 5 Creating the creativeframework 
Because the framework/organisation has to be created, that process is a good 
basis for a case study 
power, central heating etc. Thus, the 'obvious' divisions 
for a house which are physical, not functional, are 
unhelpful, because they have resulted in tight coupling 
and loose binding, the opposite of our objective. Our 
familiarity with the problem has led us astray. In essence, 
we did not divide the house by its functions; we divided 
the house by its occupants' functions ｾ＠ and that is a 
common trap. The same hurdle has to be overcome with 
divisions in a company. The following Section will con-
tinue with this 'case study' by generating four archetypal 
divisional organisations. 
6 Systems company structure options 
The four archetypal divisional organisations are outlined 
at the highest level of abstraction. None of these options 
is seen as preferred at this stage. 
The four archetypal divisional organisations shown in 
Fig. 6 and are as follows: 
(a) Project phase divisions: This structure is used by 
most production companies, principally because of the 
high tooling, stock and WIP investment required for pro-
duction, which dictates maximum utilisation and inven-
tory turns. A systems company has no large-scale 
production, however, and so the usual pressure does not 
apply. 
(b) Customer-mapped divisions: This structure maps 
directly on to the customer's domains of activity. While 
excellent in marketing terms, the structure distributes 
engineers and resources in every division with identical 
capabilities, and is hence not necessarily effective in 
implementation, because it requires much lateral flow of 
engineers between divisions. 
marketing analysis 
and design engineering 
customer 
serv i ce 
I 
land lair land/air 
military civil 
project phase divisions 
a 
I BOD I 
sea/air 
military 
customer-mapped divisions 
b 
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sea/ai r customer 
civi I serv i ce 
411 
analysis 
real-time 
systems 
information 
systems 
customer 
service 
technology-based divisions 
c 
system 
products 
software 
products 
management 
services 
Fig. 6 Structure options 
buisness-area divisions 
d 
At the highest level of abstraction there are four archetypal divisional structures: hierarchical against matrix is not visible at this level. BOD - Board of Directors 
(c) Technology-based divisions: This structure concen-
trates skills and resources, but discourages synergy 
between divisions, as they tend to operate in separate 
customer and business-areas. 
(d) Business-area divisions: This structure maps on to 
complementary sectors iIi systems engineering markets, 
but is, of itself, nonexplicit in terms of marketing and 
implementation. 
None of the organisations is immediately obvious as 
being the best solution to meet the objectives of growth, 
synergy, skill concentration and market lead. Further 
analysis of benefits is clearly needed, first by generating a 
solution-free set of criteria to judge and compare options. 
7 Criteria for a good design 
The choice of criteria is fundamental to reaching the best 
solution; the systems approach is no panacea and can be 
mishandled. Business-area divisions gave the best solu-
tion, but other options have their special merits too. 
Choice of criteria is vitally important to drive out the 
'right' design solution; as ｷｩｴｾ＠ any approach, it is pos-
sible to misapply the techniques. Fig. 7 shows, in a highly 
visible manner, the criteria and the rank order allocated 
against each archetypal design. Readers may disagree 
with both criteria and ranking: it is the objective of the 
presentation to encourage such results, which will lead to 
a more solid solution. 
Principles of business have been predicated, based on 
the principles of war (which are not unrelated). Effec-
tiveness criteria have been generated within the prin-
ciples. Options have been ranked (i.e. 1 is first, 4 is fourth, 
in' order of preference) and inability to differentiate has 
resulted in equal ranks. Row sums equal 10 . 
. Column sums favour option 4, business-area divisions, 
with little to choose between customer-mapped and 
technology-based; project phase is a poor fourth. 
However, business-area divisions did not rank first 
against all criteria; first ranks appear in favour of: 
(i) technology-based for work flow 
(ii) customer-mapped for user/design contact 
Principles Divisional organisation Options (ranks) 
of 
Business Effectiveness criteria Project Customer- Technology- Business-
phase mapped based area 
Flexibility • adapts to new markets 4 2 2 2 
• encourages growth 4 2.S 2.S 1 
• simple, easily understood 3.5 I.S 3.S I.S 
Economy • non-overlapping 2.S 2.S 2.S 2.S 
of business areas 
effort • accountable/visible 4 3 I.S 1.5 
profit and loss 
Unity • synergy between divisions 3.S I.S 3.S 1.5 
of • concentrates resources 1 4 2.S 2.S 
effort 
Market led • promotes 4 2.S 2.S 
user/designer contact 
• profitable market potential 3 3 3 
Resilience • sufficient regular business 2.S 2.S 2.S 2.S 
• responsive to market 4 2 3 1 
Maintenance • promotes systems approach 4 2 2 2 
of • promotes work How 4 2.S 1 2.5 
the aim 
Rank sum 44 30 32 24 
fourth second third first 
Fig. 7 Criteriafor a good design 
The criteria must be chosen to support the design aim. In this example. the principles of war have been 
adapted as a basis for addressing business organisational options 
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(iii) project phase for concentration of (capital 
intensive) resources. 
Optimisation at the next level of detail will incorporate 
these elements into a preferred solution, where practi-
cable. 
8 The preferred solution 
The business-area solution is optimised by incorporating 
the best features from the other structures inside each 
division as appropriate. 
The preferred solution, which best satisfies the require-
ments of growth, synergy, skill concentration and market 
lead, is shown in Fig. 8. Business-area divisional structure 
has been employed, with each division set up differently 
internally according to need: 
BOD 
I I 
major system 
systems product s 
r sales I- sales 
(land/air, sea/air) (land/air, sea/air) 
r analysis f- evaluation 
- real-ti me I- design 
systems 
- information f- development 
systems 
f- production 
- communication 
systems 
customer 
support 
• concentrated • production 
sk ills oriented 
• flow-lined 
Software: addresses software engineering, company-
wide and external sales of software products, applications 
programs, small turnkey information systems and consul-
tancy. Technology-based to promote work flow and con-
centrate scarce resources, including expensive software 
development tools. Sales account organised to promote 
directed growth. 
System management services: customer-mapped and 
with skills concentrated into tightly functionally bound 
groups of specialists in customer domains and analytical 
techniques. 
Overall, each division is internally bound tightly, while 
interdivisional synergy is promoted in two senses: there is 
no business-area overlap, and both system products and 
software divisions provide resources and products in 
support of the other divisions (synergy loops). Thus, loose 
coupling exists too in this structured design. 
I 1 
system 
software management 
services 
- sales I- sales 
_ engineering I- consul tancy 
- system software - studies 
products 
- applications - OA 
- consultancy 
• technology • customer 
oriented oriented 
• outward • concentrated 
looking sk ills 
synergy loops 
Fig. 8 The preferred solution 
The structure is business·oriented at divisional ｉ･ｶ･ｾ＠ purpose·oriented within divisions; it is tightly functionally bound within divisions and loosely coupled (via the 
synergy loops) between divisions. BOD - Board of Directors. OA - Operations Analysis 
Major systems: addresses systems engineering projects. 
Sales organisation is customer-mapped. Resources are 
technology grouped, and hence skills are concentrated. 
Project teams are envisaged, dedicated to tasks, with 
most resources in the division for the complete project 
from analysis to implementation. The division would 
probably be matrix-organised internally. 
System products: addresses system products - work-
stations, interfaces, communication switches etc. 
Production-oriented to meet the high-technology, low-
volume throughput. Sales mapped on to customer's 
domains. 
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9 State-variable analysis 
Company cash flow can be considered as a central 
problem and addressed using state-variable numerical 
methods. The results fit observed fact well for start-up 
companies in the defence business, and present 
opportunities for different approaches to creative man-
agement. 
One technique for assessing the dynamics of a company 
organisation is shown in Fig. 9, in greatly simplified 
outline. The model, for a systems company, shows a man-
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power model encapsulated in a surrounding cash-flow 
model. The company is presumed to be starting from 
scratch, and capital purchases are considered separately. 
desired 
income 
Cm 
1/3 
1.35 
Cb 
5 
0.255 
1.5 
Ci 
3 
0511 
1.25 
tually no income for the first 15 months, after which an 
upsurge is followed by violent and increasing oscillation, 
brought about by the long loop delays and the lack of 
cash flow 
5 
1.35 
actual 
income 
recruiting marketing bidding waiting implementation 
cash drive 
for recruiting 
required 
manpower 
state-variable model 
• C(5) 
Fig. 9 State-variable analysis 
The control-loop concept of company economic modelling can be addressed as a classic control-theory problem 
Time delays are allowed for recruiting, marketing for 
opportunities, bidding, awaiting the outcome of the bid, 
implementation and receipt of first sales revenue. The 
costs of manpower are calculated and compared with this 
revenue. Analysis of the cash-flow model is greatly sim-
plified by converting the resulting 6th-order differential 
equation into six 1st-order equations in the state-
variable model. 
The state-variable model is simply solved by com-
puter, using recursive numerical methods; the result is 
nonetheless dramatic for being predictable. There is vir-
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inertia. It is possible to sustain exponential growth, at 
least in the model, by the simple expedient of preventing 
E(S), the error, from going negative. The meaning of this 
in management terms is obscure, but perhaps worthy of 
investigation. 
State-variable analysis is potentially useful, then, in 
obliging the modeller to home-in on the basic cost and 
income elements in the company, and in providing a 
simpler numerical mechanism by which to observe their 
interplay. Feeding competition and external market 
forces into the model can also be achieved. The principal 
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value, as the more conventional use of the technique 
would suggest, is the ability to analyse stability and the 
impact of discontinuities on system performance. 
10 Systems dynamics and competition 
Systems dynamics presents valuable insight into the 
coupling between widely separate influences. In so doing, 
it helps to define system boundaries at the highest level of 
abstraction. 
Company dynamics can be viewed, qualitatively at least, 
using the so-called influence diagram of systems 
dynamics. Fig. 10 shows a company, at centre right, com-
peting for a dwindling defence budget, at bottom left, and 
company 
project 
completion 
company 
. ;:-
projects in 
progress 
｣ｯｭｰ｡ｮｹｾ＠ｾｦｵｮ､ｳ＠ - '\ 
engineers bids 
11 Flow line for aircraft turnround 
Flow line activity sequences may change materially at 
different throughputs. Modelling is a valuable tool in 
support of flow-line analysis. 
Current interest in computer integrated manufacture 
(CIM) is revitalising flow-line analysis. Techniques and 
the experience in their use are few, however, and a simple 
analysis follows to show that the creation of flow lines is 
not obvious. The subject chosen is intensive flying of 
training aircraft which fly, in the example, at a fleet rate 
of 15 sorties per hour, and require to be replenished 
(turned round) between sorties. 
The PERT network in Fig. llA shows a single turn-
round. Rules are few and simple: 
ＨｾＧＺ［ｩｾＧＡ［ｾＢＧｾ＠
competitors' ,-
• recru i t ing leavers 
engineers • ｾ＠ global pool J education 
ieaving • ｾｏｦ＠ engineers ｾ＠ spending 
industry 1_ • \ 
• company company 
ｾｲ･｣ｲｵｬｴｬｮｧ＠ ｬ･｡ｶ･ｾｳ＠
Ｍｾｾｾｩｲｾｾｾｳ＠ ｾ＠ ｾ｣ｯｭｰ｡ｮｹ＠ ｾ＠
company ! - company 
company 
recruiting 
) 
ｾ＠ engineers 
/ ＯｾｾｾＺｾＺｾＧＺＧ｜＠ ｾｾｾｾｾ［Ｚｾ＠ I 
_I bids In progress • 
defence ___ ;_g.lobal pool under company 
spending of con\::tr\ts. _. ｾｲ･Ｎｖｩ･Ｎｷ＠ • ｾＺｾｾｾＡｴｩｯｮ＠
ｾ｣ｯｭｰ･ｴｬｴｯｲｳＧｾＯ＠
bids 
+ own 
bids •• 
Fig.10 System dynamics and competition 
A system dynamics view shows competition to be for common pools of funding and of skills 
for engineers at top right. Systems dynamics influence 
diagrams are valuable in several senses: 
(i) they encourage the highest level of abstraction 
(ii) interactions (coupling) can be clearly seen between 
apparently remote elements in a system 
(iv) system boundaries can be found. 
This particular diagram suggests that reductions in edu-
cation spending and increases in engineers leaving the 
industry can have just as serious an effect on defence 
business as reductions in the defence vote. Such analysis 
can (and should) influence companies to be as interested 
in retaining good staff as in bidding for new work. 
Systems dynamics proceeds to a fuller modelling tech-
nique which is less simple to justify, owing to the need to 
quantify and describe in detail influences which may be 
hard to define mathematically. For example, it would be 
hard to define the precise relationship between com-
petitors' contracts and the rate of consequent recruiting. 
Care must be exercised in the design of the model to 
avoid such parameters where practicable. 
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(i) The marshaller cannot check inside the cockpit 
until the pilot exits 
(ii) Refuelling and re-oxygenation must not overlap, 
for risk of explosion. 
The critical path (CP) for this single sortie is 12 min 41 s. 
But what happens when the sortie rate rises? Aircraft 
queue, principally, for the fuel bowser and the oxygen 
trolley. Fig. 11 B is an activity timeline chart showing 
relationships, queueing times and activities. clearly refuel-
ling is holding up the proceedings. And, moreover, the 
activity chart is not comprehensive; reoiling, for example, 
could occur much later than shown, and so float exists. 
Practical observation of the flow line showed an average 
turn round time of 19 min, rather than 12 min 41 s, and it 
was also noticeable that, as the sortie rate rose, a point 
came at which reoxygenation occurred before refuelling, 
not after. 
Fig. ltC, the final PERT network, shows that, at 15 
sorties per hour, the critical path has risen to 19 min, 
provided oxygen is replenished before fuel. The network 
therefore represented the fact and justified the 
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reoil 5:20 
Fig. 11 A Aircraft turnround singleton PERT 
marsha Iler's 
internal 
CheCk\ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
legend: 
earliest 
start 
time 
float 
event number 
latest 
start 
time 
The Figure shows a network for one aircraft on turnround. Note refuelling before reoxygenation. Critical path for single sortie ... 12 min 41 s. NCO - non-commissioned 
officer 
Reoiling occurs lOin 148 times, i.e. 0 : 06 
Reoxygenation occurs 97 in 148 times, i.e. 0 : 65 
Windscreen and accelerometer check occurs 41 in 148 times, i.e. 0 : 28 
Activity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
o 27 
See-in ｾｉｅＧＭＧ＠
1:33 
Pilot's 
checks .. • 
309 Marshaller's .. • external checks 
Marshaller's 3:26 
... internal checks 
queue for 02 2:23 
Reoxygenation jk---- • • 
queue 
Reoding ir-
'* 
time. min:s 
7 8 9 10 
• 
520 
• 
queue for bowser 
11 12 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Personnel 
a 
Pilot 
a 
a 
c 
b 
316 
Refuelling ｾｾＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭＭ • • d 
051 
Windscreen ｾ＠ c 
121 
NCO's 
.A-A NCO checks 
Fig. 11 B Activity timeline chart shOWing relationships, queuing times and activities 
NB Refuelling and rcoxygenation must not coincide 
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legend: 
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time 
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event number 
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start 
time 
pi lot's checks 
Fig. 11 C Flow-line simulation 
reoxygen windscreen 
In flow lines, queuing effects introduce delays which vary with the flow rate and can change the preferred sequence of activities. In this real-life example, oxygen would be 
replenished after fuel when turning round a solitary aircraft. At 15 sorties per hour, the reverse sequence is shorter overall. CP - 19 min 01 s 
(unauthorised) change in replenishment sequence which 
had been observed in practice. 
We can conclude, in this case, and generally, that the 
one-off process does not multiply linearly to the many-off 
inflow, that the sequences employed to promote flow line 
throughput may change with rate, and that modelling of 
flow line process is feasible, practical and highly valuable. 
submission 
global 
nuclear 
war 
rapid pol i tical 
intervention 
pre-emptive political 
strike decision 
menace 
peace tension 
invasion 
appeasement 
appeasement menace 
ｾ＠ ｾ＠
12 Finite state/transition 
The technique concentrates on critical factors causing a 
system to change from one state to another, and gives a 
valuable insight into design stability and thresholds. 
So far we have considered continuous processes, evolu-
tion and growth. Life is not always like that. 
political 
D 
decision 
theatre 
nuclear 
:r!S!.!' 
aggression 
political 
solution 
rollback pol it ical unacceptable defeat 
D 
decision 
theatre 
global 
conventional 
conventional war 
war 
political aggression 
solution political 
aggression solution 
'---.7 
Fig. 12 Finite state diagram of European potential conflict transition/resolution 
This analytical technique forces highest level of abstraction and the identification of critical factors causing change 
NB Political solution generally implies victory or defeat 
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Catastrophe theory seeks to study the theory regener-
ative situations, and can prove quite complex. A simpler, 
but effective, approach is finite state/transition analysis. 
Fig. 12 shows one such example for a major system, 
conflict in Europe. Six states are shown, and Europe is 
considered to be in only one at any time. It is the cause of 
transition that is of principal interest. Menace causes 
tension where peace reigned. Invasion causes theatre con-
ventional war; and so on. 
This valuable technique forces the highest level of 
abstraction and identification of critical factors; it is a 
valuable adjunct to any creative designer's toolkit, and, 
as shown here, can give clarity of insight into a generally 
intractable problem. In practice, most systems have a 
number of mutually exclusive states. A business, for 
example, can be static, expanding, or shrinking. A flow 
line can be smooth, irregular or stepped etc. It is useful, 
and can help in the creative process, to deliberately iden-
tify as many unique system states and their transition 
factors as possible. 
13 Principles of creativity 
The principles presented in Fig. 13, for engineering 
systems creation, are hopefully ｡ｰｰｬｩ｣｡｢ｬｾ＠ across a wide 
sphere of activities. 
The principles of creativity proposed in Fig. 13 are 
general and simple in concept; they require discipline to 
observe. It is the hope and intention that they have appli-
cability beyond engineering systems creativity, as shown 
in the Figure. 
• Highest level of abstraction 
• Breadth before depth 
• Disciplined anarchy 
• Functional before physical 
• Decomposition before integration 
• Level at a time 
• Tight functional binding 
• Loose functional coupling 
• Functional migrates to physical 
Fig. 13 Principles of creativity 
The principles apply to many endeavours including engineering. product design, 
man-machine interface, organisation and management, software engineering and 
even, perhaps, art. 
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Highest level of abstraction, breadth before depth,func-
tional before physical, level at a time, binding and coupling 
have all been presented. 
Disciplined anarchy implies that creative freedom 
must not only be permitted but positively required, 
within a constructive framework. 
Decomposition before integration is necessary to 
understand the problem properly, and provide a sound, 
considered solution. 
Functional migrates to physical is observed in design 
generally. Functionally, a computer input is quite differ-
ent from its output. Physically, computer I/O is often one 
unit, driven by the physical similarities of the two func-
tions. So it is with organisations; functionally discrete 
groups will aggregate for economy, communication, iden-
tity and many other reasons. But well defined functional 
responsibilities will ensure that performance is main-
tained throughout the migration. 
Having presented the principles of creativity in an 
engineering environment, it is instructive to consider 
their wider applicability. At least two noted areas of cre-
ativity, oil painting and orchestral composition, have 
similar underlying principles, although they use different 
terminology. The artist in oils, for example, first sketches 
in charcoal and gradually works from a broad back-
ground towards a refined foreground, holding the whole 
eventual composition in his mind's eye. The composer 
seems to follow a similar line. So, too, does the system 
designer. Perhaps creativity does have common charac-
teristics in all walks of life. 
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